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Abstract 
 
Saskatchewan is home to one of the most greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions intensive 
electricity sectors in Canada. To contribute to global efforts to mitigate climate change, 
and comply with Canadian coal-fired electricity regulations, the province must transform 
its electricity sector in the coming decades. This dissertation asks, what is the cost of 
reducing Saskatchewan’s electricity sector GHG emissions by 80% or more by 2050, 
using a mix of renewable electricity generating technologies? A renewable focused 
Greening the Saskatchewan Grid scenario is compared with a business-as-usual scenario 
and alternative pathways for reducing GHG emissions. Scenarios are selected using a 
linear programming model called the Saskatchewan Investment Model (SIM). The 
resulting scenarios are then tested using the ‘Will-It-Run-Electricity’ Model (WIRE) to 
understand whether a given electricity generation mix can adequately meet hourly 
electricity demand. Scenarios are compared using indicators such as electricity cost, 
GHG emissions, land impact, water impact, and radioactive waste, and sustainability 
criteria such as path dependence. It is found that a Greening the Grid scenario can reduce 
electricity sector GHG emissions to near zero levels by 2040. There is an added financial 
cost for taking this leadership path, but the cost of the Greening the Grid scenario 
becomes comparable to competing scenarios when an escalating carbon price is assumed.  
 
This dissertation also presents the results of a deliberative modelling exercise. Three 
workshops were held in Saskatchewan that brought together diverse participants 
interested in the future of the Saskatchewan electricity system. The goal of the workshops 
was to understand whether deliberation, supported by an interactive version of SIM, 
could encourage shared understanding of the barriers to and opportunities for expanding 
renewable energy in Saskatchewan. Workshop participants did not shift their positions to 
a great extent, except to find consensus that there are political and policy barriers to 
renewable energy expansion.  
 
This research contributes to the energy transitions literature by providing a case study of 
the costs and barriers faced when pursuing a renewable energy focused electricity system. 
It also contributes to the field of deliberative ecological economics and provides an 
example of an ecological economics approach to energy policy modelling.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
Introduction 
In the spring of 2009 the Government of Saskatchewan released a report by the 
government-funded Uranium Development Partnership (UDP, 2009). The report set out 
an ambitious expansion strategy for the Saskatchewan uranium mining industry, and 
proposed that Saskatchewan construct “up to approximately 3000 MW of nuclear 
capacity…to meet Saskatchewan’s power needs and capture export opportunities” (UDP, 
2009: 55). Two months later former Deputy Premier Dan Perrins travelled around the 
province seeking input from the people of Saskatchewan on the UDP proposals. 
Thousands of citizens attended meetings expressing their opposition to the plan (Perrins, 
2009). One of the strongest sentiments was that Saskatchewan had yet to explore other 
low-carbon electricity pathways. Why, they asked, pursue dangerous nuclear power when 
the province could instead pursue energy conservation and renewable energy from wind, 
solar, biomass, and hydroelectricity?  
 
I was working as a journalist that spring. When a friend called to ask if I would cover the 
UDP consultation I agreed. The consultation would be the first province-wide discussion 
of the uranium industry in a generation, and the first province-wide discussion of nuclear 
power in the history of Saskatchewan. Scraping by with borrowed film equipment, and 
sleeping on the couches of family, friends and acquaintances to conserve our limited 
budget, we followed the Perrins consultation around the province. From the first meeting 
in Yorkton, opposition to nuclear power was clear and strong. We arrived in Yorkton to 
witness a local woman demand that Mr. Perrins allow her to present an alternative 
perspective to the UDP. Perrins consented and so this concerned citizen stood at the front 
of the room and warned of the dangers of nuclear power. She spoke of the long-lived 
nuclear waste, the higher incidence of cancer in children who lived near nuclear power 
plants in Germany, and the readily available renewable energy alternatives that could 
provide Saskatchewan with the power it needed. This meeting was not unique. At each 
stop on the trip we heard eloquent and well-researched arguments against nuclear power 
and for renewable energy. A common question was: why does the Government of 
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Saskatchewan not undertake a study of the potential for renewable energy in the 
province?  
 
The question lingered in my mind for months. Where would this study come from? Who 
would investigate the potential for renewable energy in Saskatchewan? With my 
background in economics and public policy I eventually thought to myself, why not me? 
Thus began a six-year journey to understand how to Green the Saskatchewan Grid using 
renewable energy. This dissertation presents the results of my inquiry.  
 
Related Literature 
Others have investigated the potential for renewable energy in Saskatchewan. Mark 
Bigland-Pritchard and Peter Prebble published a series of papers outlining a vision for a 
renewable electricity future and policies to achieve this vision (Prebble, 2011; Bigland-
Pritchard, 2011; Bigland-Pritchard & Prebble, 2010; Bigland-Pritchard, 2010a & 2010b; 
Bigland-Pritchard, 2015a). Bob Halliday (2013) provided a roadmap for how SaskPower 
could reduce GHG emissions in the province by shifting to renewable energy. These 
studies stopped short, however, of comprehensively modelling the likely electricity rate, 
employment, and environmental impacts of transitioning towards a sustainable electricity 
system in the province. This dissertation builds on their work.  
 
There have been economic modelling studies of the cost of reducing greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emission in Saskatchewan’s electricity sector. Kwaczek et al. (1996) used a 
MARKAL (MARKet ALlocation) linear programming model to evaluate the cost of 
stabilizing Saskatchewan’s GHG emissions at 1990 levels by 2000 or by 2010. They 
concluded that emission reductions in the electricity sector would be less expensive than 
reductions in sectors like oil refining (Kwaczek et al., 1996). To achieve GHG emissions 
reductions the model recommended that Saskatchewan build additional hydroelectric 
capacity, wind capacity, and nuclear capacity in that order of preference (Kwaczek et al., 
1996). Lin et al. (2005) and Lin et al. (2010) also used a MARKAL linear programming 
approach to study the cost of Saskatchewan GHG emission reductions that would comply 
with the Kyoto protocol. They concluded,  
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When Canada ratified the Kyoto protocol, the least-cost solution for 
Saskatchewan in the absence of nuclear power, would be to phase out 
coal-fired power generation plants and to replace them with lower 
emission options, such as gas-fired, hydro, and wind-power technologies. 
(Lin et al., 2010: 1601) 
 
Lin et al. (2010) reported that nuclear power would achieve emissions reductions at a 
lower price, if it were socially acceptable. They did not report the cost assumptions used 
in their model.  
 
While Kwaczek et al. (1996), Lin et al. (2005) and Lin et al. (2010) focused on short- 
and medium-term GHG reductions in Saskatchewan to comply with a Kyoto-type 
emission reduction target, they did not analyze the costs or opportunities to achieve more 
ambitious long-term GHG reduction targets. These studies were also conducted on the 
eve of large shifts in renewable energy costs. Solar costs have fallen substantially in 
recent years, as has the cost of electricity storage (Barbose and Darghouth, 2015; 
CitiGroup, 2015). Wind costs increased from 2000-2008, but have since fallen by 20-
40% (U.S. DoE, 2015). As the cost of generating and storing renewable energy falls, the 
appeal of renewable energy for Saskatchewan increases. In this dissertation I explore the 
potential for renewable energy to contribute to electricity sector GHG emission 
reductions of 80% or greater by 2050. I compare the renewable energy pathway to other 
scenarios for lowering GHG emissions in the Saskatchewan electricity sector.  
 
Reports evaluating the potential for renewable energy have been conducted for Alberta 
(Bell and Weis, 2009; Glave and Thibault, 2014) and Ontario (Weis and Partington, 
2011; Weis et al., 2013). This dissertation provides a comparable report for 
Saskatchewan. This research will also contribute to the energy transitions literature. 
Jacobson and Delucchi (2011) and Delucchi and Jacobson (2011) outlined the potential 
for renewable energy to provide all global energy needs by 2050. The research I have 
conducted is a detailed look at how renewable energy could provide a substantial 
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proportion of electricity within a specific jurisdiction: Saskatchewan. This case study 
approach offers insights into the sorts of real-world barriers that must be overcome if we 
are to achieve an energy transition to renewables.  
 
Several other studies of the Saskatchewan electricity system have been carried out in 
recent years. White and Noble (2012) conducted a strategic environmental assessment to 
rank pathways for reducing GHG emissions in the Saskatchewan electricity system. They 
found that a renewable energy pathway was preferred by a group of expert participants, 
and a nuclear focused pathway was ranked second. Richards et al. (2012) interviewed 
eighteen individuals active in wind energy policy in Saskatchewan. They asked 
participants whether the pace of wind expansion was fast enough, and also asked about 
“barriers to expansion, and potential opportunities” (Richards et al., 2012: 3). Richards et 
al. (2012) found that participants were divided in their assessments, 
 
Participants could be divided into two major groups with opposing 
viewpoints: those who felt that the current rate of wind energy 
development was appropriate tended to identify technology as a major 
barrier; those suggesting that current rate of expansion was insufficient 
agreed that political barriers were amongst the most significant barriers. 
(Richards et al., 2012: 4) 
 
In my research I extended the work of Richards et al. (2012) by bringing Saskatchewan 
electricity policy stakeholders together to discuss opportunities and barriers to renewables 
in a deliberative workshop setting. I used these workshops to determine whether a shared 
understanding could emerge between stakeholders with diverse positions, beliefs and 
values.  
 
Other studies of the Saskatchewan electricity sector include Richards et al. (2013) who 
used Saskatchewan wind power as a case study for understanding barriers to effective 
public policy communication. Linsay Martens (2015) analyzed Saskatchewan as a case 
study of how First Nations could become involved in a renewable energy transition. I 
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hope that this dissertation can contribute to the growing literature on the cost and 
potential for renewable energy in Saskatchewan.  
 
Saskatchewan Context 
Saskatchewan is home to one of the most GHG emission intensive electricity systems in 
Canada (Figure 1-1). Across the globe, and in each sector, annual flows of GHG 
emissions must be lowered to near zero levels in order to stop atmospheric concentrations 
of GHGs from rising and mitigate the risk of catastrophic climate change (IPCC, 2014). 
As one of the worst performers in this regard, Saskatchewan is in need of an electricity 
system transformation.  
 
 
 (Data source: Environment Canada, 2012; Environment Canada, 2014) 
Figure 1-1 Greenhouse Gas Intensity of Saskatchewan Electricity 
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(Source: Fix and Korteling, 2015a) 
Figure 1-2 Saskatchewan Electricity System 
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gas facilities in the western part of the province (red and purple icons in Figure 1-2), and 
wind installations in the southwest (green icons in Figure 1-2).  
 
SaskPower also purchases electricity from independent (i.e. private) power producers, 
including wind farms, natural gas plants (e.g. the Cory natural gas cogeneration facility 
operated by Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan, the dark maroon flame southwest of 
Saskatoon Figure 1-2), and heat recovery power-production installations owned and 
operated by the pipeline industry (light brown icons in Figure 1-2). 
 
In the coming decades Saskatchewan has an opportunity to transform its electricity 
generation mix substantially as aging generation stations reach the end of their useful 
lives (SaskPower, 2011). Figure 1-3 displays Saskatchewan’s electricity generation 
capacity minus the retirements that will lead capacity to decrease in the coming years.  
 
 
(Data source: SaskPower, 2011) 
Figure 1-3 Electricity Capacity in Saskatchewan Minus Scheduled Retirements 
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Saskatchewan must also meet the electricity needs of a growing population and a 
growing economy (Figure 1-4). The province is experiencing sustained population 
growth for the first time in decades. The governing Saskatchewan Party has a vision to 
encourage this growth and achieve a population of 1.2 million people in the province by 
2020 (Government of Saskatchewan, 2013). GDP and employment growth has been 
strong in the province, encouraged by high commodity prices for exports like potash. 
Strongly correlated to GDP growth is growth in electricity demand in the province.  
 
 
(Data sources: Population as of 1st quarter from Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 051-
0005; Employment from Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 282-0002; Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) measured in chained $2007 dollars using the expenditure approach from 
Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 384-0038; Provincial greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHGs) from Environment Canada, 2015; Electricity from SaskPower annual reports 
1990-2015; author’s calculations to normalize the data relative to 1990 levels) 
Figure 1-4 Growth Trends in Saskatchewan 
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As SaskPower works to supply growing demand, while coping with aging infrastructure, 
it can be assured that Saskatchewan’s future electricity mix will not look like the past. 
The Government of Canada has introduced regulations that specify that Saskatchewan 
must either retire its coal-fired electricity plants or retrofit them with carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) technology to ensure they achieve a GHG intensity of no more than 420 
grams CO2 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) (CEPA, 2012). To comply with the regulations all 
but one coal-fired power plant must be retired or retrofitted by 2029, creating an 
opportunity for a large-scale shift away from conventional coal.  
 
The Government of Saskatchewan has, however, made it a priority to find ways to “keep 
coal in play” (Wall quoted in Zinchuk, 2014). Premier Brad Wall supports coal because it 
provides jobs in the Estevan and Coronach areas and because Saskatchewan has a supply 
of coal that could last another two to three hundred years and this provides a degree of 
“energy independence” (Wall quoted in Zinchuk, 2014). 
 
To “keep coal in play” SaskPower has tested the viability of CCS technology at the 
Boundary Dam III station. This first-of-a-kind plant captures 90% of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) before it leaves the smokestack. The CO2 is then sold to an oil company called 
Cenovus for use in enhanced oil recovery. While CCS may prolong the life of 
Saskatchewan’s coal-fired plants and coal industry, it has been criticized as a more 
expensive and less sustainable way of reducing emissions than renewables, especially 
wind (Glennie, 2015; Banks & Bigland-Pritchard, 2015).  
 
Saskatchewan has a strong wind resource and one of the best solar resources in Canada 
(see Chapter 4). The electricity system is poised for a great transition. Despite its small 
population Saskatchewan has shown a willingness to be a laboratory for sustainable 
electricity policies. With a concerted effort Saskatchewan could become the first 
jurisdiction to meet its energy needs by a combination of wind, water and solar power 
(Jacobson and Delucchi, 2011 and Delucchi and Jacobson, 2011). In this dissertation I 
explore the potential to Green the Saskatchewan Grid.  
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Research Questions 
I am guided by a central research question, 
 
What is the cost of Greening the Saskatchewan Grid by lowering greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions by 80% or more by 2050 with a renewable energy focused electricity pathway? 
 
To allow comparison I also work to understand the costs of a business-as-usual electricity 
scenario that keeps with SaskPower’s current supply plan, and other competing scenarios 
for lowering GHG emissions. The central research question can be broken into several 
smaller questions. I address each in the chapters to follow. The relevant chapters are 
included in brackets after each question: 
 
• Research Question #1 – What energy-environment-economy models are 
commonly used to develop electricity scenarios and can I improve upon them? 
(Chapter 2) 
• Research Question #2 – What historical events have shaped the present 
electricity system in Saskatchewan? (Chapter 3) 
• Research Question #3 – What is the potential for renewable electricity 
generation in Saskatchewan? (Chapter 4) 
• Research Question #4 – How much do competing electricity generation 
technologies cost in Saskatchewan? (Chapter 5) 
• Research Question #5 – How will electricity demand in Saskatchewan change 
between 2015 and 2050? (Chapter 6) 
• Research Question #6 – What electricity generation and storage scenarios will 
meet Saskatchewan’s annual energy needs out to 2050 while minimizing 
electricity costs and meeting greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets? 
(Chapter 7) 
• Research Question #7 – Once a scenario is developed that meets projected 
annual demand and achieves the desired objectives, how can I ensure that it can 
also meet projected hourly demand? (Chapter 7) 
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On research question #7, in this dissertation I pay particular attention to scenarios that 
feature renewable energy. In doing so, I am aware of the critique, oft heard in 
Saskatchewan, that renewable energy is variable and so cannot provide a reliable supply 
of electricity.1 With that critique in mind, I have worked to model the hourly operation of 
each electricity scenario. This is a means of testing whether a given system can 
adequately balance the variability of renewable energy. While this is not an engineering 
study, I am interested in understanding the cost of balancing variable renewable 
electricity generation using technologies like demand side management, electricity 
storage, and hydroelectric power with reservoir storage. The operations modelling I have 
conducted is a means of testing whether the level of electricity storage and generation 
capacity included in each scenario is adequate. I discuss this modelling effort in greater 
detail in Chapter 2, Chapter 7 and Appendix 7B.  
 
• Research Question #8 – What are the projected electricity costs (Chapter 7) and 
electricity rates (Chapter 8) in each electricity scenario?  
• Research Question #9 – What are the projected greenhouse gas emissions 
implications of each scenario? (Chapter 7 and Chapter 8) 
• Research Question #10 – How does each scenario compare in regards to other 
indicators that can be used in a sustainability assessment? (Chapter 8) 
 
Perhaps my most ambitious research objective was to generate a shared understanding 
amongst diverse stakeholders of the opportunities to expand renewable energy in 
Saskatchewan and the barriers that prevent expansion. In particular I hoped to build a 
shared understanding between SaskPower and environmental groups who have called for 
                                                
1 In a recent news article, Mike Monea of SaskPower stated his views on this subject, 
“You need a lot of base power to support your renewables. You can’t really have 100 per 
cent renewables. If you do, you’re not going to have power all the time. That’s what 
people have difficulty understanding. Every time we have to replace a plant, we can’t just 
put up wind turbines. It doesn’t work. It’s too simplistic. It doesn’t work that way. Last 
Sunday we hit a peak (of power consumption) at 6 p.m., suppertime. We had one 
megawatt coming from our wind turbines. There was no wind blowing. What did we use? 
We used coal-fired plants for the baseload, so nobody had disruption in their power.” 
(Zinchuk, 2015) 
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a renewable energy future. To accomplish this research objective I convened three 
workshops with diverse stakeholders to discuss the future of the Saskatchewan electricity 
system with an emphasis on the potential for renewable energy to power the province. I 
ask the following question of these workshops, 
 
• Research Question #11 – Can a deliberative energy policy-modelling workshop 
generate shared understanding amongst diverse participants on the potential for 
renewable electricity to contribute to Saskatchewan’s electricity future? (Chapter 
9) 
 
By answering these research questions I hope to offer sound policy advice to SaskPower 
and the Saskatchewan provincial government as to the relative merit of a pathway to 
Green the Saskatchewan Grid. I also hope to inform broader efforts to assess the 
sustainability of competing electricity scenarios in the province. Lastly, I hope to 
empower citizen activists who asked for a detailed study into the potential for renewable 
energy during the Perrins’ consultations of 2009 (Perrins, 2009). This dissertation 
provides that study.  
 
I now turn to the methods I have used to answer these questions.   
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Chapter 2 – Towards an Ecological Economics Approach to Energy Policy Analysis 
 
 
Introduction 
In this dissertation I work to develop an ecological economics approach to energy policy 
analysis. Ecological economics is a methodologically diverse “trans-discipline” 
(Norgaard, 1989; Norgaard, 2007). Ecological economists are called to integrate 
information from across the social and natural sciences, as well as the humanities 
(Norgaard, 2007). This requires proficiency with conventional methods of economic 
analysis, as well as openness to other ways of knowing. I use a diverse set of methods, 
including participatory modelling, historical document analysis, linear programming, and 
deliberative energy policy modelling to answer the research questions I outlined in 
Chapter 1. 
 
Participatory Modelling 
To understand how to make my research useful to SaskPower, citizen activists, and 
environmental non-governmental organizations I carried out a process of participatory 
modelling. Participatory modelling is a form of interactive social research (Talwar et al. 
2011) and embraces the ideal of sustainability as a process of democratic decision-
making (Robinson, 2004). Participatory modelling shares similarities to mediated 
modelling (van den Belt, 2004) in that it relies on engagement to make a model 
meaningful and useful to participants.  
 
I carried out the process of participatory modelling in four stages (Figure 2-1). A fifth 
stage of ‘sharing the results’ will follow the completion of my PhD program. The stages 
proceeded as follows: 
 
Stage 1 – Framing the Research 
Engagement began in the early stages of the research process. I interviewed citizen 
activists, environmental non-governmental organization representatives, technical 
experts, and SaskPower staff and asked: 
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• What information gaps exist?  
• What research questions should I strive to answer?  
• What information would be useful for you to know?  
 
What I heard from citizen activists and environmental non-government organizations 
(ENGOs) was that they were looking for a detailed cost analysis of a renewable energy 
future for Saskatchewan. Citizens and ENGO representatives were also interested in 
understanding the employment impacts of a renewable energy scenario relative to a 
business-as-usual scenario.  
 
What I heard from SaskPower staff was that they were open to sharing their expertise 
with me as I explored a renewable energy scenario. They also expressed concern over the 
variability of renewable energy. This concern led me to ask, will a renewable focused 
electricity system be capable of reliably supplying electricity to meet hourly electricity 
demand?  
 
Stage 2 – Building the Model 
I conducted interviews with energy and sustainability experts to understand the technical 
nuances of modelling the Saskatchewan electricity sector. These experts included 
representatives from: 
 
• SaskPower; 
• Saskatoon Light and Power; 
• Saskatchewan Eco-Network; 
• Saskatchewan Environmental Society; 
• Green Energy Project Saskatchewan; 
• Summerhill Group;  
• Saskatchewan Industrial Energy Consumers Association (SIECA); 
• Saskatchewan Ministry of Economy; 
• Saskatchewan Research Council; 
• First Nations Power Authority; 
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• ICF Marbek; 
• Saskatchewan Community Wind; 
• Northland Power; and  
• Manitoba Hydro.  
 
The goal of this stage was to make the model technically rigorous and as “true to life” as 
possible (Robinson, 2006). Insights from these interviews were incorporated into the 
Saskatchewan Investment Model (SIM) and the Will It Run Electricity Model (WIRE 
model) developed for this project.  
 
 
 
 (Adapted from Talwar et al., 2011: 382) 
Figure 2-1 Participatory Modelling Plan 
 
Stage 3 – Preliminary Results 
I developed an initial version of the SIM model and shared my initial results in a number 
of ways: 
 
• I presented at the Canadian Resource and Environmental Economics (CREE) 
conference in Saskatoon, SK October 2, 2014; 
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• I presented at the Ontario Network for Sustainable Energy Policy conference in 
Waring House, Prince Edward County, ON April 28, 2015; 
• I wrote a summary report outlining the initial results and shared the report with a 
select group of participants I had interviewed. These participants were selected 
based on their technical knowledge and level of interest in the project; 
• I conducted follow-up interviews with a range of participants I had interviewed to 
discuss my initial results.  
 
Through this process I received useful feedback that helped me to improve the model. 
This feedback included the following suggestions: 
• Add Manitoba Hydro to the model; 
• Add small, modular nuclear reactors as an investment option; 
• Improve assumptions about the cost and potential of hydroelectric power in the 
province; 
• Use a multiplier to capture the cost premium paid to build thermal generation 
(coal and natural gas fired facilities) in Saskatchewan. This cost premium is due 
to factors such as a shortage of skilled labour in the province, which increases 
project costs due to delays and higher payments to labour; 
• Outline the employment impacts of the scenarios I created;  
• Evaluate the impact of the federal government’s coal-fired regulations; 
• Evaluate an ambitious greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction scenario that 
would include a coal phase-out by 2030.  
 
Participants I spoke to also provided improved data for use in the modelling, including: 
• The cost and potential of hydroelectric power in the province; 
• Ramp rates for electricity generation technologies in Saskatchewan; 
• Additional cost data for electricity generation technologies.  
 
I incorporated this feedback into an improved version of SIM that included: updated cost 
information; the addition of Manitoba Hydro and small, modular nuclear reactors as 
generation technologies; and indicators such as jobs and water use. I used the enhanced 
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SIM model to evaluate the impact of the coal-fired regulations and an ambitious 
Greening the Grid scenario (see Chapter 7).  
 
Stage 4 – Deliberative Workshop 
After improving the model using feedback from Stage 3, I ran three half-day workshops 
of between six and eleven people to help generate scenarios for a sustainable electricity 
system in Saskatchewan. Working from the mediated modelling philosophy I brought 
together participants from a variety of interests and backgrounds to test whether a 
deliberative modelling workshop could build consensus around the potential for 
renewable energy to contribute to Saskatchewan’s electricity future (van den Belt, 2004). 
These workshops were also a second chance for feedback on the model assumptions. The 
outcomes of these workshops are outlined in detail in Chapter 9.  
 
Stage 5 – Sharing the Results 
After completion of the dissertation I plan to share the final results of this research 
project with the participants who have provided input into the study. I then plan to 
translate the dissertation into a format that can be easily communicated to decision-
makers and the broader Saskatchewan public. In this stage I hope to contribute to a 
broader discussion of Saskatchewan’s electricity future. I also plan to continue offering 
deliberative workshops and include a broader spectrum of participants.  
 
Over the course of the participatory planning process I interviewed thirty-one individuals. 
Twenty-one individuals participated in the deliberative modelling workshops, nine of 
whom were also interviewed for the project. In total, forty-three individuals have 
contributed their time and insights to this project. The process of involving stakeholders 
in the modelling process has helped to ensure the relevance and accuracy of the 
modelling work. I have heard from participants that they look forward to the final results. 
It is my hope that the results of this analysis can contribute to a productive discussion of 
Saskatchewan’s electricity future and the role of renewables in lowering Saskatchewan 
greenhouse gas emissions.   
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History 
The trans-disciplinary nature of ecological economics admits the value of case study and 
qualitative research methods. We can learn from history. Political economist Harold 
Innes taught us much about the Canadian economy by exploring the history of the fur 
trade in this country (Innes, 1930). I studied the history of the Saskatchewan electricity 
system through an analysis of SaskPower annual reports dating back to 1949, reports 
from the Saskatchewan Power Commission dating from 1929-1949, books such as White 
(1976) and Rediger (2004), and other assorted books and papers documenting the history 
of electricity in the province.  
 
An understanding of the historical roots of a problem can offer insights where context-
free economic analysis cannot. By studying the history of the Saskatchewan electricity 
system I was able to understand why the crown utility focused their GHG reduction 
efforts on expensive carbon capture and storage technology when an analysis of 
economic costs would suggest pathways that could achieve the same GHG emission 
reductions at a lower financial cost. Chapter 3 presents this historical analysis.  
 
Energy-Environment-Economy Modelling 
To evaluate the costs and greenhouse gas emissions of various scenarios for meeting 
Saskatchewan’s electricity needs I built a suite of energy-environment economy models, 
which includes the Saskatchewan Investment Model (SIM) and the Will It Run 
Electricity (WIRE) model.  
 
Economic models are a way of “disciplining our thinking” (Victor, 2015). They challenge 
the modeller to understand the system well enough to describe it through numerical 
representation. Models also help us to see relationships and outcomes that we might not 
otherwise anticipate. Four energy-environment-economy models are frequently used to 
analyze energy policy in Canada: Energy 2020, TIMES-Canada, CanESS, and CIMS. I 
describe each in turn before outlining my own modelling approach. 
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Energy 2020 and TIM 
Energy 2020 is a simulation model owned by the US private consulting firm Systematic 
Solutions Inc. The model was created in 1981 to analyze regional energy and 
environmental policy in the United States. It is now capable of analyzing regional energy 
policy in fifty states, and each province and territory in Canada. (Amlin & Backus, 2014) 
 
In Canada, the Energy 2020 model has been used by the National Energy Board (NEB) to 
create their Canada’s Energy Futures reports (NEB, 2011; NEB, 2014a). In those reports 
Energy 2020 is paired with the macroeconomic model TIM, which was created by the 
private consulting firm Informetrica. TIM is “a detailed, dynamic econometric model of 
the Canadian economy that provides the macroeconomic drivers for the modeling 
framework” (NEB, 2014b). Macroeconomic forecasts in TIM are informed by projections 
made by the private banks and government agencies such as the Federal Department of 
Finance and the Bank of Canada (NEB, 2014b).  
 
ENERGY 2020 and TIM communicate through changes in energy production, prices, 
energy intensities, investments in energy industries, and various macroeconomic 
parameters. The models run sequentially and iteratively over each year in the projection 
period. For each year, energy supply and demand outcomes from ENERGY 2020 are 
read and processed by TIM. TIM incorporates the energy information into a new 
macroeconomic projection for the year. The new macroeconomic data is then returned to 
ENERGY 2020 to create a new energy projection for the next iteration. More 
specifically, ENERGY 2020 provides TIM with changes in energy production, 
investments, energy intensity, and prices. TIM provides changes in gross domestic 
product (GDP), gross output, housing, inflation, the Canada-U.S. exchange rate, floor 
space, and population. (NEB, 2014b: 3-4) 
 
The macroeconomic capabilities of the Energy 2020-TIM combination have made the 
NEB projections the preferred macroeconomic forecast of Canadian energy policy 
modelers. For example, the TIMES-Canada model uses the economic and demographic 
forecasts from the NEB Canada’s Energy Futures reports – developed using the 
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Energy2020-TIM combination – as an exogenous input (Vaillancourt et al., 2013). 
Energy 2020 is also used for in-house policy analysis by Environment Canada and 
NRCAN (Miller, 2014).  
 
Energy 2020 is a capital stock turnover model. It models stocks of energy-using, energy-
converting, and energy-producing technologies in physical terms. The capital stock of 
existing technologies ages and at the end of its useful life must be retired or retrofitted. 
When demand for energy-related technologies exceeds supply, this demand must be met 
with investment in new technologies. (Miller, 2014; NEB, 2014a) 
 
Human behaviour in the model is represented by a multinomial logit (MNL) equation. 
The multinomial logit equation indicates the probability that a consumer will choose a 
specific technology represented in Energy 2020. Attributes like cost affect the probability 
that a technology will be selected, but other attributes are relevant as well. For example, 
consumers do not simply choose a stove with the lowest operating cost, “some people 
choose gas stoves because they prefer to cook with them, not because of price 
differentials” (SSI, 2014: 21). The multinomial logit equations are estimated using a 
discrete choice econometric approach. (SSI, 2014; Miller, 2014)  
 
The electricity module of Energy 2020 includes detailed information on existing 
electricity generating units in Canada, including their capacity factors and scheduled 
retirement dates (NEB, 2014b). Electricity demand is divided into two seasons (summer 
and winter), and six time slices (peak, near peak, high intermediate, low intermediate, 
high base load, and low base load) for a total of twelve representative time slices. A 
linear programming approach is used to solve for the least cost method of meeting 
electricity demand in each representative time slice. (Miller, 2014)  
 
TIMES-Canada – GERAD 
TIMES-Canada is a dynamic linear programming model developed by the Quebec-based 
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GERAD research institute.2 TIMES stands for “The Integrated MARKAL-EFOM 
System” (Bahn et al., 2013). TIMES was developed as an extension and replacement of 
the MARKAL, or MARKet ALlocation, linear programming model previously used by 
GERAD. (Vaillancourt et al., 2013) 
 
TIMES-Canada has been used to create an energy outlook for Canada to 2050 
(Vaillancourt et al., 2013). It is one of two models being used in the Trottier Energy 
Futures Project, which is a joint project between the David Suzuki Foundation and the 
Canadian Academy of Engineering (Hoffman & McInnis, 2014).3  TIMES-Canada has 
also been used to analyze scenarios for electric vehicle penetration in Canada (Bahn et 
al., 2013). Applications of the new model will continue; the GERAD website indicates 
that TIMES-Canada is now being applied to the study of pipeline expansion and future 
scenarios for the oil industry.  
 
TIMES-Canada is a bottom-up model with rich technological detail. Its database 
“includes more than 5,000 specific technologies and 400 commodities in each province 
and territory” (Vaillancourt et al., 2013: 4). The electricity segment of TIMES-Canada 
explicitly models 3500 existing electricity plants in Canada.  
 
TIMES-Canada runs from 2007 to 2050 in time steps of 1-2 years in the initial periods, 
and five year time-steps in later periods. The model is divided into twelve “time-slices” 
for each time-step representing combinations of daily electricity demand fluctuation (day, 
night, peak); and seasonal demand variations (winter, spring, summer, fall). (Vaillancourt 
et al., 2013) 
 
Like Energy 2020, the TIMES-Canada model is driven by demand for energy services. 
As Vaillancourt et al. (2013) write, “The TIMES-Canada model is driven by a set of 67 
                                                
2 More information on the GERAD (Group for Research in Decision Analysis) can be found at: 
https://www.gerad.ca/en.  
3 More information on the Trottier Energy Futures Project can be found at: 
http://www.trottierenergyfutures.ca.  
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end-use demands for energy services in five sectors: agriculture (AGR), commercial 
(COM), industrial (IND), residential (RSD) and transportation (TRA)” (p. 4).  
 
Future energy service demands result from exogenous projections of economic and 
demographic trends that are sourced from the National Energy Board’s (2011) Canada’s 
Energy Future outlook up to 2035 and extended to 2050 using a “regressive approach” 
(Vaillancourt et al., 2013: 7). As discussed above, the National Energy Board (NEB) 
projections are created using the Energy 2020 and TIM energy policy modeling 
approach. 
 
TIMES is also a capital stock turnover model. Stocks of technologies related to final 
energy demand, secondary energy carriers, and primary energy supply are tracked in 
TIMES-Canada. When existing technologies reach the end of their useful lives, or 
demands for energy services grow, new technologies compete to provide the required 
end-use demand service, energy conversion service, and to supply primary energy.  
 
For example, in Bahn et al., (2013) an array of conventional, hybrid, and electric vehicles 
is available in the model to meet demand for personal road transportation. These 
automobile technologies compete, “based on lifecycle costs, which are calculated using 
capital, operation and maintenance and fuel costs” (Bahn et al., 2013: 596). Through an 
optimization routine, TIMES-Canada selects the lowest cost means of meeting the 
required demand over the time horizon.  
 
TIMES-Canada selects low-cost technologies through the process of maximizing “net 
total surplus”, which is the “sum of producers’ and consumers’ surpluses” (Vaillancourt 
et al., 2013: 3). Producer surplus is maximized by “minimizing the net total cost of the 
energy system”, which includes investment costs, operation and maintenance costs, and 
fuel costs (Vaillancourt et al., 2013: 3). Consumer surplus is maximized by minimizing 
“welfare losses due to endogenous demand reductions” (Vaillancourt et al., 2013: 3). 
This means that there is a penalty in the model for scenarios and technology choices that 
raise the price of energy and reduce consumption of energy services. The objective 
 23 
function combines the cost of the energy system to producers and the welfare losses to 
consumers into one equation to be minimized.  
 
The quantity of energy services demanded in TIMES-Canada is sensitive to price. 
Elasticities define this price response. Generally, demand is exogenous in the “business-
as-usual” (BAU) run of the model, and becomes endogenous when scenarios are run to 
test the impact of various policies (Vaillancourt et al., 2013). This price-driven demand 
response provides macroeconomic feedback in the model.  
 
TIMES-Canada is subject to the standard critiques of linear programming. Linear 
programming models such as TIMES-Canada exhibit “penny-switching”, wherein the 
optimization routine will favour one technology over another even if costs differ by mere 
pennies (Jaccard et al., 2003). Market share constraints can be introduced to ensure that 
individual technologies do not capture an entire market. However, these constraints 
introduce a degree of arbitrariness into the model. 
 
As a bottom-up model TIMES-Canada may fail to capture “intangible costs” such as the 
sentiment that a new technology is risky because it is untried. Lacking these costs, 
TIMES-Canada may be too optimistic about the costs of climate mitigation policies. 
(Jaccard, 2002; Rivers & Jaccard, 2005) 
 
To include consumer surplus in the objective function, TIMES-Canada models human 
behaviour and preferences using a social welfare function. From an ecological economics 
perspective the use of a social welfare function is problematic. This form of modelling 
uses ‘RARE’ individuals to represent human behaviour. A RARE individual is a 
homogenous Representative Agent acting with Rational Expectations to maximize utility 
by maximizing consumption (King, 2015). This caricature of human behaviour is 
sometimes referred to as ‘homo economicus.’ While the representative agent makes 
consumption decisions mathematically tractable in an optimization model, it is a 
departure from the complex reality of human behaviour in the following ways: 
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• People are diverse and not well served by being treated as “homogenous globules 
of desire” (Erickson quoting Thorstein Veblen, 2013); 
• Preferences are not well-defined across all goods in a market, instead rationality is 
bounded (Kahneman, 2003); this means that rather than optimizing their 
consumption decisions, people make decisions that “satisfice” (sufficiently satisfy 
given the available information) (Simon, 1956); 
• People are not solely self-interested and rapaciously working to maximize their 
consumption of market goods, instead we are characterized by a mix of self-
regarding and other-regarding behaviour (Gintis, 2000). 
 
Some scholars have called for ‘homo economicus’ to evolve into something more akin to 
‘homo sapiens’ (Thaler, 2000). Others have argued that in a democracy it is better to ask 
people what they want, and let them deliberate and debate in a public forum, rather than 
to simply assume their desires and fold the assumptions into an economic model 
(Norgaard, 2007). In the case of lowering greenhouse gas emissions in the electricity 
sector, we could ask if people are willing to pay more for electricity in order to stabilize 
the climate. Discussion of such trade-offs is inherently political and is influenced by the 
values and identities of those engaged in the deliberation (Kahan et al., 2007). An 
interactive approach to energy policy modelling, such as that applied in the CanESS 
model, can be used to discuss those trade-offs and avoid the RARE assumption. 
 
CanESS Model  
The CanESS (Canadian Energy Systems Simulator) model was developed by Robert 
Hoffman and Bert McInnis of ‘Whatif? Technologies’. The CanESS model is being used 
in the Trottier Energy Futures Project for Canada along with the TIMES-Canada model 
(Hoffman & McInnis, 2014). CanESS was used by the Pembina Institute to study the 
future of electricity supply in Ontario (Weis & Partington, 2011). It has been used to 
explore scenarios for alternative vehicles in Canada (Steenhof & McInnis, 2008). It has 
also been used to create the Australian Stocks and Flow Framework (Turner et al., 2011). 
The Canadian Energy Systems Analysis Research (CESAR) group – led by David 
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Layzell at the University of Calgary – is working to further develop CanESS for research 
purposes.4  
 
The prime objective of CanESS is to allow for the simulation of plausible scenarios for 
Canada’s energy future. Plausible scenarios are those that respect fundamental physical 
laws such as the conservation of energy and materials. CanESS models stocks and flows 
using a physical accounting framework. This means that rather than focusing on the 
economic value of human artifacts like cars and buildings, these are counted in physical 
terms (number of cars, number of buildings, megawatts of electricity generation 
capacity). Energy and material stocks and flows are also tracked in physical terms (e.g. 
tonnes of coal). Physical stocks and flows must “obey the thermodynamic constraints of 
conservation of mass and energy” (Turner et al., 2011: 1140). 
 
CanESS avoids making any assumptions about human behaviour. The approach was 
selected intentionally to remove “ideological bias…since the core represents largely 
irrefutable accounting relationships reflecting mass balance” (Turner et al., 2011: 1147). 
According to Hoffman and McInnis (2014), many energy policy models are built with the 
embedded ideologies contained in economic theory. Hoffman (2012) is critical of the 
RARE model of human behaviour arguing, “human behaviour is too diverse and complex 
to be represented as an aggregate consumer agent” (p. 79).  
 
Without behavioural assumptions CanESS cannot be used for least-cost optimization; the 
model is not “closed” in the way that a linear programming model is closed. Instead it is a 
descriptive model, “Open to the influence of different sets of values, i.e. not normative or 
prescriptive, but more descriptive” (Turner et al., 2011: 1137).  
 
Similar to a flight simulator, Hoffman and McInnis have designed CanESS to be highly 
interactive. When a simulation is run, users are made aware of “tensions” in the model. 
These tensions are instances when the model runs into “physically unfeasible or 
problematic outcomes” (Turner et al., 2011: 1138). These tensions “must be resolved by 
                                                
4 More information on CESAR can be found at: http://www.cesarnet.ca.  
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people interacting with the (model), similar to the flight simulator concept” (Turner et al., 
2011: 1138).  
 
Through the process of resolving tensions CanESS becomes a learning tool. Like a 
telescope, it is designed as an extension of the human nervous system. CanESS is meant 
to help users better understand the long-term, systemic consequences of energy policy 
choices. As such, Hoffman and McInnis (2014) borrow a concept from de Rosnay (1979) 
and refer to CanESS as a kind of “macroscope.” (Hoffman & McInnis, 2014) 
 
CanESS is designed to be used without reference to prices. For this reason it has been 
critiqued by economists (Turner et al., 2011). However, Hoffman and McInnis (2014) 
argue that price is a human-created institution and institutions can be changed. For 
Hoffman and McInnis (2014) energy policy decision-making should begin with an 
exploration of physically plausible scenarios for the future. Then decision-makers can 
select a desirable scenario for the future. Only at the last stage, do decision-makers decide 
on the policies and institutions required to support the desirable scenario. With this 
approach energy policy models should never conclude that we “can’t afford” a physically 
plausible scenario; if a scenario is physically plausible Hoffman & McInnis (2014) argue 
that we should be able to design institutions, prices, and policies to support it. From an 
energy policy modelling perspective this leaves something to be desired. CanESS lacks a 
clear decision-rule for sorting between scenarios. The world of physically plausible 
scenarios is wide and economic models are often tasked with recommending a favoured 
scenario. We can ask, is it enough for a decision-maker to know a scenario is physically 
plausible? Or will they expect more from a model and a modeller?  
 
The results of CanESS simulations can be combined with financial cost information. The 
modeling work conducted by the Pembina institute for Ontario’s electricity sector 
identified “two plausible scenarios of Ontario’s electricity future” and reported on the 
electricity price impacts of each (Weis & Partington, 2011: IV). The work of finding a 
recommended cost-effective and plausible scenario occurs through iteration as the 
modeller interacts with the CanESS model.  
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The CanESS scenarios for Ontario included rich detail on electricity demand: “hourly 
load shape pattern is built up from a detailed end-use representation of electricity use 
across all sectors of the economy”, and operational detail around dispatch rules for 
supplying electricity (Weis & Partington, 2011: 10). The operational and investment 
costs required to achieve each scenario were tracked and translated into electricity prices 
over time for the two scenarios. The scenarios may not have been optimal, but were 
physically plausible and robust.  
 
CIMS-GEEM  
The CIMS model was developed at Simon Fraser University (SFU) by Mark Jaccard, 
John Nyboer, Chris Bataille, Nic Rivers and other students and faculty associated with 
SFU’s Energy and Materials Research Group (EMRG). The model was built on code that 
originated from the ISTUM model (built in the United States in the 1980s) and was 
enhanced and extended at SFU throughout the past two decades (EMRG, 2014; Bataille, 
1998).  
 
CIMS has been used for consulting projects across Canada and the United States, 
including analysis conducted for the National Round Table on the Environment and 
Economy (e.g. NRTEE, 2009). CIMS is currently used as a consulting model by the firm 
Navius and has been enhanced in recent years with the addition of a macroeconomic, 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) sister model called GEEM.   
 
CIMS is a “technology choice simulation model” (EMRG, 2014) that “simulates the 
evolution of capital stocks over time” (Jaccard, 2009: 317). The model is billed as a 
hybrid incorporating the technological detail of bottom-up modelling approaches (e.g. 
linear programming) and the behavioural realism of top-down modeling (e.g. CGE 
modeling) (Rivers & Jaccard, 2005; Jaccard, 2009).  
 
On technological detail, CIMS contains “over 1000 technologies competing for market 
share at hundreds of nodes throughout the economy” (Jaccard, 2009: 321). Data on the 
technologies used by industry in Canada is enhanced by the close connection between 
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EMRG and the Canadian Industrial Energy End-Use Data and Analysis Centre 
(CIEEDAC). John Nyboer, one of the architects of CIMS, heads up CIEEDAC.  
 
Behavioural realism is represented in CIMS by a market share equation. Technologies 
achieve market-share not based on cost alone, but also based on consumer preferences for 
characteristics of the technology. These consumer preferences are represented by 
discount rates and ‘intangible costs’ estimated from market data. For example, taking the 
bus to work might be the least cost option for a commuter, but a preference for driving 
may lead that person to take their car. The value of this preference must be worth at least 
the difference between the cost of transit and the cost of driving. These cost differentials 
are estimated from real world market data. (Rivers and Jaccard, 2005; Jaccard, 2009) 
 
Like the Energy 2020 and TIMES-Canada models, CIMS is driven by exogenous demand 
for energy-services. This demand is linked to economic and demographic forecasts. 
CIMS has a macro-economic module containing elasticities that allow for demand to shift 
when policies are introduced in the model. The integration of CIMS and the GEEM 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model now allows for further macroeconomic 
feedback. GEEM is subject to the same critiques of ‘RARE’ modelling mentioned above. 
(Rivers & Jaccard, 2005; Jaccard, 2009)  
 
Model Comparison 
The energy policy models reviewed above share the following common features: 
 
• Capital Stock Turnover - Physical stocks of energy-using artifacts age, and must 
be retired or repaired; 
• Energy Service Demand – Demand for energy services such as lighting, heating, 
and industrial processes drive the models. Technologies and energy sources 
compete to supply these services.  
 
The models differ in the following areas: 
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• Simulation or Optimization – TIMES-Canada is an optimization model and 
Energy 2020 uses linear programming optimization for its electricity module, but 
is otherwise a simulation model. CIMS and CanESS are simulation models; 
• Human Behaviour – TIMES-Canada assumes cost-minimizing and welfare 
maximizing behaviour, as does the GEEM CGE addition to CIMS. Energy 2020 
and CIMS are built to allocate market share using logistic, probabilistic equations 
estimated empirically. CanESS relies on user interaction rather than embedded 
assumptions about human behaviour;  
• Participatory modeling – Energy2020-TIM, TIMES-Canada, and CIMS-GEEM 
are all expert models; that is they are designed and operated by modelling experts 
with limited input from stakeholders. CanESS models are built through a 
participatory process and user interactivity is an important feature; 
• Technological detail – Models differ in the level of technological detail they 
contain. While all of the models contain basic features of electricity generation 
technologies such as capacity factors and fuel efficiencies, they differ in their 
representation of the operation of an electricity system. TIMES-Canada represents 
the operation of an electricity system using representative “time slices”. The 
CanESS model for Ontario contains detailed hourly electricity demand and supply 
information.  
 
Towards An Ecological Economics Energy Modelling Approach 
I have created a suite of energy-environment-economy models tailored to address my 
specific research questions. When creating these models I worked to take the useful 
elements from the models described above and improve upon their weaknesses. I 
describe each model in turn.  
 
The Saskatchewan Investment Model (SIM) is a linear-programming optimization model. 
It is built to minimize the cost of meeting Saskatchewan electricity demand over the 
course of 2015-2050. Investment decisions are made in five-year time-steps beginning in 
2020. SIM is built with rich technological detail to describe the costs and operating 
characteristics of the Saskatchewan electricity system, including the fuel use and 
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greenhouse gas emissions associated with each technology. It is a capital stock turnover 
model in which generating units age and must be replaced or, in some instances, 
retrofitted. Electricity demand is exogenous in the model and is calibrated to 
SaskPower’s (2015) load forecast (see Chapter 6 for a detailed description of the 
electricity forecast used). This means that the model does not include macroeconomic 
feedback; energy demand does not respond to changes in price. SIM does, however, 
include demand side management (DSM) as a supply option. If the costs of generating 
electricity increase above those projected in the base case, then, in SIM, the utility puts 
more effort into DSM to lower electricity demand. This behavior by the utility is a proxy 
for price-induced reductions in electricity demand though it may not capture the full 
amount. Otherwise SIM excludes a representation of demand-side human behaviour. 
Instead, it represents the electricity system from the perspective of a rational system 
planner responding to inelastic demand. In Saskatchewan the crown utility SaskPower 
has a monopoly on electricity supply and a mandate to provide affordable electricity (i.e. 
SaskPower does not seek out monopoly rents). This makes the electricity system 
amenable to the assumption of a rational system planner; although in practice there are 
significant socio-technical biases that influence SaskPower’s decision-making (see 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 9). I do not address the issue of inelastic demand within SIM, but 
instead discuss some of the implications of rising electricity prices in Chapter 8. I use 
SIM to answer the research question, what electricity generation scenarios can lower 
greenhouse gas emissions in Saskatchewan while minimizing financial cost? SIM is 
described in detail in Technical Appendix 7A.  
 
The Will-It-Run Electricity model (WIRE model) is an hourly operations model of the 
Saskatchewan electricity system. The WIRE model includes real-world electricity 
demand data, wind power production data, solar production data, and hydroelectric 
seasonal capacity factors to provide a realistic picture of the variability of both electricity 
demand and renewable energy production. Electricity storage capacity is modelled as a 
means of smoothing the variability of renewable electricity production. Demand side 
management is modelled through the option of ‘peak shifting’ demand three hours into 
the future. Dispatchable electricity generation technologies (including electricity storage) 
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are called to meet electricity demand, but are constrained by ramp rates; this means that it 
takes time for technologies to increase or decrease their output. The WIRE model is a 
linear programming model that runs in the GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling 
Software) modelling environment. A detailed description of WIRE is included in 
Appendix 7B.  
 
WIRE is designed to be used iteratively with SIM. Least-cost investment pathways 
selected by SIM are trialled in WIRE to answer the questions, is this scenario capable of 
reliably supplying electricity to meet hourly electricity demand? In instances where the 
scenarios will not run I adjust the parameters in SIM and seek out another least-cost 
scenario. WIRE approaches the technological realism of the CanESS model, but is 
accompanied by SIM, which provides a useful decision rule for selecting scenarios.  
 
On the matter of a decision rule, both SIM and the WIRE model can be critiqued for 
taking an optimization approach. As Ruth (2016) points out,  
 
In places where environmental standards are low, resource extraction and 
environmental pollution may cause harms that remain unaccounted for in 
economic decision-making.  The prices of goods and services in conditions 
of social and environmental exploitation are then not worth much with 
respect to their ability to guide economic decisions towards optimal 
outcomes (Røpke 1999).  More likely, they will entrench unsustainable 
practices. 
(Ruth, 2016: 6-7) 
 
We can ask, what good is an optimized scenario if the costs are ridden by market 
failures? Or in other words, what good is a first-best scenario in a second-best world? The 
costs contained in the SIM model are financial alone; they are the direct financial costs 
required to build and operate the electricity system. In scenarios that contain a carbon 
price, this should be understood as a policy to reduce GHG emissions, not an estimate of 
the social cost of carbon. SIM does not put a monetary value on the damage done by 
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greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, nor does it put a monetary value on the negative health 
impacts from particulates or radiation, or the birds and bats killed by wind turbines and 
uranium tailings ponds. Methods for valuing such impacts in monetary terms are widely 
applied, but can aggregate and hide impacts, rather than bring them to attention. 
Valuations of health impacts in particular often contain questionable ethical propositions 
such as the belief that a monetary value of  ‘a statistical life’ adequately captures the 
public’s concern about changes in the risk of premature death. This is an ethical leap that 
many citizens would abhor. Rather than creating one number with which to evaluate a 
scenario, I identify multiple impacts for each scenario including: employment impacts, 
cumulative GHG emissions, cumulative radioactive waste produced, cumulative carbon 
dioxide stored through carbon capture and storage (CCS), land area impacted by wind 
and solar installations, and water required (Chapter 8). These indicators do not provide a 
comprehensive sustainability assessment of the scenarios. Other indicators that might be 
of interest include the health benefits of reducing particular matter and mercury emissions 
from coal plants, and lifecycle impacts such as the indirect GHG emissions released to 
manufacture generation technologies, or land impacts from hydroelectric facilities, 
uranium mines, and natural gas extraction. The indicators I include do provide insights 
into a number of sustainability criteria. It is my hope that they can inform a broader 
discussion of Saskatchewan’s electricity future in which citizens and decision-makers use 
multiple attributes to evaluate scenarios and consider trade-offs. I do not attach weights to 
any one of the indicators I measure, but instead make the information available to be 
discussed and deliberated in a democratic fashion, which takes me to the third model: 
iSIM.  
 
Scenario construction by a modelling expert may result in a report that can be published 
in an academic journal, or a news release that makes a brief headline in an evening news 
story. The most productive use of a model, however, may be as “a tool for beginning a 
dialogue” (Jackson and Victor, 2013). iSIM, the interactive scenario-builder version of 
SIM, is identical in function to SIM, but is designed to be used in a deliberative 
modelling workshop. 
 
 33 
Deliberative modelling workshops are a way to stimulate deliberative exchange amongst 
participants with different values, beliefs, and positions (Norgaard, 2007; Zografos and 
Howarth, 2010). I used the iSIM model to structure a discussion on Saskatchewan’s 
electricity future with representatives of electric utilities, private consultants working in 
the field of energy conservation, private power producers, and environmental non-
governmental organizations. The iSIM model, like SIM, is built in Excel, a software 
program with which many are familiar. By lowering the technical barriers to interacting 
with the model I hoped to make it “fun to use” (Carmichael et al., 2004).  
 
The iSIM model allows users to specify an electricity generation mix they would like to 
see in 2050. The user can also set policy inputs such as a carbon price in each time-step, 
and can adjust assumptions related to cost, electricity demand, renewable energy 
potential, and the proportion of electricity that can be provided by wind. Once the inputs 
have been set, the user (or the modelling expert) runs ‘Solver’ and iSIM identifies a least-
cost investment pathway to achieve the desired generation mix, given the assumed costs 
and constraints. The iSIM model provides data on electricity generation and greenhouse 
gas emissions in easy to interpret area charts (identical to those found in Chapter 7). It 
also summarizes both price and non-financial impacts in radar diagrams to allow 
scenarios to be quickly and easily compared. In a deliberative modelling workshop small 
groups of diverse participants can use iSIM to create scenarios and revise assumptions as 
they explore Saskatchewan’s electricity future.  
 
The goal of a deliberative workshop is to build a shared understanding that can foster a 
shared commitment to action (van den Belt, 2004). In a deliberative modelling exercise 
the role of the ecological economist is to create a space for dialogue and to integrate the 
contributions offered by diverse participants. This, I would argue, is a more democratic 
method of approaching economic analysis than a model that merely assumes RARE 
behaviour (Norgaard, 2007; King, 2015). Although power inequities do pose a barrier for 
open conversation (Zografos and Howarth, 2010), I set out to discover if antagonism 
could be suspended to make room for understanding, and conflict could be replaced with 
curiousity. To do this I used the iSIM model to focus discussion in three four-hour 
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deliberative modelling workshops in Saskatchewan. The results of those workshops are 
presented in Chapter 9.  
 
Limits of My Approach 
The modelling approach I have taken is an attempt to move towards an ecological 
economics approach to energy policy modelling. Like any modelling exercise it faces 
limitations. For one, the model does not include estimates of the impacts of the scenarios 
beyond Saskatchewan. In fact, it does not model the rest of the world at all, except for the 
inclusion of hydroelectric purchases from Manitoba. This is not all to the bad since the 
Saskatchewan electricity system is quite isolated from the rest of the world, possessing 
only limited interconnections to Alberta, North Dakota and Manitoba.  
 
The more consequential limitations result from my choice of a linear programming 
approach, which can be critiqued for the following reasons: 
 
1. Lack of Uncertainty - The model is dynamic in that decisions made in one time-
step influence decisions made in the next time-step. Capital is long-lived and 
once it is built it lasts for its expected lifetime. However, the model does not 
capture uncertainty. The rational system planner implied by an optimization 
approach can accurately see the entire horizon of electricity demand, fuel costs, 
and capital costs from 2015-2050 when making investment decisions. I work to 
deal with this by including a sensitivity analysis of important variables like the 
price of natural gas and the rate of cost improvement for electricity generation 
technologies. Others have approached this problem by using stochastic 
programming techniques (e.g. Bistline, 2014).  
2. Continuous Capital Investment – In SIM investments in capital are continuous, 
not lumpy. Integer programming techniques could have introduced lumpiness 
into SIM. This would mean that power plants would have to be built at certain 
discrete sizes (e.g. 300 MW). To some extent the five-year time step introduces a 
degree of capital lumpiness, but more could be done.  
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3. Linear Relationships – The relationships in the model are linear, with a few 
exceptions; demand side management potential and hydroelectric potential are 
both modelled as step-wise functions where costs increase as further investment 
is made.  
 
I defend my choice of strictly linear programming as a compromise made while working 
to ensure iSIM is both “fun to use” and “true to life” (Carmichael et al., 2004). The 
WIRE model helped to enhance the rigour of the SIM scenario results, but more technical 
wizardry could have been applied. Whether that would have resulted in richer discussion 
at the deliberative modelling workshops is unclear.   
 
Modeling Process 
In Chapters 4 to 9 I describe the process of creating and applying the energy-
environment-economy models I have created. The chapters roughly capture the process 
of creating an energy policy model that Bataille (1998) outlines so well. Paraphrasing 
Bataille’s (1998: 10) description, the modeling process is typically carried out in the 
following fashion: 
 
1. Forecast demand for energy services –these forecasts are typically based on 
exogenous economic and demographic drivers (Chapter 6); 
2. Determine available technologies and costs – work to understand the technologies 
that can provide the required energy services and their related costs (Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5); 
3. Capital stock – understand the age and expected service life of the existing capital 
stock (Chapter 1 and Chapter 5); 
4. Technology selection – decide on a method of selecting technologies to provide 
energy services. This could involve optimization, simulation using probabilistic 
market share equations, or user-specified technology investment paths (my choice 
of an optimization approach is described herein Chapter 2); 
5. Use the model – use the model to forecast an energy outlook, simulate a 
technology path, or test the likely effectiveness of an energy policy (optimized 
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scenarios are presented in Chapter 7, impacts are described in Chapter 8, and the 
deliberative modelling results are outlined in Chapter 9).  
 
In practice, the modelling process did not work as neatly and linearly as this outline 
suggests. For example, in my research I developed several models using different 
modelling approaches. I created a version of the SIMS investment model in the GAMS 
(General Algebraic Modelling Software) environment. This model allowed greater 
computational power, but did not provide an interactive user interface. I also developed a 
system dynamics investment model of the Saskatchewan electricity system. After asking 
colleagues to evaluate this model I was advised to improve the user interface to allow 
participants to select a generation mix they desired in 2050, rather than having them 
decide on investments in each time-step. As I worked to make this change, I found that 
the excel-based model version of SIM I had created could provide that user interface 
quite neatly. This is all to say that it took iteration between Step 4 and Step 5 in order to 
arrive at the excel-based investment model (SIM) I have used in this dissertation.  
 
Before discussing how to model the Saskatchewan electricity system, it is useful to 
understand the origins of system. The history of Saskatchewan’s electricity system is 
described in Chapter 3 to provide the context for the modelling work and stakeholder 
deliberations outlined in later chapters.  
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Chapter 3 - A History of Saskatchewan’s Electricity System  
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I describe the historical context that gave rise to Saskatchewan’s present-
day electricity grid. A largely rural, agricultural province in the early 20th Century, power 
production in Saskatchewan began in a decentralized fashion. Proposals were soon made 
to centralize power production in low-cost locations, particularly in the southeast lignite 
coalfields around Estevan. The Saskatchewan River system also held the promise of 
hydroelectricity.  
 
From 1929-1949 it was the job of the Saskatchewan Power Commission to integrate the 
decentralized production facilities and electricity grids into a centralized, integrated grid. 
In 1949 the Crown Corporation SaskPower was created to complete this integration. A 
major undertaking in the 1950s was the electrification of rural Saskatchewan, one of 
SaskPower’s greatest achievements.  
 
By the mid-1960s SaskPower had created a centralized, integrated electricity grid, 
powered by low-cost lignite coal and hydroelectricity. In recent decades challenges to 
this publicly owned, centralized system and the coal-hydro nexus of electricity generation 
have put pressure on the SaskPower system to change.  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s environmental concerns slowed or blocked hydroelectric projects 
and dams for coal-fired plants’ cooling reservoirs. Concerns over acid rain and climate 
change have demanded that SaskPower look beyond conventional coal. In recent 
decades, natural gas has become an important fuel for electricity generation, wind power 
projects have proven successful, and smaller biomass and heat recovery projects add 
diversity to the generation mix. SaskPower and the government have also flirted with 
nuclear power, most recently in 2009 with the Saskatchewan Party’s Uranium 
Development Partnership. Well-organized public opposition has so far kept nuclear 
power out of the province, but talk has turned to “small, modular reactors” in the north.  
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Public ownership of the SaskPower Crown has also come under pressure. Changes in the 
ideology of Saskatchewan’s ruling parties have at times threatened SaskPower with the 
spectre of privatization. Cogeneration and independent power producers now make up 
20% of the electricity grid and have opened the door to a slow privatization of the 
corporation.  
 
This is the story of power in Saskatchewan.  
 
Early Beginnings 
Electricity came to Saskatchewan in 1890 when private operators installed the first 
“electrical systems in Regina, Moose Jaw and Prince Albert” (White, 1976: 3). These 
early systems provided power for lighting the streets of the small prairie towns. Many 
operated their facilities on a “moonlight basis” only when the moon was not expected to 
shine (White, 1976: 3).  
 
In the early 1900s, municipalities across Saskatchewan began to build and operate their 
own electrical utilities. Regina, Moose Jaw, and Prince Albert were early into the 
business, each city taking over the operations of the original private developers. By the 
outbreak of World War I twenty communities owned and operated electric light utilities. 
The Great War slowed the number of light utilities being created, but still seven more 
electricity generation plants were built during the War. In the decade that followed, 
“slightly over a dozen additional municipalities had established or otherwise acquired 
their own electrical systems” (White, 1976: 8).  
 
By the late 1920s the municipal electric utilities were profitable enterprises. 
Municipalities used the revenue from electric utility operations to finance their operations 
and keep property taxes low (White, 1976). Municipal electrical systems were also 
diverse. The cities of Moose Jaw, Regina, and Saskatoon operated efficient facilities and 
charged an average of 1.65 ¢CDN per kilowatt-hour for electricity (SPRC, 1928). 
Electricity generated in small communities was often much more expensive. In 1926, in 
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the communities of Readlyn and Briercrest, the cost of electricity was “forty-five and 
thirty-five cents” per kilowatt-hour respectively (White, 1976: 14). 
 
As early as 1911, electricity boosters such as Frederick Haultain, Leader of the 
Opposition in the Saskatchewan legislature, began to call for a centralized electric power 
system that would utilize the lignite coalfields in southwest Saskatchewan and tap into 
the hydroelectric potential in the province. Electricity rates throughout the province 
would be reduced and cheap electricity would help the province diversify its economy, 
which was highly dependent on agriculture, into areas such as manufacturing. (White, 
1976)  
 
The idea of a centralized power system received intermittent attention for the next fifteen 
years. It was not until 1925 that Liberal Premier Dunning announced that Saskatchewan 
would establish a provincial power policy. (White, 1976) 
 
On January 7, 1927 the Provincial government, now led by Liberal James Gardiner, 
appointed the Saskatchewan Power Resources Commission (SPRC) to “report upon the 
economic practicability of generating power at central power plants and water power sites 
throughout the province” (SPRC, 1928: 3). The committee reported back in 1928 (SPRC, 
1928). In their report, the SPRC took stock of the electricity situation extant in the 
province,  
 
the total capacity of the power plants in the province is 43,757 K.W. 
and…there are 712 miles of distribution pole lines. The total energy 
generated in these plants during the year 1926 was 69,553,844 K.W. hours 
sold to 44,471 customers.5 (SPRC, 1928: 3) 
 
                                                
5 To build this system $9,058,076 had been spent (SPRC, 1928). In 2015 $CDN this 
equates to $123,465,514. This means the average cost of constructing the 43,757 kilowatt 
system, including the cost of the transmission lines, was $2822 per kilowatt in 2015 
$CDN. (SPRC, 1928; Author’s calculations using All-Items CPI for Canada in Statistics 
Canada, CANSIM table 326-0020).  
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Of the electricity generated, 80% of electricity was supplied by city owned power plants 
in Regina, Saskatoon, and Moose Jaw. The commission spoke positively of the ability of 
the three cities to provide cost-effective power. The cost of generating electricity in each 
city in 1926 is outlined in Table 3-1 and is listed in both 1926 Canadian cents (¢CDN) 
and 2015 ¢CDN adjusted for inflation using the Canadian all-items Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) (Statistics Canada, 2015). (SPRC, 1928) 
 
Cost	of	Generation	in	1926																											
(cents	per	kilowatt-hour)	
		 1926	¢CDN	 2015	¢CDN	
Regina	 0.81	 	11.08		
Moose	Jaw	 1.04	 	14.16		
Saskatoon	 1.07	 	14.54		
Table 3-1 Cost of Electricity Generation in 1926 
(Source: SPRC, 1928; CANSIM 326-0020; author’s calculations) 
 
The commission recommended that the best path forward for the Saskatchewan 
electricity system was to allow the city utilities to expand their operations and begin 
branching out to nearby towns and villages. Power plants in medium-sized centres such 
as Swift Current, Estevan, Unity, Yorkton, and Weyburn were to be encouraged and 
would provide power for regions removed from Saskatchewan’s three cities.  
 
The commission believed that this organic approach to power development would save 
money in the short term, and in the long term – as electricity load grew, transmission 
networks branched out, and old equipment came up for renewal – would open the door 
for a centralized generation system. (SPRC, 1928) 
 
The commission also concluded that a southwest coal plant would only make sense if it 
could provide power for Regina, located 217 kilometers away. Since a plant to serve 
Regina’s electrical load was already built and working efficiently the commission 
concluded, “there is no economy to be derived from the establishment of a large plant on 
the coal field at a point so far distant from the centre of the load” (SPRC, 1928:9). Any 
savings that could be generated by accessing cheap lignite coal in the southwest would be 
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overwhelmed by the cost of building a transmission system, and the sunk fixed costs of 
the existing city power plants. The southwest coal-fired plant would have to wait until 
electricity demand had grown substantially. (SPRC, 1928) 
 
The commission reached a similar conclusion in regards to hydroelectricity, finding that a 
central hydroelectric plant on the Saskatchewan River system would not make economic 
sense until the 1940s when summer load had grown substantial enough to justify the 
supply. (SPRC, 1928) 
 
But, it was predicted, demand for electricity would grow, and fast. Electricity demand 
had increased at a rate of over 10% per year from 1907-1928 in Regina and 1913-1928 in 
Saskatoon (SPRC, 1928: 10). The commission predicted these rapid growth rates would 
continue into the future.  
 
To prepare for an eventual centralized generation system, the SPRC (1928) recommended 
that a central agency oversee the rational growth of the electrical system. A central 
coordinating agency would avoid duplication of expenses on transmission lines and could 
optimize investments in new generation equipment. (SPRC, 1928) 
 
The tendency in the development of the individual stations is to plan 
primarily for the needs of each community without reference to any wider 
scheme throughout the province, and have suggested, that as time goes on, 
there will be a duplication of equipment which will be costly, unless there is a 
general plan of organization, either of the efforts of the large city installations 
under a pooling arrangement, or by the consolidation of these plants into one 
general scheme. (SPRC, 1928: 34) 
 
To create this centralized entity the committee recommended that the provincial 
government purchase and operate the municipal plants. Provincial ownership was 
preferred to municipal ownership because the province could borrow at lower rates of 
interest and coordinate the entire provincial system. Public ownership was preferred to 
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private ownership because it would save money; “the element of private gain which 
necessarily must be provided to private ownership need not be figured in a publicly 
owned system” (SPRC, 1928: 15). (SPRC, 1928) 
 
After two months of considering the SPRC (1928) report the Gardiner government 
accepted the recommendation for public ownership. Negotiations with municipal power 
authorities began and Saskatoon agreed to sell their generating assets and purchase power 
in bulk from the new public entity. This willingness on the part of Saskatchewan’s 
second biggest city to join a provincial scheme encouraged Premier Gardiner to draft the 
Power Commissions Act. In January 1929 the Act became law and with it the 
Saskatchewan Power Commission (SPC) was born. (White, 1976) 
 
Saskatchewan Power Commission 1929-1949 
The Saskatchewan Power Commission (SPC) operated from 1929-1949 and laid the 
groundwork for the existing electricity grid and the SaskPower Corporation. Its first 
commissioner was Louis Thornton who had chaired the Saskatchewan Power Resources 
Commission (SPRC). (White, 1976) 
 
The SPC was tasked with purchasing municipal utilities and expanding the provincial 
electrical system. In 1930, after SPC had taken control of Saskatoon’s generation 
facilities, the ownership of the Saskatchewan electricity grid was distributed as follows: 
Saskatchewan Power Commission 26.3 Megawatts (MW), municipally owned 37 MW, 
and privately owned 29.2 MW for a total system capacity of 92.6 MW (SPC, 1930).  
 
The Great Depression 
Almost immediately after the SPC had been created the Great Depression interrupted 
SPC’s expansion plans. The Depression hit Saskatchewan particularly hard. Where 
personal income fell 43% between 1928 and 1933 on average in Canada, average 
incomes in Saskatchewan fell by 73% (see Figure 3-1 below). Unemployment rose to the 
point where “almost one in four adult male workers in the Queen City (Regina) had lost 
his job” (Waiser, 2005: 285).  
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(Source: Statistics Canada, 2015 CANSIM Table 380-0050) 
Figure 3-1 Average Personal Incomes Canada and Saskatchewan 1926-1950 
 
The Depression exposed the vulnerability of the rural, agricultural province to the boom 
and bust cycles of international commodity markets. Low international demand for 
agricultural products led to low commodity prices, especially for wheat, Saskatchewan’s 
most important crop. For many, the Depression reaffirmed the need to diversify the 
provincial economy away from a reliance on agriculture. (Waiser, 2005) 
 
Compounding the misery, a long-lasting drought destroyed agricultural output in 1931, 
1933, 1934, and 1937. Topsoil blew freely from the land creating giant dust storms that 
would block out the sun and coat homes inside and out with a layer of dust. The period is 
popularly referred to as the “dust bowl” of the “dirty thirties” and it casts a dark shadow 
over the memories of those who lived through it. (Waiser, 2005)  
 
In the depths of the Depression there was no income to spare for luxuries like electric 
lighting. From 1931 to 1935 electricity production in facilities owned by the 
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Saskatchewan Power Commission hovered around 45 Gigawatt-hours per year (See 
Figure 3-2).  
 
 
(Source: SPC Annual Reports, 1929-1948) 
Figure 3-2 Total Electricity Generation on the Saskatchewan Power Commission 
System 1931-1948 
 
Annual reports from this era outline the situation, 
 
The general economic depression which obtained throughout the year was felt 
in a marked degree in this province and brought about the need for 
curtailment in any expenditures beyond absolute necessities. Accordingly, no 
new undertakings or extensions of the Commission's system were embarked 
upon except the minimum that was required to maintain adequate service.  
(SPC, 1932: 3) 
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The general economic depression which obtained throughout the year 1932 
has continued during 1933, and, as a result, the demand upon the 
Commission's generating plants and transmission line systems has shown no 
increase over the preceding year, but is, in fact, very slightly less. 
(SPC, 1933: 4) 
 
In this desperate time SPC operated at a loss. Impoverished citizens had a difficult time 
paying their bills and SPC employees would accept produce as payment, paying the SPC 
the value of the produce, “These were the days when a month’s light account would 
purchase a dressed hog or a quarter of beef, often with vegetables thrown in!” 
(SaskPower, 1953: 17) 
 
Wartime Scarcity 
Power demand began to grow again in step with incomes in the latter half of the 1930s. 
For the Saskatchewan Power Commission increasing demand meant increasing revenues 
and indicated “a betterment in local conditions in the towns served” (SPC, 1936: 3). 
Improving economic conditions in the late 1930s meant that existing infrastructure could 
be used at its full capacity. As SPC chairperson Louis Thornton wrote in his 1939 annual 
report “Encouraging load increases indicate that more stable economic conditions have 
been evident in all districts and bring the total energy demands to proportions which were 
contemplated when the systems were built” (SPC, 1939: 4). SPC owned generation 
capacity reached 30 MW in 1939 and production increased to 55 Gigawatt-hours in that 
year. 
 
Were it not for the intervening conditions of war, the early 1940s might have been a time 
of capacity expansion for the Saskatchewan electricity system; demand continued to grow 
and investments were badly needed, especially in Saskatoon. Instead wartime restrictions 
were placed on the production of non-essential manufactured goods. As Louis Thornton 
wrote in the 1941 SPC annual report,  
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It has been evident for some time that additional generation capacity was 
urgently required at the Saskatoon plant, and an order for a 15,000 KW turbo-
generator was placed with an English manufacturer in May. Shortly afterward 
the British Government issued a suspension order on the construction of this 
unit, and, up to the present, efforts made to have the suspension order lifted 
and the work put in hand have been of no avail. (SPC, 1941: 3) 
 
This state of rationing continued throughout the war years as materials and labour power 
were directed to war-related production rather than domestic goods and services.  
 
Integrating the System 
In 1944, the socialist Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), led by the 
charismatic T.C. (Tommy) Douglas, swept into power in Saskatchewan. The CCF 
favoured public ownership of industry, and electricity was no exception. Joe Phelps was 
appointed Minister responsible for the Saskatchewan Power Commission and soon laid 
out a plan to purchase the remaining private and municipal electric utilities companies in 
the province and “integrate” the electric system (SPC, 1945). A farmer himself, Phelps 
was eager to see the electricity system extend to farms and rural communities. With an 
integrated system under public control it would be possible to finance rural electrification 
in the province. (White, 1976)  
 
The CCF appointed H.F. Berry to replace Louis Thornton as the commissioner of the 
Saskatchewan Power Commission. Berry was a strategic choice as, until his appointment, 
he had been the General Manager of the privately owned National Light and Power 
Company in Moose Jaw. As such, he could understand the motivations and interests of 
the private power producers. (White, 1976) 
 
It is clear that the CCF government wanted Berry to take a more aggressive approach to 
fulfilling the mandate of the SPC. The Saskatchewan Reconstruction Council had issued 
a report in 1944 criticizing the Commission for its “cautious” approach (p. 148). The SPC 
had prevented private companies from expanding electricity service in the province, 
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while also refusing to expand service itself. The province had seen its share of hardship in 
the Depression and World War II and so the SPC’s slow progress was not without reason, 
but, in the post-war era, progress was expected.  
 
Under instruction from the provincial government Berry began to consolidate the 
provincial electricity system. Dominion Electric was first on the list of companies to be 
purchased. Dominion generated electricity using lignite coal near Estevan in southwest 
Saskatchewan. The purchase would provide SPC with an anchor for the consolidated 
system. As the new commissioner for the SPC explained,  
 
The Dominion Electric…Plant at Estevan purchases fuel for one-third the 
cost on a B.T.U. basis of cost for fuel at any other location 
in…Saskatchewan. The Province, in endeavouring to build up a base power 
supply in the Estevan area, will be securing the cheapest source of power in 
the Province and, in addition, will be furnishing employment to its own 
citizens and using a natural resource of the Province.  
(H.F. Berry to Minister Joe Phelps in White, 1976: 140) 
 
Cheap and abundant coal in the southwest of Saskatchewan would be used to generate 
electricity that would be transmitted throughout the province and would support the CCF 
government’s plans to electrify rural Saskatchewan and promote industrial development. 
Coal was also a “natural resource of the Province” and would generate mining jobs in the 
Estevan area. Similar arguments in favour of coal reappear in Saskatchewan to this day.  
 
Throughout the late 1940s SPC purchased electricity generation facilities small and large. 
In 1945 SPC purchased the Prairie Power Company and folded their operations into SPC 
(SPC, 1945). In 1947 SPC purchased Canadian Utilities Limited (SPC, 1947).  
 
As wartime shortages of materials eased, the SPC built transmission lines to connect the 
localized electricity distribution networks (White, 1976). Inefficient diesel plants were 
closed and expansions were made at centralized generation facilities such as Saskatoon’s 
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coal-fired steam plant. These efforts were directed at creating an “integrated electric 
power network” (SPC, 1945: 6).  
 
Integration lowered generation costs and allowed SPC to progressively reduce electricity 
rates. In 1945 the maximum rate for electricity sold by the SPC was fifteen cents per 
kilowatt-hour (SPC, 1947). Rates were lowered May 1 1945, June 1 1946, July 1 1947, 
and June 1 1948 (SPC, 1947; SPC, 1948), 
 
The rate reduction on June 1st, 1948, enabled the Commission to secure 
complete uniformity of rate schedules for similar towns throughout the 
Province. Street lighting schedules were standardized and rates to rural 
customers were reduced along with other rates so that the maximum for any 
electrical energy sold by the Commission was lowered to eight cents per 
kilowatt-hour. (SPC, 1948: 12) 
 
The rate reductions were aimed at “building load” and they had their desired effect. 
Electricity demand began to grow rapidly (See Figure 3-2 above). The Commission also 
found itself with a sizable accumulated surplus (See Table 3-2), which would provide 
investment capital in the decade to come.  
 
Still, the SPC had not succeeded in creating an integrated system. A report written by 
consultant David Cass-Beggs in 1947 was critical of the SPC. Cass-Beggs argued the 
SPC had been operating “simply as one of the power companies operating in the province 
and serving what loads it could conveniently serve” (Cass-Beggs in White, 1976: 151). 
SPC had no success in obtaining the municipal plant at Regina and the privately owned 
National Light and Power in Moose Jaw. It had also not made any major progress 
towards rural electrification. (White, 1976) 
 
This critique was particularly poignant to the CCF government, amongst whose most 
ardent supporters were Saskatchewan farmers. If the SPC could not electrify rural 
Saskatchewan it was not doing its job.  
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(Source: SPC, 1946; SPC, 1947; SPC, 1948) 
Table 3-2 Saskatchewan Power Commission Financial Conditions 
 
Berry returned to his position as head of the Moose Jaw utility in 1948, a position he held 
until 1960 when the Moose Jaw utility was finally purchased. The CCF government made 
major changes to the Saskatchewan Power Commission. (White, 1976) 
 
Birth of the Saskatchewan Power Corporation  
In 1949 the CCF government reorganized the Saskatchewan Power Commission, 
separating its regulatory duties and its generation and distribution duties. The newly 
created Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SaskPower) would be responsible for 
generation and distribution in the province while the Saskatchewan Power Commission 
(SPC) would maintain its regulatory oversight role.6 (White, 1976) 
                                                
6 SaskPower was one of many crown corporations created during this period. The CCF 
also created the Saskatchewan Government Insurance (SGI) agency, the Saskatchewan 
Government Telephones company (SaskTel), and the Saskatchewan Transportation 
Year Loss Surplus
Accumulated1
Deficit
Accumulated1
Surplus
1929 180$'''''''''''''' 180$''''''''''''''
1930 946$'''''''''''''' 1,126$'''''''''''
1931 35,880$''''''''' 37,006$''''''''
1932 50,979$''''''''' 87,985$''''''''
1933 77,497$''''''''' 165,483$''''''
1934 77,135$''''''''' 242,618$''''''
1935 46,981$''''''''' 289,599$''''''
1936 24,151$''''''''' 313,749$''''''
1937 12,617$''''''''' 326,366$''''''
1938 570$'''''''''''''' 326,936$''''''
1939 7,500$'''''''''''''' 319,437$''''''
1940 3,387$'''''''''''''' 316,050$''''''
1941 12,945$'''''''''''' 303,105$''''''
1942 16,747$'''''''''''' 286,358$''''''
1943 22,463$'''''''''''' 263,895$''''''
1944 32,477$'''''''''''' 231,418$''''''
1945 156,835$''''''''' 74,583$''''''''
1946 414,283$''''''''' 339,700$'''''''''''
1947 632,775$''''''''' 972,475$'''''''''''
1948 427,743$''''''''' 1,400,281$'''''''
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SaskPower, the Corporation, “inherited 35 power plants and 4,190 miles of transmission 
line” from the Saskatchewan Power Commission (SaskPower, 1969: 25). The task of the 
Corporation was to finish the integration that the Commission had begun. This meant 
purchasing distribution and generation facilities still held by municipal and private 
operators in Regina, Moose Jaw, Weyburn, Swift Current, North Battleford, and Yorkton. 
It meant connecting the province with high-voltage distribution lines to allow electricity 
to be generated at low-cost sites and distributed through the province. It also meant 
extending electrical service to rural Saskatchewan.  
 
Rural Electrification 
The CCF government, re-elected in 1948 with the continued support of Saskatchewan 
farmers, put a high priority on rural electrification. Joe Phelps, former Minister in charge 
of SPC, lost his seat in the 1948 election but stayed on with the SPC board and helped to 
develop the Rural Electrification Act, which was signed into law in 1949. This Act 
committed SaskPower to build distribution lines to areas where farmers had agreed to 
organize and contribute towards the costs. (White, 1976; SaskPower, 1955) 
 
Rural electrification would be an expensive undertaking. There were 125,612 census 
farms in Saskatchewan in 1946, and that number fell to 112,018 in 1951 (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2012). These farms were spread throughout the southern part of the province 
and the population density of rural areas was low, “The 70,000 farms to be supplied were 
scattered in an area of about 130,000 square miles” (SaskPower, 1969: 25). Thousands of 
kilometers of distribution lines would have to be built to electrify rural Saskatchewan.  
 
SaskPower began the process of rural electrification by focusing on the rural areas that 
were most economical to serve: those along or near existing lines. In 1949, electricity was 
connected to 1,142 farms. The next year over 2,000 farms were connected bringing the 
total farm and rural customer count to 4,500 (SaskPower, 1950: 5), and in 1951 over 
                                                                                                                                            
Company (STC), which provides bus service in the province. All of these crowns remain 
in public ownership today. (Rediger, 2004) 
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3,000 more farms received service. The pace was quickening, but much work remained. 
(White, 1976; SaskPower, 1950) 
 
In 1952 The CCF won their third term in office. Tommy Douglas campaigned on a 
promise to electrify 40,000 farms and bring electricity to all towns. Charles Smith, rural 
electrification superintendent for SaskPower, offered his frank concerns about the 
magnitude of this challenge, 
 
This will make a grand total of 56,000 new customers in the next four years! 
75% of the total number of customers presently served by the Saskatchewan 
Power Corporation (counting the cities of Prince Albert, Yorkton and North 
Battleford)! Building in four years many more miles of line than were built in 
all the preceding twenty-five years! Providing, as well, extra generating 
equipment and main trunk lines to supply these new customers and handle 
normal load growth of existing customers! In others words planning, I will 
venture to say, a relatively more ambitious program than has ever been 
carried out on this continent, or perhaps in the entire world! A program 
calling for detailed planning and a ruthless determination to carry it out! 
(Charles Smith quoted in White, 1976: 273) 
 
Ruthless determination appears to have been present in the leadership and employees of 
SaskPower. SaskPower ramped up rural electrification through the 1950s; over 4,000 
farms were connected in 1952 (SaskPower, 1952), 7,500 farms were connected in 1955 
(SaskPower, 1955), and 7,800 were connected in the peak year of 1956 (SaskPower, 
1969).  
 
Electricity transformed life on the farm, alleviating much of the labour that had 
characterized rural life, especially for women (Champ, 2001). Water was pumped, not 
hauled to the farmhouse; water heaters replaced the work of boiling water for baths 
(Champ, 2001). For those who could afford appliances, electricity soon meant cooking on 
an electric range rather than chopping wood to fuel the stove; and washing machines 
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replaced hours of scrubbing clothes on a washboard (Champ, 2001). At least one 
awestruck prairie woman (my great-grandmother) was found gazing at her washing 
machine as it worked to clean the family linens, watching it as we would a television, still 
in disbelief at the labour-saving device.  
 
Rural electrification was a great success and by 1960 the program “was essentially 
completed, having brought electricity to about 67,000 farms and to all the villages and 
hamlets in the populated half of the province” (SaskPower, 1969: 25). The feat stands as 
an impressive demonstration of how the impossible can become possible when motivated 
by determined political will and institutional buy-in. It is an example to remember as 
SaskPower begins the challenge of electrifying Saskatchewan with sustainable, low 
emissions electricity. 
 
Rural electrification was also a great success for the CCF government. CCF leader 
Tommy Douglas, the father of Medicare and the first socialist elected to office in North 
America, is believed to have said the rural electrification of Saskatchewan was his 
greatest achievement (Calvert, 2005). With the goodwill it created for Douglas, rural 
electrification may have helped make Medicare possible.  
 
Power for Industry 
Farms were not the only new electricity customers in the province in the 1950s. 
SaskPower also worked to provide electricity and natural gas sales to Saskatchewan’s 
growing industrial sector.7 As SaskPower’s (1957) Annual Report states,  
 
Reaching into more and more of her resource-filled stockrooms – oil, natural 
gas, uranium, potash – Saskatchewan has learned that power and natural gas 
are the keys to enable these stocks to be taken from storage, processed, and 
moved to market. (SaskPower, 1957: 15) 
                                                
7 “During 1951, the Saskatchewan Power Corporation was designated as the provincial 
authority to handle the distribution of natural gas” (SaskPower, 1951: 3). It retained this 
responsibility until 1989 when the SaskEnergy Crown Corporation was created to 
distribute natural gas (SaskPower, 1989).  
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The oil industry in the province was encouraged to power their pump jacks with 
electricity. A salt plant at Unity used substantial electricity and natural gas, both supplied 
by SaskPower. Various manufacturing facilities drew from the grid including “a major 
cement plant, a clay products plant, and two light aggregate plants at Regina; a fibreboard 
plant at Saskatoon; and a clothing plant at Moose Jaw” (SaskPower, 1957: 15).  
 
The potash industry was in its infant stages in the 1950s, but in 1954 SaskPower signed a 
five-year agreement with Potash Corporation of America assuring, “if the mining 
operations proved successful” the Potash Corporation could count on purchasing “60 
million kilowatt-hours” per year from SaskPower by 1958 (Rediger, 2004: 59). The 
mining proved more difficult than anticipated, and it was not until 1962 that 
Saskatchewan had its first potash mine (Burton, 2014). The potash industry remains one 
of SaskPower’s largest customers using electricity for “powering mining machines, 
hoisting, conveying, ventilation, lighting, dewatering, mill operations, tailings 
management and office/administration facilities” (CIPEC, 2003: 12). The potash industry 
drives growth in electricity demand in the present day (Interview 5).8  
 
Beyond the economic development imperative, increased electricity sales to industrial 
customers helped to “build load” allowing generation equipment to run during the night 
when demand from residential and farms was low (SaskPower, 1952: 10). This in turn 
made better use of SaskPower’s generation equipment and helped to further lower 
electricity rates. (SaskPower, 1952) 
 
 
 
 
                                                
8 It is not clear what rates were charged to each industry, but it was clear that deals were 
often cut. As the 1952 SaskPower Annual Report revealed, “In co-operation with the 
Industrial Development Office, special industrial rates were devised to attract industry to 
Saskatchewan (SaskPower, 1952: 10).” 
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Expanding Generation (1955-1965) 
Electricity demand grew exponentially during the 1950s and 1960s, doubling nearly 
every four years  (See Figure 3-3).9 The pace of growth required an ambitious 
construction schedule. Coal-fired steam plants at Saskatoon (A.L. Cole Station) and 
Estevan were expanded in 1955-56 and a new gas plant was installed in Swift Current in 
1955. Most significantly, in the fall of 1955 announcements were made that “two new 
$40,000,000 power plants” would be built at Estevan and Saskatoon (SaskPower, 1955: 
19). The Saskatoon plant was the Queen Elizabeth and was commissioned by the Queen 
herself in July 1959 (Rediger, 2004). The new Estevan plant was called Boundary Dam. 
By 1960 Boundary Dam Unit 1 provided 132 MW of lignite coal generation capacity to 
the Saskatchewan grid.  
 
 
(Source: SaskPower Annual Reports 1953 to 1970) 
Figure 3-3 SaskPower Electricity Generation 1952-1970 
 
                                                
9 Note that the anomalous growth rates of 30.1% in 1965 and 7.1% in 1966 correspond to 
the Regina municipal plant becoming part of the SaskPower system in 1965.  
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SaskPower also made plans to build Saskatchewan’s first hydroelectric plant. 
Hydroelectricity had been long studied in the province. In 1927 the Saskatchewan Power 
Resources Commission hired consulting engineers Sullivan, Kipp and Chase to study 
hydroelectric potential in Saskatchewan. The consultants concluded that a hydroelectric 
plant on the Saskatchewan River would not be economical until 1945 when load had 
grown substantially (SPRC, 1928; White 1976).  
 
In 1930, after being approached by a proposal from a private developer, the 
Saskatchewan Power Commission hired H.G. Acres and Company to study hydroelectric 
potential at Fort a la Corne, located just downstream of the junction of the North and 
South Saskatchewan Rivers (White, 1976). Acres and Company were optimistic about the 
site and believed a hydroelectric project there to be “physically and economically 
feasible, and more particularly as a public enterprise” (Acres and Company, 1931: 1). 
They estimated that the dam at Fort a la Corne along with transmission to 
Saskatchewan’s largest cities “Regina, Moose Jaw, Saskatoon, and Prince Albert” could 
be built at a cost of $19,000,000 (White, 1976: 116).  
 
The Depression put the Fort a la Corne proposal on indefinite hiatus. However, H.G. 
Acres was asked to update their analysis after World War II. They produced an updated 
report in 1946 and recommended the Fort a la Corne project be delayed until electricity 
demand had grown; a conclusion similar to that reached by Sullivan, Kipp and Chase in 
1928. (White 1976) 
 
With electricity demand growing rapidly in the 1950s SaskPower again looked to 
hydroelectricity. The decision was made to build a hydroelectric plant on the 
Saskatchewan River near Nipawin at an estimated cost of $46,250,000 or $230 per 
kilowatt (in 1959 $CDN dollars) (SaskPower, 1959a). A second hydroelectric station 
would be brought into service at Gardiner Dam once that joint federal-provincial project 
was complete.10  
                                                
10 The Gardiner Dam was a $182 million joint federal-provincial project to control 
streamflow on the South Saskatchewan River and provide irrigation water to farmers. 
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Construction of the E.B. Campbell hydroelectric station began in 1960.11 The project was 
producing electricity by 1963, operated at 201 MW in 1964, and was fully commissioned 
at 280 MW in 1966. At present it remains in service.  
 
Completing the Integration 
The Boundary Dam plant was the fulfillment of the long-sought dream to use cheap and 
abundant lignite coal to power the province. With high-voltage transmission lines this 
cheap power could be distributed throughout the province and was used as a bargaining 
chip to negotiate with the remaining utilities operating outside the SaskPower system. 
(White, 1976) 
 
The City of Weyburn agreed to sell its utility in 1957 for “$2,000,000 in annual 
installments over a twenty-year period” (White, 1976: 239). When asked how SaskPower 
could justify the purchase price General Manager David Cass-Beggs replied that he was 
relying “on the availability of cheap Estevan power” (Cass-Beggs quoted in White, 1976: 
239). Though Boundary Dam was not yet online, Cass-Beggs had calculated that the low 
cost lignite-fuelled power would allow SaskPower to make up the expense through 
electricity sales back to Weyburn.  
                                                                                                                                            
The 64-meter tall Dam created a created a 225-kilometer long reservoir of water that is 
now called Lake Diefenbaker. At the time of construction it was estimated that 
approximately 500,000 acres of cropland could be irrigated, increasing the value of 
output from $7 million to $50 million. As a secondary benefit the dam would also allow 
for hydroelectric generation; the 187 MW Coteau Creek generating station. The dam was 
not without impact, however, and valued First Nations cultural artifacts were destroyed, 
both by the flooding, and intentionally by government officials in order to prevent a hold-
up of construction. (CBC, 2015b; Water Security Agency, 2015; Herriot, 2000) 
11 The power plant was originally called ‘Squaw Rapids’. In 1987, John Dorion, a native 
educator, wrote to SaskPower asking them to change the name due to its racist 
connotations. The head of SaskPower, George Hill, responded by mailing a survey to 
customers in the same envelope as their power bills asking whether they supported or 
opposed the name change. Only 1% of SaskPower customers responded, and three-
quarters opposed the name change. Hill stood fast. Dorion expressed his disbelief, “It's 
obvious it’s a racist sign? A survey shouldn't be needed” (Windspeaker, 1987). 
SaskPower eventually relented and in 1988 the station was re-named to honour former 
SaskPower President E.B. Campbell.  
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A comparison of costs between local generation and SaskPower rates eventually 
convinced the holdout Regina City Council to agree to sell their electric utility to 
SaskPower. Regina City Council had remained committed to municipal ownership of the 
Regina power plant despite an explosion in 1960 and frequent blackouts in the early 
1960s. They had come to enjoy the revenue earned from selling power, as it was a much 
less visible source of funds than property taxes. It was not until 1965 that Regina’s 
Council faced the realization that rebuilding and retaining their aging power plant would 
cost much more than obtaining “cheap Estevan power” from SaskPower. Pressure from 
groups such as the Chamber of Commerce likely helped. The Chamber lobbied for the 
sale of the Regina power plant, arguing that SaskPower could supply businesses with 
electricity at lower rates. (White, 1976) 
 
The sale of the Regina Power Plant and distribution system in 1965 was the final puzzle 
piece in creating a truly integrated electricity system in the province. Large coal-fired and 
hydroelectric plants provided cheap power and SaskPower distributed the power 
throughout the province with a network of high-voltage transmission lines. This publicly 
owned system, and the logic of centralized power production, remains in place today. 
This 50-year reign has not been without its challenges.  
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The Dawning of Environmental Concern 
The E.B. Campbell Dam was SaskPower’s first hydroelectric project.12 More were to 
follow. For SaskPower E.B. Campbell was “the first step in a thirty-year plan to harness 
electricity from the Saskatchewan River and other northern rivers to meet an increasing 
provincial energy demand” (Waldram, 1993: 58). In 1960, General Manager David Cass-
Beggs sketched out a plan for a system of cascading hydroelectric dams along the South 
Saskatchewan River (Figure 3-4). Other dams in the remote north would power northern 
mining communities.  
 
E.B. Campbell (shown as Squaw Rapids in Figure 3-4) was not without impact. Upstream 
from the dam valuable farmland was flooded. Farmers were offered compensation of “2.5 
times the assessed value of expropriated land” and further compensation was given for 
buildings that had been on the land (Waldram, 1993: 62).  
 
Downstream, the story was different. Cumberland House, a largely Métis community 
located downstream from the dam, and the nearby Cumberland House Indian Band, 
struggled with the problems created by the dam for years without compensation. On 
construction the residents had been assured that the dam would smooth out streamflow on 
the river; lowering expected streamflow during summer melt, and increasing streamflow 
in winter, when flows were typically low. (Waldram, 1993) 
 
                                                
12 The first hydroelectric project was built in Saskatchewan between 1929-1931 and is 
called Island Falls. This hydro dam is located near the border town of Flin Flon, 
Manitoba and was built by the Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Corporation to power 
their copper and zinc mining operations. SaskPower purchased Island Falls in 1981 and 
the station, now upgraded to 111 MW of capacity, remains in operation today. (Olsen, 
1955; SaskPower, 1981; SaskPower, 2014) 
 
Saskatchewan is also home to a partially completed hydroelectric station at Lacolle Falls 
near Prince Albert. Construction of the $1.2 million dam began in 1912, but a recession, 
and a lack of access to capital, forced Prince Albert to stop construction in 1913. The City 
of Prince Albert only finished paying for the expensive and incomplete project in 1965 
and the half-completed dam stands as an example of the vulnerability faced by large 
capital projects. A recent architectural thesis reimagined the incomplete dam as a spa, but 
as of now it sits in dis-use (Hurd, 2007). (Waiser, 2005) 
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Problematically SaskPower did not plan to operate the dam in this manner. E.B. 
Campbell, Assistant Chief Engineer of SaskPower, whose name would eventually adorn 
the dam, stated internally, “The Squaw Rapids project will be operating as a peaking 
plant, at least during heavy load season, and this will result in extremely large daily 
fluctuations in discharge” (Campbell quoted in Waldram, 1993: 63).  
 
The results were decidedly negative for Cumberland House. Residents in the area relied 
on fishing, trapping, and tourism for their livelihoods. In a letter to the Provincial 
government in 1964, the President of the Cumberland House Fisherman’s Cooperative 
described the impact, 
 
From the time the Squaw Rapids dam has been operational, we have noted 
the following:  
Fish have been caught in deeper holes in rivers and lakes, when the 
water flow is suddenly reduced. Fishing operations carried on elsewhere have 
had to be abandoned. If the situation is reversed, the fish drown on sudden 
high levels. We suffer heavy losses both ways.  
Sudden high water destroys nests of waterfowl during nesting seasons. 
Income usually derived from this source of guiding and hunting by natives is 
lowered.  
At this time of writing, the species of wildlife suffering most from the 
consequences are big game. Their young are being caught in lowlands and 
drowned in the rise of water. The latter effects on fur bearing animals will 
also be greatly felt. The unsteady flow is definitely hampering with 
conservation.  
We trust that our plea will reach sympathetic ears. We are a people 
depending on these sources for a living. We ask for more consideration from 
the management of the dam and your support before our plight is increased. 
(Waldram, 1993: 68) 
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Figure 3-4 Cass-Beggs’ Hydro Plan for Saskatchewan (Cass-Beggs, 1960: i) 
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The pleas of the community did not reach sympathetic ears. E.B. Campbell, in the same 
SaskPower internal memo quoted above wrote,  
 
I don’t think that we can be expected to limit operations at the Squaw Rapids 
site to protect beaver and muskrats…Any restriction on (dam operation) in 
the interests of wildlife will, no doubt, result in economic losses to the hydro 
project that will greatly exceed the value of any fur bearing animals.  
(Waldram, 1993: 63) 
 
Though SaskPower believed its hydro-power had a higher market value than the 
fur-bearing animals downstream, the corporation did not compensate fishers or 
trappers for the external costs imposed by the dam. The only downstream entity to 
receive compensation from SaskPower was an outfitting company called Les 
Voyageurs, who were paid $1500 in 1963 because the dam had reduced fall 
streamflow and shortened their outfitting season. In exchange, Les Voyageurs 
agreed they would not file a lawsuit against SaskPower. (Waldram, 1993) 
 
Rather than offering compensation, SaskPower and the Saskatchewan government 
reacted to the letter from the President of the Fisherman’s Co-operative by studying the 
downstream impacts of the dam. Mitigation was deemed too expensive. The community 
continued to press the government for compensation. More studies were commissioned. 
After years of delay the community grew frustrated by the government’s “more study – 
no action” approach and launched a legal challenge for compensation (Waldram, 1993: 
74). The government in turn offered to continue negotiations. In good faith the 
community put the lawsuit on hold. A mediator was appointed in 1986, but progress was 
slow. In 1987, to press home their demands, hundreds of community members even 
began constructing their own dam to “raise the level of Cumberland Lake” and improve 
downstream conditions (Waldram, 1987: 78). Waldram writes, “Ironically, the 
Saskatchewan government’s Department of the Environment expressed concern that not 
only was the dam illegal, but also that it could cause environmental damage” (1987: 79).  
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In 1989, over twenty-five years after the dam was constructed, a compensation package 
was awarded to the community worth an estimated $25 million dollars. (McLennan, 
2008)  
 
During the struggle with SaskPower, other dams were proposed. A dam at Nipawin was 
proposed in the mid 1970s and was built upstream from E.B. Campbell in the 1980s. A 
dam was also proposed for the Churchill River at Wintego Rapids. The proposition was 
contentious. The Churchill River was a prized destination for recreational canoeing and 
fishing, and is home to a rich aquatic ecosystem. The government organized the Churchill 
River Board of Inquiry to seek public input on the Wintego dam proposal. The residents 
of Cumberland House made sure to let the commission, and those living downstream 
from the dam, know what to expect; a damaged ecosystem and a Corporation unwilling to 
compensate for the damage. The final report of the Churchill River Board of Inquiry was 
released in 1978 and summarized public opposition to the Wintego project. The dam was 
scrapped. (Waldram, 1994; SaskPower, 1991a; Rediger, 2004) 
 
SaskPower’s plans to expand coal-fired generation were also generating local 
environmental concern. In 1975 SaskPower expressed interest in building another coal-
fired plant near Coronach. Farmers in the area were concerned that local coal-mining 
would damage valuable farmland. Many had been to Estevan and had seen firsthand the 
“moonscape” that had been created by surface mining coal (Rousseau, 2014). Coronach 
area farmers formed a surface rights group and lobbied to have the mining companies 
store the topsoil when they removed it, and replace the ‘overburden’ and topsoil when 
they were finished. This practice would ensure that agriculture could continue in the area 
after the coal had been mined. (Rousseau, 2014) 
 
The remediation practices have been a success. Around the Poplar River plant hay fields 
now cover what used to be coalmines. For residents of Coronach the environmental 
remediation, won through the advocacy of local farmers, is a source of pride (Rousseau, 
2014). SaskPower learned a valuable lesson in the importance of obtaining social license 
for their projects. 
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Still, concern over local environmental impacts of planned power projects continued to 
plague SaskPower into the 1980s. North of Coronach, a planned coal-fired plant near was 
“blocked in 1981 when the Rural Municipality Gravelbourg designated four heritage sites 
in the area” (Rediger, 2004: 123). To supply their coal-fired power plant with cooling 
water SaskPower had planned to dam the Wood River and create a reservoir. If the dam 
were built, three of the newly designated heritage sites would be flooded. SaskPower 
disputed the size of the heritage sites and wanted to see them reduced. A third-party 
investigation was carried out, which concluded, “Staggering quantities of heritage 
resource information exists in the proposed Cooper reservoir. Reservoir construction and 
inundation will probably completely destroy the information potential of all heritage 
resources occurring in or near the impact zone” (LeaderPost article quoted in Rediger, 
2004: 123). The reservoir and the power plant did not proceed.  
 
The most notorious power siting conflict in Saskatchewan occurred when SaskPower 
made plans to supply cooling water for the proposed Shand coal-fired power plant near 
Estevan. Two dams were planned: the Rafferty and the Alameda. These dams would offer 
cooling water for Shand, and would control streamflow on the Moose Mountain creek 
and the Souris River. Project proponents argued the flow control would protect the city of 
Minot in North Dakota from flooding. (Jowett, 2012) 
 
When two farmers, Ed and Harold Tetzlaff found out the Alameda dam would flood their 
land they took action to stop it. With other affected landowners the two brothers started 
an organization called SCRAP ‘Stop Construction on Rafferty-Alameda Projects’. The 
farmers were joined by the Saskatchewan Wildlife Federation, an organization that grew 
concerned that the projects would destroy valuable wetlands. (Jowett, 2012) 
 
Trouble arose when the Federal Minister of the Environment, Tom McMillan issued an 
approval of the Rafferty-Alameda project without the project having gone through an 
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environmental assessment. One of McMillan’s senior aides resigned over the decision. 
Her name was Elizabeth May.13 (Jowett, 2012; Harrison, 1996) 
 
May caused an uproar when she went public with the reason for her resignation. May 
alleged that the decision to approve Rafferty-Alameda without an environmental review 
was the result of a political deal cut between the Federal Government and the 
Government of Saskatchewan. Critics of the decision believed it went against the Federal 
government’s own Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) Guidelines, 
published in 1985 (Environment Canada, 1985). The Canadian Wildlife Federation took 
the federal government to court demanding an environmental assessment be completed. 
(Jowett, 2012; Harrison, 1996) 
 
Rafferty-Alameda was a landmark case in environmental law. The federal court decided 
for the plaintiff and against the Federal government. They ruled that the EARP 
Guidelines were binding and that the Federal government had an obligation to conduct an 
environmental assessment on the project. (Harrison, 1996) 
 
The courts did not, however, approve an injunction to halt construction of the project. 
Construction continued, the dams were completed in 1991, and Ed and Harold Tetzlaff 
lost their farmland. The brothers had, however, won a victory for environmental groups 
in Canada, 
 
Although only thirty-five proposals were referred for public reviews by the 
federal government in the fifteen-year period from 1974 to 1989, there were 
twenty-four reviews in less than two years after the Rafferty-Alameda 
decision. (Harrison, 1996: 134) 
 
SaskPower worked to respond to the rise of environmental concern. In 1972 SaskPower 
CEO warned presciently of the challenges to come,  
 
                                                
13 May now leads the federal Green Party. 
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The development of energy resources to meet the anticipated growth in 
demand for power and gas services in the face of rising costs and increased 
public concern on environmental matters is the most important challenge 
facing the Corporation in the future. While on one hand the Corporation is 
committed to the development of energy resources to meet the growing 
demands of its customers, it also stands committed to the orderly and 
economic development of these resources, and to minimizing the undesirable 
environmental impact of such activities. (R.R. Keith in SaskPower 1972: 3) 
 
In 1980, SaskPower conducted an internal reorganization that created several new 
business units in “energy supply planning, environmental protection, energy conservation 
and public participation” (Rediger, 2004: 121). The CEO at the time, Robert Muncor, 
described the need to balance costs, environmental, and social concerns,  
 
The very major challenge is to provide the (power) needs of the province in 
a reasonable way, reasonable meaning at as low a cost as possible, in as an 
environmentally and socially sound way as those objectives can be balanced 
together. (Muncor quoted in Rediger, 2004: 123). 
 
In 1989 George Hill, then CEO of SaskPower wrote of the corporation’s progress and 
aspirations, 
 
In 1989, SaskPower formalized a comprehensive Environmental Policy 
Statement, which confirms that environmental responsibility has always been 
a priority. It provides a framework in which we can protect the environment 
while continuing to meet the province’s electrical needs. We intend to make 
SaskPower the most environmentally responsible power utility in Canada. 
(George D. Hill in SaskPower, 1989: 6) 
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By the early 1990s it was clear that a sea change had occurred in public perception of 
power production. The public had realized that electricity generation, of any type, has an 
environmental and social impact. 
 
What was once thought of as an environmentally benign source of energy has 
been linked to ozone depletion, acid rain, the greenhouse effect and other 
negative environmental concerns such as flooding, water diversion and 
radioactive contamination. (SEEORP, 1991: 3) 
 
In 1992, the coal-fired Shand Power station was commissioned. The Rafferty-Alameda 
dams that provided reliable cooling water for the plant had flooded valued farmland and 
wetlands, but SaskPower claimed that Shand would be an environmentally sustainable 
power plant. Shand’s cooling water would heat a greenhouse where native tree saplings 
would be grown, and these would be distributed around the province. As a further benefit 
the trees would act as carbon sinks. Shand was also equipped with a limestone scrubber 
system to minimize sulphur dioxide emissions and lessen the plant’s contribution to acid 
rain. (SaskPower, 1993) 
 
In 1993, Shand, the power plant, whose cooling reservoirs had been built without 
environmental assessment and set a ground-breaking precedent in environmental law, 
was honoured “with the prestigious Power Plant Award” for its sulphur dioxide control 
systems and “zero discharge water management system” (SaskPower, 1993: 6). Without a 
hint of irony SaskPower called Shand “Canada’s most environmentally friendly coal-
fired station” (SaskPower, 1993: 6). 
 
Beyond the Public Power Coal-Hydro Nexus 
As outlined above, Saskatchewan’s publicly owned power system was built to transmit 
electricity from southeastern coalfields and hydroelectric plants along the Saskatchewan 
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River system.14 These centralized plants replaced more expensive distributed diesel 
turbines, and public ownership allowed SaskPower to charge lower prices for electricity 
than private utilities.  
 
The logic and the design of the system did not change in a quarter of a century. In 1992, 
coal made up 71% of electricity generation, hydroelectricity provided just over 20% of 
electricity, natural gas provided 4.5%, with imports of hydroelectricity from Manitoba 
providing the remaining power (SaskPower, 1992).  
 
The system also remained in public ownership. In 1991 the Saskatchewan Electrical 
Energy Options Panel (SEEOP) observed, “all the electrical energy supplied to the grid 
connected Saskatchewan system comes from generating facilities owned and operated by 
SaskPower or from neighbouring utilities” (SEEOP, 1991: 18). SaskPower had survived 
under public ownership despite two previous periods when the ruling political parties 
prioritized privatization and free enterprise.  
 
The first wave of privatization in Saskatchewan came during the period of 1964-1971 
under Liberal Premier Ross Thatcher. Thatcher was a former member of the CCF, but in 
the 1964 election he campaigned as Liberal leader on a platform emphasizing lower taxes 
and less government control of business. Thatcher and the Liberals won the election, 
unseating the CCF and ending their 20-year reign. (Rediger, 2004) 
 
During the election campaign Thatcher spoke of his desire to sell off struggling crown 
companies. Crowns would be sold unless they met one of three criteria, providing “an 
essential service which private firms are unable to supply at a comparable cost to the 
public”, providing “useful employment which otherwise would not be available” or 
offering “a particularly satisfactory return on invested public funds” (Thatcher quoted in 
                                                
14 At least the southern portion of the system. The northern system is predominantly 
hydroelectric and diesel and was built in a piecemeal fashion to coincide with mining 
developments and isolated settlements.  
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Rediger, 2004: 76).15 SaskPower was a profitable crown in most years and provided 
dividends to the provincial government, meeting the third criteria. With the memory of 
the cross-subsidized rural electrification campaign fresh in the minds of Saskatchewan 
residents, SaskPower also likely passed the first test and provided a service that a private 
operator would not have supplied. This meant that, despite the ideology of the Thatcher 
Liberals, SaskPower was safe from privatization during their time in power.16 (Rediger, 
2004) 
 
Thatcher’s Liberals lost to the New Democratic Party (NDP) – a reinvented CCF – led by 
Allan Blakeney in the 1971 election. Thatcher died three months later (Rediger, 2004). 
Blakeney brought a renewed commitment to public ownership, and expanded 
Saskatchewan’s portfolio of Crown corporations. Of particular note, Blakeney formed the 
Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan (PCS) as a vehicle to purchase (or expropriate if 
need be) potash ventures in the province (Burton, 2014).  
 
A second wave of privatization occurred during 1982 – 1991 under Premier Grant Devine 
and the Progressive Conservative (P.C.) government. The P.C.’s welcomed “public 
participation” in the economic life of Saskatchewan. The Orwellian phrase referred to 
Saskatchewan citizens holding stocks in privately owned Saskatchewan corporations. 
(Rediger, 2004) 
 
The Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan, newly formed in 1975, was sold off by the 
P.C.s in 1989-1990 (Burton, 2014). It is now one of the world’s largest potash mining and 
                                                
15 Thatcher’s tenure was marked by poor labour relations at SaskPower. In 1966 workers 
on the natural gas side of the company went on strike to demand an 8% pay increase. The 
Liberals brought the strike to an end by passing essential services legislation in the form 
of the Essential Services Emergency Act. The Act allowed government to declare a state 
of emergency and implement compulsory arbitration when a strike threatened “life, 
health or property” (Rediger, 2004: 87). A strike by natural gas workers was deemed to 
fit that criterion. A strike by the electrical workers was narrowly averted at the bargaining 
table in 1969 (Rediger, 2004). 
16 Of note, Ross Thatcher’s son Colin became an MLA like his father. Colin Thatcher 
resigned his post as Minister of Energy and Mines in 1984 when he was convicted of 
killing his wife JoAnn Wilson.  
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integrated fertilizer companies, and earned over $7 Billion in revenue in 2014 
(NASDAQ, 2015; Burton, 2014). The Saskatchewan Mining and Development 
Corporation (SMDC), a provincial crown formed to mine uranium in northern 
Saskatchewan, was combined with Eldorado (a federal uranium mining crown) in 1988. 
Shares were opened for “public participation” in 1991. CAMECO is now the largest 
uranium mining company in the world.  
 
The P.C.s planned to privatize the natural gas distribution functions of SaskPower. 
Taking a step down this path, SaskPower was split in two in 1989: SaskEnergy would 
handle natural gas sales and distribution; SaskPower would continue to control electricity 
supply in the province (SaskPower, 1989). When the split was finalized George Hill, 
head of SaskPower, remarked,  
 
(SaskEnergy) is the only gas distribution company that is now owned by 
government. Every other gas distribution company (in Canada) is investor-
owned…I firmly believe that every person in Saskatchewan should have an 
opportunity to participate.  
(George Hill quoted in Rediger, 2004: 152).   
 
In April 1989 the P.C.s announced plans to privatize the newly created SaskEnergy. The 
profits would be used to pay down SaskPower’s debt, which had grown to $2 billion by 
1988 (Rediger, 2004; SaskPower, 1988). The debt was in part due to high financing 
charges. Interest rates had spiked in the early 1980s and remained at historically high 
levels throughout the decade increasing the cost of capital for SaskPower (See Figure 3-
5).17  
 
When plans to sell SaskEnergy were announced, the NDP staged a 17-day walk out from 
the legislature. It was not until the P.C. government promised a commission to study the 
impacts of privatizing SaskEnergy that the NDP returned. The commission reported in 
                                                
17 In 1986 SaskPower’s revenue was $507 million (1987 CDN dollars) and financing 
charges were $214 million, a full 40% of revenue. (SaskPower, 1993) 
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November of that year, and recommended in favour of privatization. Due to public 
opposition, however, the P.C.s opted not to sell SaskEnergy. The NDP had won the battle 
of public opinion. (Rediger, 2004) 
 
 
(Source: Statistics Canada CANSIM 176-0043 & 326-0020; author’s calculations) 
Figure 3-5 Bank Rate and 12-Month Canada All-Item CPI Percent Change 
 
The NDP returned to power under Premier Roy Romanow in 1991. But it was a very 
different NDP than the party that had expanded crown ownership in the Blakeney era. 
The free market ideology held by the P.C.s in the 1980s had become the neo-liberal 
governing consensus for parties of all stripes, including Romanow’s NDP. At the federal 
level, free trade agreements were negotiated and signed. Industries that had been 
previously protected from competition were “deregulated” or “liberalized”. The 
provincial NDP rode the wave of deregulation, making no plans to expand the role of the 
Crowns, and instead eyeing the possible sale of crown assets. Romanow also 
implemented hard-nosed budget cuts to balance the provincial budget. These spending 
cuts are still lauded for their severe austerity (Drummond, 2015).  
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In this era of deregulation and neo-liberalism SaskPower’s CEO Jack Messer, newly 
appointed by the NDP when they returned to power, believed it was important that 
SaskPower adapt to the realities of a deregulated electricity market. Messer believed that 
SaskPower should prepare for competition,  
 
The business landscape in which SaskPower operates is undergoing dramatic 
change. Deregulation of the electric industry in the United States has opened the 
doors to competition, setting the stage for similar circumstances in Canada. The 
American example is showing us the impact of a shifting market for electrical 
energy, transforming a once-stable, secure business environment into one facing 
the uncertainties of open competition for power generation, transmission and 
distribution. Within this new competitive environment, price and service 
become the keys to sustaining existing business and attracting new customers.  
(Jack Messer in SaskPower, 1994: 4) 
 
Preparing for competition meant drafting policy that would allow other power generators 
access to the Saskatchewan grid (SEEOP, 1991). Messer worked to prepare SaskPower 
for this competition, but was fired from his position in 1997 before the job was 
complete.18  
 
Messer was succeeded by John Wright, a former Deputy Minister of Finance for the 
provincial government. Under Wright’s leadership the Saskatchewan grid began to move 
away from the publicly owned coal-hydro nexus. Wright was willing to explore private-
public partnerships in the form of “cogeneration.” He also explored ways to move away 
                                                
18 Messer’s firing was related to the sale of a SaskPower venture called Channel Lake 
Petroleum Ltd. Channel Lake was created in 1993 as a SaskPower subsidiary. Its role was 
to purchase natural gas for SaskPower. The venture fared poorly and by 1997 had lost $8 
million. SaskPower negotiated the sale of Channel Lake to Alberta based Direct Energy 
Marketing Ltd for $20.8 million. When it came time to sign the contract, however, the 
SaskPower team didn’t notice that the fine print that subtracted $5.2 million from the 
price they thought there were getting. Signed contract in hand the purchasing party 
bought Channel Lake at a steep discount. Messer was fired for the error. The general 
manager of Channel Lake, who had negotiated the sale, was also fired and went on to 
work for Direct Energy. (Rediger, 2004) 
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from SaskPower’s reliance on coal. The Kyoto protocol had raised the possibility of 
greenhouse gas emissions regulation. Despite regulatory uncertainty from the federal 
government, SaskPower began creating annual climate change “action plans” to take “a 
proactive approach to reducing and mitigating greenhouse gases” (SaskPower, 2001: 10). 
Natural gas power generation was an appealing option for SaskPower since it emitted 
greenhouse gas emissions roughly one-third that of coal per unit of electricity generated. 
(Wright, 2014) 
 
The first cogeneration project was a natural gas combined cycle unit at Lloydminster. 
Owned by TransAlta cogeneration, the facility supplies steam to Husky’s Lloydminster 
heavy oil upgrader and sells electricity to SaskPower on a long-term purchase agreement. 
The Meridian project was commissioned in 2000. (SaskPower, 2001; Wright, 2014) 
 
The next cogeneration was created through a private-public partnership agreement with 
ATCO, a private utility based in Alberta. ATCO and SaskPower partnered to build a 
cogeneration plant at the Cory potash mine owned by the Potash Corporation of 
Saskatchewan (the former crown now operating as a private company). The 228 MW 
combined cycle natural gas facility provides steam for potash mining process operations 
and electricity for the Saskatchewan grid. The Cory cogeneration plant was 
commissioned in 2003. (SaskPower, 2001-2003; Wright, 2014) 
 
The move to cogeneration was not full-blown privatization, but was a shift from 
SaskPower’s former policy of exclusively building, owning and operating generation 
facilities. The phrase “co-generation” referred both to the technology being employed and 
generation owned in partnership with another private entity. The move to open new 
generation projects up to public tender won approval from groups such as the libertarian 
minded Frontier Centre for Public Policy (1999) who celebrated the Meridian 
cogeneration project as a successful step in the right direction, “It's taken a couple of 
generations, but marketplace realities are displacing the old ideas of state control and 
ownership.” Under John Wright and the Romanow NDP, the public power system had 
begun to open to private ownership. The introduction of natural gas also reflected a shift 
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away from the coal-hydro nexus that had powered the province for the previous forty 
years.  
 
The Arrival of Wind Power 
Wright’s desire to lower GHGs and diversify the SaskPower electricity system led him to 
approve the first utility-scale wind turbine project in Saskatchewan. The SunBridge Wind 
Power Project was a privately owned joint venture between Suncor Energy Inc. and 
Enbridge Inc., familiar names in the oil and gas industry. The 11 MW project was built in 
2002 in southwest Saskatchewan (SaskPower, 2001: 8). SaskPower built its own 5.9 MW 
facility in the same region, beginning full operation the following year. (SaskPower, 
2001; SaskPower, 2002; SaskPower, 2003; Wright, 2014) 
 
Wind had been under consideration in different forms for many years. There is a 
reference to farmer-owned “wind machines” in the Saskatchewan Reconstruction Council 
report of 1944. At that time, wind turbines, partnered with batteries, offered the 
possibility of supplying power to farmers located far from the existing grid. Several 
farmers did install these systems to power yard lights and water pumps. (Saskatchewan 
Reconstruction Council, 1944) 
 
In 1974 SaskPower tested an “experimental model of a small wind turbine developed by 
the National Research Council” to see how it would fare under “Saskatchewan 
conditions” (SaskPower, 1974: 10).  
 
SaskPower also explored building a commercial-scale wind project in the 1990s, but the 
project was rejected by Jack Messer who stated,  
 
In the final analysis, it was decided the cost premium associated with 
proceeding with the project could not be justified. In today’s rapidly changing 
business environment, it is critical to SaskPower’s customers that efficiencies 
are achieved wherever possible. 
(Jack Messer in Government of Saskatchewan press release, 1995)  
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The wind projects in the early 2000s were small and exploratory, but offered substantial 
returns. Southwest Saskatchewan is home to a rich wind resource and the turbines 
regularly achieve capacity factors of 40% (Interview 2). Their success, and pressure from 
environmentally minded members of the provincial NDP such as Peter Prebble, led 
SaskPower to build a larger project in 2005; the 150 MW Centennial wind power facility. 
(Wright, 2014) 
 
At present SaskPower continues to expand wind power, albeit in a slow and cautious 
manner. The preferred approach is to issue a call for proposals for wind power projects 
and allow private wind developers to respond. This puts developers in the position of 
identifying wind resources, securing land lease agreements, and seeking community 
support. SaskPower then agrees to purchase power from one or more of the applicants. 
Two recent wind projects; at Chaplin and Moosomin respectively were approved in this 
manner. (Confidential interviews, 2015) 
 
The potential for wind substantially outstrips the installed capacity. SaskPower recently 
issued a call for proposals seeking 200 MW of new wind capacity. The market returned 
4000 MW of interest (Confidential interviews, 2015). Despite this rich resource, wind 
made up only 2.7% of electricity generated in Saskatchewan in 2014 (SaskPower, 2014).  
 
Advocates of wind energy have been increasingly vocal in asking SaskPower to speed up 
investment in wind power. Saskatchewan Community Wind, set-up by James Glennie, 
has been working to build support for a community-owned wind project in the Saskatoon 
area. The Green Energy Project of Saskatchewan (GEPS) has outlined pathways to 
increase wind and solar in the province (Bigland-Prichard & Prebble, 2010; Bigland-
Prichard 2010; Bigland-Prichard 2010a; Bigland-Prichard 2011). These advocates call for 
SaskPower to move from 2.7% wind to 25% wind power on the grid in short order.  
 
Problematically SaskPower values wind only as a means of reducing their natural gas 
expenses. Wind’s electricity output is variable, and SaskPower must back-up wind 
capacity with fast-ramping natural gas single-cycle or combined-cycle turbines. The 
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value of power generated by wind power is thus discounted and is valued at the cost of 
avoided natural gas consumption – about 3.5-4 cents/kilowatt-hour – rather than the 
wholesale electricity rate. (Interview 6) 
 
Even as a means of reducing natural gas consumption wind is likely to be more important 
in the future. We live in an era of low natural gas prices, but this was not always so. The 
oil crisis of 1979 led to spikes in the price of oil and natural gas. Natural gas prices were 
also high in the early 2000s. Soon after expanding natural gas capacity with the 
Lloydminster Meridian cogeneration project SaskPower found itself stung by rising 
natural gas prices (SaskPower, 2001). A drought in 2001 led to lower than usual 
hydroelectric production and further worsened the crisis (SaskPower, 2001). As John 
Wright says of the period, “we were getting hammered by natural gas prices, just 
creamed!” (Wright, 2014). The volatile price of natural gas remains a challenge for 
SaskPower’s planning at present.  
 
Wind may be the preferred source of power generation by civil society actors such as the 
Green Energy Project of Saskatchewan (GEPS), but not all Saskatchewan citizens are 
thrilled with the technology. Residents of the Rural Municipality (R.M.) of South 
Qu’Appelle, located 20 kilometres east of Regina, said no to a proposed 50 MW 50-
turbine wind project in March 2014. Renewable Energy Systems Canada (RES) had 
hoped to install a wind monitoring station in the R.M. After significant public outcry, the 
R.M. passed a motion outlining that wind monitoring stations and wind farms would not 
be allowed (Shepherd, 2014). This despite the fact that the region allows high-impact 
uses such as intensive-livestock operations.  
 
The renewables are not getting any political support from the governing Saskatchewan 
Party. Instead Premier Brad Wall has retained a dogged fascination with nuclear power. 
Recent statements on CBC indicate that the Premier hopes for federal government 
support for replacing coal-fired generation with nuclear power (CBC, 2015a).  
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The Nuclear Dream 
The Saskatchewan Party was elected in 2007, ending the sixteen-year tenure of the NDP 
under Roy Romanow and, after 2001, Lorne Calvert. One of Saskatchewan Premier Brad 
Wall’s first actions was to set up the Uranium Development Partnership (UDP) to study 
the future of uranium in Saskatchewan. The UDP was an industry-stacked panel of 
twelve that included the CEOs of uranium mining companies CAMECO (Jerry Grandey) 
and AREVA Canada (Armand Lefèrrere), and the CEO of nuclear power producer Bruce 
Power (Duncan Hawthorne). The board also included an environmental representative, 
the infamous Patrick Moore, who has made a living advertising his former ties to 
Greenpeace while advocating for industries such as nuclear power and chemical 
pesticides. (UDP, 2009) 
 
It came as no surprise that the UDP recommended: the expansion of the uranium mining 
industry in Saskatchewan; the building of a nuclear power plant; construction of a 
research reactor to create medical isotopes; and storage of nuclear waste in the province 
(UDP, 2009).  
 
To their credit the Government of Saskatchewan took these recommendations to the 
people of Saskatchewan. Long-time civil servant Dan Perrins was asked to visit 
communities across the province to get citizen feedback on the recommendations. 
Hundreds of citizens attended the public meetings and nearly all of them opposed the 
proposed expansions of the uranium industry (Perrins, 2009).19  
 
Opposition to a nuclear power plant was particularly strong in the Lloydminster area. In 
2008, Bruce Power, eager to capitalize on the provincial government’s support for 
nuclear power, conducted a feasibility study into building a 1000 Megawatt (MW) reactor 
in Saskatchewan (Bruce Power, 2008). They selected Lloydminster as a candidate site for 
                                                
19 In statistical terms, 84% of submissions (oral or written) that touched upon nuclear 
power opposed nuclear power; on the issue of nuclear waste storage in the province 86% 
of submissions that addressed that issue were opposed.  
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the plant. Straddling the Alberta-Saskatchewan border, Lloydminster would allow the 
possibility of electricity exports to the Alberta grid (Bruce Power, 2008).  
 
In early 2009, before the UDP consultations had occurred, Bruce Power began 
approaching ranchers in the Lloydminster area to secure a location for a nuclear power 
plant. One ranching family had just celebrated the centennial anniversary of their family 
operation, only to find out that Bruce Power was planning to purchase land next door. 
Concerned about the impact to their land and their children’s health, the ranchers 
organized a group called ‘Save Our Saskatchewan’ or S.O.S. for short. S.O.S. and other 
groups in the province attended the public meetings, wrote letters to their MLAs, and sent 
a message to Premier Wall that nuclear power was not wanted in Lloydminster, or 
anywhere in the province.  
 
The Government of Saskatchewan responded to public opposition by stating that they had 
received a “yellow light” for moving ahead on the UDP recommendations (White, 2009). 
This yellow light soon turned green for uranium mining expansions, nuclear waste 
storage proposals, and a nuclear-uranium research centre at the University of 
Saskatchewan. The green light also appears to be back on for nuclear power. Premier 
Brad Wall has recently indicated his support for building small-modular nuclear reactors 
in the province (CBC, 2015a).  
 
While the Saskatchewan Party government has been a public advocate of nuclear power 
in the province, SaskPower has looked at the possibility for several decades. As early as 
1955 SaskPower was sending staff for “training in atomic energy plant design” 
(SaskPower, 1955: 27). SaskPower also drew a link between uranium mining in 
Saskatchewan’s north and the future of nuclear power in the province,  
 
In Saskatchewan’s north, electrical power assists mining companies in the 
Beaverlodge area to recover another vital source of power – uranium – which 
will some day soon, in its turn, be added to the fuels used to generate still 
more electrical power. (SaskPower 1957: 15) 
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In 1973, SaskPower CEO R.R. Keith wrote, “Nuclear energy is expected to play a 
significant role in the Provincial energy supply in the long term as it will probably be 
competitive before Saskatchewan’s coal resources are fully developed” (SaskPower, 
1973: 2). There was the sentiment at that time that nuclear power would become “too 
cheap to meter” and was the electricity generating option of the future.  
 
Under R.R. Keith’s leadership SaskPower took a close look at nuclear power in the early 
1970s. In preparation for a possible investment SaskPower commissioned a series of 
reports: a review of nuclear technology in 1972, a Feasibility Study for a Nuclear Power 
Program in 1973, and an analysis of potential sites for a nuclear power plant in 1975 
(SaskPower, 1972a; SaskPower, 1973a; SaskPower, 1975a). A chief concern in the 1975 
report was the availability of cooling water on the arid prairies. Possible nuclear power 
sites were centered on reliable water supplies like the South Saskatchewan River, Last 
Mountain Lake, and Lake Diefenbaker; the lake that had been created with the 
construction of the Gardiner Dam in the 1960s (SaskPower, 1975a).  
 
The 1970s, however, turned out to be a bad time to invest in a nuclear mega-project, not 
only for Saskatchewan, but for utilities across North America. During this “difficult 
period” costs were spiraling upwards for electrical utilities (Ford, 1997). Inflation rates 
were high, which increased the cost of building nuclear plants. High interest rates made 
borrowing to finance capital construction more expensive (see Figure 3-5 above). New 
plants also took longer to build, and the delay between construction and production 
increased costs. (Ford, 1997) 
 
Utilities that signed on for large capital projects like nuclear power plants were forced to 
increase electricity rates, but this had the effect of curbing the growth of electricity 
demand and reducing revenues. Fears abounded that utilities had entered a “death spiral” 
(see Figure 3-6) of increasing costs and decreasing demand that could bankrupt the 
industry. (Ford, 1997)  
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Figure 3-6 The Utility Death Spiral (Ford, 1997: 69) 
 
SaskPower faced similar problems during the difficult period. The 1974 annual report 
outlined the dual difficulties of increasing costs and long lead times for new capital 
projects,  
 
While revenues from sales of electricity and natural gas were higher in 1974 
than in the previous year, net income declined as a result of accelerated 
inflationary increases in direct costs of materials, supplies, wages and debt 
charges. Increased prices paid for natural gas supplies…contributed 
significantly to the overall trend of increased costs experienced during the 
year…The financial outlook for 1975 and for the years ahead can only be 
viewed with concern if inflationary trends continue. 
 
Public concern regarding the environmental impact of new plant construction, 
as well as lengthening of delivery times for new equipment have made it 
necessary to advance the lead time for planning and design for new facilities 
from approximately four to six years. (R.R. Keith in SaskPower, 1974: 2) 
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Rather than risk an investment in nuclear SaskPower opted instead to continue to do what 
it knew best. The coal-fired Poplar River facility was approved in 1974 with scheduled 
completion in 1979 (SaskPower, 1975).  
 
SaskPower continued to revisit the “nuclear option” in the decades to come. A 1981 study 
mentioned nuclear fusion as a technology likely to reach technical viability by 1990 and 
commercial viability by 2000 (SaskPower, 1981a). But fusion has stubbornly remained a 
horizon-technology; always on the horizon, never reaching technical viability.  
 
The 1991 Saskatchewan Electrical Energy Options Review Panel (SEEORP, 1991) 
included nuclear fission as an option for Saskatchewan’s electricity future and 
recommended “a broad and thorough public review of nuclear power generation in 
Saskatchewan including short- and long-term nuclear waste disposal” (p. 3).  
 
In that same year, a report prepared for AECL outlined the benefits of nuclear power in 
the province (AECL, 1991). Nuclear power would provide electricity that was cleaner 
than coal, didn’t require flooding like hydroelectric dams, and was reliable. The AECL 
(1991) report is notable because it tied nuclear power to the uranium mining industry, 
outlining the “synergies” that could be developed in Saskatchewan. Similar logic would 
appear in the 2009 UDP report, leading some to ask whether the UDP had simply 
republished the old AECL report 18 years later.  
 
AECL (1991) also promised that nuclear power could provide an economic development 
stimulus in Saskatchewan,  
 
As a prototype project, the Saskatchewan Candu-3 reactor could demonstrate 
the benefits and advantages of its technology as the basis for a new, 
Saskatchewan-based export-oriented industry. For instance, the demonstrated 
success of the project in Saskatchewan would help to sell the technology in 
other areas of the world with similar electrical energy needs. 
(AECL, 1991: 27)  
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What was good for AECL, it appeared, was good for Saskatchewan.  
 
Two years after the AECL (1991) and SEEORP (1991) reports SaskPower obtained a 
report written by two east-coast economists commenting on the lessons Saskatchewan 
could learn from New Brunswick’s Point Lepreau I project (Locke & Townley, 1993). 
The Point Lepreau I power plant was of interest to Saskatchewan since New Brunswick 
had a similarly sized grid. It was also an example of the risks of building a nuclear power 
plant. Locke and Townley (1993) describe the project,  
 
The construction of the first of two planned 630-megawatt CANDU reactors 
began in 1974 and was brought into commercial operation 105 months later, 
three years behind schedule. As well, the cost of constructing this reactor was 
between two to three times higher than the original estimates.20 
(Locke and Townley, 1993: 3) 
 
Cost over-runs on the project were attributed to “‘cost plus’ and ‘cost reimbursable’ 
contracts” that allowed suppliers to bill more than original estimates (Locke and 
Townley, 1993: 27). Locke and Townley (1993) warned SaskPower to steer clear of these 
sorts of contracts.  
 
Locke and Townley (1993) also cautioned that locals in New Brunswick were 
disappointed that the construction of the plant didn’t lead to as many new jobs as 
promised. Instead, more senior power union members were hired from outside the 
community. Locke & Townley concluded, “The major lesson for Saskatchewan is, 
therefore, to learn from Lepreau I’s mistakes” (1993: 27).  
 
Despite their warnings, Locke & Townley (1993) also spoke of the potential 
“moderating” influence of nuclear power on electricity prices in New Brunswick. This 
potential upside kept the nuclear conversation open in Saskatchewan. SaskPower 
explored the feasibility of nuclear in the following year with a report from the Energy 
                                                
20 The second planned reactor, Lepreau II, was never built. 
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Research Group (ERG, 1994). The ERG report provided detailed cost estimates for a 
CANDU-3 450-megawatt reactor. The cost estimates were based on AECL supplied data, 
but were scaled (generally up) after comparison to real-world, measured performance at 
plants like Point Lepreau in New Brunswick. On a levelized basis the AECL data 
suggested electricity costs of 2.8-2.9 cents/kilowatt-hour (1994 $CDN) while the revised 
figures were 2.8-3.7 cents/kilowatt-hour (author’s calculations; ERG, 1994).21  
 
The Energy Research Group (ERG) report also estimated the amount of used fuel the 
plant would create, the likely radiation-linked health impacts of operating the plant, and 
the potential damage the would result from a catastrophic event. A quick release nuclear 
accident was predicted to cause 92 health “effects” and $1 billion in property damage 
(1994 $CDN). The Energy Research Group explained, “The primary reason why the 
consequences of a catastrophic accident are relatively small is the low population density 
that would surround a CANDU 3 in Saskatchewan” (1994: 32). In contrast, a similar 
event would cause 1700 health effects in a densely populated region like New York 
(ERG, 1994). This would likely be small comfort to those living near a Saskatchewan 
nuclear accident site.  
 
SaskPower continued to keep an eye on nuclear power during John Wright’s 1999-2004 
tenure as SaskPower CEO.22 At that time a nuclear investment was found wanting. John 
Wright commented on the continued interest in nuclear in a recent interview, 
 
I get a kick out of the nuclear debate, because we’d done a fair amount of 
look-see while I was there. I’m not averse to a nuke, if you can show me the 
                                                
21 In today’s currency the ERG cost estimates would range from 4.1 – 5.3 cents/kwh 
(author’s calculation using Canada all-items CPI). 
22 Nuclear also remained on the table during Pat Youzwa’s 2004-2008 tenure as 
SaskPower CEO. During this time SaskPower conducted another “preliminary siting 
assessment” for a nuclear reactor (SaskPower, 2007a) and drafted an internal document 
outlining “would it would take” to make a nuclear reactor feasible in Saskatchewan 
(SaskPower, 2007b). In the siting document Lake Diefenbaker, the source of 40% of 
Saskatchewan’s drinking water, was selected as the most desirable site due to proximity 
to load and availability of cooling water (SaskPower, 2007a). 
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economics of it work in an all-in basis, considering carbon at $20, $40, $100 
(a tonne). Mathematically it just didn’t work; economically it didn’t work. 
There was no business case for it. The government changes and ‘oh sure 
there’s a business case’. An awful lot of money has been spent pursuing what 
I call ‘the nuclear dream’, ‘Oh it’s right around the corner’. And now they’re 
talking the smaller units. It’s not there, the structure, the nature, the size of 
demand or generating capacity here, you just can’t economically do a nuke. 
So frankly I just wish they’d stop it and put their money into other forms of 
generation that I think down the road will pay off bigger.23  
(John Wright, 2014) 
 
As Wright alludes to, besides the challenge of high costs, SaskPower faces technical 
barriers to building a nuclear reactor in Saskatchewan. In a 2006 presentation SaskPower 
outlined that a nuclear reactor would pose significant problems for the Saskatchewan grid 
(SaskPower, 2006a). At that time the only “economical” units on offer were 1000 MW 
reactors, but SaskPower’s grid was designed so that the largest generating assets have a 
capacity of about 300 MW. A large, 1000 MW reactor would cause several problems for 
SaskPower. (SaskPower, 2006a) 
 
First, a 1000 MW reactor would be sized bigger than any single load center and would 
require new transmission lines for distribution around the province. (SaskPower, 2006a) 
 
Second, a 1000 MW reactor would require SaskPower to build larger interconnections 
with Manitoba and North Dakota to ensure adequate reserve margins. SaskPower is 
“synchronously” connected to these jurisdictions and the entire eastern grid. When a unit 
is forced to shut down in Saskatchewan, the power is instantly backed up through the 
interconnections. With the introduction of a 1000 MW unit SaskPower would require a 
“300% plus increase in interconnection capability” and would “likely require new 500 kV 
                                                
23 During his tenure as CEO Wright focused on diversifying SaskPower’s generation fleet 
with investments in cogeneration, combined cycle natural gas generation, and the 
SaskPower’s first wind turbines. 
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transmission for interconnection reinforcement” (SaskPower, 2006a: 6). The bill for this 
was estimated to be about $700 million (2006 $CDN) (SaskPower, 2006a: 6).  
 
SaskPower (2006a) concluded that a reactor would only make sense in Saskatchewan if it 
were built primarily or even exclusively to export power. This was the same conclusion 
reached in a confidential internal report written in 2007; the Saskatchewan electricity 
system could not host a large (750 MW plus) reactor on its own. Even a medium reactor 
(361-750 MW) would require substantial export to Alberta. Only a small reactor (10-360 
MW) could be integrated into the existing Saskatchewan grid. (SaskPower, 2007b) 
 
The UDP report of 2009 targeted the construction of large reactors, but with an expected 
partnership to sell electricity to Alberta. The report suggested that up to 3000 MW of 
nuclear could be built close to the Alberta border so that 2000 MW of power could be 
exported to the Alberta grid (UDP, 2009). Problematically, Alberta’s electricity system 
runs on a different phase than Saskatchewan and Manitoba. The power would have to be 
converted from AC to DC and back to AC on the Alberta side, or kept completely 
separate from the Saskatchewan grid (Interview 8). It is also unclear what price nuclear 
power from Saskatchewan would fetch in Alberta’s de-regulated electricity market. As a 
must-run generation source a Saskatchewan nuclear plant would have to bid low to sell 
into the Alberta market. The economic return of this scenario was not made clear in the 
UDP report.  
 
The UDP report also encouraged Saskatchewan to “‘follow Ontario’s lead’ in selecting a 
reactor vendor and contractor for the new build project” to avoid “first-of-a-kind” risks 
trying out an untested technology (UDP, 2009: 68). Ontario was widely expected to 
invest in new “third generation” nuclear plants and in 2009 issued a call for proposals 
requesting bids. Recognizing the substantial cost over-runs that had plagued the nuclear 
industry in the past Ontario required that bids include all of the costs; there would be no 
‘cost-plus’ arrangements in this round of construction. Ontario received only one bid 
compliant with their guidelines; a $26 billion dollar bid from AECL to build two 1200 
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MW reactors. The price shocked Energy Minister George Smitherman into suspending 
the tender process, stating the price-tag was “billions” too high. (Hamilton, 2009) 
 
Still, Saskatchewan’s nuclear dream did not die. Premier Wall understands the technical 
constraints to building a large nuclear reactor in Saskatchewan and so now focuses his 
attention on “small, modular reactors.” This puts Saskatchewan in the position of 
building “first-of-a-kind” units, which entails considerable risk of cost over-runs. This is 
especially true when the industry appears to demonstrate a negative “learning-by-doing” 
curve; costs have only increased as more nuclear capacity has been installed in the United 
States and France (see Figure 3-7).  
 
 
(Source: Grubler, 2010: 5186) 
Figure 3-7 Negative Learning-By-Doing in US and French Nuclear Power  
 
Premier Wall also understands the high price tag involved in building nuclear reactors 
and so, like Ontario, has put out his hands for funding support from the federal 
government (CBC, 2015a). After having sold AECL’s CANDU reactor sales division to 
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combined cycles with carbon capture and sequestration (or very
large-scale solar plants in desert areas) would be prime
candidates as well.
Lastly, the French nuclear case has also demonstrated the limits of
the learning paradigm: the assumption that costs invariably decrease
with accumulated technology deployment. The French example
serves as a useful reminder of the limits of the generalizability of
simplistic learning/experience curve models. Not only do nuclear
reactors across all countries with significant programs invariably
exhibit negative learning, i.e., cost increase rather than decline, but
the pattern is also quite variable, defying approximations by simple
learning-curve models, as shown in Fig. 13.
First of all, Fig. 13 provides a useful reminder on the dangers of
‘‘logarithmic compression’’ in the customary double log learning
curve representations. Despite the learning curve metaphor is
clearly not applicable in the case of nuclear in both the US and
France illustrating the limits of simplistic learning curve assump-
tions in technology studies and policy models, the model none-
theless allows an additional insight. The rhythm (as opposed to
the different rates and extent) of cost escalation between the two
countries appears strikingly similar. Initially, cost escalations are
positive, but modest until a threshold value of some 20 GW
installed capacity is reached, followed by a phase of accelerated
cost escalation to another threshold level at some 40–50 GW,
beyond which cost escalation simply skyrockets. At this stage
above observation remains entirely conjectural. Further evidence
frommore country studies (and disclosure of reactor specific costs
data for France to improve upon the estimates presented here) are
needed before above conjecture can be moved to the status of a
hypothesis and explanatory factors explored. However, it seems
not implausible to speculate about the existence of non-linear
threshold effects in the economics of large-scale complex
technology systems that however in the case of nuclear
(as opposed to ITC) work in the opposite direction (i.e. costs
increase rather than decrease).
In symmetry to the often evoked ‘‘learning-by-doing’’ phe-
nomenon, there appears not only to be ‘‘forgetting by not doing’’18
(Rosegger, 1991) but also ‘‘forgetting by doing’’, suggesting that
technology learning possibilities are not only structured by the
actors and institutional settings involved, but are also a funda-
mental characteristic of technologies themselves.
In the case of nuclear, a theoretical framework explaining this
negative learning was discussed by Lovins (1986: 17–21) who
referred to the underlying model as Bupp–Derian–Komanoff–
Taylor hypothesis. In essence, the model suggests that with
increasing application (‘‘doing’’), the complexity of the technology
inevitably increases leading to inherent cost escalation trends that
limit or reverse ‘‘learning’’ (cost reduction) possibilities. In
other words, technology scale-up can lead to an inevitable
increase in systems complexity (in the case of nuclear, full
fuel cycle management, load-following operation mode, and
increasing safety standards as operation experience [and unanti-
cipated problems] are accumulating) that translates into real-cost
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Fig. 13. Average and min/max reactor construction costs per year of completion date (cf. Fig. 12 above) for US and France versus cumulative capacity completed.
Table A1
Average specific French nuclear reactor construction costs inferred from annual
expenditures. Best guess and min/max values for two uncertainty ranges (in 1000
FF98 per kW).
1000 FF98/kW Best guess Min-1 Max-1 Min-2 Max-2
Pre-1973 avg 6.31 5.69 6.31 3.94 7.61
1974 4.23 4.01 4.23 2.88 4.84
1975 4.45 4.21 4.45 3.75 4.89
1976 4.42 4.04 4.42 4.01 5.30
1977 4.38 4.14 4.38 4.07 5.82
1978 5.16 4.72 5.16 4.70 5.83
1979 6.32 5.88 6.32 4.93 6.67
1980 6.91 6.57 6.91 5.88 7.07
1981 6.80 6.54 6.80 6.39 8.37
1982 6.89 6.74 6.89 6.58 9.28
1983 8.03 7.27 8.04 6.90 9.05
1984 7.03 7.03 7.13 6.63 7.14
1985 7.83 7.83 8.03 6.58 8.10
1986 8.73 8.65 8.85 7.19 8.89
1987 9.78 9.78 10.23 8.88 10.26
1988 11.47 11.43 11.72 10.93 11.83
1989 11.40 11.40 11.65 10.39 12.35
1990 10.01 10.01 10.66 7.19 10.79
Post 1990 average 14.54 13.76 14.68 12.22 14.74
18 Cost escalation as a result of knowledge depreciation/obsolescence and/or
erosion institutional capability.
A. Grubler / Energy Policy 38 (2010) 5174–51885186
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SNC-Lavalin in 2011 it is unclear whether a federal government of any stripe will want to 
subsidize Ontario or Saskatchewan’s power bills (Hamilton, 2009; McCarthy, 2011). 
 
And higher power bills might be just what are needed to encourage a culture of energy 
conservation.  
 
A Conservation Mindset 
Rather than the dawn of the nuclear age, the 1970s brought a newfound interest in energy 
conservation. Oil prices spiked with the OPEC oil embargo in 1973 and high oil prices 
increased natural gas prices, which were linked to the price of oil (Ford, 1997). Figure 3-
8 shows the Canadian CPI Energy Index in terms of 12-month percentage change. 
Throughout the 1970s, energy prices increased by an average of nearly 10% per year.  
 
 
(Source: Statistics Canada CANSIM Table: 326-0020; author’s calculations) 
Figure 3-8 Canada CPI Energy Index 12 month percentage change 
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Energy price increases in the 1970s translated into inflation across the board (See Figure 
3-5) and utilities experienced the “difficult period” of increasing costs and construction 
delays mentioned above (Ford, 1997).  
 
Meanwhile, people like Amory Lovins argued that a “soft path” of energy conservation 
and decentralized renewable energy offered a more desirable future than the “hard path” 
of demand growth and big, centralized generation projects like nuclear plants (Lovins, 
1976). Utilities began to rethink their business models.  
 
Prior to this period, the goal in Saskatchewan had been to promote electricity demand, 
not constrain it. In 1928, the SPRC advocated “an active sales campaign” to increase the 
use of “domestic electric utensils” (i.e. household appliances) and expand demand for 
electricity (SPRC, 1928: 113).  
 
The story was much the same in at the newly founded SaskPower Corporation in 1950,  
 
The success of the electric utility depends on the full use of the service by the 
customer. Much more promotion on electrical use, including greater 
purchases of electrical equipment and appliances for our customers, is 
required if electrical consumptions in this Province are to compare with those 
of other provinces. Studies, commenced during the year, on load growths and 
customer usage are continuing in an attempt to make electrical service more 
attractive to customers. (SaskPower, 1950: 4) 
 
SaskPower designed travelling roadshows to promote the “the advantage of electrical 
living” (SaskPower, 1951: 7) and appointed a female spokesperson they called ‘Penny 
Powers’ to share the good news about the advantages of electricity (see Figure 3-9). 
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(Source: SaskPower Flikr, 2014) 
Figure 3-9 ‘Penny Powers’ Promoting An Electric Oven-Range Appliance24 
 
Industrial electric use was also promoted. For example, the oil industry was encouraged 
to build electric-powered pumpjacks (SaskPower, 1952). Industrial demand would help to 
“build load”, especially during off-peak hours, and this would make greater use of the 
province’s generation capacity. 
 
The first glimmer of a conservation mindset came in SaskPower’s 1968 annual report. In 
that year, SaskPower introduced a demand response “peak shaving” program with 
industrial clients, which “resulted in more efficient utilization of plant and equipment” 
(E.B. Campbell in SaskPower, 1968: p. 4).  
 
 
                                                
24 This is a photo of Lillian McConnell, the first ‘Penny Powers’. As SaskPower’s 
(2014a) Flikr account describes, “When the Corporation created the Home Economist 
Division, its first and most iconic Penny was Lillian McConnell. Lillian travelled to fairs, 
exhibitions, community centres and schools to demonstrate electrical appliances to rural 
women. As the Penny Power program grew in popularity, the Saskatchewan Power 
Corporation employed as many as four ‘Pennies’ at home time.” Image available on-line 
at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/saskpower/14321348268/in/album-
72157644953809889/. Last accessed May 13, 2015.   
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The 1970s saw this conservation mindset expand. As the 1974 Annual Report described,  
 
The Corporation has stepped up its public information program emphasizing 
the wise and efficient use of energy. Through advertisements in newspapers 
and on radio and television, customers are being encouraged to reduce cost 
and conserve energy resources by using energy wisely. (SaskPower, 1974: 2) 
 
Penny Power had been transformed into Penny-Pincher.  
 
In 1979 SaskPower formalized its promotion of energy conservation by establishing “an 
Energy Conservation Division to encourage wise and efficient use of energy in the home, 
farm, business and industry” (SaskPower, 1979: 13). A series of conservation programs 
followed in years to come (See Table 3-3).  
 
These energy conservation and demand-side management programs have undoubtedly 
helped to reduce electricity demand in Saskatchewan. Problematically these programs are 
not well integrated with supply planning; instead of being under the management of the 
Supply Planning Department, DSM programs are run out of the Customer Services 
branch of SaskPower. Their appeal as a marketing exercise is likely as or more important 
than the savings they generate.  
 
This separation of supply planning and Demand Side Management (DSM) precludes 
electricity conservation from reaching its full potential. The current target for DSM at 
SaskPower is to save or shift enough demand to prevent 100 MW of capacity 
construction by 2018. The technical potential for DSM savings in Saskatchewan may be 
closer to 400-450 MW, while 300 MW is considered an achievable, albeit more 
aggressive, target (Interview 12). 
 
 
 
 
 90 
SaskPower Energy Conservation Programs 
Program  Era Program Details 
Industrial Demand 
Response 
1968 - 
onwards 
• Industrial customers paid to shift electricity 
demand away from peak times 
Conservation 
education 
1970s • Information pamphlets distributed to homes 
and businesses; e.g. home insulation guide  
• Farm management courses to encourage 
wise electricity use on farms 
• Presence at exhibitions 
PowerWise 1980s-early 
1990s 
• Encourage peak-shifting 
• Grants for solar- or wind-water pumps on 
farms 
• Farm lighting program to encourage 
efficient lighting 
• Energy audits for homes and businesses 
PowerSmart Early 1990s • Participate in national program 
• Encourage ground source heat pumps 
Destination 
Conservation 
2000s-
present 
• Partner with the Saskatchewan 
Environmental Society to deliver 
conservation education 
Green Initiatives Fund 2007-2008 • Partner with the Ministry of Environment to 
provide rebates for energy efficient housing 
EnerGreen/EnerAction 
Go Green 
2008-present • Bulk buying program offering discounted 
lighting to commercial customers 
• Municipal ice rink program; funding to 
reduce power and natural gas costs 
• Energy Performance Contracting with 
Honeywell 
• Demand Response Program for industrial 
customers 
• LED Christmas light promotion 
• Block-heater timer giveaways 
• Refrigerator recycling; pick up old 
inefficient units for free  
(Source: SaskPower Annual Reports 1950-2014) 
Table 3-3 SaskPower Energy Conservation Programs 
 
It is expected that the 100 MW of avoided capacity, or “negawatts”, will be achieved at a 
cost of $.03/kwh, which is substantially less than the cost of new generation. Still, 
SaskPower continues to emphasize capacity expansion, and is far from embracing 
Lovins’ (1976) “soft path” energy strategy. 
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A confounding factor for DSM is the state of Saskatchewan’s electricity grid. For DSM 
to reach its full potential smart grid technology is key. With a smart grid appliances can 
be set to respond to the relative availability (or price) of electricity; for example, air 
conditioners can be cycled on and off throughout the grid to flatten peak demand on hot 
summer days. This would allow SaskPower to shave peak electricity demand and delay 
capacity expansions.  
 
Saskatchewan started on the path to a smart grid in 2010 (see Figure 3-10). Between the 
fall of 2013 and the summer of 2014 108,000 smart meters were installed in the province. 
Concerns arose in late June 2014 when several smart meters “failed catastrophically” by 
either melting or burning (CIC, 2014: 2). By the end of July the count of failed smart 
meters was up to eight. The provincial cabinet responded by ordering all of the installed 
smart meters removed (CIC, 2014). The removal of Saskatchewan’s smart meters was 
nearly complete by February 2015 at a cost of $15 million (CKOM, 2015).  
 
Political columnist Murray Mandryk compared the smart meter “fiasco” to the Channel 
Lake scandal (see footnote 14). In a prescient column on September 10, 2014 Mandryk 
noted that “heads rolled” at SaskPower after Channel Lake. The Crown Investment 
Corporation (CIC), the umbrella organization in charge of Saskatchewan’s Crowns, 
published its review of the smart meters affair on October 27, 2014 and found that 
“customer safety was not given enough of a priority” (CIC, 2014a). SaskPower CEO 
Robert Watson resigned that day (Clancy, 2014). A smart grid for Saskatchewan will now 
have to wait until the memory of smoking meters fades into history.  
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Figure 3-10 Smart Grid Chronology 
(Source: CIC, 2014: 3) 
 
The Past As Present 
At 12:46 A.M. on Sunday September 14th 2014 carbon dioxide (CO2) at the Boundary 
Dam III coal plant began to be captured and successfully prevented from reaching the 
atmosphere (Pipeline News, 2014). Originally built in 1970, SaskPower’s Boundary Dam 
III (BD3) unit was retrofitted with CCS technology to extend its life and allow it to meet 
federal greenhouse gas emissions standards.25 For SaskPower, September 14th, 2014 was 
a significant milestone,  
 
                                                
25 Boundary Dam Unit III was retrofit with a capacity of 160 MW. Because of the 
electricity needed to capture the CO2, the amount of power the plant can deliver to the 
grid has been reduced to 120 MW. (SaskPower, 2015) 
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Timeline of Events 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
  
April 20  
AMI business case 
presented to SaskPower 
Board 
August 18 
SaskPower Board 
approves AMI 
project 
August 20 
Smart Meter 
Program is 
announced 
December 15 
SaskPower Board 
approves Sensus 
and Grid One 
August 24 
Field testing 
starts in 
Hanley 
March 1  
Network Acceptance 
Test starts in Regina 
and area 
October 17 
Full program 
roll out  
June 16  
1st Meter fire reported 
in McLean 
June 30  
3 Fires reported: Pilot 
Butte, Regina and 
Strasbourg-Earl Grey 
July 10  
SaskPower stops 
installations 
July 9  
Meter fire reported on 
Pasqua First Nation 
July 13  
Meter fire reported in 
Saskatoon 
July 26  
2nd Meter fire 
reported in 
Saskatoon 
August 9  
Meter fire reported in 
Regina 
August 16  
CIC announces review 
May 27  
Request for 
Proposal 
(RFP) for 
meter vendor 
issued 
July 30  
Provincial Cabinet orders 
the meters removed 
June 20 
RFP for meter 
installer issued 
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In 2014, we took a giant leap forward by delivering the world’s first 
commercial-scale post-combustion carbon capture and storage (CCS) facility 
at coal-fired Boundary Dam Power Station. We will capture 90% of the 
carbon dioxide created by a generating unit that is capable of providing 
enough power to supply 100,000 homes. Emissions will be reduced by about 
1,000,000 tonnes each year, prolonging the life of an economical, stable and 
secure local fuel source. 
(SaskPower, 2014: 1) 
 
The final price tag for the CCS project is $1.467 billion, which works out to 
$12,225/kilowatt; a price even higher than the nuclear plants rejected by Ontario in 2009 
(Zinchuk, 2015; Hamilton, 2009). Easing the burden for Saskatchewan, the federal 
government contributed $240 million to the project (Mandryk, 2014a).  
 
Further revenue will be generated by selling captured CO2 to the oil company Cenovus 
for use in enhanced oil recovery (EOR). This source of revenue has set off alarms. For 
every tonne of CO2 captured and injected into an oil well “about 2.7 tonnes of carbon 
dioxide are eventually emitted from combustion of the oil recovered” (Banks and 
Bigland-Pritchard, 2015: 17 citing figures from Wong et al, 2013). Some of the CO2 
injected into the oil wells will also return to the surface when the oil is extracted (Banks 
& Bigland-Pritchard, 2015).  
 
Political columnist Murray Mandryk (2014a) has argued “the real winner” of the CCS 
project is “Calgary-based Cenovus” since the company will make millions in added 
revenue by injecting CO2 into its aging oil fields. Banks & Bigland-Pritchard (2015) 
come to a similar conclusion, “The predominant reason for the CCS to go ahead appears 
to be to recover more oil from south east Saskatchewan and reward the oil producing 
companies” (p. 20).  
 
The history of the CCS concept in Saskatchewan suggests there is some truth to these 
claims. As early as 1994 SaskPower discussed “Investigating the practicality of capture 
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carbon dioxide from our coal-fired power stations for use in enhanced oil recovery” 
(SaskPower, 1994: 16). The idea is mentioned again in 1995’s Annual Report where 
SaskPower stated it was “Studying the potential for capture carbon dioxide from power 
plants for use in enhanced oil recovery” (SaskPower, 1995: 19). Enhanced oil recovery 
appears to have been part of the rationale for CCS from the beginning.  
 
For Premier Brad Wall, the link to Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) is a strength of the 
CCS project, “Legislators around the world view CO2 basically as a pollutant. We’re 
getting paid for it in Saskatchewan because of this clean coal project. That’s a positive 
thing” (Brad Wall in Pipeline News, 2014: A14).  
 
The Premier sees CCS as providing a triple benefit by extending oil production in aging 
oil wells – which in turn increases provincial royalties – saving jobs in the Estevan coal 
plants, and indicating Saskatchewan’s commitment to greenhouse gas emissions 
reduction. On this last point, Wall believes that Boundary Dam III will help convince the 
United States government that the oil-producing provinces of Canada are environmental 
stewards. This in turn can help convince the U.S. to approve the Keystone XL pipeline: 
 
I’ve been saying, when we’re down in the United States on Keystone, even, 
we should reference projects like this. This particular (U.S.) administration, 
they want some environmental elbow room from the different environmental 
NGOs that hate, that don’t like Keystone. They need some environmental 
elbow room to quote-unquote “deal with the Canadians.” That pipeline is 
definitely a deal with Canadians. 
 
We’re able to go down, and have been going down, saying, “Look at the 
project, because in your coal states it might have an application. But also look 
at it as validation that we’re serious about the environment, and tell those 
worried about Canada in general, they ought not to. In Canada, this is the 
largest per-capita project related to CO2 mitigation.” I think it helps on that 
front as well. (Brad Wall quoted in Pipeline News, 2014: A15) 
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There are other ways for Saskatchewan to improve its image in the United States that 
don’t involve carbon capture and storage. Banks & Bigland-Pritchard (2015) use 
calculations by James Glennie to show that an investment in wind could generate the 
equivalent amount of electricity for $300 million less than the Boundary Dam project. 
Mike Monea, project manager of the Boundary Dam CCS project, responded to this 
critique by pointing to the variability of electricity generated by wind,  
 
Last Sunday we hit a peak (of power consumption) at 6 p.m., suppertime. We 
had one megawatt coming from our wind turbines. There was no wind 
blowing. What did we use? We used coal-fired plants for the baseload, so 
nobody had disruption in their power. 
(Mike Monea quoted in Zinchuk, 2015) 
 
As Monea implies, SaskPower does not plan to rely on variable renewables like wind to 
replace coal-fired generation because they cannot act as reliable baseload power. This is a 
perspective that resonates with the Financial Editor of the Regina LeaderPost. After the 
release of the critique of CCS by Banks & Bigland-Pritchard (2015), Bruce Johnstone 
wrote, 
 
Another day, another report from an alternative energy-public policy group 
slamming the $1.47-billion carbon capture and storage (CCS) project at 
SaskPower’s Boundary Dam power station at Estevan. 
 
But is it realistic to assume the world, which currently relies on coal for more 
than 40 per cent of its electricity generation, can easily turn to natural gas or 
renewables for its baseload power? With huge developing countries, like 
China and India, still dependent on coal-fired generation, what is the 
responsible alternative? 
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I submit that CCS or clean coal is one solution. It may not be a silver bullet, 
but it does provide us some “breathing room,’’ while we reduce our 
dependence on fossil fuels. 
 
Wind energy is also a solution; so are solar, biomass and other renewables. 
SaskPower is at 25 per cent renewable energy today and hopes to generate 10 
per cent of its capacity from wind by 2020. But SaskPower needs baseload 
power, like coal and natural gas-fired generation, to keep the lights on. 
 
By definition, intermittent energy sources, like wind, can’t provide baseload 
power, and it proponents are deluding themselves and the public if they think 
it can. 
(Johnstone, 2015a) 
 
Interestingly, Johnstone (2015a) points to the viability of natural gas for baseload 
generation. With the exception of Boundary Dam III, SaskPower appears to prefer that 
route.  
 
The Natural Gas – Wind Nexus? 
Coal has been king in Saskatchewan for over fifty years. The grid was built to move 
electrons generated by the “cheap lignite coal” found near Estevan and Coronach to load 
centres like Regina. In interviews with SaskPower employees past and present there was 
a sentiment that SaskPower possesses a “coal culture”. Generations of SaskPower 
employees have spent their careers working within the coal-based system. It is little 
surprise that SaskPower is exploring CCS as a way to keep coal alive in Saskatchewan.  
 
In the past fifteen years, however, a shift has been taking place. Figure 3-11 provides a 
look at Saskatchewan’s electricity generation by type from 1954-2015. This figure shows 
that natural gas-fired generation has quietly been growing and electricity generated by 
coal plants has stagnated and begun to decline.  
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(Source: SaskPower Annual Reports, 1951-2014) 
Figure 3-11 SaskPower Electricity Generation by Generation Type 
 
The expansion of natural gas generation began in the early 2000s with cogeneration 
projects like the 228 MW Cory Potash facility and the 210 MW Lloydminster Meridian 
plant mentioned above. More recent natural gas projects include the 260 MW combined 
cycle North Battleford Power Centre (2013), the 86 MW simple-cycle Spy Hill plant 
(2011), and the 138 MW simple-cycle Yellowhead plant (2010). The Queen Elizabeth 
Power Station in Saskatoon is also being expanded and retrofit to make it a combined 
cycle natural gas plant. The retrofit should be complete by 2016. (SaskPower Annual 
Reports, 2000-2014) 
 
The move to natural gas generation has helped SaskPower lower the greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG) intensity of its electricity output from highs of around 800 tonnes 
CO2e/Gigawatt-hour (GWH) to 660 tonnes CO2e/GWh in 2014 (See Table 3-4). These 
natural gas plants will also be compliant with the federal government’s electricity sector 
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GHG regulations, which require all new power plants to be ‘as clean as gas’ and emit 
only 420 tonnes CO2e/GWh (CEPA, 2012).  
 
  1990 2000 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2014 
Generation Intensity 
(tonnes CO2e/GWh) 798 858 780 750 709 793 800 745 660 
(Sources: Environment Canada, 2013; SaskPower, 2014) 
Table 3-4 Saskatchewan Electricity GHG Intensity 
 
The move is also changing the business model of SaskPower. Of the six natural gas fired 
facilities built since 2000, three are privately owned (Meridian, Spy Hill, and North 
Battleford), and one (Cory) involves a significant private partnership. Brad Wall has kept 
his promise not to sell off Saskatchewan’s Crown Corporations, but Saskatchewan 
citizens may one day wake up to realize that SaskPower has become only a system 
operator and electricity distributor, not a power generator.26  
 
The increase in natural gas-fired generation offers an effective back-up for variable wind 
power. New natural gas-fired plants can ramp quickly to fill in supply when the winds die 
down (Interview 2). And, as mentioned above, SaskPower values wind for its ability to 
reduce the use of natural gas fuel.  
 
The SaskPower system was home to 198 MW of utility-scale wind capacity in 2014. This 
is slated to double by 2018 with the installation of a 23 MW wind farm at Morse and a 
177 MW wind farm at Chaplin (SaskPower, 2014). At that time wind will comprise just 
under 10% of system capacity.  
 
Will the trend towards natural gas combined cycle generation paired with wind power 
continue in Saskatchewan? Is the coal-hydro nexus being replaced with a natural gas –
wind nexus?  
                                                
26 Under pressure from public sector unions and the NDP Brad Wall committed to not 
sell Saskatchewan’s Crown Corporations in his 2007 election campaign. The promise 
helped remove fear that Wall’s government would be a repeat of the Devine era.  
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Lessons From the Past Informing the Future 
By understanding the lessons of history we might better understand the future of the 
Saskatchewan electricity system. Figure 3-12 summarizes some of the major events in 
Saskatchewan’s electricity history. The following lessons can be learned from this 
history: 
 
• Rural electrification (1950s): Tommy Douglas called rural electrification his 
greatest achievement. This feat shows that massive change to the electricity 
system is possible when strong political will is combined with institutional skill 
and effort.  
• E.B. Campbell and Cumberland House (1965-1989): SaskPower’s first 
hydroelectric dam was built without adequate consideration of the downstream 
impacts on residents of Cumberland House. Power projects in the modern era 
must seek consent through consultation, or risk lengthy court battles and 
opposition.  
• Boundary Dam III & Retrofit to CCS (1970-present): Coal has formed the 
backbone of Saskatchewan’s electricity system for over 60 years. This has 
created a deeply ingrained coal culture at SaskPower, path dependency in 
electricity distribution networks, and a constituency of power workers and coal 
miners in the Estevan and Coronach regions. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
is appealing because it allows Saskatchewan’s coal-fired power industry to 
continue, and provides an ancillary benefit to the oil and gas industry. Campaigns 
to retire coal will face opposition from these interests.  
• Inflation and Energy Crisis (1973-1982): Periods of rising prices make capital 
investment costly. Large projects with time delays worsen the situation. Energy 
conservation emerged as a useful solution to utilities’ woes in the 1970s. Energy 
conservation may find a more receptive audience in periods when cost pressures 
are increasing.  
• Deregulation and Private Partnerships (1990s-present): Saskatchewan’s 
electricity system was under centralized public control for much of its history. 
Since the year 2000 public-private-partnerships and independent power 
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producers have become an important part of Saskatchewan’s electricity system. 
The SaskPower business model of keeping electricity rates low through average 
cost pricing remains, but at some point SaskPower may find itself to be little 
more than an electricity distribution company. This may have implications for the 
nature of the grid; private interests are unlikely to pursue expensive generation 
technologies such as small, modular nuclear reactors or carbon capture and 
storage (CCS). To date independent power producers have been building 
cogeneration facilities, natural gas plants, and wind farms.  
• GHG Regulation (2012-present): The federal government’s coal-fired electricity 
regulations have placed an expiry date on Saskatchewan’s coal plants. They must 
either be shuttered or retrofit with CCS at the end of their life expectancy. 
SaskPower will be forced to make decisions on expanding the CCS project to 
include Boundary Dam IV and V within the next few years. If SaskPower 
decides to retrofit those plants to CCS they will then have until 2025 to make the 
transition. If they decide not to retrofit the plants they must be shuttered by 2019  
(CEPA, 2012). Yet, the high cost of Boundary Dam III makes continued 
investments in CCS politically risky. Will SaskPower allow coal to wither in 
Saskatchewan?  
With these lessons from history in mind this dissertation explores scenarios for the future 
of Saskatchewan’s electricity system. The history of the system has been filled with 
intrigue, rolling heads, and Canadian firsts. Where will the future lead?
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Figure 3-12 History of the Saskatchewan Electricity System
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Chapter 4 – Renewable Options for A Low-Carbon Future 
 
Renewable Energy Potential in Saskatchewan 
In this chapter I explore the constraints shaping a renewable-energy focused pathway for 
Saskatchewan’s electricity future. Renewable energy options in Saskatchewan include: 
hydroelectric dams, wind turbines, solar photovoltaics, biomass plants, geothermal plants, 
solar thermal plants, and hydroelectricity imported from Manitoba. I explore the potential 
for each resource in turn.  
 
Hydroelectric Potential 
Saskatchewan contains three important watersheds with hydroelectric potential: the 
Saskatchewan River watershed, including the North Saskatchewan and South 
Saskatchewan watersheds upstream; the Churchill River watershed; and the Lower 
Mackenzie watershed in the far north. Saskatchewan is currently home to seven 
hydroelectric facilities totaling 864 Megawatts (MW) of capacity. Table 4-1 describes 
each facility and in Figure 4-1 existing hydroelectric facilities are indicated with the solid 
blue water drop. 
 
Hydroelectric Facility Capacity Watershed 
Athabasca - Wellington 5 MW Lower Mackenzie 
Athabasca - Waterloo 8 MW Lower Mackenize 
Athabasca - Charlot River 10 MW Lower Mackenzie 
Island Falls 111 MW Churchill River 
Nipawin 255 MW Saskatchewan River 
E.B. Campbell 289 MW Saskatchewan River 
Coteau Creek 186 MW Saskatchewan River 
Table 4-1 Saskatchewan Hydroelectric Facilities (Year = 2015) 
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(Source: Fix and Korteling, 2015b) 
Figure 4-1 Saskatchewan Hydroelectric Facilities Built and Proposed  
 
By all accounts, the existing 864 MW of hydroelectric capacity will continue in operation 
indefinitely; expenses associated with repowering the hydroelectric facilities are 10-20% 
the cost of building a new hydroelectric facility, transmission lines are in place, and 
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hydroelectric power does not release greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) through the 
combustion of fossil fuels.27 
 
The potential for expanding hydroelectric power has been explored several times 
throughout Saskatchewan’s history. As outlined in Chapter 3 (See Figure 3-4), David 
Cass-Beggs (1960) sketched out a plan for a series of hydroelectric dams along the South 
Saskatchewan and Saskatchewan Rivers. At that time, SaskPower was preparing to build 
the E.B. Campbell facility (then called Squaw Rapids). The Coteau Creek (1969) and 
Nipawin (1986) facilities were later completed in accordance with Cass-Beggs’ 
hydroelectric plan.  
 
Future hydroelectric potential in Saskatchewan varies by watershed. In the Saskatchewan 
River watershed there is potential for dams at the Forks and Choiceland (See Figure 4-1). 
A dam at the Forks could contain “five 84 MW units” equaling 420 MW total output, 
while a dam at Choiceland could host “four 75 MW units”, creating 300 MW of output 
(McClement and Campbell, 1977: 51). There is also potential to install two additional 84 
MW units at Nipawin to increase capacity at that station from 255 MW to over 420 MW 
(McClement and Campbell, 1977). In total this represents a potential to double the 
current hydroelectric capacity in the province on the Saskatchewan River alone.  
 
There is also potential to expand hydroelectric potential on the Churchill River. As 
outlined in Chapter 3, SaskPower proposed to build a 300 MW hydroelectric dam at the 
Wintego site on the Churchill River in 1973. This proposal was met with stiff opposition 
from Saskatchewan First Nations and was rejected by the Churchill River Board of 
                                                
27 There are, however, GHG emissions associated with flooding land to create a 
hydroelectricity facility. Barros et al. (2011) estimated that the sum total of annual 
emissions from the world’s hydroelectric reservoirs is approximately 58 Megatonnes 
(Mt) as carbon dioxide (CO2) and 3 Mt as methane (CH4) from the reservoir surface. 
Adding the action of turbines and river outflow increases this estimate roughly twofold. 
Lakes and streams generally, unless they are eutrophic, release CO2 and CH4. Releases 
of GHGs from hydroelectric reservoirs are greatest in tropical regions and lower in 
temperate and boreal forest regions. (Barros et al., 2011) 
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Inquiry (CRBI, 1978; Waldram, 1993). This lack of “social license” poses a barrier for 
future hydroelectric development on the Churchill.   
 
SaskPower is having better success obtaining social license for the Tasi Twé 
hydroelectric project in the far north of Saskatchewan, near Black Lake. Formerly called 
the Elizabeth Falls project, the Tasi Twé project is a partnership between SaskPower and 
the local Black Lake First Nation (Golder and Associates, 2012). If successful the Tasi 
Twé project will result in the creation of a 42-50 MW hydroelectric facility on the Black 
Lake River in the Lower Mackenzie watershed. Other small hydroelectric projects could 
be built in the watershed to provide a total of 323 MW of additional capacity. These 
northern dams are, however, quite expensive to build. The most affordable are likely in 
the range of $11,000-15,000/kilowatt capital cost, while the most expensive may cost as 
much as $30,000/kw to build (Interview 17).  
 
Watershed Existing Potential Additions Total 
Saskatchewan River 730 MW 1000 MW 1730 MW 
Churchill River 111 MW 480 MW 591 MW 
Lower Mackenzie 23 MW 300 MW 323 MW 
Total 864 MW 1780 MW 2644 MW 
Table 4-2 Potential Hydroelectric Capacity  
 
In total, there is potential to add up to 1780 MW of additional hydroelectric capacity in 
Saskatchewan, which would bring the provincial total to 2644 MW.  
 
Wind Power 
Residents of Saskatchewan know very well the strength and frequency of prairie winds. 
Though the bane of winter existence in the province, these winds provide an opportunity 
for near zero-carbon electricity generation.28 Figure 4-2 provides a look at the wind 
                                                
28 Note that while wind turbines do not emit greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) directly in 
their operation, emissions are generated in the process of manufacturing, installing, 
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resource in southern Saskatchewan. Regions in dark pink and orange are home to the 
highest average wind speeds.  
 
 
 (Source: PARC, 2015) 
Figure 4-2 Southern Saskatchewan Average Wind Speeds 
 
High average wind speeds in southern Saskatchewan provide a high-quality wind power 
resource. Capacity factors in the province average 36-40% in the best locations.29 There 
are five large wind farms currently operating in Saskatchewan and several more in 
development. Table 4-3 summarizes the state of operating and proposed wind projects in 
the province.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
servicing, and dismantling turbines. I estimate the level of embodied GHGs for each 
generation technology in Chapter 9.  
29 The capacity is a measure of the amount of electricity generated by a facility relative to 
the maximum amount it could generate. It is calculated by dividing the amount of 
electricity generated in a given period of time by the maximum amount of electricity the 
installation could have been expected to generate over that period (see Appendix 5A 
Equation 5A.4).  
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(Source: Reproduced with permission from SaskWind, 2015) 
Table 4-3 Wind Power Projects in Saskatchewan 
 
SaskPower has committed to having wind power contribute 10% of provincial electricity 
generation capacity by 2020 (Mohr, 2015).30 By 2019 217 MW of additional wind 
capacity will be installed, including a 177 MW wind farm near Chaplin and a 20 MW 
wind farm at Riverhurst – both located in the vicinity of Moose Jaw, and a 20 MW 
project at Grenfell, which is located 126 km east of Regina. An additional 100 MW of 
wind power will be developed to meet the 2020 target (Mohr, 2015; SaskWind, 2015).  
 
SaskPower has also made the commitment that by 2030 wind will compose 20% of total 
electricity generating capacity or approximately 1000-1100 MW (Mohr, 2015). Meeting 
the 2030 target will require another 500-600 MW of wind power in the decade between 
2020-2030 (SaskWind, 2015). This represents a change in plans for SaskPower. Former 
CEO Robert Watson stated in 2013 that wind would “not in our lifetime” compose more 
than 8% capacity in the province (StarPhoenix quoted by SaskWind, 2015). SaskPower’s 
new CEO Mike Marsh appears to be more favourable towards the technology.  
 
In a regional context SaskPower’s goals appear eminently achievable. Neighbouring 
North Dakota had 1886 MW of wind capacity installed at the end of 2014, which 
provided 17.6% of total electricity generated in that state (U.S. DoE, 2015). South Dakota 
                                                
30 Due to the lower capacity factor for wind it will supply about 6% of electricity 
(measured in GWh) when it comprises 10% of capacity (measured in MW).  
Project
Operational.
Status
No..of.
Turbines
Average.
Turbine.
Size
Turbine.
Mnfct.
Total.
Capacity.
MW
Nearest.
Town/City Owner
Cypress'Wind Since'2002 16 0.66 Vestas 10.6 Gull'Lake SaskPower
Sunbridge Since'2002 17 0.66 Vestas 11.2 Gull'Lake Suncor'&'Enbridge
Centennial Since'2006 83 1.8 Vestas 149.4 Swift'Current SaskPower
Red'Lily Since'2011 16 1.65 Vestas 26.4 Moosomin Concorde'Pacific
Cowessess Since'2013 1 0.8 Enercon 0.8 Regina Cowessess'First'Nation
Morse Since'2015 10 2.3 Siemens 23.0 Morse Algonquin'Power
Chaplin Development 77 2.3 Siemens 177.1 Chaplin Algonquin'Power
Western'Lily Development ? ? 20.0 Grenfell Gaia'Power'Inc.
Riverhurst Development 5 2 10.0 Riverhurst Capstone
Total.Operational 143 221.4
Total.Operational,.Under.Construction.&.Developed 428.5
Unallocated Additional'Operational'by'2020 100.0
Unallocated Additional'Operational'by'2030 600.0
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had 803 MW installed at the end of 2014, which on a smaller grid produced over 25% of 
total electricity generated in that state (U.S. DoE, 2015). At 20% capacity, SaskPower 
could expect to produce about 12% of their total electricity from wind (SaskWind, 2015). 
 
The potential for wind power is even higher than the 1100 MW Saskatchewan can expect 
by 2030. When SaskPower issued their 2011 Request for Proposals for 200 MW of wind 
power they received project submissions totaling 4000 MW (Interview 4). The total wind 
resource is estimated to be even greater than this and exceeds any anticipated levels of 
electricity demand (Interview 3).  
 
Meaningful limits to the wind power resource are largely social, not physical. As outlined 
in Chapter 3, the R.M. of South Qu’Appelle rejected a wind monitoring station in 2014 
due to concerns from local residents that a wind farm would impose negative health 
impacts and decreased property values. As one of the residents of the R.M. of South 
Qu’Appelle stated, “There are well documented cases of health problems with these 
things – constant noise, people can’t sleep, people can’t have their windows open” 
(Whittaker quoted in Kaul, 2014). A proposed wind turbine at the Saskatoon landfill 
faced opposition for the same reasons (Raine, 2011). Ontario has seen a similar pushback 
against wind projects. Opposition to wind farms by individuals in Ontario is significantly 
associated with perceived negative impacts to human health (Baxter et al., 2013). Anti-
wind groups have been successful at creating concerns about these health impacts, 
despite a lack of scientific evidence that these impacts exist.31 Critics of wind in Ontario 
have also raised the spectre of decreased property values near wind developments. The 
evidence does not support this concern. Vyn and McCullough (2014) conducted a 
hedonic analysis of the impacts on property values of living near a wind turbine in 
Melancthon Township Ontario. Their findings “suggest that these turbines have not 
impacted the value of surrounding properties” (Vyn and McCullough, 2014: 388).  
                                                
31 Health Canada has investigated the health impacts of living near wind turbines. Their 
preliminary results suggest no relation between living near a wind turbine and negative 
health impacts such as illness, chronic disease, stress, or sleep disturbance. They did 
however, find evidence that exposure to wind turbine noise is associated with annoyance. 
(Health Canada, 2014) 
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Concerns about impacts on health and property values may mask a deeper concern about 
lost community control over decision-making (Christidis and Law, 2012). The Ontario 
Green Energy and Economy Act removed the ability of municipalities to say no to wind 
projects. That loss of citizen control encourages resentment and opposition. It can also 
increase risk perception; Slovic (1987) has shown that a feeling that a risk is out of one’s 
control increases feelings of dread and heightens risk perceptions. Though inconvenient 
in the short term, Saskatchewan would do well to maintain the ability of rural 
municipalities to say no to wind turbines. By placing this control in the hands of local 
citizens, trust in wind turbine technology can be enhanced in the long-run.  
 
Public resistance to wind energy development in Saskatchewan will likely be less than 
experienced in Ontario due to the areas with strong wind resources being sparsely 
populated relative to Ontario. The population density in most areas of southern 
Saskatchewan is less than 1 person per square kilometer (km2) (Figure 4-3). The 
population density of southern Ontario is between 10-50 persons per km2 (NRCAN, 
2014).32 This makes it easier to locate wind turbines away from farmhouses and small 
towns. 
 
Concerns remain, however, about impacts of wind energy development on wildlife. For 
example, the proposed Chaplin wind facility will be located near a bird sanctuary. 
Respected naturalist and author Trevor Herriot was quoted in the LeaderPost asking,  
 
“Why put them there? Why not go to a place where there is not an 
internationally significant, globally important nesting and migrating area 
for shorebirds? Yes, we've got to deal with climate change and our carbon 
footprint, but we can't do it at the expense of wildlife.”  
(Herriot in Lypny, 2015) 
 
 
                                                
32 Ontario requires wind turbines to be setback a minimum of 550 meters from the nearest 
“noise receptor” (Ontario, 2013: 74). 
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(Source: NRCAN, 2014) 
Figure 4-3 Population Density in Southern Saskatchewan 
 
Research has shown that wind turbines kill birds, and even more often, kill bats. Bat kills 
typically occur at low wind rotor speeds and increase during the autumn southbound 
migration period, especially when the moon is shining bright (Baerwald and Barclay, 
2011). Seasonal changes to the management of wind turbine operation can decrease bat 
kills (Baerwald et al., 2009)33 as can locating turbines outside of bird and bat migratory 
routes. Nonetheless, some level of bird and bat kills is inescapable with existing 
                                                
33 Baerwald et al. (2009) found that bat kills could be reduced at an Alberta wind farm by 
increasing the wind speed at which a wind turbine rotor becomes active. A higher wind 
speed “cut-in” point means that the turbine rotor and blades will be motionless at low 
wind speeds. No electricity will be produced at these times. 
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technology and management practices. This has led one renewable energy proponent to 
declare, “Wind isn’t the future. It kills birds. The future is solar.”34 (Interview 31) 
 
Solar Photovoltaics  
Saskatchewan has the best solar resource in Canada (See Figure 4-4); Regina 
Saskatchewan is Canada’s sunniest provincial capital, and Estevan, in the southeast 
corner of the province, is the sunniest city in Canada (NRCAN, 2015a).  
 
 
Figure 4-4 Canada’s Renewable Energy Potential (SCD, 2015b) 
 
Not only is the solar resource the best in Canada, it is also one of the best in the world 
(see Table 4-4). Regina has solar photovoltaic potential greater than Sydney, Australia 
and much greater than German cities like Berlin. The solar resource in Estevan, which 
                                                
34 It is worth noting that 95% of human-related bird deaths in Canada result from 
“predation by feral and pet cats, and collisions with road vehicles, houses, and 
transmission lines” (Calvert et al., 2013: 6).  
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achieves 1379 kwh/kw in a typical year, is nearly as high as the solar potential in Mexico 
City (1425 kwh/kw). (NRCAN, 2015a). The greatest solar resource in Saskatchewan is 
located in the southern half of the province, which happens to coincide with the majority 
of the province’s population and electricity demand. Estevan also happens to be the 
centre of Saskatchewan’s coal-fired power industry meaning that high-voltage 
transmission lines connect the region to Regina and other load centres.  
 
 
(Source: NRCAN, 2015a) 
Table 4-4 Solar Photovoltaic in Cities Around the World 
 
Despite the cold winters, the solar resource in Saskatchewan is present throughout the 
course of the year (see Figure 4-5). Residents of the province will attest that, though the 
winters are cold, the sun is often shining. The cold temperatures offer an additional boost 
to solar potential in the province; the photovoltaic process is more efficient in colder 
temperatures (Masters, 2004). As one participant remarked, the best place for solar is a 
“cold desert” (Interview 28); Saskatchewan is just that. Saskatchewan’s northern location 
does, however, mean that the days are shorter in the winter months and the solar potential 
drops accordingly (Figure 4-5).  
 
City
Yearly*PV*
potential*
(kWh/kW)
Cairo,'Egypt 1635
Capetown,'South'Africa 1538
New'Delhi,'India 1523
Los'Angeles,'U.S.A 1485
Mexico'City,'Mexico 1425
Regina,*Saskatchewan 1361
Sydney,'Australia 1343
Rome,'Italy 1283
Rio'de'Janeiro,'Brazil 1253
Ottawa,'Canada 1198
Beijing,'China 1148
Washington,'D.C.,'U.S.A. 1133
Paris,'France 938
St.'John's,'Newfoundland/Labrador 933
Tokyo,'Japan 885
Berlin,'Germany 848
Moscow,'Russia 803
London,'England 728
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Figure 4-5 Saskatchewan Solar Potential by Month in Four Select Cities 
 
SaskPower does not currently own any utility-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) facilities. 
Private homeowners and businesses have installed smaller residential and commercial 
rooftop solar systems in the province, in part supported by the Ministry of Environment’s 
Go Green fund. A comprehensive inventory of those projects is not currently available.  
 
Biomass Potential 
The majority of biomass potential in Saskatchewan lies along the boreal forest fringe. 
The feedstock along the forest fringe consists of waste fibre leftover from pulp and paper 
mills and sawmill operations. The Meadow Lake First Nation is currently developing a 
biomass project using fuel from the latter. The project will be located beside the NorSask 
sawmill in Meadow Lake and will offer roughly 36 MW of power (Interview 12). In 
total, it is estimated that 120 MW of biomass potential exists along the forest fringe 
(McKenzie quoted in Bigland-Pritchard and Prebble, 2010).  
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Although burning the biomass does release carbon dioxide (CO2), these emissions are 
treated as carbon neutral. This assumes that the trees will regrow where they have been 
cut and uptake an equivalent amount of CO2 during their regrowth. As long as the forest 
is continuously regrown the net addition of CO2 to the atmosphere will be zero.   
 
Another biomass resource lies in the garbage dumps of the province. At a landfill, 
organic matter rots in an anaerobic state and creates methane gas. The leaching of this 
landfill methane gas is a measurable contributor to climate change. In 2013, 32 
kilotonnes (kt) of methane (805 kt of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)) was released due 
to solid waste disposal on land in Saskatchewan; (Environment Canada, 2015a). Rather 
than letting it leach to the atmosphere, the City of Saskatoon is using this landfill gas to 
generate power. Tubes drilled into the landfill extract the methane, which is then burned 
to generate electricity onsite. The Saskatoon plant has an electricity generating capacity 
of 3.2 MW (CBC, 2012; City of Saskatoon, 2015). Proposals are now being made to 
install solar photovoltaic panels at the landfill to supplement the electricity generated 
using landfill gas (Interview 20).  
 
Other smaller biomass projects can use crop residues from agriculture, manure from 
intensive livestock operations, and landfill methane. It is assumed these smaller projects 
could provide up to 30 MW of biomass power for a total of 150 MW of biomass potential 
in the province.  
 
Geothermal Potential 
Deep geothermal heat has great potential for space heating and industrial processes in 
Saskatchewan, but limited potential for direct electricity generation. Geothermal energy 
for space heating was explored at the University of Regina (UofR) in the late 1970s. In 
1978 a geothermal test hole was drilled at the UofR campus to a depth of 2226 meters. 
Brought to the surface from this depth, the water has a temperature of 58-59°C. This hot 
water was sufficient to meet a 2 MW heating load for a proposed sports complex. The 
project was discontinued when plans for the sports complex fell through and oil prices 
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collapsed. The drill-hole remains, as does the potential to drill a second hole to complete 
the loop and use geothermal heat at the University of Regina. (Vigrass et al., 2007) 
 
Figure 4-6 shows the approximate temperatures at the bottom of the sedimentary layer in 
Southern Saskatchewan, presented using isotherms at 5°C intervals. 
 
 
(Source: Vigrass et al., 2007: 19) 
Figure 4-6 Approximate Temperature at the Base of the Sedimentary Section  
 
The sedimentary layer is deepest in the southeast corner of the province near Estevan. 
This depth leads to higher temperatures, but even at 110°C this deep geothermal heat is 
not high enough to efficiently generate electricity. It does have the potential to offset 
natural gas use for space heating and process heating, but those uses are beyond the scope 
of this dissertation and geothermal is not included in the analysis.  
 
Saskatchewan Geological Survey 19 Summary of Investigations 2007, Volume 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 - Approximate temperature at the base of the sedimentary section in Saskatchewan south of latitude 53°N. Interval 
is 5°C. 
reduced to 15.5°C (60°F). This would increase the heat extracted for both options (Table 11). In addition, a gas-
fired or oil-fired boiler might be required to satisfy peak loads during the c ldest weather and to serve as ba kup. 
Heating industry representatives report that one million Btu/h are sufficient to meet the designed peak load of 
45,000 ft2 (4181 m2) of energy-efficient commercial buildings. With heat pumps, Option One would provide 
heating for approximately 450,000 ft2 (41 810 m2) of commercial space and Option Two would heat about 
735,000 ft2 (68 280 m2) of space, which, for district heating, would provide the peak heati g load to at least 500 
dwellings having average floor space of 1,470 ft2 (136.7 m2). 
Table 11 - Primary circuit options for Regina area geothermal projects. 
Estevan
Weyburn
Moose Jaw
Regina
Swift Current
North Battleford
Saskatoon
Yorkton
40
50
60
70
60
70
80
90
110
60 50
50
Scale
0 100 km50
100
109 108 107 106 105 103 102104
49
50
51
52
53
Pumping Energy Surface Main Production Reda Injection 
Rate Production Exchanger Exchanger Casing Hole Casing Pump Pump Estimated
(usgpm) (Million Btu/h) Inlet Temp. Outlet Temp. Diameter Diame er Diameter Siz Size Cost
Option One 264 6.7 58°C 30°C 273 mm 222 mm 178 mm 60 hp 20 hp $3,700,000
(9.2)*
Option Two 458 12.0 59°C 30°C 340 mm 311 mm 244 mm 300 hp 100 hp $4,900,000
(16.3)*
* Energy production in million Btu/h when heat pumps in secondary circuit are included. 
Estimated cost includes one vertical well, one directional (slant) hole, submersible pump, heat exchanger, and injection pump. 
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Solar Thermal 
Solar thermal electricity is generated by concentrating solar radiation to create useful 
heat. Heat is concentrated either using parabolic mirrors aimed at a central receiver 
(Figure 4-7) or with mirrors that reflect solar energy to a central tower (Figure 4-8) 
(Masters, 2004). This solar heat can be used in a “conventional steam turbine/generator” 
or a Stirling engine to generate electricity (Masters, 2004: 186).  
 
 
 (Source: Masters, 2004: 186) 
Figure 4-7 Solar Thermal Using Parabolic Mirrors 
 
 
      (Source: Masters, 2004: 189) 
Figure 4-8 Solar Thermal Using Heliostat Mirrors and a Central Tower 
  
Solar thermal systems can be built with storage in order to generate electricity during the 
peak hours of 5 p.m. – 7 p.m. Storage becomes important when dealing with the 
186 DISTRIBUTED GENERATION
TABLE 4.4 Second-Generation SAIC/STM Dish/Stirling System
Efficienciesa
Step Description
Step
Efficiency (%)
Cumulative
Efficiency (%)
Power
(kW)
Solar insolation 100.0 100 113.5
Reflected by mirrors 93.1 93.1 105.7
Intercepted at aperture 90.3 84.1 95.4
Absorbed by receiver 85.0 71.5 81.1
Receiver heat loss 98.0 70.0 79.5
Engine mechanical efficiency 36.1 25.3 28.7
Gear box efficiency 98.0 24.8 28.1
Gross generator output 92.0 22.8 25.9
Electrical parasites −2.2 kW 20.9 23.7
a Insolation is direct normal solar radiation at 1000 W/m2.
Source: Davenport et al. (2002).
Electric Generation System (SEGS). SEGS consists of nine large arrays made
up of rows of parabolic-shaped mirrors that reflect and concentrate sunlight onto
linear receivers located along the foci of the parabolas. The receivers, or heat
collection elements (HCE), consist of a stainless steel absorber tube surrounded
by a glass envelope with the vacuum drawn between the two to reduce heat losses.
A heat transfer fluid circulates through the receivers, delivering the collected
solar energy to a somewhat conventional steam turbine/generator to produce
electricity. The SEGS collectors, with over 2 million m2 of surface area, run
along a north–south axis, and they rotate from east to west to track the sun
throughout the day. Figure 4.9 illustrates the parabolic trough concept.
The first plant, SEGS I, is a 13.4-MW facility built in 1985, while the
final plant, SEGS IX, produces 80 MW and was completed in 1991. SEGS I
p.m a.m
N
S
Glass,
Vacuum,
Steel tubing
HCE
Steel strucuture
ReflectorParabolic reflector
Heat transfer fluid (HTF)
Receiver,
Heat collection element
(HCE)
Figure 4.9 Parabolic trough solar collector system.
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4.3.3 Solar Central Receiver Systems
Another approach to achieving the concentrated sunlight needed for solar thermal
power plants is based on a system of compu er-controlled mi rors, called
heliostats, hich bounce sunlight onto a receiver mou ted on top of a tower
(Fig. 4.12).
The evolution of power towers began in 1976 with the establishment of the
National Solar Thermal Test Facility at Sandia National Laboratories in Albu-
querque, New Mexico. That soon led to the construction of number of test
facilities around the world, the largest of which was a 90-m-tall, 10-MW power
tower, called Solar One, built near Barstow, California. In Solar One, water was
pumped up to t e receiver where it was turned into steam h t was brought back
down to a steam turbine/generator. Steam could also e diverted to a large, ther-
mal storage ank filled with oil, rock, and sand to test the pote tial for continued
power generation during marginal solar conditions or after the sun had set. While
thermal storage as a concept was successfully demonstrated, there was a sizable
mismatch between the storage tank temperature and the temperature needed by
the turbine for maximum efficiency.
Solar One operated from 1982 to 1988, after which time it was dismantled;
parts of it, including the 1818 heliostats and the tower itself, were reused in
another 10-MW test facility called Solar Two. While Solar One used water as
the heat exchange medium, Solar Two used molten nitrate salts (60% sodium
nitrate and 40% potassium nitrate). A two-tank, molten-salt thermal storage sys-
tem replaced the original oil/rock storage tank in the configuration shown in
Fig. 4.13. The molten-salt system has proven to be a great success. Its temper-
ature of 565◦C well matches the needs of the steam turbine, and its round-trip
efficiency (the ratio of thermal energy out to thermal energy in) was greater than
97%. It was designed to provide enough storage to deliver the full 10-MW output
of the plant for an extra three hours past sunset. With reduced output, it could
deliver power for much longer periods from stored solar energy.
Central
receiver
Heliostats
Figure 4.12 Central receiver system (CRS) with heliostats to reflect sunlight onto a
central receiver.
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variability of renewable energy (see discussion below). In a typical design, molten salt is 
heated to 565°C and this heat can be used when desired to operate a steam turbine 
(Masters, 2004).35  
 
Southern Saskatchewan is one of the few places in Canada that receives enough sunshine 
for solar thermal electricity to be generated. The total potential for solar thermal 
electricity in Canada is estimated to be 26,190 TWh/yr on lands with slope less than 4%. 
The Saskatchewan share of solar thermal potential is 13,575 TWh/yr; just over half of the 
total. To put this in perspective total electricity generation in Saskatchewan in 2014 was 
23.4 TWh (SaskPower, 2015). (Djebbar et al., 2014). However, for this total potential to 
be achieved a good portion of southern Saskatchewan would be covered with solar 
thermal reflective mirrors. The feasible potential is quite a bit smaller and is limited by 
ability to access land, much of which is currently used for cereal production or 
pastureland. The land requirements of the different technologies for solar thermal 
electricity are as follows; “parabolic troughs about 5 acres/MW, and power towers about 
8 acres/MW” (Masters, 2004: 191). On a typical section of land, measuring 1 mile by 1 
mile or 640 acres, it would be possible to install 128 MW of parabolic trough solar 
thermal or 80 MW using solar power towers.  
 
Imported Hydroelectricity 
A final renewable resource available to meet Saskatchewan electricity demand is 
hydroelectricity imported from Manitoba, the province immediately to the east of 
Saskatchewan. Manitoba’s electricity system is nearly 100% hydro-powered.36 The 
utility, Manitoba Hydro, exports about 30% of the electricity they generate. The 
Manitoba Hydro strategy has been to build hydro dams in the north of the province, 
connect them with transmission lines through Winnipeg, in the southeast part of the 
province, and export surplus power south to the United States. The sale of power to the 
                                                
35 Storing heat to generate electricity is one of several methods of energy storage. I 
discuss storage further in Chapter 8. 
36 In the fiscal year 2014-2015 Manitoba Hydro reported generated 35,000 Gigawatt-
hours (GWh) using hydraulic generation out of a total of 35,044 GWh total generation 
(Manitoba Hydro, 2015a).  
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United States helps to pay for the hydro dam capital investment. As electricity demand 
grows in load centres like Winnipeg, electricity generation can be switched from export 
to local consumption. (Interview 8) 
 
Manitoba Hydro has signed an agreement to supply SaskPower with 25 MW of power 
during the period of 2013-2020 for $100 million or $4 million/MW (Manitoba Hydro, 
2015b). Manitoba Hydro will also supply SaskPower with 100 MW of power from 2020-
2040 (Johnstone, 2015b). This will require the construction of an 80-kilometer 230-
kilovolt line connecting the provinces at a cost of $50 million (Johnstone, 2015b). The 
two crown corporations have signed a memorandum of understanding that SaskPower 
may negotiate to purchase up to 500 MW of power after 2020 (Manitoba Hydro, 2015b).  
 
The Manitoba and Saskatchewan electricity grids are connected at five locations and will 
soon be connected at a sixth location. One important link consists of a connection to 
Manitoba from Saskatchewan’s Island Falls hydroelectric generating station and a 
connection from Manitoba up to the northern segment of the Saskatchewan electricity 
grid. SaskPower uses this connection to “wheel” power through Manitoba and up to the 
northern portion of the Saskatchewan grid, which is otherwise unconnected from the 
southern grid (Manitoba Hydro, 2013). The existing connections between Saskatchewan 
and Manitoba allow up to 150 MW of power to be exported from Manitoba (Manitoba 
Hydro, 2013).37 The new transmission line will increase the potential for exports to 
facilitate the 100 MW purchase for 2020-2040. Further interconnection upgrades may be 
necessary to facilitate a 500 MW power purchase.  
 
An upgrade of this magnitude has precedent. As of 2013 Manitoba Hydro had 
interconnections with the U.S. market that allowed 1950 MW of power to be exported 
(Manitoba Hydro, 2013). Export agreements are in place with U.S. utilities such as Xcel, 
Great River Energy of Minnesota, Minnesota Power, Wisconsin Public Service. Of note, 
                                                
37 Note that this is above and beyond reserve capacity provided by the Saskatchewan-
Manitoba interconnections. Saskatchewan maintains interconnections with North Dakota 
and Manitoba that provide up to 300 MW of power in reserve in case SaskPower loses a 
generating unit.   
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Xcel energy has nearly 6000 MW of wind power on their system. An export agreement to 
purchase between 375 and 500 MW of hydropower from Manitoba helps to back-up 
Xcel’s variable wind power resource. (Xcel, 2015; Manitoba Hydro, 2015b) 
 
Summary of Potential 
Saskatchewan has a strong wind resource and the best solar resource in Canada.  
Additions of solar and wind capacity are limited by competing land uses, but the 
available resources exceed Saskatchewan’s electricity needs by a large margin. The 
province has 864 MW of hydroelectric capacity and the potential to develop an additional 
1780 MW. Saskatchewan also has an opportunity to access significant hydroelectric 
imports from neighbouring Manitoba. There is the potential for at least 150 MW of 
biomass capacity to be built in the province, which would include biomass plants near 
pulp and paper mills and sawmills, as well as landfill gas plants. Geothermal heat offers 
the potential to substitute for space heating, but does not appear to offer significant 
electricity generation potential. While the resource appears more than adequate for 
Saskatchewan’s electricity needs, variability is a concern. I now turn to a discussion of 
renewable energy variability in Saskatchewan.   
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Renewable Energy Variability 
Renewable energy derived from wind and solar is fundamentally different from fossil 
fuel derived energy. To use the language of system dynamics, wind and solar energy is 
flow-limited, while fossil fuels are stock-limited. A flow-limited resource is one that is 
limited by the flow of energy over time. A flow of blowing wind powers wind turbines. A 
flow of solar insolation powers solar photovoltaics and solar thermal plants. Wind and 
sunlight cannot be stored and saved for later; they must be used when available or else 
they are wasted. They also cannot be used to generate power when they are not available; 
wind turbines will not turn when the wind is not blowing and solar panels will not 
generate electricity without light. (Daly and Farley, 2010) 
 
Fossil fuels are stock-limited, but flow unlimited. The stock of coal in Saskatchewan’s 
coal seams can be mined and burned in a power plant at a rate that lies within 
SaskPower’s control (at the Poplar River station 12,000 tonnes of coal are strip-mined 
and burned per day). These stocks of fossil fuels were built up over millennia; they are 
the accumulation of the solar flow that collected in biomass and under heat and pressure 
was transformed into fossil fuels. If we were to keep burning coal this stock would 
eventually run out, or else become prohibitively expensive to extract. A stock of coal can 
be saved for later. It can also be used up quickly if we so desire.  
 
Hydropower and biomass exhibit elements of both flow-limited and stock-limited 
resources. Hydropower is dependent on streamflow, which can vary year to year. In this 
way it is flow-limited. The streamflow recharges hydro reservoirs, which can hold a stock 
of water and release it on demand.  
 
Biomass is fuelled by a flow of biomass growth and, if it is to be used sustainably, is 
limited by the rate at which trees or crops grow. Biomass and biomass fuel can, however, 
be accumulated in stocks. Forests can expand, and the stocks of biomass stored at 
sawmills (e.g. along Saskatchewan’s forest fringe) can offer rich stores of biomass for 
generating electricity.  
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Because renewables are flow-limited they are variable. They cannot be made available on 
demand. This variability introduces challenges for electricity system operators. Wind and 
solar cannot be turned on when load is required. Electricity operators must use other tools 
to respond to this variability. For example, natural gas peaking plants are used to generate 
power on short notice such as when there is a gap in renewable energy production. 
Hydroelectric reservoirs can be used to store potential power and release it when needed. 
Electricity can also be stored using technologies such as compressed air stored under 
pressure in underground caverns; pumped hydro that moves water upstream or vertically 
upwards in a mineshaft; fly-wheels; and lithium-ion batteries.  
 
Below I outline the variability of electricity demand and renewables such as wind, solar, 
and the stream flows that recharge hydroelectric reservoirs.  
 
Wind Power Variability 
Wind power varies with wind speed. Turbines do not begin to generate electricity until 
winds reach a critical “cut-in” speed; for example Vestas V80 turbines begin to turn once 
winds reach a speed of 4 meters/second (m/s) (Baerwald et al., 2009; Vestas, 2015). 
Below the cut-in speed the output of a wind turbine is nil. Turbines also cut-out at high 
wind speeds to prevent mechanical damage. For the Vestas V80 turbine, the rotors 
disengage and stop turning when wind speeds reach 25 m/s (Vestas, 2015).  
 
In 2013, SaskPower had 198 MW of wind power on their system. The average power 
output of the wind turbines was 72.7 MW, creating a capacity factor of 36.7% over the 
course of the year. The power output of the wind turbines could swing significantly from 
hour to hour. The largest swings were a ramp up of 119.1 MW from 20:00 to 21:00 on 
January 18th and a ramp down of 118 MW between the hours of 9:00 and 10:00 on 
January 18th, 2013. This large swing would have required other power generation 
facilities to ramp down from 20:00 to 21:00 and ramp up between 9:00 and 10:00 in order 
to balance the changes in wind power production. Figure 4-9 shows the 24-hour period 
with the highest wind power variance in 2013. Wind power ramped up from zero to near 
full capacity and then back down again over the course of January 29th.  
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(Source: Bigland-Pritchard, 2015b; author’s calculations) 
Figure 4-9 Hourly Wind Power Variability (January 28, 2013 – January 29, 2013) 
 
To some extent the variability of wind can be diminished by distributing turbines over a 
wide geographic area. Table 4-5 shows the correlation between hourly potential wind 
power output across five sites that stretch from west to east in southern Saskatchewan. 
The lowest correlation is between Maple Creek and Broadview; communities located 
approximately 500 km apart.  
 
Saskatchewan’s first wind farms were concentrated in the southwest of the province near 
Maple Creek and Swift Current where average wind speeds are highest. Recent additions 
at Moosomin and a planned project at Grenfell will add geographical diversity to 
Saskatchewan’s wind power. This diversity will help to reduce the variability of wind 
power in the province.  
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(Source: Bigland-Pritchard, 2015b38; author’s calculations) 
Table 4-5 Correlation of Hourly Wind Power Potential Across Saskatchewan 
(January 1, 2013 to December 31, 2013) 
 
There is also variability over the course of the day. Figure 4-10 presents the 2013 wind 
generation data in terms of hourly average power production. On average wind power is 
highest during the night and calms in the midday. This makes it poorly correlated with 
electricity demand, which generally increases during the day, peaking in the early 
evening hours. In 2013, the correlation between electricity demand and wind power 
production was only .158. The wind is, however, complementary to another variable 
renewable power source: solar energy, to which I now turn. 
 
 
                                                
38 Bigland-Pritchard (2015) calculated potential wind power at various sites in 
Saskatchewan using historic data from Environment Canada (2014).  
Maple 
Creek Eastend
Swift 
Current
Indian 
Head Broadview
Maple 
Creek 1.00 0.48 0.54 0.24 0.19
Eastend 1.00 0.50 0.32 0.29
Swift 
Current 1.00 0.41 0.33
Indian 
Head 1.00 0.69
Broadview 1.00
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(Source: Mark Bigland-Pritchard, 2014; author’s calculations) 
Figure 4-10 Average Wind Power Output by Hour in 2013  
 
Solar Variability 
Solar energy is generated in direct proportion to the amount of sunlight received, which 
means electricity begins flowing in the morning, peaks around noon, and tapers off later 
in the day. Cloud cover reduces solar power output and introduces a degree of 
unpredictability into the generation of solar energy. In Saskatchewan, electricity demand 
typically peaks in the late afternoon and early evening when the lights and computers in 
office buildings have yet to be shut off and people return from their jobs to begin 
cooking, watching television and doing other households activities. This means that peak 
generation for solar energy does not correspond with peak electricity demand. This 
creates a challenge for integrating solar into the electricity system. Just as solar electricity 
output is winding down, demand is ramping up. This means that other generation sources 
or stored electricity must be quickly ramped up and brought on-line, or demand must be 
shifted towards times of abundant electricity.  
 
0.0 
10.0 
20.0 
30.0 
40.0 
50.0 
60.0 
70.0 
80.0 
90.0 
0 6 12 18 24 
Av
er
ag
e 
W
in
d 
Po
w
er
 (M
W
) 
Hour 
 125 
California is a leading jurisdiction in renewable energy and is working to address the 
integration of variable renewable energy on the grid. The state has a goal of 33% of 
electricity to be generated by renewables by 2020. California’s Independent System 
Operators (ISO), the organization that buys and sells power in the state and is in charge 
of making sure supply equals demand on a constant basis, has worked to understand what 
this aggressive renewable energy target means for the stability of their electricity system. 
The California ISO created a now famous “duck chart” to highlight the impact of high 
rates of solar penetration. The “duck chart” subtracts the power generated by variable 
renewable electricity sources such as wind and solar from demand to create a measure 
they call “net load”. Figure 4-11 reproduces the California “duck chart” using 
Saskatchewan electricity demand data and Saskatchewan solar power potential data.39 As 
can be seen, net demand resembles the outline of a duck when high levels of renewables 
are present on the grid.  
 
 
 (Source: Mark Bigland-Pritchard, 2015b; author’s calculations) 
Figure 4-11 Saskatchewan “Duck Chart” Showing Net Load With Solar-PV 
                                                
39 Note the solar data is based on August 28th, 2003 solar insolation data for Estevan, SK 
and demand data is for August 28th, 2013.  
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If Saskatchewan were to invest heavily in solar photovoltaics (solar-PV) plans would 
have to be made to ensure smooth integration into the system. On the afternoon depicted 
in Figure 4-11, the ramp-up of a significant source of non-solar electricity would be 
required. For example, in the scenario with 3 GW of installed solar power, net demand 
(demand minus solar output) increases by 1900 MW between 1:00 and 4:00 p.m. This 
means that 1900 MW of capacity must be brought online during that period. Although 
this is an extreme example – this day was selected because it had the largest ramp-up 
requirement of all possible days in the dataset – the electricity system must be able to 
respond to even the most extreme cases in order to reliably supply Saskatchewan’s 
electricity needs.   
 
Proponents of solar point out that the electricity system is built to follow the variability of 
electricity demand; response to variability is already built into the electricity system 
(Lazar, 2014). Lazar (2014) notes that “ducks vary their shape depending on different 
circumstances…utility load shapes can do the same” (Lazar, 2014: 2). He outlines ten 
strategies that can minimize the difference between demand and net load and “teach the 
duck to fly” (Lazar, 2014): 
 
1. Target energy efficiency to periods when net load ramps most quickly; this could 
mean encouraging LED lighting to reduce residential lighting demand in the 
evening; 
2. Orient solar panels to the west to generate more power in the late afternoon, 
which may be worthwhile even if total power output declines; 
3. Build some solar thermal with storage to shift the availability of solar power 
towards the peak demand hours of late afternoon and early evening; 
4. Allow grid operator to manage electric water heating loads: electric water heaters 
can be superheated during times of plentiful electricity generation and blended 
with cool water when needed in the supper hours; 
5. Build air conditioners with thermal storage; this is less important in 
Saskatchewan, but would include storing cold by creating ice during the middle of 
the night; 
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6. Retire inflexible generating units that cannot ramp quickly: coal and nuclear 
power plants do not ramp quickly and have a harder time following net load than 
natural gas-fired generating plants; 
7. Introduce time-of-day electricity pricing for the peak hours: variable pricing can 
encourage the marketplace to find ways to shift electricity demand away from 
peaks; 
8. Introduce electrical storage in strategic locations: storage can be filled when 
electricity is abundant and emptied during times of ramping; 
9. Implement aggressive demand-response programs beyond those identified above; 
10. Exchange power on a regional basis to “take advantage of diversity in loads and 
resources” (Lazar, 2014: 19). 
 
 
 (Source: Lazar, 2014: 20) 
Figure 4-12 Teaching the Duck to Fly 
 
Figure 4-12 shows the extent to which the ten strategies listed above can shift both supply 
and demand and ease the ramping requirements created by variable renewable electricity. 
After the strategies are implemented there is less variability; notice that the ‘Post 
Strategies Net Load’ line demonstrates much less variability than the ‘Initial Net Load’ 
line.   
Teaching the “Duck” To Fly
20
It is useful now to compa e our final result – with ll ten strategies – to the starting 
point with acquisition of renewable resources, but without the strategies. Figure 16 shows 
the end result compared with the starting point.
Figure 17 
Airborne Ducks
Our newly streamlined duck needs only to stretch his wings, try a few beats, and see if 
he can become airborne like his cousins.
Figure 16
Duck Curve With All Ten Strategies Compared With Pre-Strategy Loads
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It would be possible to pursue many of Lazar’s (2014) strategies in Saskatchewan. 
Already the Saskatchewan Research Centre (SRC) and Cowessess First Nation have 
partnered on a wind turbine with electricity storage project. This project has shown the 
potential for a lithium-ion battery to smooth the generation of wind power. Experiments 
conducted at the site have shown that the combined 800-kilowatt (kw) wind turbine and 
400 kW lithium-ion battery can produce a steady stream of power at 250 kW for three 
days straight (Jansen, 2014). SaskPower has a peak saving program with large industrial 
customers, but could do more to encourage demand-side management in the province. 
The rollout of smart meters would help in this regard. Lazar’s (2014) tenth 
recommendation to “Exchange power on a regional basis” could be achieved by 
enhancing grid interconnections with Manitoba. Manitoba’s hydroelectricity could then 
offer balancing services for Saskatchewan wind and solar. I further address the issue of 
meeting load with variable renewable electricity in Chapter 7.   
 
Solar energy can also vary from year to year. Figure 4-13 shows the variability of annual 
bright sunshine hours at a Saskatoon monitoring station from 1966 to 2014. Interestingly, 
drops in bright sunshine often follow significant volcanic events (as shown on the graph). 
Plans to integrate solar into the electricity system would also have to consider these 
longer-term variations in solar power potential.  
 
 
 (Source: Beaulieu and Wittrock, 2014: 30)  
Figure 4-13 Annual Bright Sunshine Hours in Saskatoon40  
                                                
40 Note that the y-axis does not begin at zero and so the fluctuations may appear 
exaggerated. Bright sunshine hours in Saskatchewan from 1966 to 2014 have ranged 
from a low of around 2000 to a high of nearly 2700.   
SRC Publication No. 10440-1E14
SRC Climate Reference Station Annual Summary, 2013 February 2014
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Hydroelectric Power 
Hydroelectric generation is dependent on streamflow and streamflow varies both 
seasonally and from year to year. Year to year variation is shown in Figure 4-14, which 
compares Saskatchewan’s installed hydroelectric generation with hydroelectric capacity 
and mean streamflow on the South Saskatchewan River from 1963 to 2014. Years like 
2001 and 2009 are notable for the low amount of hydroelectricity generated. They also 
correspond to years with low streamflow. Contributing to the low streamflow, 2009 was 
the driest spring in Saskatchewan for 51 years (Environment Canada, 2010).  
 
 
(Source: SaskPower Annual Reports, 1963-2014; Environment Canada, 2015b41) 
Figure 4-14 Hydroelectricity Capacity and Generation in Saskatchewan 
 
                                                
41 Streamflow data is for the station on the South Saskatchewan River at Saskatoon, 
downstream from Coteau Creek and upstream from Nipawin and E.B. Campbell 
(streamflow station 05HG001, Environment Canada, 2015b). Note that hydroelectric 
generation data was missing from some of SaskPower’s annual reports, and that mean 
streamflow data for select years was missing from the Environment Canada data.  
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When hydroelectricity is a large part of an electricity system, planners must be aware of 
the potential for drought. The Saskatchewan River system, home to 84% of current 
hydroelectric capacity in the province, depends on snowmelt and rainfall runoff from the 
Rocky Mountains (Sauchyn et al., 2011). The long-run historic record shows that “mega-
droughts” of up to 30 years have occurred in the Saskatchewan system; one in the early 
1700s and another in the mid 1100s (Sauchyn et al., 2011). The Saskatchewan River 
system is fed by snowmelt from the Rocky Mountains. If climate change lowers snowfall 
in the Rockies then Saskatchewan’s hydroelectric potential will suffer. However, even 
without impacts from anthropogenic climate change, long-lasting drought is a possibility 
on the prairies and could reduce hydroelectric output in the future.42  
 
Streamflow in Saskatchewan is highly seasonal, peaking in June due to the accumulated 
effects of spring runoff. Hydroelectric production closely follows this seasonal pattern, 
although hydroelectric reservoirs such as Diefenbaker Lake and Tobin Lake allow 
streamflow to be stored for release later in time and can smooth hydroelectric production 
to a certain extent. (See Figure 4-15).  
 
Figure 4-15 shows hydroelectricity generation in Saskatchewan from 2009-2013 (solid 
black line) along with streamflow on both the South Saskatchewan River, measured at 
Saskatoon (dashed blue line), and the North Saskatchewan River, measured at Prince 
Albert (solid light green line).43 The station at Saskatoon is downstream from Coteau 
Creek and upstream from Nipawin and E.B. Campbell. Flows at the Saskatoon station are 
influenced by decisions made regarding hydroelectric production at Coteau Creek. The 
Saskatoon station shows summer peak flows, but also increased flows in the winter 
months. This coincides with the highest electricity demand in Saskatchewan; it is a 
winter-peaking province. The North Saskatchewan River at Prince Albert, which has no 
                                                
42 System planners in Manitoba have accounted for the variability of river systems in that 
province by building more hydroelectric capacity than is needed for provincial use and 
making conservative estimates of reliable streamflow. Yet even these conservative 
estimates do not account for the potential of multi-decadal mega-drought.  
43 The Prince Albert station is streamflow station 05GG001 (Environment Canada, 
2015b). 
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in-stream controls on flow, shows the natural seasonal variability of streamflow, which 
peaks in June and is lowest in the winter months. The Coteau Creek station at Gardiner 
Dam on Lake Diefenbaker is able to store water to be used in the peak demand season. 
This is a useful means of matching hydroelectric production to demand.  
 
 
(Source: SaskPower, 2014; Environment Canada, 2015b) 
Figure 4-15 Saskatchewan Hydroelectricity Generation and Streamflow in the 
South Saskatchewan (S.SK) and North Saskatchewan (N.SK) Rivers (2009-2013) 
 
Streamflow and Coal-fired Generation 
It is worth noting that streamflow is also crucial to topping up the cooling water 
reservoirs for Saskatchewan’s coal plants. As Halliday (2013) explains,  
 
SaskPower’s coal fired power stations in the Souris River basin near 
Estevan and the Poplar River basin near Coronach are dependent on prairie 
streams for their cooling water while the hydroelectric stations on the 
Saskatchewan River system depend on flows from rivers originating in the 
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Rocky Mountains. (Even if climate change is not considered, streamflow 
of prairie streams is much less dependable that that of mountain streams.) 
(p. 15) 
 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s low streamflow led to a shortage of water at the 
Boundary Dam Reservoir, which is used to cool the Boundary Dam coal-fired power 
plant. To make up for the shortfall, groundwater was pumped from two underground 
aquifers. Figure 4-16 shows water withdrawals from the aquifer in black bars at the 
bottom. The impact of these withdrawals can be seen by the drop in the level of the 
Outram (blue line) and Estevan (red line) reservoirs. (Halliday, 2013) 
 
 
(Source: Maathuis and van der Kamp, 2011) 
Figure 4-16 Drawdown of Underground Aquifers for Boundary Dam Cooling 
 
On the prairies moisture is never a certainty. The dustbowl of the 1930s still lingers in the 
collective memory. If the province’s future electricity system is to be resilient it must be 
resilient against drought. During the dry period of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
groundwater met the needs for cooling Boundary Dam, but groundwater was depleted. 
The aquifers at Boundary Dam still had not fully recovered 15 years after the last water 
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withdrawal from the reservoirs. This means that even thermal generating stations like 
coal-fired plants (and nuclear plants) are dependent on variable streamflow and limited 
stocks of groundwater. This variation may not have an impact on a seasonal timespan, but 
could become an issue if Saskatchewan were to experience a multi-decadal megadrought.  
 
Summary 
In this chapter I have identified the potential for renewable energy in Saskatchewan. The 
province is blessed with: high average wind speeds suitable for wind power; the best 
solar resource in Canada; hydroelectric potential on the Saskatchewan River and 
Churchill River systems; proximity to Manitoba Hydro’s hydropower resources; and 
potential for a limited amount of biomass along the northern forest fringe. Table 4-6 
summarizes Saskatchewan’s physical renewable potential and the socio-economic factors 
that may limit this potential.  
 
 
Table 4-6 Saskatchewan’s Renewable Energy Potential 
 
Note that Table 4-6 does not consider the economic potential of these electricity 
generation sources. In the next chapter I evaluate the cost of the various renewable 
energy technologies and how they compare to alternatives like coal, natural gas, and 
nuclear power.   
Energy Source
Physical Potential 
(GW) Limiting Factors
Land 
Intensity 
(ha/MWac) Variability
Wind >4.00 GW Siting conflicts 42.3 Hourly
Solar PV Up to 5300.00 GW Competing for agl land 3.2 Daily, seasonally
Solar Thermal 4000 - 8000.00 GW Competing for agl land 2.0-4.0 Daily, seasonally
Hydroelectricity 2.64 GW Social license - Seasonally, annually
Biomass .15 GW Available fuelstock -
Manitoba Hydro 2.00 GW Grid interconnection - Seasonally, annually
Land Intensity Sources: NREL, 2009 (wind); NREL, 2013 (solar); Masters (2004)
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Chapter 5 – Levelized Cost of Electricity Generation  
 
Electricity Generation Technologies 
SaskPower is making decisions on how to meet Saskatchewan electricity demand by 
considering a range of generation technologies. In this chapter I explore the cost of 
building new capacity and generating electricity in Saskatchewan using the following 
technologies: 
 
• Biomass; 
• Conventional coal-fired generation; 
• Coal-fired generation with carbon-capture and storage (CCS); 
• Hydroelectric new-build; 
• Hydroelectric repower (retrofit); 
• Natural gas combined cycle; 
• Natural gas combined cycle with CCS;  
• Natural gas simple cycle (peaking plants); 
• Small, modular nuclear reactors; 
• Solar photovoltaic (utility-scale); 
• Solar thermal (utility-scale); 
• Wind turbines.  
 
I am also interested in the cost of adding electricity storage to the Saskatchewan grid. 
Storage can be a useful way of addressing the variability of renewable energy output and, 
depending on the circumstances, should be included in the cost of renewables. Several 
technologies exist that could provide electricity storage in Saskatchewan including: 
lithium-ion batteries, compressed air storage, and pumped hydro storage. Compressed air 
storage may be particularly well-suited for Saskatchewan. It requires an underground 
cavern to store the compressed air. This cavern could be a former natural gas storage 
cavern or a solution-mined salt dome (Ford, 2015). Saskatchewan is home to both of 
these resources. I explore the question of storage further in Chapter 7.  
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There are several costs associated with installing and operating the electricity generation 
technologies listed above. These include the capital cost of building the technology, the 
cost of operating and maintaining the technology, fuel costs for coal, natural gas, 
biomass, and nuclear technologies, as well as technology-specific costs such as water 
usage charges for hydroelectricity, land leases for wind turbines, and nuclear waste 
storage costs for nuclear power plants. There are also financing costs associated with 
borrowing funds to purchase the technologies. In this chapter I outline the assumptions I 
have made with respect to each of these costs. These cost assumptions are used as inputs 
to the Saskatchewan Investment Model (SIM) and the interactive Saskatchewan 
Investment Model (iSIM) and play a key role in determining the least-cost scenarios 
selected by the SIM and iSIM optimization models.  
 
Levelized Cost of Electricity 
When comparing the costs of electricity generation technologies it is necessary to 
consider the operating characteristics of each technology. Electricity generation 
technologies differ with regards to capacity factors, expected life span, and fuel 
efficiency.44 These differences in operating characteristics mean that technologies 
generate different quantities of electricity with the same installed capacity. For example, 
a 100 MW solar installation that operates at a 14-20% capacity factor will generate less 
electricity annually than a 100 MW coal-fired plant operating at 75-85% capacity factor. 
The Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) takes these differences into consideration. 
LCOE is a measure of the average cost of electricity generation for a given technology 
                                                
44 EPRI (2013) explains capacity factor in the following way, “The maximum number of 
megawatt-hours that a plant could produce in one year would occur if the plant operated 
at full load 24 hours a day for 365 days a year. In reality, a plant will be shut down at 
times during the year, either for maintenance or because the electricity is not needed and 
it would be uneconomical to operate the plant” (EPRI, 2013: 24/1-7). The capacity factor 
of coal-fired and nuclear plants that are run fairly continuously throughout the year may 
be as high as 85-90%. Variable renewable electricity technologies like wind turbines do 
not operate in a continuous manner; electricity generation depends on the presence of 
wind. The capacity factor for Saskatchewan’s wind turbines in 2014 was 36.5% 
(SaskPower, 2015; author’s calculations). The life span of various electricity generation 
technologies also differs: wind turbines have a lifespan of about 20 years; hydroelectric 
facilities are relatively long-lived at 40 years or longer. For more information on fuel 
efficiency please see the technical appendix at the end of this chapter.  
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over its lifetime. It is expressed in either dollars per megawatt-hour ($/MWh) or cents per 
kilowatt-hour (cents/kWh) and it is the standard measure for comparing the costs of 
electricity generation technologies.45  
 
Several recent studies have used the LCOE measure. Citigroup’s Global Perspectives & 
Solutions (Citi GPS, 2015) published a report entitled Energy Darwinism II that used 
LCOE to compare the cost of climate action to the cost of climate inaction. Because 
LCOE includes fuel costs Citi GPS (2015) was able to demonstrate that renewables, 
despite their high capital costs, are rapidly becoming cost competitive with fossil fuel 
generation. Because of this Citi GPS (2015) found that climate action would actually save 
money relative to a path of climate inaction. Coad (2015) used LCOE numbers as the 
basis of a Conference Board study that included a focused look at the Saskatchewan 
electricity sector. Coad (2015) calculated the portfolio of electricity generation 
technologies that would minimize investor risk in the province. Lazard (2014) published 
the eighth edition of their levelized cost comparison in Fall 2014. It is widely cited in the 
electricity literature. The Global CCS Institute (2015) used LCOE to compare low-carbon 
technologies to the cost of CCS. They found that renewable technologies like wind, 
geothermal, and hydroelectricity, when available, provide lower cost GHG reductions 
than CCS. Figure 5-1 presents the range of LCOE values that result from the various cost 
assumptions presented in the literature. All figures have been converted to 2014 Canadian 
dollars (2014 $CAN) using the all-items consumer price index (Statistics Canada, 2015 
CANSIM Table 326-0020) and average annual US-CAN exchange rates (Bank of 
Canada, 2015).  
                                                
45 As a long-term average LCOE does have the drawback of not considering the market 
value of electricity. Market prices can vary throughout the course of the day. Some 
technologies, like solar-PV may coincide with high demand and high demand in certain 
seasons. Others, like wind, may provide power during times when prices are low. LCOE 
misses these aspects of the value of electricity. Studies such as Dewees (2012) take into 
consideration the cost of electricity displaced by variable renewables.  
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(Sources: EIA, 2015; Lazard, 2014, EPRI, 2013; author’s calculations) 
Figure 5-1 Levelized Cost of Electricity from Electricity Cost Literature 
 
Judging by the literature, natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) plants are the lowest cost 
generation option, followed by wind turbines in favourable locations, geothermal in 
favourable locations, and conventional coal-fired electricity plants.46  
 
The LCOE numbers taken from the literature offer a rough guide to the cost of competing 
generation technologies, but the cost and availability of technologies differs in 
Saskatchewan relative to other jurisdictions. I use the LCOE methodology and 
Saskatchewan specific data to compare the cost of electricity generation technologies in 
the province. The methodology I have used to calculate LCOE is presented in Appendix 
5A. The considerations I have made in undertaking this analysis are outlined in the 
sections below.  
 
                                                
46 Note that these LCOE numbers assume constant fuel prices as presented in EIA (2015), 
Lazard (2014), and EPRI (2013). 
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Saskatchewan Capital Costs 
I gathered capital costs from published figures of projects built in Saskatchewan. When 
Saskatchewan project costs are not available I use cost input assumptions found in 
publications such as EIA (2015), Lazard (2014), and EPRI (2013). I find a range of 
capital costs for various energy generation technologies (Figure 5-2). The blue diamonds 
in Figure 5-2 indicate capital costs in dollars per kilowatt ($/kw) for SaskPower projects, 
or in the case of nuclear, for the most recent quote on nuclear power obtained in Canada. 
In the context of the present research the following findings are of particular interest. 
First, the cost of coal with carbon capture and storage (CCS) is significantly higher than 
estimates from the literature. Saskatchewan’s Boundary Dam III CCS project is the first 
utility-scale CCS project in the world. The project was originally budgeted to cost $1.24 
billion, but costs have increased to $1.46 billion (CAN) (IEAGHG, 2015). Costs were 
higher than expected due to factors such as a shortage of skilled workers in the province, 
which increased wages paid to labour, and challenges with retrofitting a brownfield 
power plant site (IEAGHG, 2015).  
 
A second insight that should be highlighted is that there is a premium paid for thermal 
construction in Saskatchewan. Capital costs for natural gas combined cycle plants built in 
Saskatchewan, including the North Battleford Generating Station and the retrofit to the 
Queen Elizabeth II power plant in Saskatoon, are approximately 2.6 times higher than 
EIA (2015). Costs for simple cycle natural gas plants are on average 1.8 times higher 
than EIA (2015). To account for this premium I apply a cost multiplier of 2.0 to EIA 
(2015) estimates of natural gas combined cycle with CCS costs. This may be an 
optimistic multiplier for an un-tested technology like natural gas with CCS.  
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Figure 5-2 Capital Costs of Electricity Generation Technologies 
 
A third finding is that new hydroelectric projects in Saskatchewan cost significantly more 
than estimates from the EIA (2015). The Tasi Twe project in northern Saskatchewan is 
anticipated to cost $8000/kw. This is 2.4 times higher than the EIA (2015) estimates for 
hydroelectricity. Hydroelectric costs may be lower for projects on the Saskatchewan 
River system and the Churchill River. I model the costs of hydroelectricity as increasing 
in a step-wise fashion. Based on discussion with SaskPower I estimate that the lowest 
cost projects will cost $6000/kw and the highest cost projects will cost upwards of 
$15,000/kw (Interview 26).  
 
Lastly, I find that estimates found in the literature for the cost of conventional nuclear 
range widely from a high of over $10,000/kw to a low of $6650/kw (Lazard, 2014). Even 
these high estimates may be too optimistic. As mentioned in Chapter 3, in 2009 the 
Ontario Power Authority received a $26 billion dollar bid from AECL to build two 1200 
MW CANDU reactors (Hamilton, 2009). This is a capital cost of $11,800/kw (2014 
$CAN). While there are some who argue the OPA quote was too high, it is noteworthy 
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because of the nature of the quote; OPA would not allow cost over-runs, AECL would 
receive only the price quoted in their proposal. The nuclear industry in Canada has 
experienced notorious cost over-runs and delays. The Point Lepreau nuclear facility in 
New Brunswick was three years behind schedule and cost “between two to three times 
more than the original cost estimate” (Locke and Townley, 1993: 10). Contractors 
building the Point Lepreau plant received “cost plus” and “cost reimbursable” contracts; 
if the project went over-budget contractors would still be paid (Locke and Townley, 
1993). Because the OPA would not allow “cost plus” contracts the quote should be seen 
as closer to reality than more optimistic nuclear cost estimates.   
 
It is important to recognize that the OPA capital cost estimate was for CANDU nuclear 
reactors, which are typically sized 750-1200 MW, and which are a mature technology. 
Saskatchewan’s grid is ill-suited for such large power plants (see Chapter 3). Instead, 
small, modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) are being considered for the province. SMRs are 
a new technology and as such, there are substantial “first-of-a-kind” risks in constructing 
them. There is reference to the costs of small-modular nuclear reactors (SMRs) in a 
report by the Australian government (BREE, 2012). First-of-a-kind SMRs are estimated 
to cost 1.88 times more than larger light-water reactors, while nth-of-a-kind SMRs (those 
built after many other units have been constructed) are estimated to cost 1.38 times more 
(BREE, 2012). The capital cost of SMRs ($/kw) are higher than larger reactors because 
of the loss of economies of scale (Cooper, 2014). Gains from modular construction are 
not likely enough to make up for the loss of economies of scale. Cooper (2014) estimates 
that SMR capital costs may be 5-30% more expensive than large reactors. SMRs will also 
use more fuel and produce more waste per MWh. One potential advantage of modular 
reactor technology is that SMRs may reduce construction time from 69 to 38 months 
(Cooper, 2014). 
 
I estimate that the construction of a first-of-a-kind SMR would cost over $14,000/kw in 
Saskatchewan, or about 18.6% more than the 2009 OPA reactor cost estimate from 
AECL. If many of these units are installed around the world I estimate that the nth-of-a-
kind cost could be reduced to $10,350/kw.  
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Sensitivity to Carbon Pricing 
The LCOE of a fossil-fuel technology will be affected by the imposition of carbon 
pricing. I find that technologies that use coal and natural gas as fuels are quite sensitive to 
carbon pricing. In Saskatchewan, coal fired power plants emit roughly 1080 tonnes 
CO2e/MWh. When equipped with carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology, 90% of 
these emissions can be captured. However, there is a substantial parasitic load involved in 
capturing CO2. At the Boundary Dam III CCS facility a 160 Megawatt (MW) generation 
unit is rated at 120 MW available power. The other 40 MW are required to run the CCS 
processes. This means the emissions intensity of coal-fired generation with CCS is not 
10% of the intensity of coal-fired generation without CCS but is actually 143 tonnes 
CO2e/MWh, which is 13.2% of the existing GHG intensity. 
 
Natural gas combined cycle facilities in Saskatchewan have an emissions intensity of 
approximately 420 tonnes CO2e/MWh. If natural gas combined cycle plants are equipped 
with a CCS system then 90% of their emissions can be captured and stored. There is 
again parasitic power demand to run the CCS process. I estimate that natural gas with 
CCS will lead to a 20% penalty in fuel efficiency. With this parasitic load considered, 
natural gas with CCS can reduce emissions intensity to approximately 50 tonnes 
CO2e/MWh.  
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(Source: author’s calculations) 
Figure 5-3 Sensitivity of Fossil Fuel LCOE to Carbon Pricing47 
 
Figure 5-3 shows the sensitivity of the LCOE of fossil fuel electricity generation to 
carbon pricing (holding other cost and performance assumptions constant). At a carbon 
price of roughly $70/tonne CO2e, new-build coal-fired generation becomes more 
expensive per megawatt-hour than Saskatchewan’s Boundary Dam III CCS plant. At a 
carbon price of $15/tonne CO2e conventional coal becomes more expensive than natural 
gas combined cycle electricity generation. With a carbon price of $60 and higher, natural 
gas with CCS becomes the least expensive fossil-fuel based electricity generation option.  
 
In making decisions about the future of Saskatchewan’s electricity system it is sensible to 
consider the possibility of federal or provincial carbon pricing. British Columbia has 
instituted a carbon price that now sits at $30/tonne CO2e and is applied to fuels used in 
the electricity sector like natural gas and, theoretically, coal although B.C. does not use 
coal for electricity generation (B.C. Government, 2014). If a carbon price were enacted in 
                                                
47 Costs and fuel efficiency rates in this diagram are based on the initial model values 
selected for use in the baseline scenarios. 
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Saskatchewan natural gas with CCS would be roughly cost-equivalent to new-build coal-
fired generation.  
 
Fuel Cost Escalation and LCOE 
Along with carbon price risks there are also fuel price risks that can influence the 
levelized cost of electricity (LCOE).48 Natural gas is an especially volatile commodity. In 
the past decade, natural gas delivered at The Henry Hub  has varied in price from highs of 
$13.42 USD/Million BTU in October 2005 and $12.69 USD/MMBTU to a low of 
$1.95/MMBTU in April of 2012 (See Figure 5-4).49 The Henry Hub price for August 
2015 remained low at $2.77 USD/MMBTU.  
 
 
(Source: EIA, 2015) 
Figure 5-4 Natural Gas Price at Louisiana’s Henry Hub 
 
                                                
48 Appendix 5A outlines the method I use to calculate fuel use for fossil fuel 
technologies. 
49 Henry Hub is a natural gas distribution hub in Louisiana. Natural gas prices at the 
Henry Hub are regularly used as a benchmark for natural gas pricing.  
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SaskPower has felt the pinch of high natural gas prices in the past. As noted in Chapter 3, 
during the natural gas price spike of 2000-2001, SaskPower was “getting hammered by 
natural gas prices, just creamed!” (Wright, 2014). For every $1 per gigajoule increase in 
the price of natural gas the LCOE of natural gas combined cycle power increases by 
about $8.50/MWh (Figure 5-5).  
 
 
(Author’s calculations) 
Figure 5-5 Sensitivity of Natural Gas Combined Cycle LCOE to Natural Gas Prices 
 
The future of natural gas prices is uncertain. Advances in hydraulic fracturing technology 
(or ‘fracking’) have unlocked natural gas deposits that were previously thought 
inaccessible. This has increased natural gas supplies and put downward pressure on 
prices, though for how long is unclear. Fracking has not been without problems and 
controversy. Fracturing rock beneath the earth can cause earthquakes (Rubinstein and 
Mahani, 2015).50 In 2014 fracking “triggered a 4.4-magnitude earthquake in northeastern 
                                                
50 Hydraulic fracking is not causing all of the induced earthquakes in North America; 
wastewater injection from oilfields, and injection for enhanced oil recovery also created 
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B.C.” (CBC, 2015c). Fracking also requires the injection of a cocktail of chemicals, the 
composition of which is patent-protected. There are concerns that these chemicals will 
enter groundwater reservoirs and cause water quality problems. These concerns led 
Québec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and New York to pass laws banning fracking 
(Leslie, 2015). Fracking bans have the effect of reducing potential natural gas supply, 
putting upward pressure on natural gas prices.  
 
Canada’s National Energy Board (NEB, 2014a) has created three natural gas price 
forecasts for 2013-2035. These forecasts are specifically for natural gas prices paid by 
industry in Saskatchewan (Figure 5-6). The historic time series displays average annual 
natural gas prices and so hides temporary spikes of the kind shown in Figure 5-4.  
 
 
(Sources: NEB, 2014a; Statistics Canada, 2015 CANSIM Table 129-0003; author’s 
calculations 2035 - 2050) 
Figure 5-6 Saskatchewan Industrial Natural Gas Price Forecast 
                                                                                                                                            
induced earthquakes. Induced earthquakes due to hydraulic fracking are, however, most 
common in Western Canada. (Rubinstein and Mahani, 2015) 
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The natural gas price forecasts provide a range of potential values that are within the 
realm of historic variability. Each forecast tracks upwards over time. I extend the NEB 
(2013) forecasts to 2050 by increasing prices at the compounding annual growth rate 
calculated for each series from 2030-2035. For the optimization model (see chapter 7) I 
use the NEB (2013) reference scenario and then conduct a sensitivity analysis using the 
high and low price forecasts as the bounds of the 90% confidence interval.  
 
Coal prices will impact the LCOE of coal-fired electricity in Saskatchewan. 
Saskatchewan’s coal-fired plants were built in the lignite fields of south and south-east 
Saskatchewan. Coal is purchased on long-term agreements from local suppliers in 
Saskatchewan such as Westmoreland Coal. In the first quarter of 2015 Westmoreland 
reported revenues of $103.2 million and sales of 5.5 million tonnes of coal, which implies 
a coal price of $18.77 USD/tonne (Westmoreland Coal, 2015a). Saskatchewan accounts 
for a large share of Westmoreland’s coal sales so I assume that SaskPower pays the 
average price of Westmoreland’s Canadian coal, or approximately $23/tonne (2014 
$CAN). Figure 5-7 reports the impact of coal prices ranging from $20/tonne to $35/tonne 
on the LCOE of conventional new-build coal in Saskatchewan. The fuel cost for coal 
composes 21% of the total LCOE when coal is $20/tonne and increases to 31% of the 
LCOE when coal is at $35/tonne.  
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(Sources: Westmoreland, 2015a; author’s calculations) 
Figure 5-7 Sensitivity of Coal LCOE to Coal Prices 
 
The availability of “cheap, lignite coal” in Saskatchewan has made fuel a small portion of 
the LCOE, especially relative to natural gas fuelled plants. Coal prices are expected to 
escalate in Saskatchewan over time. Coal contracts with local suppliers come with built-
in escalation factors. Based on historical coal prices in Saskatchewan I estimate that real 
coal prices will escalate at 1.25%/year from 2015-2050 (Sherritt, 2003; Sherritt, 2012).  
 
Technological Progress and LCOE 
The costs associated with electricity generation technologies are not static over time. 
Increased regulatory constraints can increase costs. Technological progress can decrease 
costs. Solar costs have fallen steadily in the United States, especially in the period from 
2010-2014. Figure 5-8 show changes to the installed capital costs of solar since 1998. 
These substantial and rapid cost improvements have greatly improved the economics of 
solar power.  
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(Data source: LBNL, 2015) 
Figure 5-8 Falling Installed Cost of Solar Photovoltaics 
 
Wind turbine costs have also not been static. In the past two decades real wind turbine 
costs have fallen, risen, and then fallen again (See Figure 5-9). In recent years 
innovations such as taller turbines with larger rotor diameters have increased the power 
rating of turbines and decreased the cost per megawatt installed. These cost 
improvements have made wind power one of the lowest cost means of generating 
electricity in places with good wind resources.  
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(Source: U.S. DoE, 2015: 47) 
Figure 5-9 Wind Power Transaction Prices in the United States (1997-2015) 
 
The rate at which costs change is called the “learning rate”. Learning can be modeled as 
an exogenous force acting upon costs, or as an endogenous outcome of “learning-by-
doing” (Löschel, 2002). From a “learning-by-doing” perspective, costs change as 
experience is built up installing a technology. For example, Citi GPS (2015) comments 
on learning rates that have occurred with a doubling of installed capacity,  
 
Solar in particular was exhibiting learning rates in excess of 20% (i.e. 
the cost of a panel would fall by >20% for every doubling of installed 
capacity), wind at 7.4%, gas was evolving via the shale revolution in 
the US, while nuclear was becoming more expensive, and liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) had also increased in cost... (Citi GPS, 2015: 46) 
 
Endogenous learning-by-doing models are useful when analyzing changes to costs in 
large economies like the United States whose market size is large enough to generate 
learning-by-doing effects. At just under 5000 Megawatts (MW), the province of 
Saskatchewan has a relatively small electricity system. Saskatchewan purchases of 
 
2014 Wind Technologies Market Report 47 
 
Source: Berkeley Lab 
Figure 38. Reported wind turbine transaction prices over time 
Since 2008, wind turbine prices have declined substantially, reflecting a reversal of some of the 
previously mentioned underlying trends that had earlier pushed prices higher as well as increased 
competition among manufacturers and significant cost-cutting measures on the part of turbine 
and component suppliers. As shown in Figure 38, our limited sample of recently announced U.S. 
turbine transactions shows pricing in the $850–$1,250/kW range. Bloomberg NEF (2015b) 
reports global average pricing for recent contracts of $950-1,200/kW. Data from Vestas largely 
confirm these pricing points, with average global prices dropping to roughly $1,175/kW in 2014.  
Overall, these figures suggest price declines of 20%–40% since late 2008. Moreover, these 
declines have been coupled with improved turbine techn logy (e.g., the re ent growth in average 
hub heights and rotor diameters shown in Chapter 4) and more-favorable terms for turbine 
purchasers (e.g., reduced turbine delivery lead times and less need for large frame-agreement 
orders, longer initial O&M contract durations, improved warranty terms, and more-stringent 
performance guarantees). These price reductions and improved terms have exerted downward 
pressure on total project costs and wind power prices, whereas increased rotor diameters and hub 
heights are improving capacity factors and further reducing wind power prices.  
Lower turbine prices have driven reductions in reported installed project costs  
Berkeley L b compiles data on the total installed cost f wind power projects in the United 
States, including data on 36 projects completed in 2014 totaling 3,888 MW, or 80% of the wind 
power capacity installed in that year. In aggregate, the dataset (through 2014) includes 743 
completed wind power projects in the continental United States totaling 54,014 MW and 
equaling roughly 82% of all wind power capacity installed in the United States at the end of 
2014. In general, reported project costs reflect turbine purchase and installation, balance of plant, 
and any substation and/or interconnection expenses. Data sources are diverse, however, and are 
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electricity generation technology are too small to induce noticeable learning-by-doing 
effects. For this reason I treat learning as something that happens outside of 
Saskatchewan and I treat learning rates in Saskatchewan as exogenous cost improvements 
per year. Citi GPS (2015) translates learning rates for wind and solar into the following 
annual averages, “For solar PV modules the year on year reduction would amount to 2% 
whilst for onshore wind this number is 1%” (p. 47).  
 
Coad (2015) uses a simple exogenous learning rate equation to model changes to 
technology costs over time,  
 𝐸𝑞. 5.1  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡! = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝!!" 
 
Where, 𝛾 = learning rate 𝑡 = time.  
 
I also use Equation 5.1 to represent learning. This type of equation can be used to 
calculate or apply average annual learning rates.  
 
I calculate learning rates for each technology using data from EIA (2014). This report 
presents levelized cost of capital, variable O&M, and fixed O&M costs for 2019 and 
2040. I use Equation 5.1 to estimate the learning rate implied by the cost changes in EIA 
(2014). These learning rates are summarized in Table 5.1. EIA (2014) is optimistic that 
capital costs for nuclear will fall by 1.54%/yr. Estimates for the annual capital cost 
improvement of solar are 1.25%, a figure lower than the current rate of cost 
improvement.   
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(Source: EIA, 2014; author’s calculations) 
Table 5-1 EIA Learning Rates from 2019-2040 
 
The learning rates in Table 5-1 offer a starting point for forecasting cost improvements, 
but they are not the final word on technological progress. As mentioned above, Citi GPS 
(2015) has found that solar photovoltaic costs have been declining at a rate closer to 
2%/yr than 1.25%/yr. Wind has been declining at a rate closer to 1%/yr (CitiGPS, 2015). 
The EIA (2014) numbers also imply a high learning rate for nuclear that is not supported 
by historical experience. Recent audits of the French nuclear program have revealed cost 
increases rather than cost reductions; a negative learning rate (Grubler, 2010). Boccard 
(2014) used French audit data to estimate growth in real costs of 2.1%/yr for French 
nuclear technology. CitiGPS (2015) also writes that little is expected in the way of cost 
improvements for nuclear technology since it is a mature technology. The cost of SMRs 
may, however, decline if they are put into production at a large scale. The promise of 
SMRs is also that they will lower construction timelines. This will impact the cost of 
financing for a nuclear project. For the numbers summarized below in Figure 5-10, 
reducing the duration of construction from 69 months to 36 months would lower the 
LCOE by nearly $13/MWh.  
 
Future learning rates are a source of uncertainty and a candidate for sensitivity analysis. 
Figure 5-10 shows the impact of a range of learning rates on the LCOE of nuclear power 
from SMRs. The low cost line in Figure 5-10 presents the LCOE cost improvements that 
Capital 
Cost
Fixed 
O&M
Variable 
O&M
Biomass 1.16% 0.09% -0.06%
Coal 0.94% -0.06% -0.10%
Coal CCS 0.54% 0.47% -0.43%
Hydro 0.37% -0.55% -0.37%
Nat Gas CC 1.15% -1.25% 0.00%
Nat Gas CCS 1.50% -1.27% -0.10%
Nat Gas SC 0.92% -1.17% -0.15%
Nuclear 1.54% -0.30% -0.07%
Solar PV 1.25% 1.00% -0.57%
Storage 1.50%
Wind 0.87% 1.00% -0.06%
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would result from the EIA (2015) learning rate of 1.5%. The high cost line presents the 
impact of negative learning at -1.5%. Cost increases in France’s nuclear program were 
driven by safety concerns (Cooper, 2014). Safeguards against nuclear accident have made 
nuclear designs more complex and this has increased costs. Cooper (2014) argues that 
this is an inherent property of nuclear power systems, which rely on a “catastrophically 
dangerous resource that is vulnerable to human frailties and the vicissitudes of Mother 
Nature” (Cooper, 2014: 174). On the other hand, wind and solar electricity generation 
technologies are considered relatively benign. Their components are amenable to mass 
production, which can create economies of scale in the manufacturing process. These 
attributes have likely contributed to the rapid decline of solar photovoltaic costs but it 
remains unclear how long they will continue and at what rate. I consider a range of 
learning rates in the sensitivity analysis of scenario costs in Chapter 8.  
 
Financing Costs 
There are costs associated with obtaining the necessary funds for capital projects. In their 
latest Annual Report, SaskPower notes that it “raises most of its capital through internal 
operating activities and through borrowings obtained from the Government of 
Saskatchewan Ministry of Finance” (SaskPower, 2015: 67). In 2014 SaskPower had 
$4250 million in recourse debt obtained as advances from the Government of 
Saskatchewan’s General Revenue Fund (GRF).51 The province currently sits in a 
relatively strong financial position and as such is able to access low cost debt financing. 
In both 2013 and 2014 the Government of Saskatchewan had a credit rating of AA on 
long-term debt obligations (SaskPower, 2015: 67). In the low-interest environment of 
2014, SaskPower was able to obtain long-term financing of $675 million at effective 
interest rates that varied from 3.43% to 3.95% (SaskPower, 2015: 70).52 As a Crown 
Corporation, SaskPower is wholly owned by the Government of Saskatchewan through 
                                                
51 Note that the term for most of SaskPower’s debt is approximately 30 years from the 
date of issue.  
52 SaskPower also accessed $100 million in financing at a floating interest rate and 
borrowed “$86 million in short-term advances” from “the Government of 
Saskatchewan’s General Revenue Fund” with “interest rates ranging from .997% to 1% 
and maturity within 2015 (SaskPower, 2015: 70). 
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the Crown Investment Corporation (CIC). CIC issues equity advances to SaskPower. As 
of December 31st, 2014 SaskPower had $660 million in equity advances from CIC. 
SaskPower has a long-term target for return on equity of 8.5% (SaskPower, 2015: 39). 
However, due to the need for substantial investment in the Saskatchewan electricity 
system the Government of Saskatchewan has opted not to take dividends from 
SaskPower for the foreseeable future. It seems appropriate therefore to model the cost of 
capital as consisting entirely of debt financing at 4%/yr interest, a rate slightly higher 
than the current low interest rates charged for long-term debt and which anticipates the 
possibility of a rate increase.53  
 
Private power producers do not have access to the favourable financing terms that 
SaskPower receives, and instead have higher return on equity targets for their 
shareholders. This means that private power projects will face higher financing charges. 
This has implications for the comparative costs of public versus private construction. In 
the SIM model I make the simplifying assumption that all new capital is constructed by 
SaskPower.  
 
Financing costs also include interest that accumulates on capital during the construction 
period. Technologies with long construction periods such as nuclear and coal-fired plants 
will accumulate more interest. I add interest incurred during the construction period to the 
capital cost and amortize the whole amount over the expected lifetime of the technology. 
Details on my methodology can be found in Appendix 5A. 
 
Other Costs 
There are other technology-specific costs that can be considered in a calculation of 
LCOE: 
                                                
53 SaskPower had a debt-equity ratio of 73.5% as of December 31, 2014, meaning that 
debt financing currently accounts for 73.5% of total financing. This is a change from 
December 31st, 2013 when the debt-equity ratio was 69.8%. This number is forecast to 
continue to creep upwards; by 2017 the debt ratio (%) target is 77.3%. This reflects the 
period of intensive investment currently occurring at SaskPower. (SaskPower, 2015) 
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• In Saskatchewan, hydroelectric facilities pay water royalties at a rate of 
$5.10/MWh electricity generated (Interview 24). I assume this cost is included in 
the variable operations and maintenance cost of hydroelectricity, which I have set 
at $7.20/MWh; 
• All facilities will also incur decommissioning charges at the end of their life. 
Nuclear power plants require especially large decommissioning costs due to the 
hazard of radioactivity. Boccard (2014) estimates that decommissioning of French 
nuclear reactors will cost 25% of the original investment cost. Due to a lack of 
data I have not included decommissioning costs, which would appear to favour, in 
relative terms, nuclear power; 
• Nuclear power plants must also pay for the long-term storage of spent nuclear 
fuel. EPRI (2013) adds $1/MWh to the variable operations and maintenance 
(O&M) costs of nuclear power plants to represent the amount that would be paid 
to a nuclear waste management organization. Canada’s Nuclear Waste 
Management Organization makes the same estimate for the cost of long-term 
waste disposal (NWMO, 2015). I have used a variable O&M cost for nuclear on 
par with EPRI (2013).; 
• Fossil fuel plants emit pollutants beside CO2. Coal plants in particular emit 
sulphur dioxide (SO2), particulates, and mercury. DSS (2005) quantified the 
health impacts resulting from these pollutants in Ontario and found the health 
costs of an electricity futures scenario that maintained the Ontario electricity 
generation mix at the status quo proportions that existed in 2005 – which included 
a substantial amount of coal-fired generation – to be three times higher than the 
financial cost. I have not included health costs in the LCOE figures below, which 
means that the fossil-fuel costs are conservative estimates.  
• The use of carbon dioxide (CO2) for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) will produce 
oil that has a 10.8% higher GHG intensity than an average barrel of conventional 
oil, but 11.5% lower GHG intensity than oil extracted from the oil sands. The 
EOR operation will also lead to CO2 emissions on-site. This leads to “a net on-site 
storage of .696 TCO2e per 1 TCO2e brought to the site” (Wong et al., 2013: 8). I 
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do not consider the GHG implications of EOR in this analysis. (Wong et al., 
2013) 
 
Other Benefits 
Part of the motivation for the Boundary Dam III carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
project was to provide a source of CO2 for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) (IEAGHG, 
2015). SaskPower sells CO2 to the oil company Cenovus for around $22.50/tonne CO2 
(Glennie, 2015). This represents a potential revenue stream for the Boundary Dam 
project.54 In Figure 5-10 I include two measures of LCOE for Boundary Dam with 
(SaskPower Low) and without (SaskPower High) the revenue from sales of CO2. 
SaskPower is also able to sell sulphuric acid from the Boundary Dam project. The 
revenue from these sales is limited (Glennie, 2015) and I have excluded it from the 
LCOE calculations.  
 
Cost Assumptions 
I gathered electricity cost information from published estimates of Saskatchewan built 
projects and the energy cost literature (EIA, 2015; Lazard, 2014; EPRI, 2013). I adjusted 
all costs to Canadian 2014 constant dollars using U.S. exchange rate data from the Bank 
of Canada (Bank of Canada, 2015) and the Canadian All-items Consumer Price Index 
(Statistics Canada, 2015 CANSIM Table 326-0020).  
 
The initial LCOE calculations for coal and natural gas fired plants (shown below in 
Figure 5-10) assume constant fuel prices equivalent to current rates ($4.22/GJ for natural 
gas and $23.18/tonne for lignite coal). They are thus conservative estimates as fuel prices 
                                                
54 This potential source of revenue can also be a financial liability. SaskPower has signed 
a contract with Cenovus to deliver a certain quantity of CO2 for enhanced oil recovery. If 
SaskPower cannot deliver the CO2 and meet its contractual obligations it must pay a 
penalty to Cenovus. This occurred in 2014 and 2015 when – due to technical problems at 
the new plant – Boundary Dam III has operated at less than full capacity. This has meant 
that SaskPower has only been apply to supply half of the 800 kilotonnes of CO2 is was 
supposed to provide Cenovus in 2015. By October 2015 SaskPower had paid $12 million 
in penalties to Cenovus and was on track to face another $5-6 million in penalties by the 
end of 2015. (Leo, 2015) 
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will likely rise. I allow fuel prices to rise in the scenarios I consider in Chapter 7. I 
assume the NEB (2013) reference price forecast for natural gas (see Figure 5-6), and coal 
price escalation at 1.25% per year.  
 
Levelized Cost of Electricity 
Table 5-2 summarizes the values I use to calculate the LCOE of each technology. I also 
use these as starting values in the scenario optimization analysis summarized in Chapter 
7. Figure 5-10 presents the LCOE numbers that result from these assumptions and 
compares the LCOE numbers to those based on the literature.  
 
For reference I have included the costs of integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC) 
coal-fired technologies, but I have not included those in the simulation model used in 
Chapter 7. Instead, I have included only one coal-fired generation with CCS technology 
option that matches the cost profile of the Boundary Dam III project. Also note that solar 
thermal electricity ranges in LCOE from $386/MWh to $772/MWh. For visual clarity (to 
avoid skewing the y-axis) I have not included solar thermal in Figure 5-10. Lastly, the 
model value shown for hydroelectricity is based on a capital cost of $6000/kw. 
Hydroelectricity costs in the simulation model increase in a step-wise fashion to the 
‘SaskPower high’ LCOE as low-cost hydroelectric capacity is developed in the province.  
 
 
(Source: author’s calculations; EIA, 2015; Lazard, 2014; EPRI, 2013) 
Table 5-2 Cost Assumptions for Saskatchewan Electricity Technologies 
 
Co Vo Fo Life
Capacity.
Factor FuelEff
Heat.Rate.
(Btu/kwh)
GHG.
Intensity.
(kt/MWh)
LCOE.
($/MWh)
Biomass 5,000**** 12.0*** 115.0** 20 0.85 24% 14,500****** 1*********** $96
New*coal*scrubbed 4,500**** 5.6***** 70.0**** 30 0.85 34% 10,000****** 1.07********* $76
Coal*with*CCS*(Boundary*Dam) 13,336** 10.5*** 95.0**** 30 0.85 26% 13,333****** 1.43********* $171
Natural*gas*combined*cycle 2,878**** 3.5***** 14.5**** 25 0.54 43% 8,000******** 0.42********* $85
Natural*gas*simple*cycle 1,810**** 12.0*** 15.5**** 25 0.4 28% 12,000****** 0.63********* $106
Natural*gas*CCS 5,200**** 8.5***** 40.0**** 25 0.7 36% 9,600******** 0.50********* $118
Hydro*Repower 900******** 7.2***** 19.0**** 40 0.56 33% 1 1*********** $21
Hydro*South 6,000**** 7.2***** 19.0**** 40 0.56 33% 1 1*********** $79
Hydro*North 8,000**** 7.2***** 19.0**** 40 0.56 33% 1 1*********** $102
Wind 2,006**** 1***** 47.0**** 20 0.365 37% 1 1*********** $60
Solar*1*PV*(Utility1scale) 3,000**** 1***** 26.0**** 20 0.16 33% 1 1*********** $173
Solar*1*Thermal 8,000**** 1***** 99.0**** 20 0.16 33% 1 1*********** $483
Small*Modular*Nuclear*Reactor 14,119** 1.7***** 154.3** 25 0.85 33% 10,450****** 1*********** $176
Electricity*Storage 1,500**** 1***** 30.5**** 20 0.21 33% 1 1*********** 1
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Figure 5-10 Levelized Cost of Electricity by Reference Source 
 
Summary 
In this chapter I explored the costs of constructing and operating new electricity 
generation facilities in Saskatchewan. Based on these calculations wind power is 
estimated to be the lowest cost electricity generation technology in the province (Figure 
5-10). There is a significant opportunity to expand wind power in the province. However, 
wind expansion will have to consider the issues of variability identified in Chapter 4, 
which will lead to additional costs that are not yet included in the LCOE numbers above. 
The costs of the storage and back-up necessary to integrate wind onto the electricity 
system are included in Chapters 7 and 8. My estimates also indicate that the best 
hydroelectric locations are also highly cost-effective. As these low-cost sites are 
developed the cost of hydroelectricity will increase.  
 
Natural-gas fired generation with CCS is a low-carbon fossil-fuel technology that is less 
expensive than coal-fired generation with CCS. All of the natural-gas fired generation 
technologies are, however, vulnerable to natural gas fuel price increases.  
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Other low-carbon technologies such as coal-fired generation with CCS and nuclear power 
are estimated to be considerably more expensive than the current wholesale price of 
power, which lies between $50/MWh and $70/MWh for large electricity customers 
(SaskPower, 2015). Utility-scale solar power is notably on par with coal-fired generation 
with CCS and small, modular nuclear reactors. Solar costs are also falling rapidly 
suggesting that solar will likely soon be less expensive than either of these technologies. 
Solar, like wind, does require a system designed for variability. The costs of integrating 
solar are included in the scenarios outlined in Chapters 7 and 8, but are excluded from the 
LCOE numbers in Figure 5-10.  
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Chapter 6 – Electricity Demand Forecast and Energy Conservation Potential  
 
Introduction 
With data on the potential for renewable energy (Chapter 4) and the cost of competing 
electricity generation technologies (Chapter 5) I am almost ready to analyze scenarios for 
Saskatchewan’s electricity future. First, however, it is important to understand how 
electricity demand will change over time. In this chapter I develop a forecast for 
Saskatchewan electricity demand. I also outline the potential for energy conservation, and 
the cost of implementing energy conservation measures. This information will be used in 
Chapter 7 to select scenarios for meeting Saskatchewan’s electricity needs out to 2050.    
 
Electricity Demand Forecast 
Saskatchewan’s electricity system has grown nearly continuously since the 1950s (see 
Figure 3-11). This growth has been fuelled by the expansion of industry, as well as the 
increased electrification of modern life. Figure 6-1 shows the average electricity used by 
a SaskPower residential customer from 1960 to 2014. Note that the apparent drop in the 
mid 1990s is largely due to an accounting change (indicated by the dotted vertical line) 
rather than an increase in energy efficiency. Also note that the breaks in the solid black 
line are due to missing data; not all of SaskPower’s annual reports provided data on 
residential electricity use.   
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(Source: SaskPower, 1960-2014) 
Figure 6-1 Average Annual Electricity Use by a Residential Customer 
 
Saskatchewan’s population hovered around one million people for most of the 20th 
century. Still, residential electricity demand increased as customers outfitted their homes 
with electric refrigerators, washing machines, dryers, dishwashers, televisions, and 
microwaves. Average electricity demand continues to grow in the Saskatchewan 
residential sector, as new electricity-consuming gadgets like computers, laptops, smart 
phones, and big-screen televisions are all plugged into the power system.  
 
The fastest growing segment of electricity demand in Saskatchewan is, however, 
industrial. Saskatchewan’s potash industry is investing $12 billion to expand operations 
in the province over the course of the next five years (Government of Saskatchewan, 
2015). Pipelines, including the Keystone pipeline, are carrying more oil to U.S. markets. 
Northern mines are increasing production and this has necessitated the construction of the 
$380 million, 300-kilometer I1K transmission line from Island Falls to the Key Lake 
uranium mill (SaskPower, 2015). Electricity demand is also forecast to increase in the 
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oilfields for the next decade, even though some forecasts show Saskatchewan oil 
production volumes declining (e.g. NEB, 2014a). Oilfield electricity use will continue to 
increase due to the increased energy intensity of oil production; more electricity is 
required to extract the oil as high-quality reserves are exhausted (Interview 5). Electricity 
demand grew quickly in the province during the past decade. A forecast of provincial 
electricity demand, based on the assumption that the past trends continue, suggests a 
significant increase in demand over the next 40 years (Figure 6-2).55 
 
 
(SaskPower, 2015b; author’s calculations) 
Figure 6-2 Saskatchewan Electricity Demand Forecast (2015-2055) 
 
This forecast assumes growth of four important drivers of Saskatchewan electricity 
demand: population, gross domestic product (GDP), potash mining, and uranium 
extraction. It assumes that Saskatchewan oil production peaks in 2015 and electricity 
                                                
55 SaskPower produces 10-year, 20-year and 40-year electricity demand forecasts. The 
40-year forecast is available only internally. Wherever possible I have worked to 
calibrate my forecast with SaskPower’s forecasts, especially SaskPower (2015b).  
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demand from the oil sector peaks a decade later in 2026 when declining production 
begins to outpace the increased electricity intensity of production.  
 
Figure 6-3 presents the forecast indexed values of these five drivers of electricity 
demand: population, GDP, and potash, uranium and oil production. I assume that 
population will grow at a constant rate of .6%/year from 2015-2055, reaching a 
population of 1.46 million people by 2055. GDP, measured in constant dollars, is 
assumed to grow at a rate of 1.85%/year. Potash production, measured in physical sales 
volume (kilotonnes) grows at an annual rate of 4.5%/yr from 2015-2026; 3.25% from 
2027-2035; and 3% from 2036-2050. Uranium production (measured in tonnes sales 
volume) grows by 3.5%/year until 2035 and afterwards grows by 1.0%/year.    
 
 
(Source: author’s calculations) 
Figure 6-3 Drivers of Electricity Demand 
 
It is important to consider not only the scale of activity in Saskatchewan, but also the 
electricity intensity of activity. Figure 6-1 showed that per capita electricity use is 
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increasing in the residential sector. Meanwhile, Saskatchewan’s commercial and 
institutional sector has been improving energy efficiency.  
 
Table 6-1 summarizes the assumptions I have made about electricity intensity. A positive 
number in the ‘Intensity Change (%/yr)’ column indicates that more electricity is being 
used per unit in each year. A negative number in that column means that electricity 
intensity is decreasing; the sector is becoming more energy efficient. These intensities are 
calibrated using historic data from Statistics Canada (2003-2011), SaskPower (2015b), 
the Saskatchewan Economic Review (SBS, 1997-2015), and the Comprehensive Energy 
Use Database (NRCAN, 2015b).  
 
 
Table 6-1 Electricity Intensity Assumptions 
 
Table 6-1 also summarizes my projections on how the drivers will interact with 
electricity demand from 2015-2050. For example, I assume residential electricity demand 
will be influenced by the size of the population; initially, for every 1000 people added to 
Saskatchewan’s population, electricity demand increases by 2.85 GWh. Commercial 
electricity demand is a function of GDP, as is electricity demand by ‘power class’ 
customers outside of the potash, pipeline, and northern mining sectors. Potash electricity 
demand increases with potash production, measured in proxy by sales volume.56 Northern 
mining is handled in a fashion similar to potash mining. While not shown, pipeline 
electricity demand is assumed to grow by 8.5% from 2015-2020 and then to hold at a 
constant level between 2020-2055. This assumes that increased pipeline capacity will be 
                                                
56 Note that sales volumes may differ from production volumes due to the accumulation 
or drawing down of inventories.  
Sector Unit
Initial 
Intensity 
(GWh/unit)
Intensity 
Change 
(%/yr)
Residential 1000 People 2.85            1.20%
Commercial $1000 GDP (2007 CDN) 63.00          -1.20%
Potash Kilotonnes sales volume 0.26            0.00%
Oilfields
1000 m3 per day 
production volume 40.00          3.50%
Northern mining Tonnes sales volume 50.00          0.00%
Other power $1000 GDP (2007 CDN) 65.00          -0.75%
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built (e.g. the proposed Energy East pipeline) and a continued high volume of oil exports 
from Alberta after 2020.  
 
The remaining categories of electricity demand are forecast as follows: 
• Farm electricity demand is constant at 1300 GWh per year; this category of 
electricity demand has been falling slowly in recent years as small family farms 
have been purchased and amalgamated into large corporate farms. This has meant 
fewer people living on farms in rural Saskatchewan; 
• Reseller electricity demand refers to the electricity sold to Saskatoon Light & 
Power and Swift Current Light & Power. These companies manage electricity 
distribution in their respective cities. However, Saskatoon Light & Power sells 
only to customers within the 1958 city boundaries of Saskatoon; customers 
outside of this area are served by SaskPower. Electricity demand from these 
resellers has grown slowly in recent years. I assume that electricity demand grows 
at half the rate of population growth. This means that reseller electricity demand 
grows from 1300 GWh in 2015 to 1480 GWh in 2055; 
• Corporate Use refers to electricity used within SaskPower’s operations. This is a 
relatively small portion of electricity demand. Based on historic data I assume that 
corporate use equals .4% of the total electricity demand from the other categories;  
• Line Loss refers to electricity lost through the transmission and distribution of 
electricity. Based on the historic relationship between electricity demand and line 
loss I assume that line loss is equal to 7.5% of total electricity demand (including 
corporate use).   
 
This forecast is by no means certain. The United States government recently said no to 
the Keystone XL pipeline project and similar opposition in Canada could prevent the 
Energy East pipeline from being built. Strong climate policy could encourage fuel 
switching away from fossil fuels and lower demand for Alberta oil. In the potash sector, 
demand has been cooling in 2015 and PotashCorp has announced a round of lay-offs and 
temporary shutdowns at three Saskatchewan plants (CBC, 2015d). Lower oil and potash 
demand would result in a lower electricity demand forecast. Conversely, the forecast 
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would be higher with stronger growth in commodity sales. Higher penetrations of electric 
vehicles would also increase electricity demand. The forecast used in this dissertation 
provides one possible demand scenario, and one possible set of drivers that would 
achieve the scenario. Other demand scenarios are possible.  
 
Electricity Conservation Potential 
SaskPower produces two electricity demand forecasts: one that considers opportunities to 
conserve electricity through ‘demand side-management’ (DSM), and another that 
excludes the potential for energy conservation. ICF-Marbek (2011) defines DSM as 
follows, 
 
“DSM measures can include energy efficiency (use more efficiently), 
energy conservation (use less), demand management (use less during peak 
periods), fuel switching (use a different fuel to provide the energy service) 
and customer-side generation (displace load off of grid).” 57 (p. 5) 
 
The forecast presented in Figure 6-1 is calibrated to SaskPower’s (2015b) DSM-adjusted 
forecast. This forecast is informed by the efforts of SaskPower’s Customer Services 
Branch, which designs and implements SaskPower’s energy conservation programming 
(Interview 14). This conservation programming is in turn informed by ICF-Marbek’s 
(2011) Conservation Potential Review for Saskatchewan. In 2010-2011 SaskPower 
commissioned ICF-Marbek to conduct a review of conservation potential in 
Saskatchewan. The results of this review are presented in Tables 6-2 and 6-3.58 Table 6-2 
indicates the potential for peak demand savings (expressed in megawatts). Table 6-3 
indicates the potential to reduce total electricity demand in Saskatchewan (in gigawatt-
hours/year). 
                                                
57 Note that demand management does not necessarily mean using less electricity, but 
instead involves shifting demand away from periods of high or “peak” demand. 
58 The Residential (Resl) sector includes residential homes and farm households. The 
commercial sector (Comml) includes commercial and institutional customers. The 
industrial sector (Indl) includes large power users such as mines and oilfield customers. 
(ICF-Marbek, 2011) 
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(Source: ICF-Marbek, 2011) 
Table 6-2 Peak Demand Savings Potential 
 
 
(Source: ICF-Marbek, 2011) 
Table 6-3 Electricity Conservation Potential 
 
The Upper and Lower Potential numbers in Tables 6-2 and 6-3 show the achievable DSM 
savings in Saskatchewan. To calculate this achievable potential ICF-Marbek (2011) first 
calculated total economic potential. ICF-Marbek (2011) define economic potential as 
DSM measures that can achieve electricity savings at or better than a rate of $.15/kwh, 
the marginal cost of new electricity production (ICF-Marbek, 2011). This places an upper 
bound on the economic potential for DSM, but this bound is not static. As technologies 
develop and costs are reduced, the frontier of economic potential expands. LED lights are 
a case in point; five years ago they were prohibitively expensive, but economies of scale 
in production, and technological innovation, have led to rapid cost improvements 
(McKinsey, 2012).59 Economic potential can also expand if the marginal price of 
electricity rises above the $.15/kWh threshold identified by ICF-Marbek (2011).  
 
                                                
59 McKinsey (2012) reports that LED prices were declining by 14-24% per year in the 
2010-2012 period. They forecast that by 2016-2020 LEDs will gain the highest market 
share of any lighting technology (McKinsey, 2012). 
Reference
Total
(MW) Resl Comml Indl Total Resl Comml Indl Total
2015 3,473666666666 256666666666 326666666666 506666666666 10766666666 126666666666 296666666666 326666666666 736666666666
2020 3,627666666666 566666666666 656666666666 21566666666 33666666666 376666666666 566666666666 646666666666 15766666666
2025 3,772666666666 666666666666 916666666666 26966666666 42666666666 426666666666 736666666666 10466666666 21966666666
2030 3,862666666666 676666666666 11866666666 26666666666 45166666666 426666666666 926666666666 14966666666 28366666666
Peak2Demand2Savings2(MW/yr)
Upper2Potential Lower2Potential
Reference
Total
(GWh/yr) Resl Comml Indl Total Resl Comml Indl Total
2015 23,2104444444 20644444444 20344444444 53544444444 94444444444 954444444444 18244444444 35444444444 63144444444
2020 24,4524444444 45444444444 42344444444 2,09144444 2,96844444 29744444444 36044444444 70244444444 1,35944444
2025 25,6224444444 52744444444 60144444444 2,71344444 3,84144444 33944444444 48344444444 1,12944444 1,95144444
2030 26,3244444444 54544444444 79344444444 2,87944444 4,2174444 33844444444 61544444444 1,59144444 2,54444444
Electricity5Savings5(GWh/yr)
Upper5Potential Lower5Potential
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Achievable potential is lower than economic potential because not all economically 
beneficial DSM measures will be carried out by customers. There are significant barriers 
that can prevent energy conservation: 
 
“New technologies present greater risks, as do the longer paybacks 
associated with investments such as energy efficiency. Some low-
cost…technologies are not perfect substitutes in the eyes of the businesses 
or consumers expected to adopt them.” (Jaccard, 2009: 312) 
 
On this last point, electricity users may have a preference for non energy-related features 
of a less efficient technology (I personally enjoy the warm glow of an incandescent 
lightbulb while reading a book on a cold winter’s day). 
 
The upper and lower “achievable potential” numbers presented in Tables 6-2 and 6-3 
account for barriers to adoption. These numbers were developed by ICF-Marbek (2011) 
in consultation with SaskPower staff. The difference between upper and lower potential 
relates to incentives; the upper potential numbers can be achieved if SaskPower supplies 
customers with more generous financial incentives for conservation.  
 
ICF-Marbek (2011) study in hand, SaskPower’s Customer Services Branch set a target of 
shaving 100 MW off of peak demand by 2018 (Interview 16). This target lies in between 
ICF-Marbek’s (2011) upper and lower achievable potential for 2015 (see Table 6-2 
above).  
 
SaskPower (2015) reports that DSM programs have achieved 90 MW in peak demand 
savings since 2008. In 2014, savings were 13 MW, which exceeded SaskPower’s target 
of 9 MW for that year (SaskPower, 2015). The Customer Services Branch is on track to 
meet their target of 100 MW peak demand savings by 2018 (Interview 16). 
 
Interestingly, the mix of DSM savings achieved by SaskPower differs from the relative 
potential identified by ICF-Marbek (2011). ICF-Marbek (2011) forecast that total peak 
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load in 2015 would be composed of residential demand of 485 MW, commercial demand 
of 542 MW, and 2446 MW of industrial demand for a total of 3473 MW. The industrial 
sector is the largest of the three sectors and holds the greatest potential for peak demand 
savings (Table 6-2) and electricity savings (Table 6-3). However, SaskPower (2015) 
estimates that only “10-15% of DSM-related energy savings can be expected from the 
industrial market” (p. 50). SaskPower (2015) anticipates further DSM savings of “50-
60% from the commercial market” and “30-35% from the residential market” (p. 50). 
Figure 6-4 compares the ICF-Marbek (2011) potential to the SaskPower (2015) DSM 
estimates.  
 
 
Figure 6-4 Estimated Sectoral Contributions to DSM 
 
The focus on commercial and residential DSM may be partly due to the shape of 
electricity demand for each sector. Figure 6-5 shows demand for electricity on December 
22nd 2013 broken out by power customers, oilfield customers, and a large category for 
‘other’ customers, which includes commercial and residential customers, farms, and 
resellers. Electricity demand from power and oilfield customers, some of the biggest 
industrial consumers of electricity in Saskatchewan, is relatively flat. Industrial processes 
run fairly constantly and so do not demonstrate the fluctuations seen in the residential and 
commercial sectors.  
0% 
20% 
40% 
60% 
80% 
100% 
120% 
ICF-Marbek SaskPower 
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 D
SM
 S
av
in
gs
 
Industrial 
Commercial 
Residential 
 169 
 
(Source: SaskPower via Bigland-Pritchard, 2015b)  
Figure 6-5 Power Demand on December 22nd, 2013 
 
To reduce peak demand for power in the residential sector, SaskPower has sponsored 
programs such as providing free timers for block heaters and providing discounts for 
LED Christmas lights.60 Typically, peak power demand occurs on a cold evening in 
December when furnaces are running on high, cars are plugged in, and Christmas lights 
are switched on (ICF-Marbek, 2011; SaskPower, 1990-2015). Reducing demand at this 
peak time directly offsets the need for additional generation capacity.61  
 
There may be other reasons for the emphasis on commercial and residential customers. 
Not all industrial customers are enthusiastic about DSM initiatives. DSM may require 
                                                
60 Often these programs are carried out by third-party energy conservation consultants 
such as the Summerhill Group. 
61 ICF-Marbek (2011) reports on the potential savings block heater timers can provide on 
a winter weekday peak, “block heaters use only 2% of annual electricity, but account for 
10% of the residential contribution to the system peak demand. Use of a block heater 
timer was estimated to reduce the system peak demand from block heaters by at least 
90%.” (p. 20) 
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changes in operating practices that increase other costs. For example, large, inefficient 
fans are used to blow air in potash mines. These fans use a lot of power and more 
efficient fans are available. However, equipment in a potash mine must be cleaned 
frequently to deal with corrosion; the salts in the mines quickly accumulate on 
equipment. The large fans are easily cleaned and this saves labour time relative to more 
efficient, but smaller and harder to clean, fans. (Interview 21) 
 
Electricity is also a relatively small portion of production costs in Saskatchewan’s potash 
mines; from 2003-2011 expenditures on electricity were about one-fifth the level of 
expenditures on labour (Statistics Canada, 2003-2011). The electricity cost savings 
promised by DSM may not be large enough to allocate scarce labour time to achieving 
them. 
 
Increasing electricity prices may change this thinking. SaskPower customers will often 
complain when rates increase, and this becomes an ideal time to talk about DSM 
opportunities (Interview 36). SaskPower is working to create a “culture of conservation” 
within Saskatchewan that will encourage business and industry to react to price increases 
with increased efficiency rather than anger (Interview 36).  
 
I now turn my attention to the costs of electricity conservation in Saskatchewan.  
 
The Cost of Electricity Conservation 
The cost of electricity conservation measures can be expressed by the Cost of Conserved 
Energy (CCE). Marbek (2007) defines CCE, 
 
“CCE is calculated as the annualized incremental cost (including operating 
and maintenance) of the measure divided by the annual kilowatt-hour 
savings achieved, excluding any administrative or program costs to 
achieve full use of the measure.” (p. 5) 
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𝐸𝑞. 6.1  𝐶𝐶𝐸 ($/𝑘𝑊ℎ) =  𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ($)𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑘𝑊ℎ 𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑑 (𝑘𝑊ℎ) 
 
This measure can be used to compare energy conservation to the cost of generating 
electricity (expressed in Chapter 5 using LCOE). Figure 6-6 shows the cost of 
conservation in the Saskatchewan residential sector in 2015 as reported by ICF-Marbek 
(2011). CCE is indicated by the black ‘marginal cost’ line. Conservation is inexpensive at 
low levels of cumulative energy conservation. Costs then increase as “low-hanging fruit” 
(i.e. low-cost conservation options) are “picked” (i.e. implemented). Once CCE reaches 
$.15/kwh further conservation measures are beyond the realm of economic potential as 
defined by ICF-Marbek (2011).  
 
 
(Source: ICF-Marbek, 2011) 
Figure 6-6 Residential DSM Program Costs (Year=2015) 
 
Figure 6-6 shows both the marginal cost of additional conservation efforts (black solid 
line) and the average cost of cumulative efforts (green dotted line). The cost of 
conserving electricity (CCE) in the residential sector can be lower than many of 
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SaskPower’s electricity generation options. Until cumulative electricity savings of about 
140 GWh/yr are achieved, the marginal cost of conservation is $.03/kwh or less. This 
cost is lower than all of the electricity generation options outlined in Chapter 5. 
Conserved electricity is also clean; it avoids greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs).62 
 
SaskPower targets a portfolio of conservation measures that achieve an average cost of 
$.03/kwh or less (Interview 8). Average cost is lower than marginal cost because the 
presence of low-cost actions in the portfolio balances out the presence of higher cost 
actions. The dotted green average cost line in Figure 6-6 shows how average cost 
increases with conservation effort. In the residential sector in 2015 it is possible to 
achieve a portfolio of actions amounting to about 175 GWh/yr in savings before reaching 
an average cost of $.03/kwh.  
 
Figures 6-7 presents the cost of electricity conservation for the commercial sector in 
2015. If all the conservation measures that belong to the upper achievable potential 
category, which total 206 GWh/yr in 2015, were implemented in the commercial sector, 
the average cost of conservation would still be below $.06/kWh. These average costs do 
increase in the commercial sector over time (see Table 6-5 below). This is to be expected 
as “low-hanging fruit” are “picked”. Average costs also increase as the frontier of 
achievable potential expands outwards in future years. 
 
                                                
62 At least direct GHGs; energy-saving technologies will contain embodied GHGs. 
 173 
 
(Source: ICF-Marbek, 2011) 
Figure 6-7 Commercial DSM Program Costs (Year=2015) 
 
 
(Source: ICF-Marbek, 2011) 
Figure 6-8 Industrial DSM Program Costs (Year=2015) 
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Industrial electricity conservation is more expensive than conservation in the commercial 
and residential sectors. Figure 6-8 shows that the marginal cost of industrial energy 
conservation rises above $.05/kWh by the time 50 GWh/yr of savings are achieved. 
Marginal cost begins to exceed $.10/kWh after reaching 350 GWh/yr of cumulative 
savings, and the average cost reaches $.09/kWh when cumulative savings reach the ICF-
Marbek (2011) cut-off point. These higher costs may explain the emphasis SaskPower 
places on residential and commercial conservation over industrial conservation.  
 
It is worth noting that large industrial power users pay between $.05 and $.07 per 
kilowatt-hour for their electricity (SaskPower, 2015d). The largest users receive power 
directly from transmission lines, operate their own transformers, and pay the lowest rates. 
This means that most of the conservation measures in Figure 6-8 will be more expensive 
than simply purchasing more power from the grid. There is little economic incentive for 
industrial power users to find ways to conserve.  
 
Modelling Energy Conservation 
To summarize, the DSM-adjusted forecast presented in Figure 6-1 is premised on 
SaskPower achieving some of the energy conservation opportunities identified by the 
ICF-Marbek (2011) report. However, the DSM-adjusted forecast does not assume that all 
of the achievable gains will be realized; there is still room for further conservation, 
especially in the industrial sector.  
 
Having identified the cost of conservation in Saskatchewan using ICF-Marbek (2011), I 
include energy conservation as a substitute for building new generation capacity in my 
optimization model. I model the potential for electricity conservation beyond the DSM-
adjusted forecast by making the following assumptions: 
1. I assume that the SaskPower DSM-adjusted forecast is premised on achieving the 
“lower achievable potential” levels of conservation in the residential and 
commercial sectors; 
2. I assume that the remaining conservation potential in the residential and 
commercial sectors from 2015-2030 equals the increment between the lower 
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achievable potential and the upper achievable potential identified by ICF-Marbek 
(2011); 
3. After 2030 I assume that residential conservation potential in each 5-year time 
step equals 3% of the electricity forecast total for the residential sector. Included 
in the residential sector total are the residential sector plus farm electricity 
demand plus half of reseller demand; 
4. After 2030 I assume that commercial conservation potential in each 5-year time 
step equals 3.5% of the electricity forecast total for the commercial sector. 
Included in the commercial sector total are the commercial sector plus half the 
reseller demand plus one quarter of ‘other power user’ demand. I include 25% of 
the ‘other power user’ because the category includes large institutions such as the 
University of Regina and the University of Saskatchewan; 
5. I assume that the DSM-adjusted forecast (SaskPower, 2015b) includes industrial 
conservation only for measures with a marginal cost less than $.05/kWh. From 
2015-2030 I subtract the cumulative savings that cost less than $.05/kWh from the 
upper achievable potential to determine the remaining conservation potential in 
the industrial sector; 
6. After 2030 I assume that industrial conservation potential in each 5-year time step 
equals 16% of the electricity forecast total for the industrial sector. This large 
number indicates the high degree of potential ICF-Marbek (2011) identified in the 
industrial sector. I assume the industrial sector is composed of the oilfields, the 
potash mining, northern mining and pipeline sectors, and three quarters of the 
‘other power user’ sector.  
 
For each sector I represent the cost of electricity conservation as the average cost of the 
portfolio of conservation measures that reach the upper achievable potential identified by 
ICF-Marbek (2011). In the scenarios outlined in Chapter 7, each GWh of conservation 
potential must be purchased at this average cost. The average cost ($/kWh) increases for 
the residential and commercial sectors until the year 2030 and then remains constant 
afterwards. In the industrial sector, average cost ($/kWh) starts at the high level of 8.5 
cents per kilowatt-hour and remains there through to the year 2055.   
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Tables 6-4, 6-5, and 6-6 present the conservation potential and conservation costs that I 
use in my model of the Saskatchewan electricity system.  
 
 
(Source: ICF-Marbek, 2011; author’s calculations) 
Table 6-4 Model Values Assumed for the Residential Sector 
 
 
(Source: ICF-Marbek, 2011; author’s calculations) 
Table 6-5 Model Values Assumed for the Commercial Sector 
 
Upper%
Achievable%
(GWh/yr)
Lower%
Achievable%
(GWh/yr)
Model%
Bound%
(GWh/yr)
2015 5,171'''''''''''' 203''''''''''''' 182''''''''''''' 21''''''''''''''' 0.040
2020 5,492'''''''''''' 423''''''''''''' 360''''''''''''' 63''''''''''''''' 0.050
2025 5,843'''''''''''' 601''''''''''''' 483''''''''''''' 118''''''''''''' 0.055
2030 6,227'''''''''''' 793''''''''''''' 615''''''''''''' 178''''''''''''' 0.060
2035 6,647'''''''''''' 199''''''''''''' 0.060
2040 7,107'''''''''''' 213''''''''''''' 0.060
2045 7,611'''''''''''' 228''''''''''''' 0.060
2050 8,162'''''''''''' 245''''''''''''' 0.060
2055 8,765'''''''''''' 263''''''''''''' 0.060
Residential
Residential%
Forecast%
(GWh/yr)
Conservation%Potential
Average%
Cost%
($/kWh)
Upper%
Achievable%
(GWh/yr)
Lower%
Achievable%
(GWh/yr)
Model%
Bound%
(GWh/yr)
2015 5,405'''''''''''' 206''''''''''''' 95''''''''''''''' 111''''''''''''' 0.050
2020 5,590'''''''''''' 454''''''''''''' 297''''''''''''' 157''''''''''''' 0.060
2025 5,782'''''''''''' 527''''''''''''' 339''''''''''''' 188''''''''''''' 0.065
2030 5,981'''''''''''' 545''''''''''''' 338''''''''''''' 207''''''''''''' 0.070
2035 6,188'''''''''''' 217''''''''''''' 0.070
2040 6,402'''''''''''' 224''''''''''''' 0.070
2045 6,625'''''''''''' 232''''''''''''' 0.070
2050 6,857'''''''''''' 240''''''''''''' 0.070
2055 7,097'''''''''''' 248''''''''''''' 0.070
Commercial%
and%
Institutional
Comml%and%
Instl%
Forecast%
(GWh/yr)
Conservation%Potential
Average%
Cost%
($/kWh)
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(Source: ICF-Marbek, 2011; author’s calculations) 
Table 6-6 Model Values Assumed for the Industrial Sector 
 
Converting Electricity Savings to Peak Demand Savings 
When modelling energy conservation I am also interested in peak demand reductions. I 
convert energy saved (measured in Gigawatt-hours) into peak demand using the 
following equation,  
 𝐸𝑞. 6.3  𝑃𝑒𝑎𝑘 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑑 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 (𝑀𝑊) =   𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 (𝐺𝑊ℎ/𝑦𝑟)  (8760 ∗ 𝐶𝐹) ∗  1000 
 
The conversion factors were selected to calibrate to the ICF-Marbek (2011) relationship 
between GWh saved and peak demand savings. I use the following conversion factors 
(CF): 
 
• Residential: 92.5% 
• Commercial: 75% 
• Industrial 62%. 
 
These conversion factors can be understood as the capacity factor of a theoretical 
electricity generated facility sized equal to the peak load savings (MW) that would 
generate the amount of electricity savings in a year (𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 (𝐺𝑊ℎ/𝑦𝑟). After 
Upper%
Achievable%
(GWh/yr)
Lower%
Achievable%
(GWh/yr)
Model%
Bound%
(GWh/yr)
2015 11,555&&&&&&&&&& 535&&&&&&&&&&&&& 354&&&&&&&&&&&&& 498&&&&&&&&&&&&& 0.085
2020 13,657&&&&&&&&&& 2,091&&&&&&&&&& 702&&&&&&&&&&&&& 2,010&&&&&&&&&& 0.085
2025 15,068&&&&&&&&&& 2,713&&&&&&&&&& 1,129&&&&&&&&&& 2,591&&&&&&&&&& 0.085
2030 16,069&&&&&&&&&& 2,879&&&&&&&&&& 1,591&&&&&&&&&& 2,647&&&&&&&&&& 0.085
2035 17,082&&&&&&&&&& 2,733&&&&&&&&&& 0.085
2040 18,073&&&&&&&&&& 2,892&&&&&&&&&& 0.085
2045 19,229&&&&&&&&&& 3,077&&&&&&&&&& 0.085
2050 20,573&&&&&&&&&& 3,292&&&&&&&&&& 0.085
2055 22,134&&&&&&&&&& 3,541&&&&&&&&&& 0.085
Conservation%Potential
Industrial%
Forecast%
(GWh/yr)Industrial
Average%
Cost%
($/kWh)
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solving for these conversion factors, I then divide the industrial peak load savings in half 
to account for the relatively flat nature of industrial electricity demand and to match the 
ICF-Marbek data.  
 
Caveat on Energy Conservation Modelling 
There is evidence that utilities over-report the effectiveness of their DSM programs, 
especially if they do not sufficiently account for free-riders and the rebound effect 
(Rivers and Jaccard, 2011). Free-riders are those who would have taken an action without 
an incentive from SaskPower. For example, a free-rider of the block-heater timer 
program may have purchased a block-heater timer on their own if SaskPower hadn’t 
provided them with a free one. The rebound effect refers to an increase in energy use that 
occurs after an energy efficiency measure is taken. Sorrell et al. (2008) describe three 
kinds of rebound effects: 
1. Direct rebound effect – efficiency reduces the “effective price” of energy services 
making them more desirable to customers. For example, more efficient LED 
lighting decreases the cost of lighting. But because lighting has become less 
expensive, people may string up three times the number of decorative lights 
during the holiday season; 
2. Indirect rebound effect - financial savings from conserving energy in one realm 
(e.g. more efficient lighting) may be funneled into purchasing energy services in 
another area (e.g. buying a hot-tub);63  
3. Economy-wide rebound effects – “A fall in the real price of energy services may 
reduce the price of intermediate and final goods throughout the economy, leading 
to a series of price and quantity adjustments, with energy-intensive goods and 
sectors likely to gain at the expense of less energy-intensive ones.”  
(Sorrel et al., 2008: 637) 
 
                                                
63 The rebound effect can also occur as savings in one realm (e.g. saving electricity by 
replacing an incandescent lightbulb with an LED bulb) requires increased energy use in 
another realm (e.g. increased natural gas or electric heating requirements in winter to 
make up for the heat that was once thrown from the incandescent bulbs). 
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The combined impact of free-riders and the rebound effect can negate DSM efforts by 
utilities. Using econometric analysis, Rivers and Jaccard (2011) found that DSM 
spending did not have a statistically significant impact on electricity use in Canada in the 
period of 1990-2005. They conclude that energy efficiency gains may be occurring, but 
they are driven by technological change, stock turnover, and government regulation, 
rather than DSM spending by utilities (Rivers and Jaccard, 2011).  
 
The Rivers and Jaccard (2011) study highlights that DSM spending on information and 
incentives has its limits. DSM spending is not, however, the only way to encourage 
conservation. A fulsome list of approaches to energy conservation would include the 
following: 
1. Moral suasion – provide information to customers on ways to lower energy; 
2. Incentives – provide customers with energy efficient products (e.g. block heater 
timer giveaway), or provide rebates for energy efficient products;  
3. Regulation – introduce energy efficiency standards on things like housing, 
appliances, and lighting; 
4. Price-based policy – increase the cost of fossil-fuel generated electricity through a 
policy like a carbon price or increase the price of electricity at times of high 
demand using time-of-use pricing.64 
 
Governments and utilities often prefer the first two policies. Providing information is a 
friendly way to encourage conservation. Incentives reward people for doing the right 
thing. Politically there is little to be lost from rewarding good behaviour, which makes an 
information and incentives approach attractive. Problematically, effectiveness is 
diminished by free-riders and the rebound effect.  
 
                                                
64 These policies may also be combined. For example, a smart meter system can be used 
in combination with a peak pricing system. The smart meter provides information to 
electricity users to indicate when their use is occurring during a period of peak demand, 
and therefore can encourage customers to react better to price incentives. (Koksal, 
Rowlands and Parker, 2015).  
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Workshop participants stressed the importance of energy efficiency regulations to 
encourage conservation (Workshop 1). Standards can drive improvements, but are not 
under the legislative control of SaskPower. Instead, the task falls to SaskPower’s owner, 
the Government of Saskatchewan. Critics of regulations complain about the economic 
costs they impose. Studies such as ICF-Marbek (2011) help to outline the technologies 
for which standards can be introduced at a socially acceptable economic cost.  
 
Higher prices mitigate the rebound effect by providing a consistent incentive to conserve 
electricity and improve energy efficiency. There are also no free-riders; everyone pays 
more for electricity. These strengths make higher prices an economically efficient 
approach to promoting conservation.  
 
Higher prices can be introduced by putting a price on carbon. A well-designed carbon 
pricing system will then redistribute the carbon pricing revenue back to citizens, either as 
a direct payment or through tax reductions. These methods of redistributing carbon 
revenues may also lead to a rebound effect as income increase. The higher prices do, 
however, provide a consistent signal that can shift consumption behaviour towards less 
energy-intensive purchases.  
 
With these caveats in mind, the relatively conservative approach I have taken to 
modelling energy conservation potential and cost appears justified. In Chapter 7 I outline 
scenarios to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the electricity sector. As will be seen, 
DSM has an important role to play in some of these low-carbon electricity futures.  
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Chapter 7 – Scenarios for Greening the Saskatchewan Grid 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I explore the electricity rate impacts of scenarios to lower greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHGs) in the Saskatchewan electricity sector. Scenarios are selected using a 
linear programming model I call the Saskatchewan Investment Model (SIM). This model 
operates in five-year time-steps from 2015-2050. The purpose of this model is to 
understand the least-cost pathways to meeting environmental objectives in the electricity 
sector. Inputs to this model include Saskatchewan’s renewable energy potential identified 
in Chapter 4, the cost of electricity generation technologies in Saskatchewan outlined in 
Chapter 5, the forecast of electricity demand outlined in Chapter 6, and the cost and 
potential for energy conservation outlined in Chapter 6. Outputs for each time-step in this 
model include average electricity prices, capital investments (in Megawatts), and GHGs. 
Technical documentation for this model can be found in Appendix 7A. 
 
I analyze the 2050 electricity mix for each scenario using a non-linear programming 
model called WIRE – the Will It Run Electricity Model. This model optimizes hourly 
electricity production for four representative months: March, June, September and 
December. The purpose of this model is to check whether a given investment scenario 
will sufficiently meet electricity demand. Its main task is to test whether scenarios with a 
high penetration of variable renewable electricity can adequately meet demand in the face 
of hourly and seasonal variations in demand and renewable electricity output. The model 
also identifies the extent to which electricity storage and demand side management can 
play a role in ensuring demand is met. The technical documentation for this model can be 
found in Appendix 7B.  
 
Related Literature 
Researchers at the Center for Studies in Energy and Environment at the University of 
Regina, led by engineering Professor Gordon Huang, constructed a MARKAL-based 
linear programming optimization model for Saskatchewan to analyze least-cost pathways 
to lower GHG emissions in the province (Lin et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2005). This model 
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analyzes energy use and energy production across the entire economy, including 
electricity generation, natural gas processing/production, oil refinery/upgrading, and oil 
extraction. The model was used to evaluate the cost of reducing Saskatchewan’s GHGs to 
6% below 1990 levels by the period of 2008 to 2012; that is, the model tested how the 
province might have met a Kyoto equivalent target within its borders (Lin et al., 2010). In 
the electricity sector the study found that GHGs could be reduced by replacing coal-fired 
power plants with wind turbines, hydroelectric facilities, and natural gas plants (Lin et 
al., 2010). The modelling group also reported that the costs of GHG reductions would be 
lower if nuclear power plants could be built in the province (Lin et al., 2010; Lin et al., 
2005).  
 
The researchers using the MARKAL-based model did not explore the potential for a high 
penetration of renewable energy. They assumed that hydropower was limited to 330 MW 
of additional capacity, a number much lower than that provided by SaskPower and 
outlined in Chapter 4 (Lin et al., 2005). The research was also conducted at a time when 
it was still fair to say, “wind power is available at considerably higher cost than 
electricity from conventional fossil fuel sources” (Lin et al., 2005: 153). As shown in 
Chapter 5, wind is now one of the lowest cost means of generating electricity in 
Saskatchewan. Cost reductions in solar power and electricity storage have also changed 
the discussion of renewable electricity futures. The analysis in this chapter provides an 
updated view of renewable energy potential and cost in Saskatchewan.  
 
In her PhD dissertation, Dr. Lisa White applied strategic environmental assessment to a 
case study of the Saskatchewan electricity system (White and Noble, 2012; White, 2013). 
Dr. White consulted with six Saskatchewan experts to identify five scenarios for 
Saskatchewan’s electricity future. These scenarios are presented in Figure 7-1.  
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(Data source: White, 2014; White and Noble, 2012; author’s presentation) 
Figure 7-1 Future Electricity Scenarios for Saskatchewan in 2040 
 
The renewable scenario includes a greater focus on wind and hydro electricity. In this 
scenario wind comprises 18.2% of total capacity and hydro comprises 22.7%. The 
renewable scenario also includes biomass (4.5% of capacity) and small-scale renewables 
(1.8% of capacity). Conventional coal remains a greater proportion of capacity than it 
does in the carbon capture and storage (CCS) scenario and the nuclear scenario. Total 
capacity in the renewable scenario is higher than the other scenarios because White and 
Noble (2012) assume that additional simple cycle natural gas turbines are required to 
provide backup for the variability of wind electricity. The scenarios were not, however, 
analyzed using an hourly operations model such as WIRE and the renewable scenario did 
not include the potential for energy storage technology or demand side management. 
(White, 2013; White and Noble, 2012) 
 
Although economic analysis of future electricity scenarios was not central to her work, 
Dr. White did provide estimates of the cost of various electricity scenarios. These 
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estimates were based on an estimate of the capital cost to build the facilities and an 
estimate of the cost per kilowatt-hour to generate electricity. The costs are, however, a 
simple weighted average of levelized cost estimates: they do not account for 
technological progress and fuel price escalation; they do not address uncertainty; and they 
are a static snapshot of expected prices in 2040, rather than a dynamic electricity price 
pathway. Electricity prices and greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) for the five scenarios 
presented in White and Noble (2012) are summarized in Table 7-1. Despite the higher 
financial cost for the renewable energy scenario, participants in the strategic 
environmental assessment process indicated that this scenario was the preferred pathway 
for the future of electricity in the province (White and Noble, 2012).  
 
 
(Source: White and Noble, 2012) 
Table 7-1 White and Noble (2012) Scenario Outcomes in 2040 
 
In this chapter I present scenarios that are optimized to achieve environmental objectives 
at the least financial cost to SaskPower. I also address the dynamics of improving 
technology and increasing fuel prices, include a sensitivity analysis to address the 
uncertainty inherent in estimates of future scenario costs, and use the WIRE model to test 
whether the models can provide electricity on an hourly basis. I begin this analysis by 
outlining SaskPower’s short- to medium-term electricity supply plan. This supply plan 
informs my baseline business-as-usual scenario.  
 
SaskPower’s Supply Plan 
The baseline scenario in my analysis is designed to align with SaskPower’s stated 
investment priorities. Knowledge of SaskPower’s supply plan out to 2030 is based on 
interviews, SaskPower presentations, and news reports.  
Current Mix Nuclear Renewable Coal CCS Natural Gas
GHG emissions 
(million tonnes 
CO2e/GWh) 19.6 7.3 11.5 8.0 15.7
Cost of electricity 
($/kWh) 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.10
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The most important constraint faced by SaskPower is the Canadian federal government’s 
coal-fired electricity regulation (CEPA, 2012). This regulation sets a maximum allowable 
greenhouse-gas emission (GHG) intensity of 420 tonnes carbon dioxide (CO2) per 
Gigawatt-hour (GWh) for coal-fired power plants. Existing Saskatchewan coal plants 
must be either retired at the end of their useful life, or retrofitted with carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) in order to comply with the regulation. Table 7-2 shows the retirement or 
conversion schedule for Saskatchewan’s coal-fired electricity plants. If a commitment is 
made to retrofit a given plant then it is allowed to operate as a conventional coal plant for 
an additional five years before it must be equipped with CCS. The Boundary Dam III 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) project was commissioned in 2014 and complies with 
the federal regulation.  
 
 
(Source: Interviews, 2014; CEPA, 2012) 
Table 7-2 Saskatchewan Coal-fired Generation Regulatory Impact 
 
As shown in Table 7-2, decisions must be made in the near future regarding Boundary 
Dam units IV and V. Significant retirements are also scheduled in the period of 2028-
2030 when Boundary Dam VI and both units at Poplar River must be either retired or a 
commitment made to convert them to CCS. Shand, which was commissioned in 1992, is 
able to operate out to 2042, representing its fifty-year expected life.  
 
Coal-fired Units
Capacity 
(MW) Comissioned
Retirement If Not 
Converted to CCS
Conversion 
Deadline If 
Converted to CCS
Boundary Dam I 62 1959 Retired
Boundary Dam II 62 1959 Retired
Boundary Dam III 139/120 1970/2014 Converted
Boundary Dam IV 139 1970 2019 2025
Boundary Dam V 139 1973 2019 2025
Boundary Dam VI 273 1978 2028 2033
Shand 279 1992 2042
Poplar River I 291 1981 2030
Poplar River II 281 1983 2030
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Environment Canada produced a Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement that accompanied 
the coal-fired regulation (CEPA, 2012). This statement provides a cost-benefit analysis of 
the impact of the regulation. Environment Canada modeled the impact using their in-
house E3MC energy-environment-economy model. In Saskatchewan they estimated the 
coal-fired regulation would increase electricity generation costs by $1,174 million dollars 
(present value 2010 $CDN) over the period of 2015 to 2035, and would increase average 
electricity prices by 2.50 cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) by 2035 (CEPA, 2012: 2064). 
This is a greater price increase than that faced by Alberta (2.12 cents/kWh) and Nova 
Scotia (1.40 cents/kWh). Part of the reason for the higher price impact is the choice of 
how to comply with the regulation, “Saskatchewan officials indicated that the provincial 
utility intends to implement CCS technology as a response to the regulatory performance 
standard” (CEPA, 2012: 2018). As outlined in Chapter 5, coal-fired plants equipped with 
CCS are expensive relative to other generation options. Saskatchewan officials like this 
approach, however, because “Where the captured CO2 is used for enhanced oil recovery, 
it generates additional benefits as a result of incremental oil production” (CEPA, 2012: 
2018).65 The Saskatchewan government is also interested in maintaining employment in 
the coal mining industry.  
 
The baseline for my analysis assumes that Saskatchewan meets the regulatory 
performance standard with a combination of conversion to CCS and retirement. I assume 
that Boundary Dam units IV and V are retrofitted to CCS, allowing them to operate as 
conventional plants until January 1st, 2025, when they begin to operate as CCS facilities. 
I assume that Boundary Dam unit VI and both units at Poplar River are retired at the end 
of their useful lives; they no longer operate as of 2030. I assume that the Shand coal plant 
                                                
65 CEPA (2012) estimated that using captured CO2 for enhanced oil recovery could lead 
to $6 billion in additional oil extraction (valued at 2012 oil Western Texas Intermediate 
oil prices 2010 $CAN) between 2015 and 2035. Increases in emissions associated with 
EOR would total 5.4 Mt CO2e in that period, lowering GHG reductions created by the 
policy from 219.2 to 213.8 Mt Mt CO2e (CEPA, 2012).  
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is retrofitted in the 2025-2029 time-step to extend its life as a conventional coal plant 
until the 2040-2044 time-step.66 Shand then operates as a CCS facility after 2045.  
 
SaskPower’s baseline supply plan also includes investment in other technologies. The 
following investments can be expected in the next fifteen years: 
• Existing hydroelectric facilities will be repowered at the end of their scheduled 
lives and retained as part of the electricity system; 
• Investments will be made in wind capacity so that it composes 10% of capacity by 
2020 and 20% by 2030. Note that this recent commitment by SaskPower means 
that Saskatchewan will achieve the wind contribution outlined in White and 
Noble’s (2012) renewable scenario within fifteen years; 
• A small investment in biomass of 36-42 MW will be made at Meadow Lake; 
• Small solar projects of 5-10 MW will be built to test the suitability of solar for the 
Saskatchewan electricity system; 
• SaskPower has signed a memorandum of understanding to purchase up to 500 
MW of power from Manitoba Hydro. In September 2015 SaskPower signed an 
agreement with Manitoba Hydro to secure 100 MW of power in the period 2020-
2040. I assume that SaskPower will purchase the additional 400 MW of 
hydropower. This additional 400 MW of hydropower will enter service in the 
period from 2020-2029; 
• A 350 MW natural gas combined cycle plant will be built at Swift Current. More 
investments in natural gas combined cycle and simple cycle will be made to make 
up any shortfalls in electricity supply; 
• SaskPower will pursue at least the lower potential of demand-side management 
(DSM), but will also seek another 11 MW of peak savings. 
 
Investment according to these assumptions creates an electricity system with 5869 MW 
of capacity in 2025. After forcing these investments into the SIM model I optimize 
investment decisions from 2030-2050. In this optimization I do not allow the construction 
                                                
66 Environment Canada reports that a repowering of an existing coal plant can be 
assumed to cost $395/kilowatt (2012 $CDN) (CEPA, 2012: 2024). 
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of new coal facilities, unless they are equipped with carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
technology. The resulting electricity generation profile for Saskatchewan is presented in 
Figure 7-2. The demand forecast matches that presented in Chapter 6.  
 
 
Figure 7-2 SaskPower BAU to 2025 and Optimization to 2050 
 
Coal-fired electricity production decreases steeply in 2030 with the retirement of 845 
MW of coal-fired capacity, representing the retirement of Boundary Dam VI, and both 
units at Poplar River. In this simulation, natural gas combined cycle plants, additional 
hydroelectric capacity, and wind turbines replace retired coal plants and meet 
Saskatchewan’s growing electricity demand.  
 
The retirement of Saskatchewan’s coal-fired plants leads to a substantial reduction in 
annual GHGs. Figure 7-3 displays the resulting annual GHGs from this SaskPower 
business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. The thatched area below the x-axis represents annual 
captured GHGs from CCS. By 2035 total annual GHGs are 11,245 kt CO2e/yr. When 
captured CO2 is subtracted from that total, net GHGs to the atmosphere are 8,467 kt 
 -    
 5,000  
 10,000  
 15,000  
 20,000  
 25,000  
 30,000  
 35,000  
 40,000  
 45,000  
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
G
en
er
at
io
n 
(G
W
h)
 
Investment Period 
Biomass Coal compliant Coal CCS 
Natural gas combined cycle Natural gas simple cycle (peaking) Natural gas CCS 
Hydro Wind Solar - Photovoltaic 
Solar - Thermal Small Modular Nuclear Reactor Manitoba Hydro 
DSM Demand 
 189 
CO2e/yr. Note that some of the captured CO2 will be sold for enhanced oil recovery 
(EOR). I do not include revenue from the sale of CO2 in my optimization model, nor do I 
include royalties due to increased oil production in the model. Conversely, I do not 
penalize SaskPower for any CO2 that might escape from storage when it is used in EOR. 
On balance, the omission of CO2 sales increases the apparent cost of carbon capture and 
storage (CCS). However, recent events have shown that contracts to sell CO2 can also 
become a liability. As of October 2015 SaskPower had paid $12 million in penalties to 
Cenovus for failing to deliver an adequate quantity of CO2  for enhanced oil recovery 
(Leo, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 7-3 SaskPower Greenhouse Gas Emissions  
in Response to Federal Regulation 
 
I compare this scenario to one without federal regulation by removing the forced 
investment decisions, allowing old coal facilities to be retrofitted to continue operating at 
the end of their useful lives, and allowing new coal facilities to be built. Like 
Environment Canada (CEPA, 2012) I assume that the lifetime of existing coal plants can 
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be extended with an expenditure of $403/kw (2014 $CDN). When I run this scenario I 
find that Saskatchewan average electricity prices are 1.66 cents/kWh higher by 2035 due 
to efforts to comply with the federal regulation. This is .74/kWh lower than the estimate 
by Environment Canada, which is likely due to different cost assumptions between SIM 
and Environment Canada’s E3MC model (CEPA, 2012). Without the federal coal 
regulation, new coal plants are not built (based purely on cost), but the existing coal-fired 
generation fleet (1402 MW) are retrofitted and continue operating. In the absence of the 
federal regulation, total annual GHGs would be 16,612 kt CO2e/yr by 2035. When the 
impact of Boundary Dam III is considered, net GHGs to the atmosphere are 15,731 kt 
CO2e/yr in 2035. This means that the federal regulation will effectively reduce net GHGs 
to the atmosphere by 7,264 kt CO2e/yr by 2035, which is a 46.2% reduction from the 
total in the scenario without federal regulation. This is a substantial improvement.  
 
Equivalency Agreement 
Of course, we can ask, could Saskatchewan reach these GHG reductions at a lower cost? 
The federal government has shown a willingness to consider equivalency agreements 
with provinces that would like to meet the intent of the regulatory performance standard 
in a different manner. Nova Scotia signed such an equivalency agreement and it came 
into effect July 1, 2015. This agreement requires the province to meet mandatory 
emission limits for the electricity sector that are equivalent to those that would be 
produced by the federal regulation. (Environment Canada, 2015c)  
 
By imposing GHG constraints for each time-step in the model I calculate how 
Saskatchewan could achieve emission reductions equivalent to those driven by the 
federal regulation. The resulting scenario is presented in Figure 7-4.  
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Figure 7-4 Federal Regulation Equivalency Scenario 
 
Two changes are worth noting in this Equivalency Scenario. First, the province continues 
to operate conventional coal plants out to 2050. In the short-term, Boundary Dam units 
IV and V are retrofitted in 2020 to allow their operation for another 25 years. Second, no 
coal facilities are retrofitted with carbon capture and storage (CCS). Only Boundary Dam 
III operates as a CCS facility until its retirement in 2040. As outlined in Chapter 5, CCS 
is an expensive means of generating electricity and it is not selected by the cost 
minimizing optimization model. Instead, hydroelectric capacity is expanded in the 
province and agreements are made with Manitoba Hydro to supply 759 MW of power by 
2035. Wind capacity expands substantially once the Poplar River and Boundary Dam VI 
coal plants are retired in 2030. It is accompanied by increased investments in natural gas-
fired combined cycle facilities. In the 2030 time-step this approach increases average 
electricity costs by .81 cents/kWh relative to a scenario without regulation. Compare this 
to an increase of 1.70 cents/kWh in the SaskPower BAU scenario. In the 2035 time-step 
the equivalency approach increases average electricity costs by .86 cents/kWh, while the 
SaskPower approach, which relies on CCS, increases costs by 1.64 cents/kWh. On 
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average from 2030-2050 the equivalency approach saves .86 cents/kWh relative to the 
SaskPower approach.  
 
Figure 7-5 compares the pathway of average electricity prices under the three scenarios: 
SaskPower’s BAU response to federal regulations; an equivalency approach to achieving 
the same GHG reductions; and a scenario where no policy is enacted to limit GHGs. The 
expected average prices for each scenario are joined by the solid lines. The 5% and 95% 
confidence intervals are represented using the error bars that surround each price point. 
Note that the confidence intervals for the equivalency scenario overlap with the no-policy 
scenario in several time-steps. 
 
 
Figure 7-5 Average Electricity Prices Comparing Federal Regulation to Equivalency 
 
The confidence intervals in Figure 7-5 reflect three sources of uncertainty:  
 
1. The rate at which capital costs will change for electricity generation technologies; 
2. The rate at which power purchased from Manitoba Hydro will increase in price;  
0.0 
1.0 
2.0 
3.0 
4.0 
5.0 
6.0 
7.0 
8.0 
9.0 
10.0 
11.0 
12.0 
13.0 
14.0 
15.0 
16.0 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Av
er
ag
e 
C
os
t o
f E
le
ct
ric
ity
 (c
en
ts
/k
W
h)
 (2
01
4 
 $
C
A
N
) 
Time Step 
SaskPower BAU BAU Equivalent No GHG Policy 
 193 
3. The future price of natural gas. 
 
A Monte Carlo analysis was conducted allowing each of these factors to vary within a 
specified range. Due to lack of data, a Triangular distribution was chosen for each 
uncertain parameter. The distributions were bounded in the following manner: 
1. The autonomous capital cost improvement (ACCI) parameter for each electricity 
generation technology was bounded by .5% on either side of the preset value. 
The only exception is nuclear, which has a likely value of 1.54% (the preset 
value derived from EIA, 2015), and which is bounded by 2.04% on the high side 
and 0% on the low side. This lower bound for cost improvement is based on 
historic difficulties achieving cost reductions (Grubler, 2010; Boccard, 2014); 
2. The likely cost escalation factor for Manitoba Hydro power was set at 1% and 
was bounded by a .5% minimum and a 1.5% maximum; 
3. The NEB (2013) reference price is set as the most likely price of natural gas, and 
the distribution is bounded by the high and low NEB (2013) forecast natural gas 
prices for each time period.  
 
Using these distributions I ran 1000 Monte Carlo trials using Frontline Solver’s ‘Risk 
Solver Pro’ software. The results from these simulations were used to create the 
confidence intervals in Figures 7-5, 7-11, 7-18, and 7-22. 
 
Long-Term GHG Reduction 
The federal coal-fired regulations achieve a nearly fifty-percent reduction of 
Saskatchewan’s electricity sector GHGs by 2035 followed by no further reduction to 
2045. This is a substantial improvement, but as Figure 7-3 indicates, GHG emissions in 
the electricity sector begin to increase after 2045 as natural gas combined cycle plants 
expand to meet growing demand.  
 
Further reductions are required if the province is to contribute to global efforts to mitigate 
climate change. In their Fifth Assessment Report, the IPCC (2014) outlines several 
scenarios for our future climate. In scenarios where it is likely (although not certain) that 
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average temperature change will remain below two degrees Celsius relative to pre-
industrial levels, atmospheric concentrations of GHGs lie in the realm of 450 ppm CO2e 
by 2100. To achieve these scenarios, and stabilize atmospheric concentrations at or below 
450 ppm CO2e, global GHG emissions must be near zero by 2100. This requires a 
significant transformation of our energy systems. Low-carbon energy must compose over 
90% of primary energy by 2100 and substantial gains need to be made by 2050. (IPCC, 
2014) 
 
Saskatchewan once had a provincial target of reducing GHGs to 80% below 2004 levels 
by 2050. This target was first proposed by the NDP government, and was upheld by the 
Saskatchewan Party government in their first term. The Saskatchewan government has 
since backed away from the 2050 target and instead current legislation reads, “The 
Lieutenant Governor in Council shall establish a greenhouse gas emission reduction 
target for Saskatchewan for a year or years selected by the Lieutenant Governor in 
Council” (Government of Saskatchewan, 2015). A new GHG reduction target has not 
been set at the time of writing this dissertation.  
 
GHGs from the ‘public electricity and heat production’ sector in Saskatchewan measured 
16,705 kt CO2e in 2004 and decreased to 16,010 kt CO2e by 2013 (Environment Canada, 
2015b). In the scenario below, I use SIM to solve for the least-cost pathway to achieve an 
80% reduction in GHGs by 2050 relative to 2015 levels. There are three variations of this 
scenario; one allowing imports of hydroelectricity from Manitoba of up to 1950 MW, 
another relying on electricity produced in Saskatchewan alone, and a third that excludes 
both nuclear power and increased imports from Manitoba Hydro. All of the scenarios 
include the 100 MW that Manitoba Hydro has already agreed to provide to SaskPower 
between 2020 and 2040. As a caveat, I focus only on direct GHG emissions and not the 
life-cycle GHG emissions related to each technology. More work could be done to 
understand the full lifecycle GHG implications of each electricity scenario.  
 
80% GHG Reduction: Scenario 1 – Interprovincial approach 
To generate the first 80% GHG reduction scenario, I run SIM using all available 
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technologies, including hydropower from Manitoba. The resulting electricity generation 
mix is presented in Figure 7-6 below.  
 
 
Figure 7-6 80% GHG Reduction: Scenario 1 – Interprovincial Approach 
 
In this future the coal-hydro nexus of Saskatchewan’s past is replaced by a wind-hydro 
nexus. By 2050 wind power meets 24% of electricity demand, domestic Saskatchewan 
hydro meets 20%, and imported hydro from Manitoba meets another 19% of total 
demand. Biomass plants provide 150 MW of capacity beginning in 2045, partially 
replacing the Shand coal-fired station, which is retired in that period. Assuming a 
continual cost improvement of 1.54%/yr – the relatively optimistic cost improvement 
factor outlined in Chapter 5 – one 209 MW modular nuclear reactor is built in the 
province in 2050 and provides about 4% of supplied electricity. Lastly, significant efforts 
are put into demand side management; conservation efforts offset about 10% of expected 
electricity demand in 2050. 
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Note that in this scenario coal plants are retired at the end of their useful lives; options to 
retrofit existing coal plants are excluded except for the Shand station which continues to 
operate until 2045. As well, the amount of electricity that can be generated by wind is 
constrained to 6% in 2020, which corresponds to SaskPower’s commitment that wind 
will compose 10% of capacity by that time. Allowable wind generated electricity then 
increases by 3% in every time step; in 2030 12% of electricity can be generated by wind, 
corresponding to SaskPower’s commitment that wind will compose 20% of capacity by 
that time; in 2050 24% of electricity can be generated by wind. This assumes that 
SaskPower will gain experience integrating wind into the electricity system. This is a 
broadly accepted assumption; most of the experts that took part in the participatory 
modelling workshops believed that variable renewables like wind and solar could 
contribute at least 24% to the Saskatchewan electricity system by 2050.  
 
I use the WIRE model to test whether this scenario could sufficiently meet electricity 
demand in four representative months: March, June, September and December. The 
resulting system operation in December of 2050 is displayed in Figure 7-7. The jagged 
green portion of the image shows the variable contribution of the 2800 MW of wind. 
Along the bottom, the biomass plants (brown) provide a steady supply of power. The 
purple bar above shows natural gas combined cycle plants reacting to variations in wind 
power. Domestic hydroelectric power (light blue) also acts as a balancing technology and 
ramps up to provide power when wind power drops off. Imports from Manitoba Hydro 
fill the remaining gap. Because it is December, a period of reduced stream flows, the 
capacity factors for both domestic and Manitoba hydropower production are constrained 
to 48% in the WIRE model; the domestic hydro plants achieve this capacity factor, while 
the 1950 MW Manitoba Hydro link operates at only a 30% capacity factor. The Manitoba 
Hydro link does provide a peak supply of 1367 MW in hour 523 when wind power 
production falls to 22 MW. As outlined in Appendix 7B, I assume that the hydroelectric 
facilities can ramp up to full capacity within an hour and that hydroelectric potential can 
be stored in reservoirs when not needed.  
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Figure 7-7 80% GHG Reduction Scenario 1 in Operation (December 2050) 
 
This GHG reduction scenario relies on transmission links between Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba of 1950 MW. SaskPower and Manitoba Hydro have signed a memorandum of 
understanding for SaskPower to purchase 500 MW, but another 1450 MW would be 
necessary. This is not outside the realm of possibility. Manitoba Hydro is currently 
working to construct the Keeyask Generating Station on the Lower Nelson River in the 
northern Manitoba (Manitoba Hydro, 2015). The Keeyask station will provide 695 MW 
of capacity, and 4,400 GWh of electricity per year (Manitoba Hydro, 2015). 
Saskatchewan’s purchase of 100 MW from Manitoba Hydro will be provided by the 
Keeyask station. Manitoba Hydro has recently postponed development of the 1485 MW 
Conawapa Generating Station. Manitoba’s provincial electricity regulator has expressed 
concerns that export demand is not high enough to justify the project (Puxley, 2014). An 
export contract with SaskPower could bring that project back to life and supply low-
carbon electricity to replace SaskPower’s coal plants and meet Saskatchewan’s growing 
electricity demand.  
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80% GHG Reduction: Scenario 2 – Nuclear Approach  
Proposals to purchase electricity from Manitoba may, however, meet with resistance 
from Saskatchewan citizens and government leaders interested in using the electricity 
sector as a means of economic development. For that reason, it is useful to look at how 
SaskPower might achieve an 80% reduction in GHGs by 2050 using only domestic 
electricity supply (aside from the 100 MW purchase from Manitoba Hydro). When the 
target of 80% GHG reduction is constrained to Saskatchewan electricity generation 
sources alone, the following generation mix is selected by SIM (See Figure 7-8).  
 
 
Figure 7-8 Domestic 80% GHG Reduction: Scenario 2 – Nuclear Approach 
 
In this scenario about 500 MW of small, modular nuclear reactor capacity is built in 2045 
and another 720 MW of nuclear is built in 2050. In 2050, nuclear generates 23% of 
electricity. Wind generates 24% of electricity in 2050 and is again limited to this amount 
by a constraint in the model. In operation, slow-ramping nuclear provides steady “base-
load” power, adjusting occasionally for periods of high wind. Natural-gas fired 
generation makes up 1666 MW of capacity and domestic hydroelectricity makes up about 
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2000 MW. Both of these more flexible electricity generation sources can be ramped up 
and down to balance variable wind production (See Figure 7-9).  
 
 
Figure 7-9 80% GHG Reduction Scenario 2 in Operation (December 2050) 
 
80% GHG Reduction: Scenario 3 – CCS Approach 
Though this nuclear scenario was selected by SIM, we can ask, is a nuclear powered 
future desirable? The technology is controversial, even in Saskatchewan where, as one 
participant noted, “everyone has stocks in (uranium mining giant) CAMECO”. There are 
also substantial costs and risks above and beyond the construction and operation numbers 
in SIM. Decommissioning a nuclear reactor at the end of its useful life is an expensive 
endeavour. In Ontario, decommissioning will cost the nuclear utilities $6 billion 
(Winfield et al., 2006 quoting OPA, 2005). The Ontario Power Authority estimated the 
“total cost for facility decommissioning” to be $7.5 billion (2003 $CDN) (OPA, 2005: 
114). Boccard (2014) estimates that decommissioning costs for the French nuclear fleet 
will be a minimum of 25% of the original investment cost of building the fleet; an 
increase from the 15% of original investment assumed by the IEA. Nuclear power also 
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poses health risks, which are ill-suited for monetary valuation. For example, a study by 
Kaatsch et al. (2008) found a relationship between Leukaemia in young children and 
vicinity to German nuclear power plants. These health risks have galvanized opposition 
to nuclear. When Saskatchewan citizens were asked in 2009 whether they wanted a 
nuclear power plant, they responded with a resounding “No” (Perrins, 2009). Citing 
research such as Kaatsch et al. (2008) one participant stated, “Any risk to our health or 
our children’s health is unacceptable” (Dolter and Arbuthnott, 2010).67  
 
To address the concerns over the real and perceived risks imposed by nuclear power 
generation we can ask, what would a domestic 80% GHG reduction scenario look like 
without nuclear power? Figure 7-10 outlines one pathway.  
 
 
Figure 7-10 80% GHG Reduction: Scenario 3 – Carbon Capture Approach 
 
                                                
67 In Saskatchewan, there has been less public concern over health risks from coal-fired 
power generation, including mercury exposure. Some concern has been expressed over 
the health impacts of wind, most notably in the Maclean area (see Chapter 3).  
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In this scenario, natural gas combined cycle generation (NGCC) with carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) fills the gap that was previously filled by small, modular nuclear reactors. 
Biomass again makes a contribution up to the 150 MW limit, wind pushes to the 
constraint of 24% of total electricity by 2050, and 2194 MW of domestic Saskatchewan 
hydroelectric capacity is constructed. This scenario relies on the viability of applying 
CCS technology to natural gas fired plants. Saskatchewan has achieved a world-first in 
building the coal-fired CCS plant at Boundary Dam III. Could the province also host a 
pioneering natural gas fired CCS facility? And, importantly, could it be built at the costs 
assumed in SIM and outlined in Chapter 5?  
 
Cost of the Three 80% GHG Reduction Scenarios 
The three scenarios for reducing GHGs by 80% by 2050 generate a range of electricity 
generation cost impacts. Figure 7-11 compares average electricity costs for the three 
GHG reduction scenarios against the SaskPower BAU plan. The error bars again indicate 
95% confidence intervals, taking into account uncertain technological change, Manitoba 
Hydro price increases, and natural gas prices.  
 
 
Figure 7-11 The Cost of Achieving 80% Reduction in GHGs by 2050 
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What is striking about these GHG reduction scenarios is that their costs are not 
significantly different than costs in the BAU scenario. From 2030 to 2045 the 95% 
confidence intervals of the GHG reduction scenarios overlap with the confidence interval 
of the BAU scenario. Even in 2050 – a time when GHG emissions are increasing in the 
BAU scenario – the interprovincial scenario, which involves importing hydroelectricity 
from Manitoba Hydro, has a 95% confidence interval that overlaps with the BAU 
scenario. On the high side, the carbon capture and storage scenario has an average 
expected electricity price of 1.57 cents/kWh higher than the BAU scenario in 2050. At 
worst, the gap between the 5% confidence interval for the BAU scenario and the 95% 
confidence interval for the CCS scenario is 2.52 cents/kWh. 
 
Whether or not action is taken to reduce GHGs, the real cost of electricity will increase in 
Saskatchewan over time. With significant retirements of coal-fired capacity in the period 
of 2030 it is possible to plan now to transform the electricity sector in order to achieve 
lasting GHG reductions by 2050.  
 
80% GHG Reduction: Scenario 4 – Renewable Approach 
Besides the three GHG reduction scenarios outlined above, another pathway is possible, 
one that would focus investment on achieving a high penetration of renewable electricity 
generated within Saskatchewan. Groups like the Green Energy Project Saskatchewan 
(Bigland-Prichard, 2015; Prebble, 2011; Bigland-Pritchard, 2011; Bigland-Pritchard & 
Prebble, 2010; Bigland-Pritchard, 2010a & 2010b) and the Saskatchewan Environmental 
Society (Halliday, 2013) have begun to explore such a scenario. I continue this work by 
outlining a scenario where Saskatchewan reduces GHGs in the electricity sector by 80% 
by mid-century while also meeting 90% of electricity demand using domestic renewable 
energy and energy conservation. Figure 7-12 displays one possible generation mix that 
could fulfill those criteria.  
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Figure 7-12 80% GHG Reduction: Scenario 4 – Renewable Approach 
 
The first difference worth noting in this scenario is that the constraint on wind energy has 
been loosened. Rather than capping wind power at supplying 24% of electricity demand 
in 2050, wind is now allowed to supply up to 40% of total electricity demand in that time 
step. After subtracting the contributions of demand side management, which meets 10% 
of electricity supply in 2050, wind provides 44.4% of net electricity demand in this 
scenario. Solar photovoltaics supply 13% of total demand (14.2% of net demand). 
Hydroelectric capacity is expanded to reach almost the limit of Saskatchewan’s current 
potential; 2494 MW of capacity is built, which would require several dams along the 
Saskatchewan River system, as well as the controversial Wintego dam mentioned in 
Chapter 3. Natural gas combined cycle plants act as the bridge fuel in this scenario, 
providing the bulk of electricity from 2025-2035, after which time wind capacity begins 
to increase substantially and natural gas fired facilities are allowed to retire. By 2050, 810 
MW of natural gas combined cycle capacity supplies 10% of total electricity demand 
(11.1% of net demand).  
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For electricity planners at SaskPower, Scenario 4 probably looks like a reckless 
nightmare. How could variable wind and solar provide steady power for a growing 
province? This is exactly the question the WIRE model was created to answer. I use this 
model to ask, ‘Will It Run?’ The answer I received was yes; it will run. The results for 
December are presented in Figure 7-13.  
 
 
Figure 7-13 80% GHG Reduction: Scenario 4 in Operation (December 2050) 
 
With 4667 MW installed, wind can provide all of the province’s power needs during a 
windy hour. When wind power production drops, fast-ramping natural gas combined 
cycle plants, hydroelectric facilities, and stored electricity pick up the slack. Figure 7-14 
shows total installed capacity in Scenario 4.  
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Figure 7-14 Electricity Capacity in Domestic Renewable Energy Scenario 
 
In this scenario storage capacity plays an increasingly important role towards the end of 
the investment period (see teal blue wedge in Figure 7-14). By 2050 this scenario 
includes about 6500 MW of electricity storage capacity. This storage capacity is 
recharged in periods when sun and wind are abundant, and drawn down when it is cloudy 
and calm. The yellow bits at the peaks in Figure 7-13 (previous page) indicate when 
electricity storage is drawn upon. As can be seen, the stored energy becomes important in 
the latter part of the month when natural gas combined cycle plants and hydroelectric 
facilities are operating at full capacity and further energy is needed to meet demand. On 
an hourly basis storage capacity helps to smooth out the contribution of wind and solar 
energy. Storage capacity also adds to the cost of the electricity system. 
 
Grid integration of wind and solar is aided by the demand side management (DSM) 
strategy of peak shifting. In this scenario 370 MW of peak shaving is allowed. I model 
this in WIRE by allowing electricity demand to be shifted three hours into the future (see 
Appendix 7B for further detail). This is introduced with the constraint, 
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 𝐸𝑞. 7.1  𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠! = 𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔!!! . 
 
This peak shaving feature allows DSM to smooth demand. Interestingly, peak shaving 
has the effect of smoothing net demand; this is electricity demand minus the generation 
of variable wind and solar electricity (recall the duck graph from Chapter 4). Figure 7-15 
shows the impact of DSM peak shaving over the course of 72 hours in December 2050. 
As can be seen, the peaks are, at times, lower and the valleys higher once the DSM peak 
shaving has been applied. This shows the potential for smart grid technology to aid in 
variable renewable integration. The assumption that DSM savings can only be pushed 
three hours into the future means that not all of the peaks are shaved. Greater DSM 
flexibility, perhaps offered by smart grid technology, would allow for better peak shaving 
performance.  
 
 
Figure 7-15 Peak Shaving Applied to Net Demand (December 7-9, 2050) 
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In the domestic renewable energy scenario (Scenario 4), 5085 MW of solar photovoltaics 
are built by 2050 (Figure 7-14). The contribution of solar power only occurs during the 
daytime hours as represented by the orange slices in Figure 7-13. Figure 7-16 provides a 
closer look at the dynamics of solar power over a period of six days in the middle of 
December. The orange bases indicate solar power that is used when generated. The grey 
shading at the peaks indicates solar power that is stored for later use. At no point during 
this six-day period is solar power curtailed. The need to curtail solar power is rare in 
December, and in total only .3 GWh of solar power is curtailed during the month.  
 
 
Figure 7-16 Solar Power Operation Domestic Renewable Scenario  
(December 13-18, 2050) 
 
Figure 7-16 shows that solar power is highly variable from day to day. At its December 
peak, solar output reaches 4025 MW. Overall, solar achieves a capacity factor of only 
11% in December when the shorter days limit the number of clear, sunny hours. As 
Figure 7-17 shows, solar offers a much larger contribution in June, when the days are 
longer and the solar capacity factor reaches 16%. Hydroelectricity is also abundant in 
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June when stream flows are charged from spring melt and hydro capacity factors average 
71% in Saskatchewan. The abundance of solar and hydro power allows the electricity 
system to operate carbon-free in June; natural gas combined cycle plants are not required 
and the (effectively carbon neutral) 150 MW of biomass plants operate only during a few 
calm nights.   
 
 
Figure 7-17 80% GHG Reduction: Domestic Renewable Scenario in Operation 
(June 2050) 
 
This abundance of renewable energy in summer unfortunately does not correspond to 
peak electricity demand in the province. By scaling hourly electricity demand data for 
2013 to anticipated load growth in 2050 (see Appendix 7B) I forecast average hourly 
electricity demand in 2050 to be 4.5 GWh/hour in December and 3.6 GWh/hour in June. 
This may prove inaccurate if climate change increases summer temperatures, and summer 
cooling loads begin to rival winter heating loads. I don’t account for that possibility in my 
forecast. As it stands, the system is forced to curtail 24 GWh of solar power and 32 GWh 
of wind power in June under this scenario.  
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Liebig’s Law of the Minimum Applied to Renewable Energy Planning 
The seasonal differences in output for solar and hydroelectricity point to a renewable 
energy planning problem; a system sized to meet demand in periods of renewable energy 
scarcity will be over-sized in periods of renewable energy abundance. Scenario 4 arose 
out of an interaction between the SIM and WIRE models. The first round of SIM 
optimization called for more hydroelectricity. However, the optimization was based on an 
annual average capacity factor of 56% for hydroelectricity. When the scenario was tested 
in the WIRE model it could not meet demand in March. Due to low streamflows, 
hydroelectric capacity factors are constrained to 43% during that month and in a 
hydroelectric dominated system this created a significant electricity shortfall. I ran 
another optimization using the 43% hydroelectric capacity factor for March. This 
scenario recommended a greater proportion of solar photovoltaics. When I tested this 
scenario in WIRE, it would not run in December. The optimization had been based on an 
average capacity factor of 16% for solar, but in December the capacity factor for solar is 
11%. I then allowed more wind to be constructed in order to balance out the low capacity 
factor for solar, and I ran a SIM optimization using the 11% capacity factor for solar. The 
result is Scenario 4. It provides adequate electricity in December and March, and an 
abundance of renewable electricity in June.  
 
In agriculture, Liebig’s Law of the Minimum describes the relationship between plant 
growth and levels of nitrogen, phosphorous, and potassium. Nitrogen helps plants grow 
their leaves, which are necessary for photosynthesis. Phosphorous helps plants create 
roots that bring in water and nutrients, and flowers and fruit that allow the plant to 
reproduce. Potassium strengthens the stem of the plant and encourages growth. Liebig’s 
Law of the Minimum holds that growth of a plant is constrained by the essential nutrient 
that is most scarce. If even one of these essential nutrients is in short supply the growth of 
the plant will be stunted. 
 
Planning for a renewable electricity system is similar. In order for the system to provide 
sufficient power, adequate supply must be available for the moments when renewable 
energy is most scarce.  
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On the arid plains, the spring season introduces a minimum for hydroelectricity. 
Hydroelectric dominated systems must be sized to provide adequate power in March, 
especially during periods of extended drought when reservoirs have been run down.  
 
In the northern latitudes, the winter season introduces a minimum for solar power. 
Systems with a high penetration of solar power must have adequate back-up generation 
for the long, cold nights of December (see Figure 4-5).  
 
Wind is seasonally variable, and is complementary to solar in that it is often windier 
during the night (see Figure 4-10) and in winter. Wind is, however, quite variable from 
hour to hour. In the WIRE model, electricity storage technologies can provide backup 
power on an hourly scale; the 6462 MW of storage has a capacity to hold 12 GWh of 
electricity, which when conversion loss is considered, can provide 8.4 GWh of energy at 
an instantaneous rate of 4.5 GW. This storage capacity helps to smooth the hourly micro-
variability of renewables like wind and solar. Storage technologies that could provide this 
hourly smoothing benefit include lithium-ion batteries, compressed air electricity storage, 
and pumped hydroelectric storage (McPherson, 2014; Jones, 2015).  
 
To pursue an electricity generation mix with a high penetration of variable renewables, 
and to ensure energy security, seasonal storage would be an asset. The Lake Diefenbaker 
hydroelectric reservoir offers 445 GWh of seasonal storage in Saskatchewan (personal 
communication, 2015). The Nipawin reservoir provides storage of 5 GWh, which may be 
useful to balance variable wind production over the course of a few hours, while E.B. 
Campbell provides 33 GWh of storage, which can provide balance over the course of a 
few days (personal communication, 2015). If future hydroelectric developments were 
equipped with reservoirs capable of seasonal storage then it would be possible to reduce 
the overall size of the installed system capacity, avoid curtailment, and lower the cost of 
Scenario 4. Many of the potential hydroelectric sites in Saskatchewan are, however, 
suitable for only run-of-the-river projects that would lack reservoir capacity (Interview 
31).  
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One emerging technology that could provide seasonal storage is hydrogen (McPherson, 
2014). McPherson writes, “hydrogen storage can mitigate seasonal storage by generating 
hydrogen from electricity using an electrolyzer and storing that hydrogen in an 
underground cavity or above ground tank over the course of weeks to months” (2014: 6). 
This would allow abundant solar and hydro electricity generated in summer to be stored 
until demand peaks in winter, and in effect, convert variable flows of renewable 
electricity into a stock of fuel that can be drawn upon when necessary. Saskatchewan’s 
natural gas storage caverns and solution-mined potash mines offer potentially low-cost 
options for hydrogen storage caverns (Steward et al, 2009). Hydrogen can also be 
processed into methane by adding carbon dioxide (Jentsch et al., 2014). Germany is 
exploring methods of converting electric power to methane “biogas” as a way of 
providing long-term electricity storage,  
 
The storage concept links power and gas networks by the conversion of 
power into gas by two major steps: hydrogen (H2) production by water 
electrolysis and the following conversion of H2 and carbon dioxide (CO2) 
into methane (CH4) in the Sabatier reaction. In this way, renewable 
electricity can be stored in the natural gas infrastructure, accessing the 
large transport capacities of the natural gas network and gas storage sites 
that offer the largest storage capacities for energy in Germany. 
 (Jentsch et al., 2014: ) 
 
Saskatchewan would be well served by directing research efforts towards long-term 
seasonal storage of energy.   
 
As a note, the current version of WIRE does not include the possibility of seasonal 
storage. The model proved computationally intractable when making 8760 x i generation 
and storage decisions – i.e. the WIRE optimization would run for periods of up to twelve 
hours without returning a solution. In future research I may work to overcome this 
limitation, include seasonal storage in the model, and combine SIM and WIRE.  
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Cost of the Renewable Pathway 
The domestic renewable pathway results in lower average electricity prices than the BAU 
scenario in the time steps from 2025-2040 (Figure 7-18). This is because the constraint 
on wind energy has been loosened and wind is a low-cost generating technology. The 
domestic renewable scenario then becomes the most expensive scenario in the last two 
time steps when solar and electricity storage are constructed in large quantities. In 2050, 
the expected average electricity price in the domestic renewable scenario is 13.7 
cents/kWh. By comparison, in the interprovincial scenario that relies on a 1950 MW 
connection to Manitoba Hydro, the expected price is 12.5 cents/kWh. Both scenarios 
meet the same target of reducing GHGs by 80% below 2015 levels by 2050, but the 
interprovincial scenario relies on renewable energy and energy conservation to meet 75% 
of demand, while the domestic renewable scenario achieves 90% renewable energy. The 
ambitious reader may be left wondering, can we do more and how much it would cost? 
 
 
Figure 7-18 Relative Cost of the Domestic Renewable Pathway 
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Greening the Saskatchewan Grid 
As a last task in this Chapter I ask, how much would it cost to achieve an aggressive 
GHG reduction strategy? This strategy would not wait until 2045 to pursue renewable 
energy and would instead see SaskPower undertake a complete transformation of the grid 
in the period following the retirement of Saskatchewan’s coal-fired power plants in 2030. 
This scenario would achieve near-zero GHG emissions by 2040. It would see 
conventional coal phased out by 2030, and conventional natural gas facilities phased out 
by 2040. Renewable energy and energy conservation would meet 78% of electricity 
demand by 2030, 94% by 2040 and 95% by 2050. This achievement would make 
Saskatchewan one of the leaders in renewable electricity generation in Canada and the 
world.  
 
In this Greening the Saskatchewan Grid scenario, I allow imports of 1950 MW of power 
from Manitoba Hydro. As the scenarios above show, this helps to keep electricity rates 
low and helps to balance variable wind and solar energy. I retire the Shand coal-fired 
power plant in 2025, rather than retrofitting it to run until 2045. I allow wind-powered 
electricity to meet 24% of total demand by 2030 and 35% by 2050. I then constrain the 
model to reduce GHGs to 100 kt CO2e by 2040. When the resulting Greening the Grid 
scenario was tested in WIRE it ran in each of the four representative months. This Green 
Grid scenario is presented in Figure 7-19.  
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Figure 7-19 Greening the Grid Electricity Generation Mix 
 
Figures 7-20 and 7-21 allow us to compare the GHGs from the Greening the Grid 
scenario to those of Scenario 4: the domestic renewable energy approach. The Green 
Grid scenario results in significantly lower cumulative GHGs, and those cumulative 
emissions matter. Climate change is not driven by the flow of annual GHG emissions, but 
instead by the cumulative stock of CO2 and other GHGs in the atmosphere. Cognitively, 
citizens and policymakers have trouble recognizing this fact (Sterman and Booth 
Sweeney, 2007). It is common to assume that simply stabilizing GHG emissions can 
mitigate climate change. The fact is that flows of GHGs must be reduced to zero by the 
end of the century in order to stabilize the stock of GHGs in the atmosphere. To actually 
reduce the stock of GHGs in the atmosphere will require a negative flow of GHG 
emissions, which can be achieved by expanding natural CO2 sinks, such as wetlands and 
forests, and artificial CO2 sinks; for example biomass can be paired with carbon 
sequestration to create a net removal of GHGs from the atmosphere. Getting to zero 
quickly is important. 
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Figure 7-20 Scenario 4: 90% Renewable by 2050 Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
 
Figure 7-21 Greening the Grid Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
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Figure 7-22 compares the Greening the Grid scenario against the other renewable energy 
focused pathways. 
 
 
Figure 7-22 The Cost of Greening the Saskatchewan Grid 
 
We can see that there is a premium to be paid for early action. Due to the ambitious 
actions taken in the Greening the Grid scenario, electricity prices from 2030 to 2045 will 
be higher than they would be otherwise. These high average prices stabilize in the period 
of 2040-2050, when contributions from wind and solar are protected from fuel price 
risks. The largest uncertainty in the Greening the Grid scenario comes from the rates 
charged by Manitoba Hydro for their imported electricity. To reduce uncertainty while 
pursuing this scenario SaskPower would be wise to sign a long-term power purchase 
agreement with Manitoba Hydro that contains a clear schedule of electricity price 
increases. As it stands, the expected average electricity price for the Greening the Grid 
scenario in 2050 would be 1.94 cents/kWh higher than the SaskPower BAU scenario. 
 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Av
er
ag
e 
C
os
t o
f E
le
ct
ric
ity
 (c
en
ts
/k
W
h)
 (2
01
4 
 $
C
A
N
) 
Time Step 
SaskPower BAU Interprovincial Domestic Renewable Greening the Grid 
 217 
The picture changes, however, if we anticipate carbon pricing in Canada. One potential 
carbon-price pathway would involve a price of $15/tonne CO2e in 2015, increasing by 
$3/tonne/yr so that it reaches $30/tonne CO2e in 2020 – the current carbon price in 
British Columbia – and climbs to $120/tonne/yr by 2050. Figure 7-23 compares the 
Greening the Grid scenario against the SaskPower BAU scenario, the nuclear scenario 
(Scenario 2 for reducing GHGs by 80% by 2050), and the carbon capture and storage 
scenario (Scenario 3 for reducing GHGs) in the context of this escalating carbon price.  
 
 
Figure 7-23 Cost Comparison With An Escalating Carbon Price  
 
With this escalating carbon price, the aggressive GHG emission reductions of the 
Greening the Grid scenario pay off. By 2025 it is the lowest cost scenario and this 
advantage is maintained through to 2050. The average cost of electricity in the 
SaskPower BAU scenario is .8 cents/kWh more expensive than the Greening the Grid 
scenario in the final time-step. In the Greening the Grid scenario GHG emissions are 
reduced aggressively, leading to near-zero emissions by 2040. If Saskatchewan or 
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Canada were to implement carbon pricing the Greening the Grid scenario would be 
resilient against a carbon pricing shock. 
 
Conclusions 
In this chapter I have compared SaskPower’s business-as-usual (BAU) electricity 
generation plan against a range of other scenarios. The BAU scenario relies on 
retrofitting coal-fired plants with carbon capture and storage (CCS) to meet federal coal-
fired regulations. I found that SaskPower could achieve the same level of GHG emissions 
reductions at a lower cost by shutting down existing coal plants, investing in wind, 
hydroelectric and natural gas facilities, and importing more hydroelectricity from 
Manitoba Hydro. Over the period of 2030-2050 this equivalency approach saves .86 
cents/kWh relative to SaskPower approach. However, both the BAU and equivalency 
scenarios do not lead to lasting GHG emissions reductions. By 2045 GHG emissions 
begin to increase in both scenarios.  
 
I then explored four scenarios for achieving an 80% reduction in GHG emissions by 
2050: an interprovincial approach, which took advantage of low-cost Manitoba Hydro 
imports; a nuclear approach, in which 1000 MW of small, modular reactor capacity was 
built by 2050; a carbon capture approach, which relies on investment in natural gas with 
CCS; and a domestic renewable energy scenario, which meets Saskatchewan’s electricity 
demand with investments in wind, solar, domestic hydroelectric facilities, electricity 
storage, and energy conservation. Each of these scenarios achieved the goal of reducing 
GHG emissions by 80% relative to 2015 by 2050. Each scenario also proved capable of 
reliably supplying electricity when tested using the WIRE model. Electricity generation 
costs were higher than the SaskPower BAU scenario by 2050, but not significantly so; 
there was, for example, still overlap between the 95% confidence interval of the 
interprovincial scenario and the SaskPower BAU scenario.  
 
Lastly, I outlined a Greening the Grid scenario in which Saskatchewan moves quickly to 
phase out coal-fired electricity generation by 2030 and achieves near-zero GHG 
emissions by 2040 using predominantly renewable energy technologies. This scenario 
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required careful and iterative planning; higher penetrations of renewables meant that I 
had to pay attention to a ‘Liebig’s Law of the Minimum’ rule related to seasonal solar 
and hydroelectric potential. After iterating between SIM and WIRE, I found a scenario 
that could reliably meet Saskatchewan’s hourly electricity demand in four representative 
months of March, June, September and December. In this WIRE simulation a 
combination of electricity storage, demand side management, and fast-ramping 
hydroelectric generation capacity (located both within Saskatchewan and imported from 
Manitoba) allowed high penetrations of variable wind and solar to be integrated onto the 
Saskatchewan grid.  
 
The Greening the Grid scenario did increase the average cost of electricity generation by 
1.94 cents/kwh relative to the SaskPower BAU scenario. However, with an escalating 
carbon price, the Greening the Grid scenario becomes the lowest cost electricity pathway. 
In any scenario, electricity generation costs are anticipated to rise in the future. In the 
next chapter I explore the implications of this price increase on individuals, businesses, 
and industry in the province. I also outline scenario impacts that are more difficult, or in 
some cases impossible, to express in financial terms. These impacts are relevant to a 
public discussion of Saskatchewan’s electricity future.    
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Chapter 8 – Scenario Impacts 
  
Introduction 
The scenarios outlined in Chapter 7 differ in terms of their projected cost of electricity 
and their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In this chapter I compare the scenarios using 
a selection of other criteria. My aim is to begin to assess the sustainability of each 
scenario. A sustainability assessment is, however, an evaluation process that is best 
undertaken with widespread public input and deliberation (Winfield et al., 2010). White 
and Noble (2012) provide a good example of a quantitative approach to strategic 
environmental assessment that could form the basis of a larger public consultation. In this 
chapter I limit my efforts to providing quantitative indicators and qualitative commentary 
that can guide a future public sustainability assessment.  
 
Sustainability Criteria 
There are a number of criteria with which the sustainability of electricity scenarios can be 
evaluated. Jaccard (2005) uses four criteria to evaluate energy technology options: 
projected cost, extreme event risk, geopolitical risk, and path dependence. The first two 
criteria are fairly self-explanatory; I outlined projected cost for each scenario in Chapter 7 
and extreme event risk relates to the possibility that an extreme event may affect the 
stability of the system or the health and safety of the public. Geopolitical risk is relevant 
in international markets such as oil, where supply chains can be disrupted by cartels and 
political embargoes. It is less relevant in an assessment of Saskatchewan electricity; 
supplies of coal, uranium, and natural gas are produced locally and are not vulnerable to 
international supply risks. One might, however, reframe this criterion as energy 
independence. Premier Brad Wall has expressed his interest in continued use of coal in 
order to maintain energy independence (Zinchuk, 2014). Imports of hydroelectricity from 
Manitoba are interpreted as reducing energy independence. For Jaccard (2005) the fourth 
criterion, path dependence, is a measure of the degree of fit between a proposed 
electricity system and an existing system. Scenarios that fit within an existing socio-
political-technical institutional context will face lower resistance to adoption than 
scenarios that disrupt existing institutional arrangements.  
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Winfield et al. (2010) critique Jaccard’s (2005) criteria (and other related criteria) for 
focusing on economic and technical characteristics and “neglecting equity effects, 
systemic interactions and uncertainty/precautionary factors” (p. 4119). Winfield et al. 
(2010) propose a detailed set of eight criteria that can be applied in a sustainability 
assessment, as well as six trade-off rules or principles that should be followed when 
choosing between scenarios. The eight criteria that should be considered in a 
sustainability assessment are listed below. I include a short quote or summary relevant to 
each criterion to indicate its meaning: 
 
1. Socio-ecological system integrity – “protect irreplaceable life support functions” 
2. Livelihood sufficiency and opportunity – “Ensure that everyone and every 
community has enough for a decent life” 
3. Intragenerational equity – “reduce dangerous gaps in sufficiency and 
opportunity…between the rich and poor” 
4. Intergenerational equity – “enhance the opportunities and capabilities of future 
generations to live sustainably” 
5. Resource maintenance and efficiency – reduce extractive damage, avoid waste, 
and improve efficiency 
6. Socio-ecological civility and democratic governance – “apply sustainability 
requirements through more open and better-informed deliberations” 
7. Precaution and adaptation – “Respect uncertainty, and avoid even poorly 
understood risks of serious or irreversible damage” 
8. Immediate and long-term integration – “Apply all principles of sustainability at 
once” 
(Winfield et al., 2010: 4119) 
 
When two scenarios both pose a threat to any of these criteria it is necessary to consider 
trade-offs. The six rules for trade-offs outlined by Winfield et al. (2010) include: 
 
• Burden of argument on trade-off proponent – “the burden of justification falls on 
the proponent of the trade-off” 
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• Avoidance of significant adverse effects – “No trade-off that involves a 
significant adverse effect…can be justified unless the alternative is acceptance of 
an even more significant adverse effect.”  
(Winfield et al., 2010: 2119) 
 
The remaining trade-off rules call for decision-makers to seek maximum net gains, 
protect the future, explicitly and openly justify trade-off decisions, and evaluate trade-
offs in “processes that include open and effective involvement of all stakeholders” (p. 
4119).  
 
White and Noble (2012) used eight criteria in their strategic environmental assessment of 
Saskatchewan’s electricity system. These criteria bear resemblance to Winfield et al. 
(2010) in that they strive to address equity, but also included is the criterion “security of 
supply” which is akin to Jaccard’s (2005) “geopolitical risk” criterion. The eight criteria 
used by White and Noble (2012) are as follows: 
 
1. Adaptive capacity – “Maximizes the ability to accommodate projected, as well as 
unanticipated future demand growth” 
2. Emissions management – “Minimizes emissions to air and water during electricity 
production, distribution and use over the life cycle of the system” 
3. Employment and income sufficiency – “Maximizes short- and long-term income 
and employment opportunities” 
4. Ecological integrity – “Ensures biodiversity conservation and ecological 
resiliency by minimizing use and disturbance of land and water resources”  
5. Security of supply – “Ensures secure and affordable access to energy supply for 
current and future generations”  
6. Energy production and transmission efficiency – “Meets electricity demands 
while minimizing energy use, raw material use and generation of waste during 
production and energy loss during transmission” 
7. Aboriginal rights – “Minimizes infringement on culture, traditional land use 
practices and Treaty Rights” 
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8. Public health and safety – “Minimizes risk to public health and safety during 
electricity production and transmission.”  
(White and Noble, 2012: 286) 
 
While Winfield et al. (2010 and White and Noble (2012) share some overlapping criteria 
like “ecological integrity”, there are important differences. White and Noble’s (2012) 
definition of adaptive capacity appears biased towards electricity system growth. They 
are concerned with efficiency, but define efficiency with respect to “energy production 
and transmission efficiency”, not in terms of energy demand. Winfield et al. (2010) 
emphasize energy conservation in their definition of resource maintenance and efficiency 
when they speak of “reducing overall material and energy use per unit benefit” (p. 4119). 
 
As well, Winfield et al (2010) recommend an integrative approach to assessment. The 
language used in White and Noble’s (2012) list is the language of optimization; each 
criterion is either maximized or minimized. In their strategic environmental assessment, 
White and Noble (2010) had expert participants weigh and rank the criteria. These 
weighted criteria were then used to create a score for each scenario. This reductionist 
approach reduces opportunities for an integrative view of scenario selection. 
 
White and Noble (2012) do however, consider important factors that are implied by 
criteria listed by Winfield et al. (2010), but not explicitly stated. In particular, the 
criterion ‘Aboriginal rights’ is very relevant in Saskatchewan, which has a high 
proportion of people identifying as aboriginal in its population (15.6% in 2011, Statistics 
Canada, 2011b). The Canadian constitution recognizes aboriginal rights and treaty rights, 
which include the right to traditional livelihoods. The Canadian courts have ruled that 
government has a duty to consult and accommodate aboriginal peoples on decisions that 
may impact their livelihoods (Aboriginal Affairs, 2011). Electricity sector projects can 
impact aboriginal livelihoods (e.g. the E.B. Campbell hydroelectric station affected 
fishing for aboriginals downstream of the dam). Recognition of aboriginal rights and 
interests has led SaskPower to seek partnerships with First Nations on power projects like 
the proposed Tazi Twé hydroelectric station.   
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In this chapter I offer quantitative indicators that can contribute to understanding the 
sustainability criteria outlined above. The quantitative indicators I provide for each 
scenario are listed below and grouped by the criterion they help to inform.68  
 
• Projected Costs (Jaccard, 2005) 
o Projected cost of electricity in 2050 with and without carbon pricing 
(cents/kwh); 
o Total discounted cost of meeting electricity demand 2015-2050 with and 
without carbon pricing ($Millions). 
• Intragenerational equity (Winfield et al, 2010): 
o Electricity rate impacts to residential customers (cents/kwh); and 
o Electricity rate impacts to commercial customers (cents/kwh).  
• Livelihood sufficiency and opportunity (Winfield et al, 2010): 
o Electricity rate impacts to industrial customers (cents/kwh); 
o Direct and indirect employment resulting from the electricity scenarios 
(full-time jobs); 
o Direct and indirect employment divided by electricity price to control for 
scenario cost (full-time jobs/cents per kwh). 
• Emissions management (White and Noble, 2012): 
o Annual direct GHG emissions in 2050 (kilotonnes CO2e); 
o Cumulative direct GHG emissions 2015-2050 (Megatonnes CO2e); 
o Cumulative captured CO2 (km3).  
• Ecological integrity (Winfield et al., 2010; White and Noble, 2012): 
o Land impacted by wind and solar facilities (Sections/hectares); 
o Water consumption by all facilities (Gigalitre/Olympic sized pool); 
o Hydroelectricity capacity in Saskatchewan (MW); 
o Hydroelectric dams on the Churchill River (number). 
• Energy Independence (modified from Jaccard, 2005) 
o Hydroelectric contracts with Manitoba Hydro (MW). 
• Resource maintenance and efficiency (Winfield et al., 2010) 
                                                
68 All monetary values are reported in 2014 $CAN constant dollars.  
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o DSM energy savings in 2050 (GWh) 
• Precaution (Winfield et al., 2010) and public health and safety (White and Noble, 
2012): 
o Radioactive waste produced by nuclear power production (tonnes).  
 
These indicators are far from comprehensive, but touch on some of the key issues 
associated with the various electricity scenarios. For instance, while I give only a passing 
reference to the land impacts related to coal-fired generation, and do not comment on the 
land impacts related to natural gas-fired generation (including natural gas extraction), 
nuclear power (including uranium mining), hydroelectricity generation, or biomass, I list 
land impacted by wind and solar facilities because these energy sources are often singled 
out for their low “energy density” (e.g. van Kooten, 2011). The measure of land impacted 
by wind and solar provides a quantitative indicator that can inform a discussion of energy 
density and land-use impact. As well, when I explore employment impacts, I use data for 
both direct and indirect employment. However, when I outline cumulative GHG 
emissions I focus only on direct emissions at the site of electricity production, and not 
indirect emissions associated with manufacturing and installing a technology, or 
decommissioning a facility and dealing with its waste. Water use is a measure of direct 
use during operation and does not include the water associated with manufacturing the 
technologies. After presenting a selection of these indicators I discuss how they might 
contribute to our understanding of the sustainability of each electricity scenario.  
 
Projected Costs 
In Chapter 7 I presented the electricity cost resulting from each scenario. A summary of 
the electricity costs in 2050 is presented in Table 8-1. These indicators contribute to 
understanding Jaccard’s (2005) sustainability criterion of projected cost. The lowest cost 
scenarios are highlighted in light blue while the highest cost scenarios for each indicator 
are highlighted in rose.  
 
The section marked ‘Projected Cost’ outlines the expected cost of electricity in 2050, 
along with the 95% and 5% confidence intervals from the sensitivity analysis. The BAU 
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equivalent scenario is projected to achieve the lowest electricity cost in 2050, reducing 
electricity costs by .4 cents/kwh relative to the SaskPower BAU scenario. The four 
scenarios in which GHG emissions are reduced by 80% relative to 2015 have confidence 
intervals that overlap. The zero-emissions Greening the Grid scenario is expected to cost 
about 1 cent/kwh more than the inter-provincial 80% reduction scenario.  
 
 
Table 8-1 Projected Costs 
 
The section labeled ‘Discounted Project Cost’ shows the total financial cost of each 
scenario from 2015-2050, discounted at a rate of 3%. This discounted total cost number is 
the objective function I minimize in SIM. I show three versions of this number. The first 
assumes a carbon price of zero. The second assumes a carbon price of $30/tonne CO2e 
applied equally to all emissions released to the atmosphere (i.e. it is not applied to 
captured GHG emissions) from the period the 2015-2050. These carbon charges are also 
discounted to their present value in 2015. The third version assumes an increasing carbon 
Financial Cost Comparison
Scenario
SaskPower 
BAU 
BAU 
Equivalent
Inter-
provincial Nuclear CCS
Domestic 
Renewable
Greening 
the Grid
Electricity Cost in 2050 
(cents/kWh 2014 $CAN) 11.6        11.2        12.6        12.7        13.2        13.7        13.6        
Electricity Cost in 2050 95% 
C.I. (cents/kWh 2014 $CAN) 12.1          11.7          13.4          13.4          13.6          14.0          14.3          
Electricity Cost in 2050 5% 
C.I. (cents/kWh 2014 $CAN) 11.1          10.8          11.9          12.2          12.8          13.4          12.9          
Total discounted cost mean 
(million 2014 $CAN) 67,091    62,467    68,173    67,037    67,618    69,477    76,368    
Total discounted cost 95% 
C.I. (million 2014 $CAN) 68,285       63,515       69,767       68,374       68,876       70,729       78,848       
Total discounted cost 5% C.I. 
(million 2014 $CAN) 65,930       61,426       66,641       65,689       66,387       68,243       74,105       
Total discounted cost mean 
(million 2014 $CAN) 73,863    69,158    74,745    73,752    74,286    75,379    79,551    
Total discounted cost 95% 
C.I. (million 2014 $CAN) 75,024       70,323       76,370       75,069       75,537       76,545       81,951       
Total discounted cost 5% C.I. 
(million 2014 $CAN) 72,722       68,008       73,156       72,535       73,085       74,061       77,387       
Total discounted cost mean 
(million 2014 $CAN) 80,672    75,984    80,450    79,659    80,091    79,985    80,681    
Total discounted cost 95% 
C.I. (million 2014 $CAN) 81,836       77,056       82,098       81,045       81,291       81,224       83,133       
Total discounted cost 5% C.I. 
(million 2014 $CAN) 79,463       74,929       78,846       78,445       78,833       78,765       78,415       
Projected Cost
Discounted Project Cost
Project Cost with Constant Carbon Price ($30/tonne CO2e)
Project Cost with Escalating Carbon Price ($15/tonne CO2e in 2015 escalating by $15/time-step)
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price that begins at $15/tCO2e in 2015 and increases by $15/tCO2e in each time-step; it is 
$30/tCO2e in 2020, $45/tCO2e in 2025, and reaches $120/tCO2e in 2050.  
 
Without a carbon price the BAU equivalent scenario is by far the lowest cost scenario, 
coming in nearly $14 billion cheaper than the Greening the Grid scenario in present value 
terms. With a carbon price of $30/tCO2e the gap narrows to about $10 billion. 
Interestingly, at a price of $30/tCO2e the four 80% GHG reduction scenarios are very 
close in cost to the SaskPower BAU scenario. This means that if Saskatchewan were to 
adopt the carbon price currently charged in British Columbia, it would be a break-even 
venture to pursue an 80% reduction in GHGs by 2050 (the discounted project costs are all 
within the 5%-95% confidence intervals of each other). With an escalating carbon price 
the expected discounted cost of the Greening the Grid scenario becomes equivalent to the 
SaskPower BAU scenario. Carbon prices above the escalating pathway would begin to 
favour the Greening the Grid scenario. This means the least-cost scenario is sensitive to 
carbon pricing policy in Saskatchewan and Canada.  
 
Electricity Rate Impacts 
In each of the scenarios outlined in Table 8-1 the cost of generating electricity, measured 
in constant dollars to control for inflation, increases over time. Saskatchewan must 
replace old generating assets, and find a pathway to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHGs), as it expands electricity production. Natural gas combined cycle plants are the 
default means of accomplishing this in the SaskPower business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, 
and natural gas fuel prices are expected to rise over time.  
 
The costs presented in Table 8-1 indicate the average cost of generating electricity in 
each time-step and for each scenario. To understand the impact on citizens, businesses, 
and industry it is necessary to convert generation costs into the electricity rates required 
to pay for these costs. Historically, electricity rates have not been equal for all SaskPower 
customers. Large power customers pay less and residential customers pay the most. 
Appendix 8A explains why this is so and provides a ‘cost of service’ model that converts 
electricity generation costs into electricity prices.  
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Residential Sector 
In Figure 8-1 I present the expected residential electricity prices that would result from 
four scenarios: the SaskPower BAU scenario; two scenarios for reducing GHGs 80% 
below 2015 levels by 2050; and the Greening the Grid scenario, which achieves near zero 
emissions by 2050. These prices do not include a carbon price.  
 
 
Figure 8-1 Residential Electricity Prices in Saskatchewan (cents/kWh) (2014 $CAN) 
  
In 2040, the Greening the Grid scenario has electricity prices that are 11% higher than the 
SaskPower BAU scenario. This remains true in 2050 as well. The other two scenarios for 
reducing GHGs have prices that are 8% and 9% higher than the BAU scenario by 2050. 
As prices increase, residential customers will have an incentive to conserve electricity. In 
all four of the scenarios above, residential conservation opportunities are taken up to the 
‘upper potential’ of residential DSM. Recall from Chapter 6 that upper potential is 
calculated by looking at the level of DSM that is economical at an electricity price of 15 
cents/kWh. All of the scenarios contain electricity prices higher than that by 2025 and so 
a broader suite of conservation measures would become economical at that time.  
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Residential customers will have another reason to seek out additional conservation 
opportunities. The forecast model outlined in Chapter 6 assumed that residential 
customers will use more electricity over time; their electricity intensity will increase. 
Increasing at 1.2%/yr, residential electricity use is forecast to be 52% higher by 2050. 
Residential electricity prices in the scenarios outlined in Figure 8-1 will increase by a 
factor of 1.8 (BAU) to 2.1 (Greening the Grid). Table 8-2 shows how the average 
residential electricity bill might change without energy conservation measures.  
 
 
Table 8-2 Average Monthly Residential Electricity Bill (constant dollars) 
 
Under the SaskPower BAU scenario an average residential electricity bill increases by 
$166.89 per month between 2015 and 2015. Subtracting column 3 from column 4 we can 
see that achieving near zero emissions by 2040 in the Greening the Grid scenario would 
increase residential bills by an additional $28.37 per month by 2050 (assuming a carbon 
price of zero).  
 
We would expect residential customers to react to price increases by seeking 
opportunities for energy efficiency and conservation. Ryan and Razek (2012) estimated 
that the average elasticity of electricity demand for residential customers in 
Saskatchewan was -.45 over the period 1960-2006. This means that residential electricity 
demand is inelastic, but still responsive to price. I have not modelled this price feedback 
in SIM, but we can assume that, for those who have the financial means, higher prices 
will result in increased energy conservation efforts. For low-income residents of 
Saskatchewan, who lack the means to invest in energy efficiency, the increased rates will 
be a financial hardship.  
 
Residential Bill 2015 2035 BAU 2050 BAU 2050 Green
Electricity use (kWh) 750 952 1139 1139
Rate (cents/kWh) 12.6 21.2 23.0 25.5
Energy cost ($) $94.67 $202.31 $261.57 $289.94
Fixed ($) $20.22 $20.22 $20.22 $20.22
Total ($) $114.89 $222.53 $281.79 $310.16
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Residential customers with the financial means to do so may also look to self-generation 
to lower their electricity bills. Due to its high-cost I did not include residential solar 
photovoltaics (PV) in SIM, instead I focused on utility-scale solar PV. Rooftop 
residential panels are falling in cost and, from a customer’s point of view, can be 
expected to achieve grid parity in the coming decades. Grid parity is the point when it 
will cost residential customers less to generate their own solar electricity than to purchase 
electricity from the grid. Figure 8-2 shows a range of possible pathways for the price of 
rooftop solar PV in Saskatchewan. The pathways differ based on the cost of financing 
(4% or 8% interest) and the rate at which solar panel costs improve (1.3%/yr or 2%/yr).69 
 
 
Figure 8-2 Residential Rooftop Solar PV Achieving Grid Parity70 
 
                                                
69 Note that 4% financing is currently available for fixed rate mortgages of 3-4 years, 
while financing for a fixed rate mortgage of 25 years is 8.75% (Royal Bank, 2015). The 
financing rates of 4% and 8% roughly approximate a homeowner financing a solar 
installment through a mortgage.  
70 Solar data is from Lazard (2014). LCOE is calculated with an annual capacity factor of 
16% and an initial 2015 capital cost of $4643/kw (2014 $CDN).  
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If solar PV costs continue to decline by 2%/yr (their current rate of cost improvement), 
then grid parity for residential customers will occur sometime between 2030 and 2040. If 
the rate of cost improvement slows to 1.3% (the rate used in SIM), solar will achieve grid 
parity between 2035 and 2050.  
 
Commercial Sector 
Commercial customers will see price increases similar to that of residential customers. 
Figure 8-3 shows the expected electricity prices for commercial customers in four 
scenarios (the same as shown for residential in Figure 8-1).  
 
 
Figure 8-3 Commercial Electricity Prices in Saskatchewan (cents/kWh) 
 
By 2050, electricity costs will have nearly doubled for commercial customers, increasing 
from the current price of 12.1 cents/kWh to 21.9 cents/kWh (SaskPower BAU), 23.7 
cents/kWh (nuclear GHG reduction), 23.9 cents/kWh (CCS GHG reduction), or 24.3 
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cents/kWh (Green Grid).71 Table 8-3 shows the impact these higher prices would have on 
the average monthly commercial electricity bill.  
 
 
Table 8-3 Average Monthly Commercial Electricity Bill 
 
In the commercial sector the impact of increasing prices is muted by improvements in 
energy efficiency. In Chapter 6 I forecast that electricity use in the commercial sector 
would decline at a rate of 1.2%/yr. This leads electricity use to about 2/3 the 2015 level 
by 2050. Additional energy conservation measures could be undertaken above and 
beyond that assumed rate of change to further control cost increases.  
 
                                                
71 These estimates of price increases do not account for uncertainty and do not include a 
carbon price. Refer to Chapter 7 for the range of potential price increases that would 
result from each scenario and to see the impact of carbon pricing.   
Commercial Bill 2015 2035 BAU 2050 BAU 2050 Green
Electricity use (kWh) 6000 4713 3932 3932
Rate (cents/kWh) 12.1 20.3 21.9 24.3
Energy cost ($) $727.54 $955.87 $862.18 $955.54
Fixed ($) $20.22 $20.22 $20.22 $20.22
Total ($) $747.76 $976.09 $882.40 $975.76
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Figure 8-4 Commercial Rooftop Solar PV Achieving Grid Parity72 
 
Like the residential sector, the commercial sector also has opportunities for self-
generation of electricity. The commercial sector faces lower costs for installing rooftop 
solar than the residential sector and will reach grid parity even sooner.73 Figure 8-4 shows 
that rooftop solar PV for commercial and institutional customers can be expected to 
achieve grid parity as early as 2030 in the scenario with low initial capital cost and cost 
improvement of 2%/yr. Even under conditions with higher capital costs and a rate of cost 
improvement of only 1.3%/yr, commercial rooftop solar PV reaches grid parity by 2045 
(Figure 8-4). 
 
 
                                                
72 Solar data is from Lazard (2014). LCOE is calculated with an annual capacity factor of 
16% and a capital cost of $3317/kw (2014 $CDN) in the low scenarios and $3980/kw in 
the high scenarios.  
73 Commercial costs are lower because projects are typically large and fixed project costs 
and overhead can be distributed over a larger number of installed solar units (Barbose and 
Darghouth, 2015).  
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The Utility Death Spiral 
For residential and commercial customers, grid parity is good news. Homeowners and 
businesses can install solar panels and shield themselves from electricity price increases. 
Price protection, for those who choose to install solar, would mean that residential 
electricity users hit a ‘peak price’ of between 20-25 cents/kWh, while commercial 
electricity users would hit a peak price of 17-23 cents/kWh (RMI, 2015).  
 
Grid parity makes utilities like SaskPower nervous. What is price protection for 
individuals is grid defection to a utility like SaskPower. When customers choose to 
generate their own electricity SaskPower loses revenue. With less revenue, SaskPower 
must raise prices to pay for their capital costs. The higher prices in turn encourage more 
customers to defect from the grid. This positive feedback loop has been called ‘The 
Utility Death Spiral’ (Ford, 1997). Figure 8-5 provides a causal loop diagram showing 
how this process unfolds. On the right side we see ‘the death spiral’ where higher prices 
have a damping effect on electricity consumption (the negative sign indicates an inverse 
relationship). Lower electricity consumption requires a higher ‘indicated price’ for 
electricity (the negative sign again indicates an inverse relationship).  
 
 
Figure 8-5 Feedback Loops in the Utility Sector (Ford, 1997: 69) 
 
Fig. 5. Key feedback
loops in the utility
system
reacted quickly and strongly to changes in the electric rate while they were stuck
with long lead time power plants under construction. Simply waiting for regulators
to grant the requested rate increases would not necessarily solve their problems. We
learned that the utility could take steps on its own to soften the impact of the “death
spiral.” The best way to improve their situation was to shorten the length of the
construction delay. This could be done by shifting investments from long lead time
generation technologies (i.e., nuclear plants or large coal plants) to short lead time
technologies (i.e., small coal plants, geothermal stations or wind machines). We
also learned that the debilitating effects of the “death spiral” would be greatly
reduced if the IOU were expanding its system to keep pace with slow growth (i.e.,
1–2 %/year) rather than the rapid growth of the “golden years.” Slower growth rates
could be achieved by utility conservation programs that would actively encourage
their customers to invest in more efficient energy equipment.
1980s: the shift to small scale
The 1980s was a decade in which utilities shifted emphasis from large power
stations with long lead times to smaller, shorter lead time resources. Table 3 notes
that the move to smaller scale was manifest in:
• the cancellation of nuclear plants;
• a shift to smaller coal plants;
Ford: System Dynamics and the Electric Power Industry 69
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The death spiral is not an inevitable outcome for Saskatchewan. As one workshop 
participant noted, grid defection leads to stranded assets; power plants that are 
underutilized or that are shut down prematurely. But, as a crown corporation, these 
stranded assets belong to the people of Saskatchewan (Workshop 1). SaskPower’s debt 
sits on the Government of Saskatchewan’s books and Saskatchewan citizens and 
businesses will have to pay for it either through electricity payments to SaskPower or 
taxes at a later date. Anticipation of the death spiral may be one reason why SaskPower 
has not implemented a policy like a feed-in-tariff that would encourage self-generation.  
 
The possibility of grid defection does point to a potential new role for SaskPower. If it 
remains a crown corporation – a state of affairs which has been challenged by past 
Saskatchewan governments such as Devine’s Progressive Conservatives in the 1980s (see 
Chapter 3) – then SaskPower may want to find a peaceable way of encouraging self-
generation. Already, SaskPower thinks of residential solar photovoltaic as a DSM 
measure. In partnership with the Ministry of Environment’s Green Initiatives Fund they 
have offered grants for small-scale residential solar projects. SaskPower also offers a 
program they call ‘net metering’ that allows households to generate electricity. However, 
the ‘net metering’ policy falls short of encouraging households to generate more than 
they need; electricity bills can reach an energy charge of zero, but households are not 
paid for generating surplus electricity. Instead they can accumulate energy ‘credits’, 
which expire if they are not used. In this way, the policy is more truly a ‘zero metering’ 
policy than a net metering policy.  
 
Further policy innovation is needed. SaskPower could encourage self-generation by 
offering low-interest financing to customers who want to install solar, or by leasing 
rooftops and installing the solar panels themselves – a business venture now being 
popularized by private companies like SolarCity. Resellers could also enter this market. 
In the City of Saskatoon and the City of Swift Current it would be possible for the 
utilities to install solar panels on a home or business and recoup the cost through property 
tax payments. When grid parity is achieved this would mean that customers who sign 
onto the program would see net savings with electricity bills falling by more than the 
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property tax bill increases. SaskPower and the Government of Saskatchewan have not 
made it easy for resellers to pursue these types of generation projects (Interview 26).  
 
In general, with electricity storage costs also falling, customers will soon have a cost-
effective means of defecting from the grid entirely. SaskPower, and the two resellers, will 
have to innovate to keep residential and commercial customers on their systems.  
 
Power Customers 
The situation for power customers is also filled with uncertainty and opportunity. The 
largest 100 customers in Saskatchewan currently pay the lowest electricity rates. They 
will also see the largest proportional increases in the rates they pay. Figure 8-6 shows 
electricity prices for the largest power customers under four scenarios: SaskPower BAU 
and three other GHG reduction scenarios.  
 
Because the large power customers do not pay for transmission costs, electricity 
generation costs compose a larger portion of the prices they pay. In all of the scenarios in 
Chapter 7 these generation costs increase and become a bigger proportion of cost for all 
customers. The large power customers currently pay prices of between 5 and 7 
cents/kWh. I estimate that, as generation costs increase, power customers could find 
themselves paying between 10.8 and 14.6 cents/kWh by 2050.  
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Figure 8-6 Large Power Customer Electricity Prices in Saskatchewan (cents/kWh) 
 
As outlined in Chapter 6, there is plenty of potential for energy conservation in the 
industrial sector. One response to higher prices will be energy conservation. Depending 
on the industry and the GHG policy environment, another response could be 
cogeneration. At the Cory potash cogeneration facility, natural gas is burned to produce 
electricity and waste heat is used in the process operations of the potash mine. As potash 
mining is set to expand across the province, opportunities for cogeneration will increase. 
Cogeneration could allow for the establishment of a price ceiling for electricity purchased 
by potash operations. If they are to survive as a corporation, SaskPower must again find a 
way to be involved. If not, cogeneration could easily become self-generation and lead to 
large customers defecting from the grid.  
 
What do higher electricity rates mean for the viability of industry in Saskatchewan? As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, while the potash industry is a big electricity user, payments to 
labour are about five times higher than payments for electricity. Payments for natural gas 
are also higher than payments for electricity. With a high use of natural gas the potash 
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industry is well suited for natural gas fired cogeneration. Figure 8-7 shows payments for 
electricity, natural gas, labour, and operating surplus for Canada’s potash industry from 
2001 to 2011.  
 
 
(Statistics Canada, 2001-2011) 
Figure 8-7 Payments for Inputs in the Potash Sector (current dollars) 
 
That electricity prices will nearly double in the coming decades will surely concern the 
industry. Assuming that labour costs do not also increase, it would mean that payments 
for electricity become 40% the cost of labour rather than 20%. Electricity in most years 
was, however, between 2.4% (2011) and 8.9% (2003) of operating surplus or profit for 
the industry. While painful, an electricity price increase would not be fatal to the 
industry.  
 
There are other industries in Saskatchewan that are more electricity intensive than potash 
mining. Table 8-4 provides a breakdown of the most electricity intensive industries in 
Canada. I divide electricity by gross output to get a sense of the proportion of input 
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payments spent on electricity in each industry. The table is sorted from most to least 
electricity intensive.  
 
 
(Source: Statistics Canada, 2011) 
Table 8-4 Electricity Intensive Industries in Canada (2011) 
 
Several of these industries operate in Saskatchewan including crude oil and pipeline 
transportation, chemical manufacturing, animal production, pesticide and fertilizer 
manufacturing, and potash mining. Universities also appear as fairly intensive users of 
electricity. The question for Saskatchewan is, will companies shut down or relocate due 
to an increase in electricity costs? Arguably companies in the oil sector and potash 
mining sector are less likely to leave because they operate where the oil and the potash is 
Electricity
Gross	
Output
Electricity	/	
Gross	
Output
Wages,	Salary,	
Supplementary	
Income
Electricity	/	
Labour
Pulp,	paper	and	paperboard	mills 1559 18033 8.6% 3328 46.8%
Crude	oil	and	other	pipeline	transportation 216 4466 4.8% 465 46.5%
Non-metallic	mineral	product	manufacturing	(except	
cement	and	concrete	products) 148 5004 3.0% 1372 10.8%
Religious	organizations 159 5396 2.9% 2618 6.1%
Basic	chemical	manufacturing 515 17594 2.9% 1180 43.6%
Arts,	entertainment	and	recreation 49 1905 2.6% 685 7.2%
Animal	production 594 23276 2.6% 1784 33.3%
Other	aboriginal	government	services 176 7310 2.4% 2980 5.9%
Other	non-metallic	mineral	mining	and	quarrying	(except	
diamond	and	potash) 29 1257 2.3% 244 11.9%
Dry	cleaning	and	laundry	services 52 2263 2.3% 703 7.4%
RV	(recreational	vehicle)	parks,	recreational	camps,	and	
rooming	and	boarding	houses 50 2315 2.2% 788 6.3%
Grant-making,	civic,	and	professional	and	similar	
organizations 277 12910 2.1% 5811 4.8%
Coal	mining 159 7616 2.1% 789 20.2%
Pesticide,	fertilizer	and	other	agricultural	chemical	
manufacturing 104 5062 2.1% 504 20.6%
Other	municipal	government	services 1461 71962 2.0% 29815 4.9%
Cement	and	concrete	product	manufacturing 168 9151 1.8% 1945 8.6%
Automotive	repair	and	maintenance 188 10555 1.8% 4270 4.4%
Potash	mining 120 8502 1.4% 723 16.6%
Non-conventional	oil	extraction 715 54026 1.3% 3088 23.2%
Sand,	gravel,	clay,	and	ceramic	and	refractory	minerals	
mining	and	quarrying 20 1593 1.3% 313 6.4%
Bakeries	and	tortilla	manufacturing 97 8023 1.2% 2014 4.8%
Other	chemical	product	manufacturing 57 4861 1.2% 826 6.9%
Offices	of	dentists 161 13788 1.2% 3821 4.2%
Metalworking	machinery	manufacturing 43 3752 1.1% 1410 3.0%
Household	and	institutional	furniture	and	kitchen	
cabinet	manufacturing 62 5524 1.1% 1963 3.2%
Social	assistance 92 8313 1.1% 5827 1.6%
Universities 356 36430 1.0% 17324 2.1%
Local	credit	unions 73 7584 1.0% 3354 2.2%
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located. In industries like chemical manufacturing, however, companies may relocate to 
locations where electricity is less expensive (Interview 5).  
 
The impact of rate increases will also depend on whether an industry is trade-exposed. 
Trade-exposed industries compete in international markets and cannot pass costs along to 
their customers. A good example of a trade-exposed company is the Evraz Steel mill 
operating in Regina, Saskatchewan. In their 2014 submission to the Saskatchewan Rate 
Review Panel (SRRP) – the body that arbitrates decisions about utility rates for 
Saskatchewan crown corporations – Evraz laid out their circumstances, 
 
EVRAZ Regina Steel is the largest steel company in Western Canada. It is 
also one of the largest private sector employers in Regina with 1200 
employees and spends over $135 million per year on local purchases of 
goods and services.  
 
The steel industry operates in a highly competitive market on a regional, 
North American Continent and global level. We currently face stiff 
competition from domestic producers and imported product from 
international steel companies. The Regina facility also competes with other 
EVRAZ global production facilities for investment capital which is based 
on earnings and return on investment. This requires the Regina plant to 
maximize operational efficiency and minimize costs on an on-going basis.  
 
Our manufacturing processes are highly energy intensive. Next to raw 
materials, electricity costs are the next highest cost in producing our steel. 
As a result of competitive pressures, increases in power costs cannot be 
passed on to our customers. Consequently, increases in power costs have a 
direct impact on our bottom line. The EVRAZ Regina location has had a 
freight advantage in the northern part of the continent, which has kept us 
competitive against other steel companies in North America and globally. 
However, this advantage is being eroded by past increases in power costs. 
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SaskPower’s latest application will further diminish this competitive 
advantage which is very concerning to us. A decreasing competitive 
advantage lowers demand for our product which ultimately has an adverse 
trickledown effect on our company’s employees and the demand for local 
goods and services. We urge the SRRP to carefully evaluate the proposed 
increases in light of its potentially serious impacts on industrial 
competitiveness in Saskatchewan.  
(Evraz, 2014) 
 
The electricity costs faced by industrial customers are dependent on the level of energy 
conservation that is pursued. Table 8-5 shows the potential electricity bill implications of 
the SaskPower BAU scenario and the 2050 Greening the Grid scenario. The Green 
scenario relies on large amounts of energy conservation and lowers the impact of higher 
electricity rates. In this example energy costs double between 2015 and 2050 in the BAU 
scenario, and increase by a factor of 2.3 in the Greening the Grid scenario. If aggressive 
energy conservation measures are taken then the final energy costs in the Greening the 
Grid scenario are 17% higher than that of the SaskPower BAU scenario.  
 
 
Table 8-5 Average Monthly Power Customer Electricity Bill 
 
With millions of dollars at stake, it is likely that the Saskatchewan Industrial Electricity 
Consumers Association (SIECA), the public voice of the large power users, will lobby 
against any proposals that increase energy costs for their customers. With high potential 
for conservation in the industrial sector SaskPower might reasonably respond by 
increasing DSM programming for that sector.  
 
Power Customer 2015 2035 BAU 2050 BAU 2050 Green
Electricity use (MWh) 77,851          77,851            77,851            77,851         
DSM savings (%) 0% 0% 0% 25%
Net demand (MWh) 77,851          77,851            77,851            58,030         
Rate ($/MWh) $54 $100 $108 $169
Energy cost ($) $4,172,274 $7,806,115 $8,371,832 $9,784,442
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Employment Impacts 
There have been a number of studies into the employment implications of expanding 
renewable energy production. Often these studies are conducted in the context of a 
specific policy proposal such as Ontario’s Green Energy and Economy Act and related 
feed-in-tariff for renewable electricity. The outcomes of these studies are related to the 
methodological approach (and embedded ideology) applied to the analysis (see Winfield 
and Dolter, 2014).  
 
Studies that use a Leontief multiplier analysis show that jobs will increase when 
increasing renewable energy investment (e.g. Pollin and Garrett-Peltier, 2009). The 
Leontief approach measures the direct jobs that result from manufacturing, installing, 
operating and maintaining renewable energy facilities. It also measures the indirect jobs 
that are associated with the production of intermediate inputs to the manufacture of 
renewables, as well as the inputs to those manufacturing processes, and the inputs to 
those, and so on. A Leontief analysis documents the entire chain of economic activity that 
must occur in order for renewable technologies to be built and installed. Using a 
multiplier approach these studies show that the jobs total exceeds the direct jobs created 
(for a good review of Leontief analysis see Miller and Blair, 2009).  
 
There are two things missing from a Leontief analysis. The first is an acknowledgement 
that if a renewable electricity pathway costs more than a business-as-usual pathway then 
the higher electricity prices can reduce economic activity. Money spent on paying for 
electricity will be diverted away from investment and consumption in other sectors of the 
economy. Böhringer et al. (2012) used CGE modelling to predict a net increase in 
unemployment resulting from Ontario’s feed-in-tariff for renewable energy. Hillebrand et 
al. (2006) use an econometric model to study Germany’s feed-in-tariff. They find that the 
initial investment into renewable energy generates new jobs, but the impact of higher 
prices reduces jobs in later years. In total, Hillebrand (2006) forecast a net job loss of 
6000 by 2010 due to the German feed-in-tariff.  
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In papers published afterwards, Böhringer and Rivers independently point out that the 
employment effects of a feed-in-tariff for renewables will depend on factors like the level 
of the subsidy (Böhringer et al., 2013) the mobility of capital (Rivers, 2014), and the 
share of labour costs in the production of renewable energy (Rivers, 2014). Rivers (2014) 
concludes that renewable energy subsidies like a feed-in-tariff can create jobs “when the 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is low, when capital is not mobile 
internationally, and when the labor intensity of renewable generation is high relative to 
conventional generation” (p. 1). He goes on to say that in any case the impact on 
employment is “very small” and “the focus of debate around such policies should shift 
from employment impacts to other more relevant metrics” (Rivers, 2014: 18).  
 
The second thing missing from a Leontief analysis is a sense of the counter-factual; how 
many jobs would have been created by meeting electricity demand in another manner? 
What if more natural gas plants had been built instead of more wind turbines? What if 
more had been spent on energy conservation? Jobs are created any time money is spent 
on investment and new business activity. Of interest to Saskatchewan is the question, 
how many jobs are created in the province for each electricity pathway?  
 
Wei et al. (2010) provide some numbers to help answer that question. They conduct a 
meta-analysis of job studies to understand the jobs created by investing in various 
electricity generation technologies. The job numbers provided by Wei et al. (2010) 
include jobs generated in the construction, installation and manufacturing of the 
technologies, the operations and maintenance of facilities, and fuel processing for 
technologies like natural gas-fired and coal-fired generation. The job calculations are 
converted to a measure of job-years per GWh electricity by considering the capacity 
factors and expected lifetime of each technology. I revise the Wei et al. (2010) numbers 
using the capacity factors and expected lifetime values from SIM. The resulting job 
multipliers are presented in Table 8-6. I then use these factors to analyze the seven 
scenarios presented in Chapter 7. The results for each time-step are presented in Table 8-
7.  
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Table 8-6 Job Multiplier Factors 
 
Solar photovoltaics stand out in Table 8-6 as the largest job creator per GWh electricity 
generated. This is for three reasons, one positive and two less so. The first is that 
installing solar photovoltaics is labour-intensive. This means that labour costs are a 
higher proportion of total costs. The second, and a less positive reason, is because solar is 
more expensive and so more investment is needed to install each megawatt. The third 
reason is because solar has a capacity factor of 16% in Saskatchewan, which requires 
more megawatts to be installed to generate the same amount of electricity as other 
technologies (Croucher, 2011). On these last two points, it is useful to remember that, 
while job creation makes for good politics, labour is also a cost of production. The same 
can be said for coal and natural gas fired plants equipped with CCS. The CCS process 
adds additional jobs and additional costs to generation from those technologies.  
 
I assume that energy conservation creates .15 job-years/GWh saved. Typically, energy 
conservation job creation numbers are much higher. The higher numbers come, in large 
part, from induced employment. These are jobs in other sectors that result when 
electricity customers save money by conserving electricity and then spend it elsewhere in 
the economy. Since customers will be paying more for electricity, without conservation 
these induced effects will be negative; customers will have less money to spend 
elsewhere. Since I do not count the lost spending due to higher prices, I truncate the 
conservation job numbers and do not include induced effects from energy conservation. 
Generation Technology
Job-years/ 
GWh
Biomass 0.23
Coal 0.14
Coal CCS 0.36
Natural gas combined cycle 0.12
Natural gas simple cycle (peaking) 0.12
Natural gas CCS 0.35
Hydro 0.26
Wind 0.18
Solar - Photovoltaic 1.26
Small Modular Nuclear Reactor 0.18
Conservation 0.15
Electricity Storage Capacity 0.15
Adapted from Wei et al. (2010)
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The values in Table 8-6 assume static job multipliers, which is a limitation of the input-
output approach (Lambert and Silva, 2012). We should expect these multipliers to 
change. For example, as solar costs decline over time, labour costs and job multipliers 
will fall. The multipliers also include manufacturing and indirect jobs created in the 
manufacturing process, which might not be representative of jobs created in 
Saskatchewan. Currently, Saskatchewan is home to a Hitachi plant, which manufactures 
power generation equipment that is used within the province, including the turbine and 
generator used for the Boundary Dam CCS facility (Hitachi, 2011) (See Figure 8-8). 
 
  
(Source: Waldner, 2014) 
Figure 8-8 Inside the Hitachi Manufacturing Plant 
 
Whether Saskatchewan will be an attractive place to manufacture other power generation 
equipment remains to be seen. Within Canada, Ontario has the first-mover advantage. 
The Green Energy and Economy Act – including the local content requirement, which 
was subsequently struck down by the World Trade Organization (WTO) – helped Ontario 
develop a renewable energy manufacturing base in the province. This makes it more 
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difficult to imagine Saskatchewan becoming a manufacturing centre for solar and wind 
technologies. In general, the job multiplier numbers should be seen as rough estimates 
that may change depending on local circumstances in Saskatchewan. With those caveats 
we can compare employment by scenario (Table 8-7).  
 
 
Table 8-7 Job-Years for Seven Scenarios 
 
The numbers in Table 8-7 are calculated using the job multiplier factors from Table 8-6. 
They are based on the expected number of jobs per GWh electricity production for each 
technology. In 2050, the interprovincial scenario posts the lowest job numbers. This is 
because of the large proportion of electricity imported from Manitoba Hydro. Though 
there may be spillover job creation benefits if Manitoba Hydro builds the Conawapa 
project, I assume that Saskatchewan job creation is negligible for electricity imported 
from out of province. The domestic renewable scenario creates the most job-years in the 
2050 time-step. This is due to high investment in solar photovoltaics. The CCS scenario 
and Greening the Grid scenarios are next in line. The CCS scenario edges out the 
Greening the Grid scenario because all of the generation is domestic. In the Greening the 
Grid scenario, the loss of in-province jobs due to Manitoba Hydro imports is balanced by 
jobs in solar, wind and electricity storage.  
 
What all of these scenarios have to contend with is the reality of lost coal jobs. Coal 
mining in Saskatchewan employs 536 people: 167 at the Poplar River site and 367 at 
Estevan (Westmoreland, 2015b). In SaskPower’s BAU scenario Poplar River will be 
closed in 2030 and this will have a devastating impact on the local economies of 
Coronach (pop. 711; Statistics Canada, 2011) and Willowbunch (pop. 286). Unless 
alterative investments are made in the region, the loss of 167 coal mining jobs and the 
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
SaskPower BAU 4,038     4,296     4,840     5,209     5,415     5,760     6,585     6,484     
Equivalency 4,038     4,502     4,362     4,840     5,053     5,398     5,902     6,417     
Inter-provincial 3,781     4,121     4,371     4,625     4,843     4,854     5,083     5,727     
Nuclear 3,781     4,121     4,301     4,625     4,843     5,525     6,458     7,191     
CCS 3,781     4,121     4,301     4,625     4,843     5,609     7,118     8,647     
Domestic Renewable 3,781     4,121     4,240     4,649     5,103     5,941     6,614     13,173   
Greening the Grid 3,781     4,781     4,947     4,702     5,148     7,754     8,007     8,419     
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130 employees at the Poplar River plant will send this region into the downward spiral 
that characterizes much of rural Saskatchewan.  
 
Many of the coal-related jobs at Estevan (pop. 11,000, Statistics Canada, 2011) would be 
protected if the coal-fired plants were retrofit with CCS. This is the plan for Boundary 
Dam units IV and V in the SaskPower BAU scenario. Shand will continue operating out 
to 2045 as a conventional coal plant and may be retrofit at that time to comply with the 
federal coal-fired regulation.  
  
The alternative pathways do not involve coal-fired plants with CCS. Even the scenario I 
have called the ‘CCS scenario’ relies on natural gas plants with CCS in order reduce 
GHG emissions; coal is phased out when Shand closes in 2045. These alternative 
scenarios may be viewed as a threat to the coal mining regions of Estevan/Bienfait and 
Coronach/Willowbunch.  
 
Yet Table 8-7 shows that there are employment opportunities in all of the scenarios. The 
question is, will the coal miners find work, close to home, building and operating another 
electricity generation technology? Strategic planning could make this possible. Estevan is 
the sunniest place in the province (and one of the sunniest in Canada) and strategic 
investment in a Greening the Grid scenario could shift the workforce away from coal and 
towards solar. This would be as much a cultural shift as a technological shift. Coal 
mining has a long history in the province and has helped to form the identity of the 
southeast region.74  
 
Environmental Impacts 
The goal of this dissertation has been to understand pathways to reduce GHG emissions 
in the Saskatchewan electricity sector. The seven scenarios outlined in Chapter 7 provide 
                                                
74 In an historic event in 1931, coal miners were protesting for the right to form a union 
of their choice. The RCMP opened fire on a union rally in Estevan killing three and 
wounding many others. A monument to the miners was erected in Bienfait that reads 
“Lest We Forget. Murdered in Estevan, Sept 29, 1931 by RCMP”. The monument still 
remains, as does the proud coal culture of the region (Endicott, 2002). 
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alternatives and have unique GHG emissions profiles, especially from a cumulative 
perspective. I outline the cumulative GHG profiles in this section. As discussed above, 
there are multiple sustainability criteria that should be considered when comparing 
scenarios. I look at two indicators that can inform the criterion of ecological integrity: 
land impacted (especially by wind and solar installations) and water used. I also look at 
one indicator that can inform the ‘precaution’ (Winfield et al., 2010) and ‘public health 
and safety’ (White and Noble, 2012) sustainability criteria: radioactive waste produced.  
 
Cumulative GHGs  
As I mentioned in Chapter 7 climate change is not a problem of annual flows of GHG 
emissions, but is caused by the excessive stock of CO2 and other GHGs in the 
atmosphere. Each tonne emitted in Saskatchewan adds to this global stock. Table 8-8 
shows the net GHG emissions from the Saskatchewan electricity sector (in Megatonnes 
CO2e) released to the atmosphere in each 5-year period, as well as the cumulative total 
from 2015 to 2050.75  
 
 
Table 8-8 GHGs Released to the Atmosphere by Scenario 
 
Early action to reach near-zero emissions in the Greening the Grid scenario significantly 
reduces cumulative emissions by 2050; this scenario releases 50% less GHGs to the 
atmosphere by 2050 than SaskPower’s BAU scenario. This would be a celebrated 
achievement and would place Saskatchewan in a GHG reduction leadership position. Of 
the four scenarios that achieve a GHG reduction of 80% below 2015 levels by 2050, the 
domestic renewable scenario achieves the lowest level of cumulative GHG emissions. In 
                                                
75 I assume that annual GHG emissions for each time-step are representative of average 
annual GHG emissions for the five-year period and multiply by five to get the time-step 
total.  
Net GHGs (Mt CO2e/5-yr) 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Cumulative 
(Mt CO2e)
SaskPower BAU 71.1       73.4       64.2       39.5       42.3       42.9       40.0       44.2       418
Equivalency 71.1       70.0       64.2       39.8       42.7       43.0       40.0       44.2       415
Inter-provincial 71.1       64.4       69.9       46.0       49.4       41.5       22.2       15.3       380
Nuclear 71.1       64.4       72.7       46.0       49.4       44.2       24.9       15.3       388
CCS 71.1       64.4       72.7       46.0       49.4       42.0       23.8       15.3       385
Domestic Renewable 71.1       64.4       66.8       39.3       38.8       30.2       21.1       7.4        339
Greening the Grid 71.1       55.3       53.8       10.6       8.6        0.5        0.5        0.5        201
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this scenario I allow wind to generate a higher percentage of electricity. Increased 
expansion of wind lowers GHG emissions in the earlier time-steps and lowers the 
cumulative total. From the perspective of climate change mitigation, the pathway to 
achieving a reduction target is as important as achieving the target itself. The Greening 
the Grid scenario and domestic renewable scenario are low-emission pathways to 
reaching a 2050 GHG reduction target.  
 
With the inclusion of carbon capture and storage (CCS) options, it is also useful to look 
at the cumulative stock of captured CO2 that would result by 2050. Table 8-9 shows the 
cumulative captured GHGs (Mt CO2e) that result in each scenario. The equivalency, 
inter-provincial, nuclear, and domestic renewable scenarios contain captured GHGs from 
Boundary Dam III alone. SaskPower’s BAU scenario adds captured GHGs from 
Boundary Dam IV and V as well as Shand in the 2050 time-step. The CCS scenario 
includes natural gas with CCS in the 2045 and 2050 time-step, as does the Greening the 
Grid scenario.  
 
 
Table 8-9 Cumulative Captured CO2 by Scenario 
 
Table 8-10 outlines the volume of space that would be required to store this CO2 
underground, assuming that one tonne of CO2 required 556.2 meters cubed (m3) of 
volume for storage (ICBE, 2015).  
 
Cumulative Captured GHGs 
(Mt CO2e) 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
SaskPower BAU 5         10       25       40       54       63       80       88       
Equivalency 5         10       15       20       24       24       24       24       
Inter-provincial 5         10       15       20       24       24       24       24       
Nuclear 5         10       15       20       24       24       24       24       
CCS 5         10       15       20       24       24       34       54       
Domestic Renewable 5         10       15       20       24       24       24       24       
Greening the Grid 5         12       18       25       32       37       41       45       
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Table 8-10 Cumulative Storage Required for Captured CO2 
 
There is likely adequate space for the 49 cubic kilometres of captured CO2 in the deep 
saline aquifers below Saskatchewan. This is not a pressing concern. The calculations do, 
however, highlight that storage is a continually increasing challenge in a CCS focused 
scenario.  
 
Land Impact 
One critique made against wind and solar energy is that they have a low “energy density” 
compared to technologies like nuclear energy (van Kooten, 2011). This means that more 
land area is required to produce a given amount of electricity. The United States National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) has estimated the land requirements for wind 
(NREL, 2009) and solar (NREL, 2013). These are presented in Table 8-11 below.  
 
 
Table 8-11 Land-use Factors for Wind and Solar Energy Installations76 
 
Where energy density is most relevant is in places where land is scarce. This is not the 
case in Saskatchewan, which has a low population density throughout the province (see 
Figure 4-3). However, it is worth understanding the geographic spread of renewables in 
                                                
76 For wind I average the high-end estimates of total impact for wind turbines located in 
areas of grasslands (high-end 52.4 ha/MW) and small grain farming (high-end 32.2 
ha/MW). Actual impacted land area may be less.  
Cumulative CO2 storage 
volume required (km3) 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
SaskPower BAU 3 6 14 22 30 35 44 49
Equivalency 3 6 8 11 13 13 13 13
Inter-provincial 3 6 8 11 13 13 13 13
Nuclear 3 6 8 11 13 13 13 13
CCS 3 6 8 11 13 13 19 30
Domestic Renewable 3 6 8 11 13 13 13 13
Greening the Grid 3 6 10 14 18 20 23 25
Land-use factors
Hectares/ 
MWac
Wind 42.3       
Solar photovoltaic (> 20 MW) 3.2         
Solar thermal CSP 4.0         
(NREL, 2009; NREL, 2013)
 251 
the various scenarios since the amount of impacted land may be a useful proxy for the 
likelihood of siting conflicts. Table 8-12 presents the land use from wind and solar in 
each of the scenarios. For ease of interpretation, hectares have been converted to sections; 
much of southern Saskatchewan is divided into sections, 1 mile x 1 mile square, and grid 
roads dissect the province at this spacing.  
 
  
Table 8-12 Wind and Solar Land Use by Scenario (Sections)77 
 
The two domestic renewable and Greening the Grid scenarios have the highest area of 
land impacted by wind and solar. In the domestic renewable scenario wind generates 40% 
of electricity in 2050 and solar generates 13%. A total of 825 sections would be impacted 
by this electricity mix. In the Greening the Grid scenario, wind generates 35% of 
electricity in 2050 and solar generates 4%. A total of 681 sections would be impacted by 
this mix.78 This is equal to 1.2% of the area of the province seeded in 2014 (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 2015).  
 
To put this in perspective, the Estevan/Bienfait coalmines are currently licensed to impact 
20,331 hectares (ha) or 78 sections, and the Poplar River/Willowbunch coalmines are 
licensed to impact 7,488 ha or 29 sections, which means that in total, coal operations are 
licensed to impact 107 sections of land. In the Coronach area, reclamation work has been 
                                                
77 A section is equivalent to 640 acres or 260 hectares.  
78 In 2012, cropland in Saskatchewan could be leased for about $23,000/section 
(Insightrix, 2012). If these costs prevailed, the Greening the Grid scenario would result in 
land lease agreements of approximately $15.6 million. For land impacted by wind part of 
the land costs could be made up by cropping or grazing cattle in the project area. From 
the perspective of electricity generation costs, these land leases would add .09/MWh or 
.0009 cents/kWh to the cost of wind-generated electricity.  
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
SaskPower BAU 65 90 127 184 204 221 239 281
Equivalency 65 65 64 169 189 303 376 457
Inter-provincial 65 80 129 182 240 304 376 457
Nuclear 65 80 76 182 240 304 376 457
CCS 65 80 76 182 240 304 376 457
Domestic Renewable 65 80 76 273 348 507 627 825
Greening the Grid 65 80 186 303 385 488 588 681
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done to restore impacted land back to agricultural quality (Interview 19). In the Estevan 
area there are still old coalmines in need of reclamation (Interview 19).  
 
It should be noted that measures of land impacted by wind and solar consist of direct 
impacts associated with physical infrastructure such as roads, turbines, solar arrays, 
transmission lines, as well land that is indirectly associated with the project area. Direct 
land impacts are about 1/100th of the total impacted land area for wind (NREL, 2009). 
Turbines are 10% of that total (or 1/1000th), while roads make up 79% of the direct 
impacts of wind (NREL, 2009). This means that much of the impacted land is still 
available for cropping or grazing. This agricultural activity just so happens to occur in the 
midst of a wind farm.  
 
Water Impact 
Saskatchewan is a semi-arid region. Drought is always a threat and water is precious. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, drought has impacted the coal-fired electricity sector in the past 
(Maathuis and van der Kamp, 2011). Table 8-13 shows the water requirements of the 
electricity generation technologies included in my analysis. These indicators are the 
median values for each technology in a 2011 NREL study (NREL, 2011). Nuclear power 
plants and natural gas combined cycle plants are the greatest water users. Hydroelectric 
facilities (which use water and then release it downstream) also have large water 
requirements.  
 
I use these indicators to analyze the water impacts of the seven scenarios from Chapter 7. 
The results are presented in Table 8-14 in terms of Gigalitres per year (billion litres per 
year) and in Table 8-15 in terms of thousands of Olympic sized swimming pools (a 
perhaps more intuitive figure; each Olympic swimming pool contains 2.5 Megalitres of 
water). 
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Table 8-13 Water Impact Indicators 
 
As a word of caution, these water impacts include consumption and withdrawals, but they 
do not indicate changes in water quality. Ontario’s nuclear plants routinely release tritium 
into Lake Ontario (Winfield et al., 2006). Tables 8-14 and 8-15 do not capture this 
qualitative impact on water. These figures also only include direct water impacts. The 
water impact of coal mining, natural gas extraction, and uranium mining is not included, 
and neither is the water impact of manufacturing processes required to create the 
electricity generation equipment. This means these numbers are an incomplete measure 
of water impact, but they are a useful measure of drought resilience. They can be used to 
determine, once a given scenario is in place, how vulnerable it is to drought conditions. 
 
 
Table 8-14 Water Impact by Scenario (Gigalitres/yr) 
Generation Technology
Biomass
Coal
Coal CCS
Natural gas combined cycle
Natural gas simple cycle (peaking)
Natural gas CCS
Hydro
Wind
Solar - Photovoltaic
Solar - Thermal CSP
Small Modular Nuclear Reactor
Conservation
Electricity Storage Capacity
Source: NREL (2011)
Type
Water 
Consumption 
(L/MWh)
Water 
Withdrawals 
(L/MWh)
Total 
(L/MWh)
Steam pond 1,476 1,703 3,180       
Generic pond 2,063 2,063       
subcritical with 
CCS 3,202 3,202       
Pond 908 22,523 23,432     
Pond 908 22,523 23,432     
Tower combined 
cycle with CCS 1,431 1,878 3,308       
Aggregated In-
stream and 
Reservoir 17,000 17,000     
0 -          
98 98           
Trough dry 295 295         
Pond 26,687 26,687     
-          
-          
Water Impact (Gigalitre/yr) 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
SaskPower BAU 295 334 366 464 500 543 600 668
Equivalency 303 325 363 458 494 501 592 590
Inter-provincial 285 326 397 471 515 506 484 481
Nuclear 285 326 429 471 515 517 526 552
CCS 285 326 429 471 515 490 419 333
Domestic Renewable 285 326 471 508 532 467 392 253
Greening the Grid 285 277 292 349 343 289 288 289
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Table 8-15 Water Impact by Scenario (thousands of Olympic sized pools/yr) 
 
The renewable focused scenarios appear most resilient to drought, although losing 
hydroelectric capacity would make the variability of wind and solar energy more difficult 
to manage. The CCS approach is next in line. Table 8-13 contained natural gas CCS 
factors that were lower than conventional combined cycle factors. This is due to the 
assumption that a cooling tower is used. Water requirements increase substantially if 
cooling ponds or once-through cooling systems are used. The SaskPower BAU scenario 
appears to be the biggest water user. In this scenario, combined cycle natural gas plants 
require a great deal of cooling water. It should also be noted that drought is a particular 
concern for nuclear power plants, which require a steady supply of cooling water to avoid 
catastrophic nuclear meltdown.  
 
High-Level Radioactive Waste 
Only two scenarios contain small, modular nuclear reactors. These scenarios create an 
environmental impact wholly unlike the others. Nuclear reactors create intermediate and 
high-level radioactive waste. High-level radioactive wastes like plutonium must be 
managed and contained for stretches of time beyond the human imagination (i.e. one 
million years, one hundred times longer than the history of human civilization see 
Winfield et al., 2006). Siting nuclear waste facilities generates conflict. The Yucca 
Mountain site in the United States was a matter of contention and the nuclear waste 
storage project has now been cancelled. Proposals to store nuclear waste in northern 
Saskatchewan led to a high-profile protest walk by northern residents in the summer of 
2011. These residents walked 800 kilometers from their home community to the 
Saskatchewan legislative building. They gathered water from lakes and rivers on their 
Water Impact (1000 Olympic 
Swimming Pools/yr) 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
SaskPower BAU 118 134 147 186 200 217 240 267
Equivalency 121 130 145 183 197 200 237 236
Inter-provincial 114 130 159 189 206 202 194 193
Nuclear 114 130 172 189 206 207 210 221
CCS 114 130 172 189 206 196 167 133
Domestic Renewable 114 130 189 203 213 187 157 101
Greening the Grid 114 111 117 139 137 115 115 116
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journey and presented it in front of the legislative building, reminding southern residents 
that water, and its attendant pollutants, unites the province. Table 8-16 shows the quantity 
of high-level nuclear waste that would result from the inter-provincial scenario and the 
nuclear scenario.  
 
 
Table 8-16 High-Level Radioactive Waste 
 
Quantity is, however, a poor measure of the risks posed by nuclear waste. Even a very 
small amount of plutonium is dangerous. The choice to embark down the path of nuclear 
power has been rejected once by the people of Saskatchewan. It should not be taken 
lightly, and it should be compared in detail to alternative scenarios that do not pose the 
risk of catastrophic nuclear accident, routine radiation releases, occupational hazard, and 
long-lived waste products that must be isolated from human systems for millennia. 
  
Contributions to a Sustainability Assessment 
The indicators I have outlined in this chapter can contribute to a sustainability assessment 
of scenarios for Saskatchewan’s electricity future. Below I review the indicators and 
comment on what they say about relevant sustainability criterion. First, I reproduce Table 
8-1 to highlight the cost differences between the scenarios.  
 
Projected Cost 
The expected electricity costs and total discounted project costs range from the lows of 
the BAU equivalent scenario to the highs of the Domestic Renewable and Greening the 
Grid scenario. The relative cost are, however, dependent on carbon pricing policy. An 
escalating carbon price leads the Greening the Grid scenario to be roughly equivalent in 
High-level radioactive waste 
(cumulative tonnes) 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
SaskPower BAU -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      
Equivalency -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      
Inter-provincial -      -      -      -      -      -      -      28       
Nuclear -      -      -      -      -      -      67       232      
CCS -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      
Domestic Renewable -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      
Greening the Grid -      -      -      -      -      -      -      -      
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expected cost to the SaskPower BAU scenario and the four 80% GHG reduction 
scenarios (Table 8-17).  
 
 
Table 8-17 Financial Cost Comparison 
 
Other costs are relevant to particular scenarios. The nuclear scenario poses a unique 
decommissioning hazard and those costs are worth detailing as they are not included in 
the discounted costs listed above. Radioactive components of a nuclear facility include 
“spent fuel, and parts of the plant and machinery that have been exposed to radiation” 
(Winfield et al., 2006: 75). These components are so radioactive that nuclear power 
plants are often shutdown for five to ten years before decommissioning begins to allow 
the radioactivity to decrease (Winfield et al., 2006: 75). Estimates of nuclear 
decommissioning costs range from 15% to 25% of the original capital cost (Boccard, 
2014). In the inter-provincial and nuclear scenarios SaskPower would be required to set 
aside funds to pay for the decommissioning of small, modular nuclear reactors (Table 8-
18). This increases the discounted value of the inter-provincial scenario by between $57-
Financial Cost Comparison
Scenario
SaskPower 
BAU 
BAU 
Equivalent
Inter-
provincial Nuclear CCS
Domestic 
Renewable
Greening 
the Grid
Electricity Cost in 2050 
(cents/kWh 2014 $CAN) 11.6        11.2        12.6        12.7        13.2        13.7        13.6        
Electricity Cost in 2050 95% 
C.I. (cents/kWh 2014 $CAN) 12.1          11.7          13.4          13.4          13.6          14.0          14.3          
Electricity Cost in 2050 5% 
C.I. (cents/kWh 2014 $CAN) 11.1          10.8          11.9          12.2          12.8          13.4          12.9          
Total discounted cost mean 
(million 2014 $CAN) 67,091    62,467    68,173    67,037    67,618    69,477    76,368    
Total discounted cost 95% 
C.I. (million 2014 $CAN) 68,285       63,515       69,767       68,374       68,876       70,729       78,848       
Total discounted cost 5% C.I. 
(million 2014 $CAN) 65,930       61,426       66,641       65,689       66,387       68,243       74,105       
Total discounted cost mean 
(million 2014 $CAN) 73,863    69,158    74,745    73,752    74,286    75,379    79,551    
Total discounted cost 95% 
C.I. (million 2014 $CAN) 75,024       70,323       76,370       75,069       75,537       76,545       81,951       
Total discounted cost 5% C.I. 
(million 2014 $CAN) 72,722       68,008       73,156       72,535       73,085       74,061       77,387       
Total discounted cost mean 
(million 2014 $CAN) 80,672    75,984    80,450    79,659    80,091    79,985    80,681    
Total discounted cost 95% 
C.I. (million 2014 $CAN) 81,836       77,056       82,098       81,045       81,291       81,224       83,133       
Total discounted cost 5% C.I. 
(million 2014 $CAN) 79,463       74,929       78,846       78,445       78,833       78,765       78,415       
Projected Cost
Discounted Project Cost
Project Cost with Constant Carbon Price ($30/tonne CO2e)
Project Cost with Escalating Carbon Price ($15/tonne CO2e in 2015 escalating by $15/time-step)
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95 million and the nuclear scenario by $306-510 million (2014 $CAN). The relative 
ranking of the nuclear scenario, based on project costs, changes at the higher level of 
decommissioning costs.  
 
 
Table 8-18 Nuclear Decommissioning Costs 
 
Intragenerational Impacts 
Increased electricity costs will impact electricity customers in Saskatchewan. Higher cost 
scenarios lead to correspondingly higher rates. These rates can pose hardship for low-
income households and households on fixed incomes (e.g. seniors). Commercial 
customers will also see the electricity rates impact their bottom line. Scenarios that lower 
GHG emissions increase rates relative to the SaskPower BAU scenario (Table 8-19). 
Energy conservation programs aimed at low-income households and vulnerable 
businesses can provide a means of reducing the impact of higher rates.  
  
Scenario
SaskPower 
BAU 
BAU 
Equivalent
Inter-
provincial Nuclear CCS
Domestic 
Renewable
Greening 
the Grid
Installed Nuclear Capacity 
2050 (MW) -          -          209         1,220      -          -          -          
Total Capital Cost for nuclear 
(million 2014 $CAN) -          -          1,927      10,372    -          -          -          
Decommissioning @ 15% 
(million 2014 $CAN) -          -          289         1,556      -          -          -          
Decommissioning @ 25% 
(million 2014 $CAN) -          -          482         2,593      -          -          -          
Decommissioning @ 15% 
discounted from 2070 @ 3% 
(million 2014 $CAN) -          -          57           306         -          -          -          
Decommissioning @ 25% 
discounted from 2070 @ 3% 
(million 2014 $CAN) -          -          95           510         -          -          -          
Total discounted cost mean 
with 15% nuclear liability  
(million 2014 $CAN) 80,672    75,984    80,507    79,966    80,091    79,985    80,681    
Total discounted cost mean 
with 25% nuclear liability  
(million 2014 $CAN) 80,672    75,984    80,545    80,170    80,091    79,985    80,681    
Nuclear Liability
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Table 8-19 Scenario Impacts in 2050 
 
Livelihood sufficiency and opportunity 
Coal mining and coal-fired electricity generation jobs will be lost in all scenarios; even in 
the SaskPower BAU scenario, Poplar River is shut down by 2030. In the Greening the 
Grid scenario, which includes a coal phase-out by 2030, all of the 500 coal mining jobs 
will be lost. However, Saskatchewan’s electricity system is forecast to grow and workers 
will be needed in every scenario. The net impact of manufacturing, constructing, and 
operating electricity generation facilities will mean that coal mining job losses represent 
10% of the full-time jobs available in 2050. The domestic renewable scenario offers the 
greatest opportunity for employment. This is partly due to its higher cost, but when 
controlling for electricity cost (using the metric employment/cost of electricity), 
Scenario
SaskPower 
BAU 
BAU 
Equivalent
Inter-
provincial Nuclear CCS
Domestic 
Renewable
Greening 
the Grid
Electricity rate for residential 
customers (cents/kwh) 23.0 22.3 24.0 24.8 25.1 26.3 25.5
Electricity rate for 
commercial customers 
(cents/kwh) 21.9 21.3 22.9 23.7 23.9 25.1 24.3
Electricity rate for industrial 
customers (cents/kwh) 10.8 10.3 13.5 14.1 14.3 15.2 14.6
Employment (full-time jobs) 6,484      6,417      5,727      7,191      8,647      13,173    8,419      
Employment (full-time jobs)/ 
Cost of Electricity (mean) 559         573         455         566         655         962         619         
Annual direct net GHGs     
(kt CO2e/yr) 8,849      8,849      3,054      3,054      3,054      1,485      100         
Cumulative direct net GHGs 
(Mt CO2e) 418 415 380 388 385 339 201
Cumulative captured CO2 
(km3) 49 13 13 13 30 13 25
Land impacted by wind and 
solar (sections) 281 457 457 457 457 825 681
Water use (1000 Olympic 
swimming pools/yr) 267 236 193 221 133 101 116
Hydroelectric development in 
Saskatchewan (MW) 1664 1664 1994 1994 2194 2494 2394
Hydroelectric dams on the 
Churchill River 0 0 1 1 1 2 1
Hydroelectric contracts with 
Manitoba in 2050 (MW) 0 0 1950 0 0 0 1950
DSM Energy Conservation 
measures in 2050 (GWh) 485 485 3777 3777 3777 3777 3777
Cumulative high-level 
radioactive waste (tonnes) 0 0 28 232 0 0 0
Energy Independence
Resource Maintenance and Efficiency
Precaution and Public Health and Safety
Ecological Integrity
Emissions management
Livelihood sufficiency and opportunity
Intragenerational Equity 
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employment is still higher for the domestic renewable scenario. If the province moves 
away from coal, the question will be, will the new jobs be available in the same location 
as existing jobs? Halliday (2013) suggests a solar thermal plant for the Coronach area to 
provide jobs for coal miners and employees at the Poplar River plant. Opportunities to 
manufacture components in Saskatchewan would also contribute to employment, but are 
in no way guaranteed.  
 
While there will be jobs in the electricity sector, higher electricity rates may lead to job 
losses in other sectors. Energy-intensive industries such as chemical manufacturing and 
steel manufacturing may choose to leave Saskatchewan for locations with lower rates. 
Household and business spending would be redirected from other areas of the economy 
towards their electricity bills. The higher the electricity rates, the greater the threat of job 
loss throughout the rest of the economy.  
 
Emissions Management 
It is a central focus of this dissertation to find electricity scenarios that reduce GHG 
emissions. The Greening the Grid scenario achieves near-zero emissions by 2040 (100 kt 
CO2e/yr) and maintains this low level of GHG emissions to 2050. This early action leads 
to cumulative GHG emissions measuring half that of the SaskPower BAU scenario. In 
contrast, action is delayed in the four scenarios that reduce GHGs by 80% by 2050 and 
cumulative GHG emission are 137-179 Mt CO2e higher than the Greening the Grid 
scenario, nearly approaching that of the SaskPower BAU scenario. Early action would 
enhance Saskatchewan’s contribution to global efforts to mitigate climate change. It is 
also worth noting that the SaskPower BAU scenario, which relies on converting coal-
fired generation stations to carbon capture and storage (CCS), requires the largest volume 
of underground space to store CO2. To those who advocate using captured CO2 for 
enhanced oil recovery this may be a benefit of the scenario.  
 
Ecological Integrity 
Four indicators can contribute to our understanding of the ecological integrity of each 
scenario: land impacted by wind and solar; water use; hydroelectric capacity; and the 
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number of hydroelectric projects on the Churchill River. Land impacted by solar and 
wind is highest in the domestic renewable scenario. This indicates a higher potential for 
land use conflicts or wildlife impacts. From the perspective of landowners, this also 
represents an economic opportunity. Land lease payments for wind turbines are generally 
in the range of $8000 per turbine per year (Baxter et al., 2013). 
 
The domestic renewable scenario has the lowest water impact of all scenarios, followed 
closely by the Greening the Grid scenario. This makes installed wind and solar facilities 
resilient against drought (although their manufacture may not be). Scenarios that rely on 
coal-fired generation, natural-gas fired generation, and nuclear generation require the 
most water. Without a steady supply of cooling water coal-fired and natural-gas fired 
units must shut down. Without cooling water, a nuclear plant could risk a melt-down. 
This makes the thermal, and especially nuclear generation facilities, susceptible to 
drought. 
 
Further work needs to be done to understand the impacts of drought on hydroelectricity 
production. The domestic renewable scenario and Greening the Grid scenario have the 
highest reliance on hydroelectricity. This power is needed to balance the variability of 
wind and solar. Though wind and solar may be resilient to drought, an energy system 
combining wind and solar and hydroelectricity may not be. The Greening the Grid 
scenario was designed to meet electricity demand in periods of seasonally low 
hydroelectric availability. The possibility of a multi-year mega-drought must also be 
examined. 
 
Hydroelectric facilities create lasting ecological impacts by modifying river systems. I 
include the number of facilities assumed to be constructed on the Churchill River as a 
proxy of hydroelectric impact on ecological integrity. In the late 1970s people rejected 
the Wintego project on the Churchill River because of the ecological impacts it would 
cause. At the time the Churchill River Board of Inquiry reported that the proposed 300 
MW Wintego dam would create, 
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“a new reservoir extending approximately 70 miles upstream from the 
Wintego site to Drinking Falls on the Churchill River and extending 
upstream on the Reindeer River for the full extent of the river, some 59 
miles upstream to Whitesand Dam…The reservoir so created would flood 
an additional 112 square miles of land.”  
(Churchill River Board of Inquiry (CRBI), 1978: 10) 
 
All of the GHG reduction scenarios assume that a Wintego type project would proceed on 
the Churchill River. The domestic renewable scenario assumes that a second 
hydroelectric facility would be constructed on the Churchill River. The social 
acceptability of these hydroelectric facilities remains in doubt. Opposition to the Wintego 
project in the 1970s came from groups ranging from northern First Nations – especially 
the Cree peoples who have traditionally lived along the Churchill River – northern Métis 
peoples who have connections to the river dating back to the voyageurs who used it as a 
key transportation artery for the fur trade, and southern settler groups who value the 
recreational opportunities offered by the Churchill. The National and Provincial Parks 
Association spoke of the “triple value” of the Churchill: “it’s a wild river, it is scenic, and 
it is of historic importance to Canada” (CRBI, 1978: 38). If hydroelectric projects are not 
built on the Churchill River additional low-carbon firm capacity must be obtained from 
other sources.  
 
The lessons from Cumberland House should also be remembered. If new hydroelectric 
projects are used to balance the variability of wind and solar energy, as I have shown 
them to be used in Chapter 7, the downstream river flows will be highly erratic. As 
recounted in the quote found on page 59, the erratic outflows from the E.B. Campbell 
dam created hardship for the people of Cumberland House impacting wildlife, local 
outfitting businesses, and the way of life of the people of Cumberland House. Limits on 
the operating range of hydroelectric facilities can reduce downstream impacts, but will 
also mean that other back-up sources must be brought on-line to balance the variability of 
wind and solar power.  
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Energy Independence 
Premier Wall has stated that he prefers coal-fired generation with carbon capture and 
storage to hydroelectricity imports from Manitoba because coal offers a greater degree of 
energy independence (Zinchuk, 2014). Two scenarios include large scale contracts with 
Manitoba Hydro in 2050: the inter-provincial scenario and the Greening the Grid 
scenario. These scenarios also have the greatest range of uncertainty around their costs. 
The risk of relying on Manitoba Hydro electricity is that prices are set outside the 
province, and outside of SaskPower’s control. If this risk is to be mitigated, stable long-
term contracts must be signed between SaskPower and Manitoba Hydro.   
 
Some of the 1950 MW of Manitoba Hydro capacity included in the inter-provincial and 
Greening the Grid scenarios would come from the Keeyask project. This 695 MW 
hydroelectric project is a partnership between Manitoba Hydro and four First Nations. It 
is currently under construction. The rest of the capacity from Manitoba Hydro would 
require the construction of the Conawapa hydroelectric project. That project is currently 
on hold “until more export sales are confirmed” (Puxley, 2014). If Saskatchewan is to 
access this power in time to replace the coal-fired plants being retired in 2028 and 2030 it 
will have to act soon to sign import agreements with Manitoba Hydro.  
 
Resource Maintenance and Efficiency 
Winfield et al. (2010) argue that a sustainable electricity pathway will focus on resource 
maintenance and efficiency, including end-use energy efficiency. In all of the GHG 
emission reduction scenarios DSM conservation efforts are pursued to the maximum 
potential allowed in SIM (3777 GWh in 2050). This stands in contrast to the SaskPower 
BAU and BAU equivalency scenarios. The difference is explained by industrial DSM 
becoming cost-competitive in scenarios with higher electricity prices.  
 
Precaution, Public health and safety, Extreme Event Risk 
All three sets of sustainability criteria proposed at the beginning of this chapter include 
mention of something like precaution (Winfield et al., 2010), public health and safety 
(White and Noble, 2012), or extreme event risk (Jaccard, 2005). These criteria seem 
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tailored to bring attention to the unique dangers posed by nuclear energy. Nuclear energy 
poses an extreme event risk in the form of catastrophic meltdown (e.g. Fukushima). It 
poses public health and safety risks through routine and accidental release of radiation 
(Winfield et al., 2006). The safety of a nuclear facility is fraught with uncertainty and so 
invites the application of the precautionary principle. These risks are enough to 
encourage many people – including those who expressed their opposition to nuclear 
power at the Perrins’ (2009) consultation meetings – to strike the inter-provincial and 
nuclear scenarios off the list of desirable electricity futures.  
 
Path Dependence 
Jaccard (2005) and Winfield et al. (2010) both list path dependence as a consideration in 
an assessment of electricity futures. For Jaccard (2005) a scenario is more politically 
acceptable if it aligns with existing institutions. Path dependence in this instance is 
something to recommend a scenario. For Winfield et al. (2010) path dependence is a 
potential trap to be avoided. In Ontario, where Winfield et al. (2010) focus their research, 
large nuclear plants have been built. The socio-technical apparatus that surrounds these 
nuclear plants creates a powerful political lobby for maintaining and expanding nuclear 
power in the generation mix. Path dependence in the Ontario electricity system reduces 
flexibility and adaptive capacity, limiting future electricity generation options (Winfield 
et al., 2010).  
 
Saskatchewan does not have nuclear power plants, but it does have a uranium mining 
industry with strong ties to the nuclear power industry (uranium mining company 
CAMECO is a part-owner of Ontario’s Bruce Power nuclear power corporation). There is 
a strong sense among the business community and leadership of the Saskatchewan Party 
that Saskatchewan should build a nuclear power plant. In the UDP (2009) report, nuclear 
power was represented as a way to “add value” to Saskatchewan’s uranium. This creates, 
if not path dependence, at least path pressure to build a nuclear power plant.  
 
Interest in nuclear power also comes from the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers (IBEW) labour union. Neil Collins, then business manager for the IBEW, had a 
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seat on the UDP (2009) panel that recommended Saskatchewan build a nuclear power 
plant. The IBEW also signed an agreement with Bruce Power guaranteeing union jobs 
were a nuclear power plant to be built. The IBEW continued to show their support during 
the Perrins’ (2009) consultations, when at each meeting an IBEW member would stand to 
advocate for nuclear power and explain why wind and solar power could not supply 
“baseload power.”  
In Saskatchewan, where coal has been king since Boundary Dam was commissioned in 
1959, path dependence points towards the continued existence of coal-fired electricity. 
SaskPower staff and senior management have spent their careers working in a coal-based 
electricity system. This familiarity with coal breeds allegiance, and the effect can be 
powerful. In Chapter 7 I showed that the GHG emission reductions that will result from 
the federal coal-fired regulations could be achieved at a lower cost by allowing coal 
facilities to be retired at the end of their useful lives, and replacing them with natural gas 
combined cycle plants and wind turbines, instead of converting them to carbon capture 
and storage. SaskPower and Premier Brad Wall have other plans. In the Fall of 2015 the 
Premier expressed his continued support for the Boundary Dam III carbon capture and 
storage plant, despite cost over-runs, and despite the fact that it was still suffering from 
problems that kept it from running at full capacity, 
 
“Mr. Speaker, it’s going to get to 90 per cent (carbon capture) on a 
consistent basis. We know that in the coming months the plant will be 
operational again. And we need it to be operational if we’re going to 
continue to have coal, cleaner coal in the fleet, if we’re going to continue 
to have coal mining jobs in the province.” 
 (CBC, 2015e) 
 
Members of the IBEW were also quoted expressing their support for the Premier’s 
position on coal (Langenegger, 2015). The large centralized technologies – nuclear and 
coal - appear to be a good fit for the IBEW workforce. Path dependence may keep 
Saskatchewan on the trail of carbon capture and storage despite the availability of other 
options.  
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Conclusions 
The scenarios I outlined in Chapter 7 are diverse in their impacts. The SaskPower BAU 
scenario posts the second lowest electricity price increases, but the highest cumulative 
GHGs, stored GHGs, and water requirements. The Greening the Grid scenario achieves 
the lowest cumulative level of GHG emissions, the lowest water requirements, and avoids 
nuclear waste, but also increases electricity prices and impacts a large area of land. The 
analysis reveals that there is no consequence free pathway to Saskatchewan’s electricity 
future. Trade-offs are involved and decisions must be made that balance attributes against 
one another. In a qualitative sense, this was the work of White and Noble (2012) who 
found a renewable based scenario to be the preferred electricity pathway. Further work 
can be done to involve the citizens of Saskatchewan in evaluating trade-offs and deciding 
which pathway is best for the province. The information I have presented in this chapter 
can inform such a discussion.  
 
It is worth noting the many additional impacts that have not been explored in this chapter. 
This list includes: 
• Health impacts from fossil fuel emissions like sulphur dioxide and particulate 
matter; 
• Environmental impacts from sulphur dioxide (e.g. acid deposition in lakes); 
• Environmental impacts from mercury released by coal-fired electricity plants; 
• Lifecycle environmental impacts from rare-earth elements contained in lithium-
ion batteries (if that storage method is pursued); 
• Lifecycle energy requirements for technologies that would indicate the ‘Energy 
Return on Investment’ of competing options; 
• Land impacts from hydroelectricity dams, natural gas extraction, uranium mining; 
• Wildlife impacts; and importantly, 
• Climate change costs in Saskatchewan avoided through global GHG reduction. 
 
There are also social impacts associated with the various scenarios that include: 
• International reputation from contributing to GHG reduction;  
• Community division if controversial technologies such as nuclear are pursued; 
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• Community conflict over the siting of electricity generation technologies; 
• Impact of each scenario on Aboriginal Rights. 
 
On this last indicator, the history of electricity development in Saskatchewan has not 
been kind to Aboriginal people. The E.B. Campbell dam resulted in significant impacts to 
downstream fishers and outfitters, many of who were Métis or First Nation. The First 
Nations Power Authority (FNPA) appears to be a step in a better direction. The FNPA 
works with First Nations to develop electricity generation projects in Saskatchewan. It 
serves as a bridge between SaskPower and First Nations. Already the FNPA has 
developed a solar photovoltaic tracking project in Swift Current in partnership with the 
File Hills Qu’Appelle Tribal Council, an affiliation of eleven First Nations in the 
province (Interview 7). Continued partnership and consultation could help to ensure that 
aboriginal rights are respected and the electricity system becomes a vehicle for 
supporting aboriginal livelihoods (see Martens, 2015).  
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Chapter 9 – Deliberating Saskatchewan’s Electricity Future 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I outline the results of three deliberative energy policy modelling 
workshops. These workshops allowed stakeholders engaged in Saskatchewan electricity 
policy to evaluate scenarios for Saskatchewan’s electricity future using an interactive 
version of the Saskatchewan Investment Model (iSIM).  
 
The workshops also presented opportunities for stakeholders to meet one another, 
exchange views, and, it is hoped, develop a greater understanding of one another’s 
positions. Akin to van den Belt’s (2004) Mediated Modeling, the deliberative workshops 
are an opportunity to “increase the level of shared understanding amongst the group” (p. 
17). This shared understanding can act as a foundation for “investigating policy, research, 
or management alternatives” (van den Belt, 2004: 17). Shared understanding is also very 
much an end in and of itself. One of the most important outcomes of a deliberative 
modelling process is “the growth of mutual recognition and compassion” (Ravetz, 1999: 
652). 
 
Models such as iSIM are idealized representations of the world and “useful ways of 
disciplining our thinking” when used to support deliberation (Victor, 2015). They provide 
opportunities for participants to test their understanding of the Saskatchewan electricity 
system against an empirically grounded model of the system. Conversely, they are 
intended to allow participants to challenge and improve the manner in which the system 
is modelled. In both of these ways the model helps to structure a deliberative discussion 
(van den Belt, 2004). 
 
The deliberative modelling workshops build on the work of Richards et al. (2012) who 
conducted interviews with sixteen individuals in Saskatchewan on the topic of wind 
energy. Richards et al. (2012) found differences in participants’ views on whether the 
rate of expansion of wind energy in Saskatchewan was adequate. Those who believed the 
pace was adequate cited technological barriers to integrating variable wind energy onto 
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the provincial grid. Those who believed the pace was too slow cited political barriers 
such as the lack of carbon pricing, feed-in-tariff, or renewable generation targets. 
Richards et al. (2012) theorized “Opposing sides may never agree simply because their 
perceptions of barriers and what is an appropriate level of investment are based on 
different underlying values” (p. 7). Deliberative workshops were an opportunity to test 
whether deliberative exchange could move stakeholders closer to agreement on the 
potential for renewable energy in Saskatchewan, barriers to renewable energy 
penetration, and means of overcoming the barriers in Saskatchewan.   
 
Theoretical Approach 
The economic costs outlined in Chapter 8 are necessarily incomplete. Some costs, like 
the damage we can expect from climate change, are inherently uncertain. High-profile 
attempts to monetize the social cost of carbon (e.g. Nordhaus, 1991) have been severely 
critiqued for hiding uncertainty behind a veil of mathematical precision (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1994; Pindyck, 2013). Ecological economists have been among the first to 
recognize that in the face of the “irreducible uncertainties and ethical complexities” 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1994: 198) posed by issues like climate change we require a new 
approach to science and a new approach to economic analysis.  
 
“Post-normal science” is one name given to this new approach to economic analysis. It is 
defined in contrast to “normal science”, which means both normality in the sense of 
Thomas Kuhn’s idea of “research science as normality” and also the idea that “routine 
puzzle-solving by experts provides an adequate knowledge base for policy decisions” 
(Ravetz, 1999: 648). This idea of “routine” normal science does not hold in situations 
where “facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high, and decisions urgent” (Ravetz, 
1999: 649). Climate change fits this description well. We ultimately do not know, and 
will not know until it occurs, whether our climate is near a tipping point where it will flip 
into a chaotic and catastrophic new reality. We can have some confidence about the 
likely costs and impacts of mitigating greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) – and this was 
the goal of the work I outline in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 – but the decision on how 
quickly to reduce GHG emissions is a moral decision; a judgement of acceptable risk and 
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moral responsibility for action. A cost-benefit analysis, where a social cost of carbon is 
assigned to calculate the “optimal” level of GHG abatement, is an attempted shortcut to 
avoid messy ethical debate (Zografos and Howarth, 2010). This “normal” approach to 
economic analysis places the economist in the authoritative role of expert, while 
subverting democracy by embedding moral assumptions within the analysis (e.g. 
discounting the impact of climate change on future generations). Citizens, environmental 
groups, and ecological economists have begun to ask for better.  
 
A post-normal approach to ecological economics begins with the assertion that the 
economic or technical expert is not the final arbiter of truth. It rejects the idea that we can 
arrive at certainty when studying complex problems such as climate change. It invites an 
“extended peer community” to partake in deliberation to ensure high-quality research is 
conducted (Ravetz, 1999). It admits that subjective and ethical values enter into the 
research and decision-making process. Rather than awareness of subjectivity weakening 
the research process, post-normal science provides a degree of transparency that is 
lacking in “normal” science.  
 
Deliberative ecological economics has arisen as a method of operationalizing post-normal 
science (Zografos and Howarth, 2010). The goal of deliberative ecological economics is 
to “generate consensus solutions through dialogue, reflection and preference change” 
(Zografos and Howarth, 2010: 3405). Representative stakeholders are selected to 
participate in a deliberative discussion on a particular topic. Typically, these discussions 
occur in a small group setting of 15 people or less (Zografos and Howarth, 2010). A 
facilitator works to organize the session so that respectful and productive dialogue can 
occur. Ecological economists, with their experience working in a trans-disciplinary 
environment, are well suited to the task of facilitating a deliberative discussion 
(Norgaard, 2007; Norgaard, 1989).  
 
Deliberative Energy-Economy-Environment Modelling 
I used a deliberative approach to explore potential futures for the Saskatchewan 
electricity system. After developing the Saskatchewan Investment Model (SIM) and Will 
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It Run Electricity Model (WIRE) I held three workshops with invited stakeholders. The 
purpose of the workshops was twofold. First, I wanted to present the models I had 
developed and receive feedback on their strengths and weaknesses. Second, I wanted to 
host a deliberative exchange between people with different views on the future of the 
electricity system. This deliberative exchange, it was hoped, would encourage 
participants to reach a shared understanding of the options for the future of the 
Saskatchewan electricity system. It was also a chance for participants to meet each other; 
while they had all been working on electricity policy in some fashion, many had never 
met in person.  
 
Participants were drawn from the pool of thirty-one experts that I interviewed when 
developing SIM and WIRE, their colleagues, as well as others who are actively engaged 
on the topic of Saskatchewan’s electricity future. The pool of invited participants 
included representatives from utilities, government, private consulting firms, research 
institutes, industry, and environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs). 
Twenty-one individuals participated in the workshops: 11 in the first workshop, 6 in the 
second workshop, and 6 in the third (this workshop also included an observer from my 
supervisory committee). One individual participated in all three workshops. Participants 
in the workshops represented electricity utilities, environmental non-governmental 
organizations, private industry working in the field of energy conservation, and 
independent power producers. The first two workshops featured the most diverse 
participant groupings. Workshop 1 was attended by six utility representatives, two ENGO 
representatives, two private industry energy conservation representatives, and one 
independent power producer representative. Workshop 2 was attended by two utility 
representatives, three ENGO representatives, and one private industry energy 
conservation representative. Workshop 3 was attended by six ENGO representatives.  
 
Pre-Workshop Survey 
Before the workshops I invited participants to fill out an on-line survey containing seven 
questions (Appendix 9D). This survey sought to identify the starting positions each 
participant would bring to the discussion. Sixteen invited participants responded to the 
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survey. This included one respondent who did not end up attending the workshops, one 
respondent who did not provide a name, and fourteen participants who took part in the 
workshops. Participants in the third workshop did not fill out a pre-workshop survey. 
 
I first asked questions to understand each participant’s position on GHG emission 
reductions and the technologies that could help achieve GHG reductions: 
• Thinking ahead to the future, what GHG intensity should Saskatchewan strive to 
achieve in the electricity sector by 2050? (Question 1) 
• Several technologies might contribute to lowering the GHG intensity of 
Saskatchewan's electricity system. Seventeen of these technologies are listed 
below in alphabetical order. Please rank the technologies in terms of their 
importance for reducing the GHG intensity of Saskatchewan's electricity system. 
(Question 2) 
• Imagine a preferred electricity generation mix in the year 2050 that achieves the 
electricity GHG intensity you listed in Question 1. What proportion of total 
electricity generation is provided by each of the following technologies in your 
preferred scenario? (Question 3) 
 
There was a range of responses to the first question (Figure 9-1). One of the participants 
who wanted GHG intensity to be 0-99 grams CO2e/kWh included the note,  
 
It is clear from the 2013 IPCC WG3 AR5 report that the whole world needs 
to decarbonize fully by 2070 - and even then there will need to be multiple 
decades during which we are net carbon negative after that time - if we are to 
prevent climate change from going into unpredictable, likely irreversible 
territory. Decarbonisation of electricity is a relatively easy component, and a 
necessary prerequisite for decarbonisation of certain other sectors.  Hence a 
failure to decarbonize electricity by 2050 worldwide (and that includes 
Saskatchewan!) would put us in a very perilous position.  
(Workshop Participant) 
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From this comment, it appears that belief in the urgency of climate change encourages a 
stronger desire to reduce the GHG intensity of the electricity sector.  
 
 
Figure 9-1 Responses to Question 1 of the Pre-Workshop Survey 
 
On the other side of the ledger, the lone respondent who stated Saskatchewan should 
achieve a GHG intensity of 600-699 g CO2e/kwh by 2050 felt Saskatchewan had a 
differential responsibility in the world,  
 
Most of the country, with the exception of Saskatchewan, Alberta, and 
possibly Nova Scotia, do not have an abundance of cheap hydro so we need 
to rely on coal and gas to have a reliable, economic source of electricity. 
Improvements can and should be implemented, but Saskatchewan should not 
have to meet the same targets as the hydro-rich provinces like Manitoba, BC 
and Quebec. 
(Workshop participant) 
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In 2014 SaskPower’s GHG intensity was 660 g CO2e/kwh (SaskPower, 2015). This 
participant calls for a holding pattern at SaskPower’s current GHG intensity. Lack of 
agreement between workshop participants on the need to act on climate change may 
reflect the different value positions Richards et al. (2012) observed in their interviews.  
 
Some of those who selected ‘uncertain’ also provided comments with their selection. One 
participant stated that asking about the desired GHG intensity was, “Too much of a 
loaded question. Climate change is a global problem and needs appropriate action 
worldwide to mitigate the risks.” This response implied that Saskatchewan alone could 
not mitigate climate change risks; mitigation depends on global efforts. A second 
participant who responded with ‘uncertain’ offered, “Should likely be concentrating on 
reductions rather than picking a target for GHG intensity.” For this participant absolute 
reductions were important, lowering GHG intensity might still lead to increased GHG 
emissions if growth in electricity demand overwhelmed intensity improvements.  
 
In total, the responses show a diversity of thought around GHG emission reductions. This 
diversity carried into the desired scenarios for achieving GHG emission reductions 
(Question 3). There were no clear trends in the scenarios selected by participants before 
the workshop. Instead participants selected a wide range of possible scenarios that could 
describe the Saskatchewan electricity sector in 2050 (Figure 9-2).  
 
I then asked participants for their thoughts on the potential for renewable energy to 
contribute to Saskatchewan’s electricity supply.79 In particular, I asked: 
• What is the maximum proportion of Saskatchewan electricity that renewables can 
supply in the medium-term (i.e. by 2030-2035) (Question 4)? 
• What is the maximum proportion of Saskatchewan electricity that renewables can 
supply in the long-term (i.e. by 2045-2050) (Question 5)? 
                                                
79 Note that survey respondents were required to answer each question before heading on 
to the next. This was to ensure that the discussion of renewable energy did not bias 
answers to the first three questions. Unfortunately this frustrated one potential participant 
who opted not to fill out the survey because questions like Question 3 and Question 6 
were too time consuming and could not be easily skipped.  
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Figure 9-2 Scenarios to Achieve Desired GHG Intensity (Pre-Workshop Survey) 
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• What electricity generation mix would achieve the maximum renewable potential 
you identified in Question 5 (Question 6)? (Summarized in Figure 9-3) 
 
Questions 4 and 5 were used as markers to understand whether participants’ views would 
shift through the process of deliberation at the workshop. Identical questions were asked 
in the post-workshop survey (Appendix 9A). Question 6 produced a range of scenarios 
that differed from those presented in response to Question 3, and were still diverse 
(Figure 9-3). 
 
The seventh and final question asked participants about barriers to expanding renewable 
energy in Saskatchewan. Participants were asked to rank ten barriers in terms of whether 
they were ‘Not important’, ‘Somewhat important’, or ‘Very Important’ (Table 9-1). The 
list of barriers overlaps with the categories of “agreement, knowledge, technology, 
economy, social, and political” used by Richards et al. (2012), but is more specific in 
many instances. For example, rather than asking whether technology is a barrier I asked 
specifically if the intermittency of renewable energy is a barrier. The ten barriers I asked 
about in the pre-workshop survey emerged from the thirty-one interviews I conducted 
during the research process (see Chapter 2).  
 
Beliefs about cost and intermittency appear to be strongly related to the level of 
renewable penetration participants felt was possible. Intermittency was particularly 
polarizing, 44% of participants (7 of 16) believed it was not important, 38% of 
participants (6 of 16) believed it to be very important, and only 19% (3 of 16) took the 
more neutral stance that it was somewhat important. 
 
Participants who believed cost and intermittency were ‘not important’ barriers were more 
likely to believe that 100% renewable electricity generation was possible by 2050.80 
These participants were also more likely to be from an ENGO background; three of the 
                                                
80 Three of the four participants who believed cost was not important believed renewable 
electricity could meet 100% of electricity demand by 2050; three of the five who believed 
intermittency was not important believed 100% renewable was possible by 2050. 
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four participants who thought cost was not an important barrier were from ENGOs, as 
were four of six participants who thought intermittency was not an important barrier. 
 
 
Table 9-1 Important Barriers to Renewable Energy (Pre-Workshop Survey) 
 
In contrast, those who believed cost and intermittency were ‘very important’ on average 
believed that renewables could provide 40-41% by 2030-2035 (maximum 85%) and 55-
67% by 2050 (maximum 75%). These responses were also associated with the 
background of the participants. Four of five of the participants who believed cost to be an 
important barrier came from a utility background, as did five of six participants who 
believed that intermittency was an important barrier. Only one of the seven participants 
from a utility perspective thought that intermittency was not an important barrier. The 
relationship between perception of barriers and group membership may reflect different 
knowledge of the barriers or, as Garrett et al. (2012) propose, a difference in value 
orientations between the utility and ENGO groups.  
 
Barrier
Not 
Important
Somewhat 
Important
Very 
Important
Cost: The price of renewable electricity is too high. 25% 44% 31%
Feed-in-Tariff: Saskatchewan does not pay preferred 
rates for renewable power. 19% 50% 31%
Grid design: The Saskatchewan grid is built for 
centralized, not distributed, generation. 13% 44% 44%
Job loss: A focus on renewables will lead to lost jobs in 
the coal-power industry. 81% 19% 0%
Intermittency: Renewables cannot provide reliable 
electricity. 44% 19% 38%
Physical limits: Saskatchewan lacks adequate hydro, 
solar, wind resources. 56% 31% 13%
Political will: Political leaders in Saskatchewan have 
not prioritized renewables. 25% 25% 50%
Preference for coal: SaskPower has a preference for 
coal-fired generation. 31% 31% 38%
Public ownership: A private market would increase 
renewables more quickly. 56% 31% 13%
Social acceptance: People do not want to live near 
renewable energy generation. 31% 63% 6%
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The greatest degree of consensus was found on ranking the importance of job loss. Job 
loss was not seen as ‘very important’ by any of the respondents, and instead 81% (13 of 
16) believed it was not important. This may be a reflection of the composition of the 
participants in the deliberative workshops; affected labour groups were not represented. 
The diversity of responses to the ranking of barriers showed that deliberation could be 
productive. The split between representatives from utility and ENGO backgrounds 
indicated a potential for conflict at the workshops.  
 
Deliberative Modelling Workshop 
The workshop was divided into six parts (see workshop script in Appendix 9B for more 
detail): 
1. Welcome, introductions and ground rules 
2. Presentation of the history and context of the Saskatchewan electricity system 
3. Model introduction and workbook exercises to examine the assumptions 
4. Scenario creation 
5. Opportunities and barriers discussion 
6. Post-workshop survey 
 
In the first segment I worked to generate an atmosphere of openness and respect. In 
particular, participants were encouraged to “disagree without being disagreeable.”81 The 
second segment was meant to provide a common basis of understanding. I presented a 
condensed history of the Saskatchewan electricity system (a summary of Chapter 3), and 
explained the need for investment in the electricity system to replace aging infrastructure, 
meet growing demand, and comply with federal GHG legislation (a summary of Chapter 
1). I also outlined the physical potential for renewable energy in Saskatchewan (a 
summary of Chapter 4).  
 
In the third segment I asked participants to break into smaller groups of 3 or 4 people. 
Participants were provided with a workbook that outlined the assumptions I used in the 
                                                
81 I had a facilitator helping with workshop 1, but not workshops 2 and 3. The facilitator 
worked to ensure that everyone had a chance to speak and be heard.  
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Saskatchewan Investment Model (Appendix 9C). In the first workshop, three sub-groups 
were formed. Sub-groups were selected to maximize the institutional diversity of 
representation within each group. These sub-groups were each assigned a specific part of 
the workbook to review: electricity generation costs, renewable potential, or electricity 
conservation cost and potential. I asked each group to discuss the assumptions I had made 
and record suggestions for improvements within the workbook. The goal was to seek 
agreement on the underlying assumptions before testing scenarios. After the first 
workshop I received feedback that the sub-groups did not have enough time to adequately 
review the workbook and felt rushed. In subsequent workshops this segment was 
combined with scenario creation.  
 
In the fourth segment sub-groups were tasked with generating scenarios that could be 
analyzed using iSIM (Model 9A). In the first workshop, the sub-groups formed to 
evaluate the workbooks were shuffled so that a representative from each original sub-
group (and with knowledge of the particular model area they had focused on: cost, 
renewable potential, or energy conservation potential) was present in every scenario-
building group. This step was also used to increase interactions between diverse 
participants. In subsequent workshops the groups did not exchange members, but instead 
worked as teams to compete against the other group in their scenario achievement. Once 
the sub-groups had come to an agreement on a scenario for Saskatchewan’s electricity 
future, that information was placed in SIM either by a ‘modeller’; i.e. a participant 
assigned to interact with the laptop in each group, or by me.82  
 
The interactive SIM model was designed to strike a “balance between the simplicity 
needed to make the model ‘fun to use’ and the complexity required to make it ‘true to 
life’” (Carmichael et al., 2004: 173). It was built in Excel, since it is a commonly used 
software and many participants have experience using it. It was accompanied by a 
                                                
82 This worked well in the second and third workshops, which had two scenario building 
groups, but proved challenging in the first workshop where there were three scenario-
building groups.  
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workbook (Appendix 9C) that walked participants through the various inputs they could 
control in the model. Participants could design scenarios in SIM by: 
 
1. Changing assumptions used in the model related to capital cost, O&M costs, and 
cost improvement factors; 
2. Changing constraints used in the model related to conservation potential, wind 
integration potential, hydroelectric potential, and biomass potential; 
3. Changing assumptions regarding growth of electricity demand; 
4. Assigning a carbon price in each time-step; 
5. Assigning a minimum proportion of electricity generated in 2050 for desired 
technologies; 
6. Assigning a maximum proportion for small, modular nuclear reactors, which 
allowed groups to turn the nuclear option on or off.  
 
The customized scenario was then optimized using Frontline Solver in Excel. The 
objective function in the interactive model is the same as that found in SIM (see 
Appendix 7A). The optimization finds the least-cost path to supplying Saskatchewan’s 
electricity, while meeting the constraints specified by the group, and using the cost, 
renewable potential, conservation potential, and demand growth assumptions assumed by 
the group. Figure 9-4 presents a screen-shot from the scenario design interface of iSIM.  
 
 
Figure 9-4 Scenario Building Screen in SIM 
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After the optimization is run, the model returns information on average electricity cost, 
investment in each technology (MW), the generation (GWh) and capacity (MW) mix, and 
GHG emissions for each time-step. This information is summarized in easy to view Excel 
charts identical to those presented in Chapter 7. A radar diagram for each scenario 
summarizes wind and solar land requirements, GHG emissions, price impacts, the 
volume of CO2 storage required, and radioactive waste generated. These indicators are all 
presented relative to the business as usual scenario. Throughout the scenario creation 
process participants were encouraged to consult the feedback offered by the model and 
refine their scenarios. Seven distinct scenarios were created over the course of the three 
workshops (Figure 9-5). These scenarios emerged from the conversations and 
negotiations that occurred in each sub-group.83  
 
 
Figure 9-5 Workshop Scenario Outputs84 
                                                
83 As a note, scenarios 2, 4, and 6 all contained a common member; the one participant 
who attended all three workshops. The close similarity of the scenarios is undoubtedly 
related to this participant’s presence in the group.  
84 The interactive SIM model did not differentiate between small-scale and utility-scale 
wind and solar technologies and so Figure 9-5 contains fewer technologies than Figures 
9-2 and 9-3.  
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I travelled around the room helping the sub-groups as they created their scenarios. In the 
first workshop I heard feedback that participants would like improvements to the user 
interface. I improved the interface for the subsequent workshops. In the second 
workshop, one participant expressed dismay that the model had added in natural gas 
combined cycle with CCS “against our wishes” (scenario 4 in Figure 9-5). The 
participant did not like this technology and disagreed that it should be included. This was 
an opportunity to discuss the model assumption that dispatchable capacity must meet 
peak demand; natural gas with CCS has been added to ensure peak demand could be met. 
This discussion led the participant to revisit the model and redesign the scenario. It 
appeared to me to be a good example of learning through the discipline imposed by the 
model.  
 
At the end of the scenario creation exercise the sub-groups were brought together at a 
plenary roundtable to discuss the scenarios they had generated. Each sub-group was 
asked to present their scenario. A reporter from each sub-group discussed the electricity 
generation mix they had generated and explained their group’s choices. I was sure to note 
the final price and GHG emission implications of each scenario to encourage a 
competitive spirit between the teams.  
 
The final interactive component of the workshop was a brainstorming exercise to identify 
barriers to renewable energy in Saskatchewan and opportunities for overcoming these 
barriers. Participants were each given a pad of sticky notes and asked to write down as 
many barriers as they could think of in five minutes. Myself, with help from the 
facilitator in workshop 1 and a member of my supervisory committee in workshop 2, 
walked around the room grabbing the sticky notes when they were completed and posting 
them on a wall. We organized the barriers into related clusters as we posted them on the 
wall. Following this, participants were asked to volunteer explanations for the barriers 
they had posted. This provided a chance for clarification and discussion. We then 
repeated the exercise with different coloured sticky notes and asked participants to 
brainstorm opportunities for overcoming the barriers. Means of overcoming barriers were 
posted alongside related barriers. Another round of discussion followed before the 
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workshop closed and participants were asked to fill out a six question post-workshop 
survey (Appendix 9A).  
 
Analysis 
The pre-workshop and post-workshop surveys provided a means of evaluating the impact 
of the deliberative workshops. In the first instance the surveys allowed me to understand 
whether interactions with the model and deliberative discussion affected participants’ 
views on the percentage of renewables possible in the medium-term (2030-2035) and 
long-term (2050).  
 
 
Table 9-2 Maximum Percentage of Renewables Possible in Saskatchewan 
 
The workshops appeared to have a small, but statistically significant, impact on 
participants’ views of the medium-term potential for renewable energy (Table 9-2). Eight 
participants indicated a lower potential for renewables in the medium-term (2030-2035) 
after the workshops, while three participants indicated a higher potential. I tested the 
Pre-
Workshop 
(%)
Post-
Workshop 
(%) +/-
Pre-
Workshop 
(%)
Post-
Workshop 
(%) +/-
1 ENGO 85 65 - 100 100 = No
1 ENGO 100 45 - 100 85 - No
1 Industry 45 40 - 65 60 - Unsure
1 Industry 45 35 - 85 45 - Unsure
1 Industry 35 35 = 35 47 + Yes
1 Utility 35 60 + 55 100 + Unsure
1 Utility 35 35 = 65 70 + Unsure
1 Utility 45 35 - 55 45 - No
1 Utility 35 30 - 45 65 + No
2 ENGO 85 60 - 100 100 = No
2 ENGO 75 80 + 95 90 - No
2 Industry 45 40 - 65 60 - No
2 Utility 35 45 + 55 75 + No
2 Utility 35 35 = 55 50 - No
Average 52.5 45.7 - 69.6 70.9 =
Standard 
Deviation 23.1 14.8 22.1 21.0
t-test 1.375 * -0.232
Numbers indicate midpoint of indicated 10% range
* Statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval using paired difference t-test
2030-2035 2045-2050
Has your 
response 
changed?ParticipantWorkshop
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difference between the pre-workshop and post-workshop responses using a t-test and 
found a statistically significant decrease in participants’ views on medium-term 
renewable potential at the 90% confidence interval. Using this same approach I find that 
the workshops did not have a statistically significant impact on participants’ views of 
renewable potential in the long-run (2045-2050). This lack of movement on participants’ 
responses was echoed by their answers to the question: “Has your response changed from 
the earlier survey?” Nine participants stated their response did not change; any difference 
may have been an error of memory, rather than a change in perspective. Only one person 
stated their response did change as a result of the workshops. This person explained that 
they, “Learned more about actual potential and costs of various resources through 
interaction with informed participants.”  
 
The pre- and post-workshop surveys also allowed me to understand whether perspectives 
had shifted on the barriers to renewable energy expansion in Saskatchewan. The 
discussion of barriers in the workshops uncovered themes very similar to those outlined 
by Richards et al. (2012) (see Table 9-3). The barrier mentioned most often (35 
responses) was the lack of political and policy support for renewables. This lack of 
support was expressed with notes such as: 
 
• Lack of federal emissions targets; 
• Lack of government leadership; 
• Lack of political will to address climate crisis; 
• Lack of support mechanisms such as Feed-in-Tariff (FIT); 
• Lack of carbon pricing.  
 
To overcome this barrier participants recommended implementing many of the policies 
currently lacking such as GHG emission reduction targets, carbon pricing, and feed-in-
tariffs.  
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Table 9-3 Coded Results of Opportunities and Barriers Exercise 
 
The second most prominent barrier was grid integration, which includes the challenge of 
addressing the variability of renewable energy. The grid integration barrier was 
mentioned in 25 separate notes. To overcome this barrier participants suggested the need 
for smart grid technology, storage for renewable energy, and a stronger grid connection 
to Manitoba to balance wind’s variability. In the first workshop a good discussion was 
held about the merits of next generation flexible natural gas generation. The new natural 
gas-fired turbines are able to ramp up and down quickly and follow the variability of 
output from wind and solar. There was also mention of dispersing renewables 
geographically and generating renewable energy close to communities as a way to 
minimize system-wide variability.  
 
Barriers
Opportunities to             
Overcome Barriers
Theme # Theme #
Politics and Policy 35 Public education & advocacy 21
GHG targets 3
Grid integration 25 Smart grid 9
Storage 8
Manitoba Interconnection 5
Flexible natural gas generation 5
Distributed generation 2
Cost 20 Carbon price 8
Feed-in-tariff 5
Time of use pricing 2
SaskPower Monopoly 17 Deregulate/Reregulate 4
Demand growth 5 Demand side management 11
Social license 3 Community ownership 5
Jobs 4
Infant technology 3 Research/Demonstration 11
Uncertainty 3 Improve decision-making 3
Diverse portfolio reduces risk 3 No fuel price risk 2
Resilident to mega-drought? 2 Lower water usage than thermal 1
Environmental Impact 2 Great wind, solar resources 3
SaskPower debt 2 Investment needed 5
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The importance of the grid integration barrier aligns with Richards et al. (2012) who 
found that technology was the most frequently mentioned barrier. Richards et al. (2012) 
also heard participants offer many of the same solutions, such as smart grids, storage and 
geographic dispersion.  
 
The cost of renewable technology was mentioned as a barrier on twenty separate sticky 
notes. To overcome this barrier, real or perceived, participants suggested changing the 
pricing system. Carbon pricing would level the playing field with fossil-fuel 
technologies, as would an end to fossil-fuel subsidies. A feed-in-tariff would provide a 
better price to private power producers. Full-cost accounting would ensure that 
externalities besides GHG emissions were considered. The study by Richards et al. 
(2012) also found that cost was a perceived barrier.  
 
Other barriers that appeared were complaints about SaskPower’s monopoly control of the 
Saskatchewan grid. This control led some to call for deregulation and a competitive 
market, while others disagreed and suggested re-regulation would be better. Re-
regulation would keep the power system in public control, while also opening up the 
possibility of community generation of renewable energy. Other barriers mentioned on 
only a few occasions, were social license, the challenge of making decisions under 
uncertainty, and the environmental impacts of renewables (one note read “concern about 
wildlife impact, real or not”). Frequently mentioned means of overcoming barriers were 
further renewable energy research projects and renewable energy demonstration projects 
in Saskatchewan.  
 
The promise of a deliberative exchange is that understanding can be gained and positions 
can shift. To understand whether participants had shifted their thinking about the barriers 
that face renewable energy in Saskatchewan, the post-workshop survey included a final 
question asking people to indicate which barriers were “very important”. It was possible 
to compare the answers to the pre-workshop survey and post-workshop survey for 
fourteen participants (Table 9-4). The results show that the four-hour workshop did not 
lead to substantial shifts in thinking about barriers. In only two instances did a participant 
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switch their rating of a barrier from being “not important” to being “very important.” In 
nine instances, a participant listed a barrier as “very important” in the pre-workshop 
survey, but then did not subsequently check the barrier as “very important” in the post-
workshop survey. This occurred in three instances for the barrier “grid design”, and 
occurred twice for “preference for coal” and “public ownership”. The latter two barriers 
were interesting. After the first workshop I received feedback from a number of other 
participants that they were impressed at how open the participants from a utility 
background were to discussing a wide variety of technologies. One note on the post-
workshop survey read, “found interesting (the utility’s) position on various areas, 
specifically being non-biased when it comes to generation/technologies.” At the very 
least the workshops appeared to generate an increase in understanding and compassion 
between utility and non-utility actors. This was indicated by a decrease in the number of 
participants who thought the culture at SaskPower (“preference for coal”), or the 
monopoly ownership structure of SaskPower, were barriers to renewable expansion.  
 
 
Table 9-4 Importance of Barriers Pre- and Post-Workshop Survey Comparison 
 
Post-
Workshop
Not 
Important
Somewhat 
Important
Very 
Important
Very 
Important
Cost: The price of renewable electricity is too high. 25% 44% 31% 50%
Feed-in-Tariff: Saskatchewan does not pay preferred 
rates for renewable power. 19% 50% 31% 50%
Grid design: The Saskatchewan grid is built for 
centralized, not distributed, generation. 13% 44% 44% 57%
Job loss: A focus on renewables will lead to lost jobs in 
the coal-power industry. 81% 19% 0% 0%
Intermittency: Renewables cannot provide reliable 
electricity. 44% 19% 38% 36%
Physical limits: Saskatchewan lacks adequate hydro, 
solar, wind resources. 56% 31% 13% 7%
Political will: Political leaders in Saskatchewan have 
not prioritized renewables. 25% 25% 50% 86%
Preference for coal: SaskPower has a preference for 
coal-fired generation. 31% 31% 38% 29%
Public ownership: A private market would increase 
renewables more quickly. 56% 31% 13% 7%
Social acceptance: People do not want to live near 
renewable energy generation. 31% 63% 6% 21%
Pre-Workshop
Barrier
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There was little shift in ranking of the barrier “intermittency”. Of the fourteen 
respondents for which I had both pre- and post-workshop surveys, five had indicated 
intermittency was very important before the workshop and four continued to indicate that 
intermittency was very important after the workshop. One participant changed their 
ranking of intermittency from “somewhat important” to “very important.” This highlights 
the problem that may have been created by switching the format of the question from a 
three-option scale in the pre-workshop survey to a simple checkmark to indicate “very 
important” in the post-workshop survey. The post-workshop survey was, however, 
designed to be quick and easy to answer so that participants would be willing to fill it out 
before leaving the workshop.  
 
The one area where thinking did seem to converge was in regards to the barrier “political 
will”. In the pre-workshop survey 50% (8 participants) thought a lack of political will 
was a “very important” barrier, 25% (4 participants) thought it was “somewhat 
important”, and 25% (4 participants) thought it was “not important”. Following the 
workshops, 86% of participants (12 of 14) thought lack of political will to be a “very 
important” barrier. Three participants had upgraded the barrier from being “somewhat 
important” to being “very important” and one participant upgraded the barrier from being 
“not important” to “very important.” This is particularly telling when compared with the 
results in Table 9-3. Political leaders have failed to introduce the policies that would see 
renewables thrive. With political will it would be possible to change the relative costs of 
renewables, give increased impetus to GHG emission reductions, fund research and 
education on climate change and renewable energy, negotiate co-operative agreements 
with Manitoba Hydro, and provide SaskPower with a clarity of purpose. Lacking political 
will, renewables will continue to face barriers to expansion.  
 
Conclusions 
The deliberative modelling workshops were an attempt to nurture a shared understanding 
between Saskatchewan’s electric utilities and ENGOs calling for more renewables. Over 
the course of four hours, participants were asked to work together to imagine scenarios 
for Saskatchewan’s electricity future. The exercise succeeded, to a certain extent, at 
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creating sentiments of compassion and mutual respect. All of the workshop participants 
responded yes to the questions, “Have you learned anything from this workshop?” and 
“Did you enjoy the experience of interacting with others at the workshop?” Post-
workshop surveys included comments like “useful discussion” and “very stimulating – 
always fun to talk to folks with different priorities and backgrounds.” The participants 
appeared genuinely curious to learn about each other’s perspectives.  
 
The four-hour workshop did not appear to substantially shift the perspectives of 
participants. The only noticeable change was a slight decrease in the level of renewable 
energy participants felt was possible in the medium-term (2030-2035; Table 9-2). This 
may mean that the workshop created a better understanding of the constraints that 
currently affect the electricity system, which caused participants to revise renewable 
potential downwards. Participants generally did not shift their perspectives on the barriers 
to renewable energy expansion. They did, however, achieve a near consensus that ‘lack 
of political will’ is a barrier to encouraging renewables in the province.  
 
Shortcomings 
The deliberative modelling workshops I hosted required a specialist level of knowledge 
of the electricity sector. I realized that it would be difficult to find a group of participants 
that were knowledgeable enough of the specifics of the electricity industry to offer useful 
advice on the modelling assumptions and who were also representative of the 
Saskatchewan population. Participants at the workshops were skewed to representatives 
from utilities, private consulting companies in the electricity conservation sector, and 
ENGOs. This highlights the “representation problem” of deliberative exercises (Zografos 
and Howarth, 2010). The workshop participants were not representative of Saskatchewan 
society at large. Participants were predominantly from European-settler backgrounds and 
all but two were men. This reflected the pool of potential participants I had invited; only 
four of the thirty-one stakeholders I interviewed were female. The Saskatchewan utility 
sector and ENGO sector appear to be predominantly male; at least at the management-
level or board-level. 
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To host a deliberative conversation with members of the broader, non-specialist, 
Saskatchewan public, I would need to make modifications to the workshop format. Less 
time would be spent investigating assumptions, and more time could be spent presenting 
a range of pre-set scenarios and indicators. The conversation could then focus on the 
trade-offs faced when choosing between electricity scenarios.   
 
van den Belt’s (2002) Mediated Modeling approach offers a deeper level of participant 
engagement than the deliberative modelling process I carried out. In the mediated 
modelling process participants sign on to participate over the course of months or years. 
Participants meet regularly, providing input on the research questions, the structure of the 
model, and contributing research effort to developing and improving the model. The 
advantage of the much less elaborate deliberative modelling approach I used was that 
participation was easy; only a brief pre-workshop survey was completed beforehand, the 
workshop was scheduled for one four-hour afternoon session, and participants were not 
assigned any homework when they left.  
 
The light level of participation in the deliberative workshops was not enough to generate 
significant movement towards consensus. If financial resources allowed, it would be 
interesting to trial a more intensive mediated modelling process to see if a greater degree 
of consensus could be achieved.  
 
There would likely be substantial barriers that could prevent stakeholders from 
participating in a mediated modelling process. I found that, even with the relatively light 
commitment required, there were barriers to participation in the deliberative workshops. 
One invited participant could not participate because his organization did not have the 
budget to spare his time during work hours. Another invited participant chose not to 
participate because he felt he could be more candid in an interview setting than in a 
setting with professionals from the electricity field, especially representatives from the 
SaskPower utility. The comment from this would-be participant highlighted that “power 
relations are not simply left at the door of deliberative forums” (Howarth, 2010: p. 3409). 
Power – political and social – is present in a deliberative modelling exercise.  
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In Saskatchewan, as in many regulated electricity markets, SaskPower has a monopoly on 
the supply of electricity. This market power is enshrined in the Saskatchewan Power 
Corporations Act. Self-generation of renewables is a threat to the market power that 
SaskPower fought to gain, from its incorporation in 1949 to the purchase of the Regina 
power plant in 1965. This may explain the different perception of barriers between 
ENGO and industry representatives. To a renewable energy advocate a feed-in-tariff is a 
way to encourage renewables in the province. To SaskPower a feed-in-tariff is a cost; it 
requires the corporation to pay market rates (or above) for electricity generated by 
producers who are meanwhile eroding SaskPower’s market share, and thereby creating 
“stranded assets” out of existing generation and transmission equipment. The issue of 
integrating variable renewables is similar. For renewable advocates, the solutions to 
intermittency are readily available. But, as Sovacool (2009) observes, “Technically, these 
technologies can be incorporated into the grid easily. Socially, much institutional 
resistance remains” (p. 4506). Utilities find more comfort in “conservative inventions” 
like coal-fired generation with carbon capture and storage (CCS) or small, modular 
nuclear reactors because these centralized technologies maintain monopolistic market 
power (Sovacool, 2009). This preference was certainly expressed in the pre-workshop 
survey where respondents from SaskPower typically ranked coal with CCS as the 3rd 
most important technology for achieving a desired 2050 GHG intensity (mode ranking, 
median was 3.5) and ranked small, modular nuclear reactors 6th most important (mode 
and median both 6). The other respondents most often ranked coal with CCS or small, 
modular nuclear reactors dead last (the median ranking of coal with CCS amongst non-
SaskPower participants was 12th and the mode was 17th, while the median ranking of 
small, modular nuclear reactors was 13th and the mode was again 17th). There is a very 
clear split in support for these “conservative inventions.” Concerns over intermittency 
may be less a technical barrier, and more a result of institutional resistance. An open-
ended discussion in a deliberative modeling workshop may not be the best way to discuss 
these issues, as it involves questioning the motivations of some of the participants. It may 
be hard to “disagree without being disagreeable” when entering into such a discussion.  
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Chapter 10 – Conclusions and Next Steps 
 
Findings 
In this dissertation I set out to ask, what is the cost of Greening the Saskatchewan Grid 
by lowering greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 80% or more by 2050 with a renewable 
energy focused electricity pathway? To understand the relative cost of a renewable 
energy pathway I needed to know the costs of alternative scenarios, including a business-
as-usual scenario (SaskPower BAU), and scenarios for lowering GHG emissions that 
featured technologies like carbon capture and storage (CCS) and small modular nuclear 
reactors. I built the Saskatchewan Investment Model (SIM) to understand the costs of 
these various scenarios.  
 
Building SIM required me to answer a number of intermediate questions. I needed to 
know how electricity demand might change between 2015 and 2050. I created an 
electricity demand forecast in Chapter 6 to answer that question. I needed to know how 
much potential there is in Saskatchewan to generate renewable electricity from wind, 
water, sun, and biomass. I outlined Saskatchewan’s renewable potential in Chapter 4. I 
needed to know the relative costs and operating characteristics of competing electricity 
generation technologies, including their capital costs, operating costs, capacity factors, 
expected life, and fuel efficiency. Those costs and characteristics are examined in 
Chapter 5. I also needed to know how these costs and characteristics would change over 
time; SIM includes exogenous cost improvement factors that forecast changes in capital 
and operating costs due to technological progress. I also created fuel price forecasts to 
understand how the price of coal, natural gas, biomass and uranium might change over 
time. Both the cost improvement factors and future fuel prices are uncertain and so I 
conducted a sensitivity analysis to account for the uncertainty of these estimates (Chapter 
7).  
 
After conducting this analysis I found that a Greening the Grid leadership scenario would 
cost about two cents per kilowatt-hour (kWh) more than a business-as-usual scenario by 
2050. The Greening the Grid scenario would, however, cut cumulative GHG emissions 
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in half, reduce water use, and create more jobs (Chapter 8). It would also reduce 
emissions without adding significantly to the volume of stored CO2 and would not result 
in the creation of any long-lived radioactive waste (Chapter 8). The Greening the Grid 
scenario would also be resilient to carbon pricing. If Canada or Saskatchewan were to 
implement an escalating carbon pricing policy, that begins at $15/tonne in 2015 and 
increases by $15 every 5-year time-step, the total discounted cost of the Greening the 
Grid scenario would be comparable to the other scenarios.  
 
Because of my focus on a renewable energy pathway I paid particular attention to the 
issue of variability. Renewable energy sources like wind, water, and solar are naturally 
variable in their electricity output. From the Premier of Saskatchewan to SaskPower 
management there is a concern that the variability of renewable energy will create a 
shortage when it is needed most. In this dissertation I asked, what is the cost of building 
adequate storage capacity and back-up capacity to ensure a renewable focused scenario 
can provide a reliable supply of electricity?  
 
To answer this question I allowed electricity storage to be built in tandem with wind and 
solar facilities in SIM. I then created an hourly operations model, the WIRE model 
(Appendix 7B). I used the WIRE model to test whether each of the scenarios outlined in 
Chapter 7 could meet forecast hourly electricity demand in 2050 while responding to 
variations in renewable energy output and electricity demand.  
 
This step led to an iterative process of creating an investment scenario in SIM and then 
checking to see ‘Will-it-Run?’ in the WIRE model. I found that, in order to provide 
reliable electricity, a renewable energy focused scenario must be resilient to the seasonal 
availability of solar power and hydroelectricity. Applying a ‘Liebig’s Law of the 
Minimum’ for electricity planning, I revisited assumptions in the SIM model and created 
the Greening the Grid scenario based on the minimum capacity factor for solar (11% in 
December) and the minimum average capacity factor for hydroelectricity (43% in 
March). By planning for the times when renewable electricity generation technologies are 
at their seasonal low points, I found that a renewable focused Greening the Grid scenario 
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could reliably meet hourly electricity demand even in the depths of winter when 
electricity demand peaks.  
 
Key to managing the variability of renewable energy are technologies like electricity 
storage, demand side management (DSM) peak shifting, and hydroelectric facilities that 
can store water in reservoirs. Electricity storage and hydroelectric facilities with 
reservoirs provide dispatchable power that balances the variability of the wind. DSM 
peak shifting helps to smooth out net electricity demand, reducing the peaks and 
increasing the troughs.85  
 
This finding is not in itself enough to prove the technical viability of the Greening the 
Grid scenario. A model is after all a simplification of a real-world system. I have 
abstracted from the workings of the Saskatchewan electricity system in several ways. 
First, my analysis was not spatial; I did not map the location of proposed electricity 
facilities for each scenario, nor did I explicitly model the transmission and distribution 
system. More engineering analysis could be done to design, model and test a Greening 
the Grid scenario for Saskatchewan.  
 
What I did succeed in modelling were the likely costs of lowering GHG emissions in the 
Saskatchewan electricity sector using renewable energy. I found that planning for a 
renewable energy system using a modified ‘Liebig’s Law of the Minimum’ results in an 
overbuilt system and this increases costs. In the summer, when solar power and 
hydroelectricity are abundant, electricity production from wind and solar exceeds total 
electricity demand and has to be curtailed. Seasonal energy storage using a technology 
like electrolytic hydrogen could provide a means of using that curtailed energy. This 
would allow an electricity system planner to reduce the size of the Greening the Grid 
system. Whether this would save money would depend on whether the value of curtailed 
electricity is high enough to pay for the hydrogen conversion facilities. My research 
could be extended by pursuing that line of inquiry.  
                                                
85 Net electricity demand equals electricity demand minus variable renewable electricity 
output. 
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Barriers to Renewable Energy Expansion 
In general, the results of the WIRE modelling indicated that renewable energy variability 
does not appear to be a technical barrier to a Greening the Grid scenario. Technologies 
exist that can balance the variability of wind and solar, at a cost. The premium paid for 
balancing renewable energy variability using electricity storage, hydroelectricity, and an 
overbuilt system increases the cost of electricity, but not drastically.  
 
If renewable energy variability and cost are not barriers to the pursuit of a Greening the 
Grid scenario, then what barriers might exist? I worked to explore barriers to and 
opportunities for renewable expansion in three deliberative modelling workshops. As 
expected, several workshop participants felt that cost and “intermittency” were 
significant barriers to higher penetrations of renewable electricity in Saskatchewan. 
These positions did not appear to shift over the course of a four-hour workshop and were 
largely associated with utility-affiliated participants. But stakeholders from a variety of 
backgrounds also came to a near consensus that renewable energy expansion is held back 
by political barriers.  
 
Nationally, Canada lacks a carbon price or hard GHG emission reduction targets. The 
federal government did introduce a coal-fired electricity regulation and SaskPower plans 
to meet (but not exceed) the requirements of the regulation by outfitting select coal plants 
with carbon capture and storage. That regulation will reduce Saskatchewan’s electricity 
sector GHG emissions by approximately half, but the gains will be temporary. I project 
that GHG emissions in the SaskPower BAU scenario will begin to increase by 2045 as 
natural-gas fired plants expand to meet growing electricity demand.  
 
Provincially, Saskatchewan also lacks a carbon price and a GHG emission reduction 
target. The Saskatchewan Party government also lacks motivation to get serious on the 
climate change file. Premier Brad Wall told media in October 2015 that he would attend 
the 2015 Paris climate change summit “to make sure that whatever Canada is committing 
to doesn’t kneecap our economy in the west” (CBC, 2015). Aside from the Boundary 
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Dam III carbon capture and storage project Premier Wall has not taken any significant 
action to reduce GHG emissions in the province.  
 
Within SaskPower there is path dependence and a coal culture that has made coal with 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) the preferred GHG emission reduction solution; at least 
until small modular nuclear reactors prove out. Both coal with CCS and nuclear reactors 
support SaskPower’s centralized control of the grid. They are “conservative” 
technologies in that they maintain the existing institutional arrangements and institutional 
power of SaskPower (Sovacool, 2009).  
 
SaskPower is living through a critical time, however, when their credibility has been 
damaged. CEO Robert Watson was forced to resign in 2014 after smart meters installed 
in the province began to spontaneously start on fire. The heat was on SaskPower again in 
Fall 2015 when it was revealed that the Boundary Dam III CCS plant was not operating 
at full capacity, and was instead paying millions of dollars in penalties to Cenovus for 
failing to deliver CO2 (Leo, 2015).  
 
As the costs mount for the Boundary Dam III project, and criticism builds, SaskPower 
may wish to recall Ross Thatcher’s test for public ownership. A crown would be held in 
public ownership if it provided “an essential service which private firms are unable to 
supply at a comparable cost to the public”, offered “a particularly satisfactory return on 
invested public funds”, or provided “useful employment which otherwise would not be 
available” (Thatcher quoted in Rediger, 2004: 76). The first criterion is currently in 
question. SaskPower has used its monopoly position to subsidize the Boundary Dam III 
CCS project, increasing the cost of electricity generation relative to other pathways for 
meeting the federal coal-fired GHG regulation. On the second criterion, the crown 
corporation has been raising rates, but its financial situation is so tenuous that it will not 
offer dividends to the Saskatchewan government anytime in the foreseeable future. The 
third criterion, providing “useful employment” appears to be the saving grace as the 
government works to save jobs in the coalmines. A hard look at employment in 
competing pathways, especially renewable pathways, could change that perspective. I 
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found that renewable-focused scenarios offered more job opportunities than the 
SaskPower BAU pathway focused on preserving coal jobs.  
 
There were people I interviewed who argued that deregulation would be the best path 
forward for the Saskatchewan electricity system. Opening the grid up to private power 
producers would continue the work begun by CEO Jack Messer in the early 1990s. 
Advocated of de-regulation believed that it would spur the wide-scale adoption of low-
cost wind power. Others argued that re-regulation was needed. They argued the 
Saskatchewan Power Corporation Act should be amended to allow independent 
electricity producers into the market, but that electricity generation was best carried out 
by municipalities, community co-operatives, and residential and commercial customers. 
SaskPower’s role in this context would be as keeper of the electricity commons; the 
shared transmission and distribution network that has been built up over the past eighty-
five years. In Chapter 8 I outlined the possibility of grid defection and the utility death 
spiral. Death in this instance could refer to death of SaskPower’s current business model. 
The question remains, will SaskPower continue to resist private power generation and the 
grid defection it might encourage? Or will SaskPower embrace a new business model?  
 
People Power 
From my analysis of the Saskatchewan electricity system I find support for Sovacool’s 
(2009) assertion that an electricity system is more than a collection of electricity 
generators connected by wires. Instead, it is “a set of social, cultural, economic, and 
political interests fused together with technology” (Sovacool, 2009: 4502). The coal-
hydro nexus that defined the past sixty years of electricity generation in Saskatchewan 
has created a political constituency of coalminers, SaskPower employees, and politicians 
committed to keeping coal alive. A focus on centralized power generation has made 
nuclear energy a popular substitute if coal is to be abandoned. It is difficult to tell where 
technological and economic analysis ends and cultural and political interests begin.  
 
Schumpeter (1942) argued that capitalism is driven by creative destruction. Renewable 
electricity technologies like wind and solar, as well as storage technologies like lithium-
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ion batteries, have disruptive potential. They do not fit into the existing socio-technical 
structure of the Saskatchewan electricity system. They do, however, fit well in the low-
density, dispersed Saskatchewan electricity grid.  
 
Creative destruction is not pretty. There are winners and losers. Without continued 
enthusiasm for CCS, the coalminers fear they will lose their jobs. However, with strategic 
investment in wind, solar, and electricity storage, especially in southeast Saskatchewan, 
these power workers can transition from mining the Earth to harnessing the power of the 
wind and sun.   
 
Without questioning their commitment to large-scale, costly ventures like coal with CCS 
and nuclear power, SaskPower is likely to lose. The utility death spiral beckons utilities 
that do not realize the potential for increasing electricity prices and increasingly 
affordable renewable technologies to encourage grid defection.  
 
The winners will be those who see the opportunities presented by greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions and disruptive renewable technologies, and who are able to inspire 
public support for their ideas. Saskatchewan citizens are intelligent, hard-working, 
progressive people. They have been leaders in agricultural innovation. They have been 
leaders in social policy innovation (e.g. socialized medicine). They have been leaders in 
energy conservation (the German sounding Passivhaus concept was inspired by the 
Saskatchewan Conservation House; Huck, 2015). That leadership is present in projects 
like the Cowessess wind and storage facility located east of Regina, which is 
demonstrating that we have overcome the technical barriers to renewable energy 
expansion. Applied to the electricity system, there is no telling what that leadership could 
achieve; five hundred landowners could change the course of history if they committed to 
installing wind and solar facilities on their lands.  
 
Saskatchewan people also take pride in being neighbourly, offering a hand when it is 
needed. Climate change demands that we pitch in and lend a hand. It demands that we 
contribute our fair share to efforts to stop catastrophic climate change. If the 
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consequences of climate change were broadly understood (and the voices of climate 
change denial rightly quieted), I believe the people of Saskatchewan would rally for 
change.   
 
And change can happen quickly. The T.C. Douglas government brought electricity to 
rural Saskatchewan within a four-year term. The achievement took political will and it 
took the will of the people to get involved. Rural families worked to erect power poles 
and string lines to bring electricity to their farms. There is a window opening to Green 
the Saskatchewan Grid. Will the citizens of Saskatchewan seize the opportunity? 
 
Least-cost economic analysis is likely not enough to inspire citizens to Green the 
Saskatchewan Grid. A quote from David Orr summarizes the failings of this approach,  
 
“A great deal has been said about the potential for least-cost, end-use 
analysis that hitches narrow economic rationality to the efficient use of 
resources with better technology. This is all to the good. However, 
problems arise when the same economic rationality causes consumers to 
observe that least cost is not the same as full cost. For example, the fully 
informed consumer, armed with least-cost reasoning, would certainly 
choose to buy compact fluorescent lightbulbs that have lower lifetime 
costs than incandescent bulbs. But the same narrow economic rationality 
would cause that consumer to refuse to pay higher utility costs to clean up 
nuclear wastes and decommission reactors used to generate the electricity 
that is used with greater efficiency. At this point, economic rationality 
stops and virtue begins. Least-cost reasoning applies to those costs that 
must be paid now; full cost applies to those costs that can be pushed onto 
others or deferred to our children. Only people who take their obligations 
seriously, people of virtue, would willingly pay the full costs of their 
actions or even demand to do so.”  
(Orr, 1994: 63)  
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The UDP process of 2009 presented citizens with a vision of a nuclear-powered 
electricity future. Citizens asked, why was renewable energy not considered? Critics 
responded that the variability of renewable energy and cost were significant barriers. This 
dissertation has shown that a renewable energy pathway is not only possible, it is 
affordable, and it creates jobs. The barriers to Greening the Saskatchewan Grid are 
political, not technical or economic.  
 
Democracy begins where least cost economic analysis ends. The scenarios I have 
outlined in this dissertation produce a range of impacts: economic, ecological and social. 
Choosing which electricity pathway to embrace is a political and moral decision, not an 
economic decision.  
 
The real work begins now that the dissertation is complete; the work of building 
understanding of climate change; the work of deliberating pathways for a Green 
electricity future; and the work of calling on the citizens of Saskatchewan to act with 
virtue and determination to make a better world. As Tommy Douglas once said, it is not 
too late to build one. 
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Appendix 5A - LCOE Methodology 
 
Electricity generation technologies can be compared by calculating the ‘levelized cost of 
electricity’ (LCOE). This calculation determines the price per kilowatt-hour required in 
order for an electricity generation project to obtain a net present value of zero. This 
means LCOE is the break-even price required in order to pay for the cost of generating 
electricity over the lifetime of the generation technology. (Citi GPS, 2015: 44) 
 
Calculating LCOE requires cost data, including the following: 
 
• Co – Capital cost of constructing the generation technology ($/kilowatt) 
• Vo – Variable operations & maintenance (O&M) costs incurred while operating 
the technology ($/megawatt-hour) 
• Fo – Fixed operations & maintenance (O&M) costs ($/kw/yr) 
• Fuelt  - Fuel price (when relevant) in year t. 
 
Financing information is required to calculate the costs of obtaining the funds necessary 
to build the electricity generation technology. Financing information includes the type of 
financing used (debt or equity) and the rate of interest on debt or return on equity.  
 
Calculating the LCOE also requires engineering data to determine the electricity 
generated by the technology and the fuel used over its lifetime: 
 
• Capacity – Size of the project being built (megawatts) 
• Lifetime – Expected life of the generating technology (years) 
• Capacity factor – Expected percentage of electricity generated over the course of 
a lifetime relative to electricity that would be generated if the technology 
operating at full capacity all of the time (percentage %) 
• Heatrate / fuel efficiency – a measure of how much fuel is required in order to 
generate electricity (measured in btu/kwh or kwh/kwh for heat rate and % for fuel 
efficiency) 
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• Energy content of fuel – conversion factors may also be necessary to calculate the 
energy content in fuels such as coal and natural gas. 
 
There are two approaches to calculating the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE). In the 
first approach, average annual costs and average annual electricity generation are 
determined for each technology. The annual costs are divided by annual electricity 
generation to calculate LCOE as follows: 
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 1    𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸 ($/𝑀𝑊ℎ) =  𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ($) 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑀𝑊ℎ) 
 
This annual approach requires capital costs to be amortized into equal annual payments. 
It also assumes that fuel prices, operations and maintenance costs, and electricity 
generation all remain constant over the life of the technology.  
 
The second approach, and the one used in this study, involves producing a stream of 
annual costs and a stream of electricity generation output for each year of the 
technology’s life. These costs and the generation quantities are then discounted back to 
the present to obtain the net present value of costs and benefits: 
 
𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 2    𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐸 ($/𝑀𝑊ℎ) =  𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡!($) (1+ 𝑟)!!! 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦! (𝑀𝑊ℎ)(1+ 𝑟)!!!  
 
Where 𝑟 equals the discount rate and t equals time in years.  (Short et al., 1995) 
 
Note that while it may seem unusual to discount the physical quantity of electricity 
generated, this physical quantity does have a monetary value. When the stream of annual 
costs and annual electricity generation are constant and equal to the average these two 
methods produce identical results.  
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Electricity Generation Calculation 
Equation 5A.3 provides the formula I used to calculate the amount of electricity 
generated by a given project in a given year t: 
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 3    𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦! =  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟! % ∗  8760 
 
Capacity factor is a measure of how much electricity a given technology generates 
relative to a theoretical maximum. It is calculated as follows: 
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 4  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 % =  𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 (𝑀𝑊ℎ)𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 (𝑀𝑊ℎ) 
 
Where,  
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 5  𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑀𝑊ℎ =  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑊 ∗  8760 
 
The last number, 8760, refers to the number of hours in a non-leap year. If a generation 
technology runs quite continuously at its maximum rate capacity it may obtain a capacity 
factor of 85-90%. 
 
For this analysis I have assumed constant capacity factor and a constant level of 
electricity generation for each technology. This allows me to use the simple approach in 
Equation 5A.1.  
 
Fuel Use Calculation 
I calculate fuel use for coal-fired plants, natural gas-fired plants, nuclear plants, and 
biomass plants. The process of calculating fuel use begins by ensuring that data is in 
comparable units. Electricity generation is measured in kilowatt-hours (kwh) while fuel is 
measured in a variety of units including gigajoules (GJ), tonnes (t), and imperial 
measures such as millions of British thermal units (MMbtu) and short tons in the United 
 340 
States. The following conversion factors are useful for converting these various energy 
measures.  
 
Energy	1	MWh	equals	 3.6	 GJ	
Coal	1	tonne	lignite	coal	equals	 14.4	 GJ	
Natural	Gas	1	m3	equals	 0.037244529	 GJ	
Energy	1	MMBtu	equals	 1.0551	 GJ	
NG	Volume	1	cubic	foot	equals	 0.0283	 m3	
NG	vol	1000	cubic	feet	equal	 28.3	 m3	
1	btu	equals	 0.000293071	 kwh	
(Source: NEB, 2012) 
Figure 5A-1 Energy Conversion Table 
 
I calculated fuel requirements using the following steps: 
 
1. Translate electricity generation from megawatt-hours (kwh) to gigajoules (GJ): 
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 7    𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑊ℎ ∗ 3.6 = 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐺𝐽). 
 
2. Match units in numerator and denominator of heatrate measure by transforming 
(btu per kwh) to common units (kwh fuel per kwh electricity): 
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 8    𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝐵𝑡𝑢/𝑘𝑤ℎ)  ∗  .00029307107 = 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑘𝑤ℎ/𝑘𝑤ℎ). 
 
3. Calculate fuel efficiency percentage using heat rate: 
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 9    𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 % =  1𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑘𝑤ℎ/𝑘𝑤ℎ) 
 
4. Divide electricity generated (GJ) by the fuel efficiency percentage to calculate 
required fuel (GJ): 
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𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 10   𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝐺𝐽)! =  𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐺𝐽)!𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 (%) 
 
5. Calculate the cost of the fuel bill. For fuels like natural gas, gigajoules (GJ) are a 
convenient unit of measurement. Natural gas prices are often listed in terms of 
$/GJ, at least in Canadian data. For other fuels, like coal or uranium, conversions 
may be needed, depending on the original data source. In general the fuel bill is 
calculated as follows: 
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 11   𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙! =  𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 (𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑠)!  ∗  𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ($/𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡)! 
 
Note the time subscripts in equation 5A.9. These allow for the possibility that fuel prices 
are not constant over time. The LCOE measures presented in Chapter 5 assume constant 
fuel prices. However, fuel prices generally escalate over time. In the linear programming 
model (see chapter 7) natural gas prices are allowed to increase over time. Forecasts of 
natural gas price increases are taken from the National Energy Board (2013) Energy 
Forecast for Canada from 2015 to 2035. Forecasts for natural gas are then extended by 
continuing to increase natural gas prices at the annual rate of increase recording during 
the period of 2030-2035 in the forecast. The linear programming model also assumes that 
coal prices escalate at 1.25%/year (constant 2014 $CAN dollars). Conversations with 
relevant experts have indicated that 1.25%/year is an appropriate number for coal price 
escalation (Workshop 1).  
 
Capital Cost and Financing Cost Calculation 
The installed capital cost of a given electricity generation project can be found by 
multiplying the cost per kilowatt installed by the size of the planned installation:  
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 12   𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡! =  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑡𝑡!  ∗  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (𝑘𝑤) 
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The method of financing the installation of an electricity generation project is another 
important part of the cost. There are many different ways to finance capital projects. The 
Lazard 8.0 (2014) calculations of LCOE assume the following financing structure: 
 
• 40% equity-financed at 12% return; 
• 60% debt-financed at 8%/year interest. 
 
In my calculations of LCOE I assume that 100% of the capital cost is debt-financed at 
4%/yr compounding interest. This is a debt-structure that is consistent with SaskPower’s 
operations. I calculate financing costs using a monthly periodic interest rate: 
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 13   𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑐 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖 =   (1 +  𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒)!/!"= 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒!"  
 
During the period of construction, interest is charged on the amount of capital required to 
construct the project. These interest payments are accumulated during the construction 
period, added to the principle, and then capitalized using debt-financing. Pre-
commissioning interest on the amount borrowed is calculated as follows, 
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 14   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐼𝐷𝐶) =   𝑐 ∗ 𝑖 ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡! 
 
Where c refers to the number of months of construction and i is the periodic interest rate. 
Note that interest charged during the construction period is not compounding, but 
accumulates and is amortized upon commissioning.  
 
This approach to interest during construction is meant to mirror SaskPower’s practices. 
SaskPower’s policy on capitalizing interest reads as follows: 
 
“Where construction or development of a capital project is ongoing for a 
period of time, the asset is not of any productive use to the Corporation, 
but funds that could be used elsewhere are being tied up by the 
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construction process. To recognize this inherent carrying cost, interest 
must be capitalized on projects that are anticipated to be under 
construction or development for a period of 6 months or longer. Interest is 
not capitalized on projects that are under construction or development for 
less than 6 months.” (SaskPower, 2011: 7) 
 
The costs that are eligible for interest are treated in the following manner: 
 
• “Interest is applied monthly on the ending asset under construction balance – 
excluding previously accumulating interest charges” (SaskPower, 2011: 7); 
• “The annual interest capitalized during construction is calculated at a simple 
interest rate based on the previous year’s weighted average cost of long-term debt 
and short-term borrowings” (SaskPower, 2011: 7). 
 
To calculate annual amortized capital costs I assume an amortization period equal to the 
lifetime of the technology (measured in years n). Annual amortization payments are then 
calculated using this amortization formula: 
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 15  𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =   (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙 + 𝐼𝐷𝐶) ∗ 𝑖1− (1+ 𝑖)!!  
 
Where m equals the number of months in the amortization period, which is found by 
multiplying the number of years (n) by twelve. Annual capital payments are equal to: 
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 16  𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡! =  𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!"!   
 
Operations & Maintenance Costs 
Once electricity generation numbers are calculated it is straightforward to calculate 
variable operations and maintenance (O&M) costs: 
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𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 17  𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑂&𝑀 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ($)!= 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑂&𝑀 ($/𝑀𝑊ℎ)! ∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑀𝑊ℎ)! 
 
Fixed O&M costs are calculated simply in the following way: 
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 18  𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑂&𝑀 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 ($)! = 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑂&𝑀 ($/𝑘𝑤/𝑦𝑟)! ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 (𝑀𝑊)! 
 
Average electricity cost is then calculated by adding up the following: 
 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 19  𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡!= 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑂&𝑀 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡! + 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑂&𝑀 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡!+ 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡! + 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙! 
 
Note that this does not include charges for GHG emissions. If a policy path included a 
carbon price then additional costs would be added to the average annual cost. The LCOE 
numbers in Figure 5-10 do not assign a cost for GHG emissions.  
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Appendix 7A – Technical Documentation for the 
Saskatchewan Investment Model (SIM) 
 
Introduction 
The Saskatchewan Investment Model (SIM) is a linear programming model of the 
Saskatchewan electricity sector. The model was built in Excel for Mac 2010 and solved 
using the ‘Solver’ optimization tool (Frontline Solvers, 2014). In creating a linear 
programming (LP) model it is necessary to specify three components of the model: 
 
1. The objective function defines the value to be minimized or maximized; 
2. The decision variables are values that can be increased or decreased in order to 
change the value of the objective function; 
3. Constraints are necessary to define the problem and restrict the feasible solution 
space.  
 
Objective Function 
SIM optimizes investment decisions taken in five-year time-steps beginning in 2016-
2020 and ending in 2046-2050. The objective function is defined as the total discounted 
cost of supplying electricity over the period (Eq. 7A.1). SIM minimizes 𝐶(𝐼!") by 
selecting appropriate investments (𝐼!") in each five-year time-step. 
 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐴. 1  min𝐶(𝐼!")=  𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡!" + 𝑂&𝑀!" + 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙!" + 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑥 ∗ 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑠!"(1+ 𝑟)!!"!!!!!!!  
 
Where, 
• i is a subscript indicating electricity technologies, which include generation 
technologies, demand side management measures in the residential, commercial 
and industrial sectors, one electricity storage technology, and one technology to 
represent contracts for imported hydroelectricity from Manitoba Hydro;  
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• t is a subscript indicating time. There are seven five-year time steps in SIM 
representing five-year investment periods beginning in 2016-2020 and ending in 
2046-2050. Values in each time-step are assumed to be representative of a five-
year average within that time-step. This means that average values are counted 
five times, but are discounted by a discount factor corresponding to the specific 
year they are incurred. For example, the average values in the 2020 time-step 
would be discounted at t=1, t=2, t=3, t=4 and t=5 and added to the cost total; 
• 𝐶 refers to a cost (𝐶) function; 
• 𝐼 stands for investment; 
• 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 refers to the annual payment made to cover the cost of capital 
investments. Capital is amortized over its lifetime in the same manner outlined in 
Equations 5A.12 to 5A.16 in Appendix 5A. I assume an annual interest rate of 4% 
for debt-based capital financing costs; 
• 𝑂&𝑀 refers to operations and maintenance expenditures and is the sum of fixed 
(𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑂&𝑀) and variable (𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑂&𝑀) O&M expenditures. These are 
calculated in the same manner as shown in Equations 5A.17 and 5A.18 in 
Appendix 5A; 
• 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙 is the cost of purchasing natural gas, coal, biomass and uranium. It is 
calculated in the same manner as shown in Equations 5A.7 to 5A.11 in Appendix 
5A. In SIM, however, fuel prices are not static and so 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ($/𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡)! varies 
with each time-step (Table 7A.1); 
• 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑥 refers to a tax on greenhouse gas emissions, measured in $CAN per 
tonne carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e). A carbon tax can be assigned in the 
model to impact optimization decisions. In creating the scenarios in Chapter 7 I 
did not assume a carbon price (Carbontax=0). Carbon prices could be selected by 
participants in the modelling workshops who used iSIM (see Chapter 9);  
• 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑠 refers to direct greenhouse gas emissions resulting from electricity 
generation (measured in tonnes of CO2e) that are released to the atmosphere. 
Emissions captured using carbon capture and storage technology are not charged 
a carbon tax; and 
• 𝑟 is the discount rate. 
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Fuel Costs 
Fuel is required for electricity generated by coal-fired natural gas-fired generation 
facilities, biomass plants, and small modular nuclear reactors. In SIM I assume that coal 
and natural gas costs increase over time (Table 7A.1) (see Figure 5-6 in Chapter 5 for the 
natural gas price forecast).  
 
 
Table 7A.1 – Fuel Costs 
 
Coal prices for Saskatchewan are based on the prices reported in the annual reports of 
coal mining company Sherritt (Sherritt, 2003; Sherritt, 2012). Sherritt was the primary 
coal mining company supplying SaskPower’s coal plants in Saskatchewan until they sold 
their coal mining assets to Westmoreland in December of 2013 (Younglai, 2013). 
Between 2002 and 2012 Sherritt’s coal prices increased at an annualized compound 
growth rate of 1.25%. Future coal prices are forecast using that growth rate.  
 
Natural gas prices from 2014-2035 are taken from the industrial reference scenario of the 
National Energy Board (NEB, 2013) report Canada’s Energy Future 2013. Prices from 
2036-2050 are forecast using the annualized growth rate implied from price changes from 
2030-2035 in the NEB reference forecast. I calculated this annualized growth rate to be 
1.41%.  
 
Biomass and uranium prices are taken from Lazard (2014). Lazard (2014) provides low 
and high values for both biomass and uranium. I assume that prices begin at the low 
values and increase in a linear fashion to reach the high value by 2050.  
 
Fuel Costs 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Biomass (2014 CAN/GJ) 0.95 1.09 1.22 1.36 1.49 1.63 1.76 1.90
Coal (Westmoreland price + forecast @ 1.25%) 
(2014 CAN/tonne) 23.18 24.68 26.27 27.96 29.77 31.69 33.73 35.91
Natural Gas (NEB SK Industrial REF to 2035 + 
forecast @ 1.41%) (2014 $CAN per GJ) 3.21 4.04 4.64 5.07 5.44 5.83 6.25 6.70
Natural Gas (NEB SK Industrial HIGH to 2035 + 
forecast @ 1.11%) (2014 $CAN per GJ) 4.82 5.64 6.24 6.67 7.05 7.45 7.87 8.31
Natural Gas (NEB SK Industrial LOW to 2035 + 
forecast @ 2.09%) (2014 CAN per GJ) 2.53 2.55 3.03 3.46 3.83 4.25 4.72 5.23
Uranium for Nuclear SMR (2014 CAN per GJ) 0.38 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.60 0.65 0.71 0.76
Natural gas forecast from NEB (2013); Biomass and uranium prices from Lazard (2014); Coal price from Westmoreland (2015)
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Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Annual greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) for each time step are calculated using by 
multiplying the natural gas and coal required to generate electricity in that time step 
against the GHG intensity of the fuels, measured in CO2e (Equation 7A.2).  
 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐴. 2  𝐺𝐻𝐺𝑠!"= 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑(𝐺𝐽/𝐺𝑊ℎ)!" ∗ 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝐺𝑊ℎ)!" ∗ 𝐺𝐻𝐺𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦! 
 
Where, 
• j is a subscript indicating fuel type (j ∈ 1,2 where 1 = natural gas, 2 = coal); 
• 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑(𝐺𝐽/𝐺𝑊ℎ)!" indicates the fuel efficiency of each technology. For 
coal fuel use gigajoules (GJ) are converted to metric tonnes; 
• 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝐺𝑊ℎ)!" is the total amount of electricity generated by fossil-fuel 
technology i in time-step t; 
• 𝐺𝐻𝐺𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦! is the GHG intensity per unit of fuel expressed in kg CO2e per GJ 
for natural gas and tonnes CO2e per tonne for lignite coal.  
 
GHG intensities used in this paper are: 1.46 tonnes CO2e per tonne lignite coal (the coal 
burned for electricity production in Saskatchewan is entirely lignite coal); and 49.51 
kilograms of CO2e per Gigajoule (GJ) natural gas (Environment Canada, 2014 Part 2 pp. 
183-187).   
 
Capital Stock Model 
SIM is a capital-stock model. Capital in the model is created through investment, 
maintained for its expected lifetime, and retired at the end of its expected lifetime. 
Equation 7A.3 shows that the capital stock for any given technology in time-step t 
(𝐾!") is equal to the capital stock in the previous time-step (𝐾!,(!!!)) plus investment (𝐼!") 
and minus retirements (𝑅!"), 
 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐴. 3  𝐾!" = 𝐾!,(!!!) + 𝐼!" − 𝑅!" . 
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The capital stock determines the amount of electricity generated (𝐸𝑞. 7𝐴. 4, which is the 
same as 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 3 in Appendix 5A). For electricity generation technologies, the capital 
stock (𝐾!", measured in MW) is multiplied by its (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟!") and also the 
number of hours in a year (8760) to determine the quantity of electricity generated 
(𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦!", measured in MWh), 
 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐴. 4  𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦!" = 𝐾!" ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟!" ∗ 8760. 
 
I assume that electricity generation technologies produce electricity at their average 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟!" throughout their lifetime. The capacity factor indicates the 
relationship between electricity generated by a technology over the course of a period of 
time and the theoretical maximum the technology could have generated in that period of 
time (See 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 4 and 𝐸𝑞. 5𝐴. 5). In SIM the capacity factors translate megawatts 
(MW) of installed capacity into Megawatt-hours (MWh) of electricity generated (See 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐴. 3). Capacity factors range from a high of 83% for biomass and small, modular 
nuclear reactors to lows of 10% for solar thermal and 16% for solar photovoltaic 
installations. Due to its strong wind resource, Saskatchewan wind installations are able to 
achieve a capacity factor of 37.5%, which is quite high relative to other regions 
(Interview 5).  
 
By assuming constant capacity factors the model remains linear. A variation to the model 
would allow capacity factors to vary. This could increase the realism of the model, but 
would introduce a non-linearity as SIM would have to choose both the capital investment 
and the capacity for each technology. Electricity generation for each technology would 
then be a multiplicative relationship between two decision variables. For computational 
ease, and to ensure the interactive SIM (iSIM) can run in Excel, I have kept relationships 
in the model linear.  
 
Decision Variables 
The decision variables in SIM are physical capacity investments (measured in megawatts 
– MW) in twelve competing electricity generation technologies and one electricity 
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storage technology, as well as demand side management (DSM) efforts (measured in 
GWh/yr saved) in three sectors: residential, commercial, and industrial. Investment 
decisions are made at five-year intervals beginning in the 2016-2020 interval and 
continuing until the 2046-2050 interval.  
 
Electricity Generation Technologies 
The twelve electricity generation technologies represented in the model are: 
 
• Biomass 
• Conventional coal-fired generation 
• Coal-fired generation equipped with carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
• Hydroelectric facilities in Saskatchewan 
• Hydroelectric capacity purchased from Manitoba Hydro 
• Natural gas combined cycle turbines 
• Natural gas simple cycle turbines 
• Natural gas combined cycle turbines equipped with CCS 
• Small, modular nuclear reactors 
• Solar – photovoltaic (PV) installations 
• Solar concentrating thermal stations 
• Wind generation facilities 
 
Investment in each technology is made in terms of megawatts (MW). The capital costs 
vary for each technology and also change over time in response to an ‘Autonomous 
Capital Cost Improvement’ (ACCI) factor (See Table 5-1). I use Equation 5.1 to model 
cost improvement. It is reproduced here as Equation 7A.5, 
 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐴. 5  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡! = 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡! ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝!!". 
 
This cost improvement equation is also used to calculate cost improvements for fixed 
O&M costs (𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑂&𝑀) and variable O&M costs (𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑂&𝑀). The autonomous 
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cost improvement factors for Fixed O&M and Variable O&M costs are summarized in 
Table 5-1.  
 
Hydroelectric Facilities 
Hydroelectric facilities in Saskatchewan receive special treatment when it comes to 
capital costs and investment decisions. Existing hydroelectric facilities can be retrofitted 
at the end of their useful life at a cost of $900/kw. This reflects feedback I received that 
SaskPower will continue to operate the existing hydro facilities indefinitely. Now that 
they have been built, the costs of extending the lives of hydroelectricity facilities is much 
lower than construction costs. I received feedback at workshop 1 (see Chapter 9) that 
hydroelectric facilities could be “repowered” for 10-15% the cost of building a new 
hydroelectric facility. The best hydroelectric sites in Saskatchewan can be developed at a 
cost of $6000/kw. In SIM I assume that the cost of retrofitting existing hydro facilities is 
15% of that value: $900/kw. The cost of developing new hydroelectric facilities varies by 
site. There are projects on the Saskatchewan River system that can be built for less than 
$10,000/kw. Costs rise as the best sites are developed. I represent the increasing cost of 
new hydroelectricity by including six hydroelectric sites in SIM (Table 7A.1) each with a 
unique capital cost ($/kw) and potential capacity (MW). The sites are named to indicate 
the watershed where they would be located. Note that the ‘Churchill River I’ project 
corresponds to the Wintego project that had been rejected in the 1970s (see Chapter 3).  
 
 
Table 7A.1 Hydroelectric Potential Projects in Saskatchewan 
 
Hydroelectric Site
 Capital 
Cost 
($/kw)
Cost 
Improv-
ment (%)
Potential 
Capacity 
(MW)
Repower existing hydro facilities 900          0.00% 864          
Saskatchewan River II 6,000       0.50% 400          
Saskatchewan River II 8,000       0.50% 400          
Churchill River I 10,000      0.50% 330          
Saskatchewan River II 11,000      0.50% 200          
Northern Hydro 13,000      0.50% 200          
Churchill River II 15,000      0.50% 100          
Total 2,494       
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This representation of hydroelectric potential in Saskatchewan means that SIM makes 
seven investment decisions related to domestic hydroelectricity investment in each time-
step making 49 decisions in total (7 hydroelectric projects multiplied by 7 time-steps). 
SIM also makes investment decisions for the 11 other electricity generation technologies 
in each time-step, creating an additional 77 decisions. Note that total hydroelectric 
potential modelled in SIM (2494 MW) is 150 MW less than the provincial hydroelectric 
potential outlined in Chapter 4 (2644 MW). Some smaller sites in northern Saskatchewan 
have hydroelectric potential, but have capital costs that exceed $20,000/kw and have been 
excluded from this analysis.  
 
Electricity Storage 
SIM must also make 7 decisions on whether to build electricity storage (7 decisions = 1 
decision per time-step). Electricity storage does not generate electricity, but instead can 
be paired with variable renewables like wind and solar in order provide firm capacity and 
meet the peak demand constraint outlined in the next section. This brings the total 
number of decisions to 133 related to electricity generation and storage.  
 
Demand-Side Management 
Lastly, SIM must decide the level of effort to put into demand side management (DSM) 
measures. DSM costs and potential are outlined in Chapter 6. In each time-step SIM 
decides how many Gigawatt-hours (GWh) of DSM savings to pursue in each of the three 
sectors: residential, commercial and industrial. This creates 3 decisions per time-step for 
an additional 21 decisions over the course of the optimization. DSM efforts contribute to 
electricity generation in a manner akin to ‘negawatt-hours’; that is, they are modelled as 
if they are another electricity generation technology that meets electricity demand. DSM 
efforts are also converted into DSM peak savings in the manner described in Chapter 6 
(see Equation 6.3). These peak savings contribute to the required capacity necessary to 
meet peak load, a constraint described in the next section.  
 
In total there are 154 independent decisions made in each run of SIM: 49 decisions 
related to Saskatchewan hydroelectric investment, 77 decisions related to investment in 
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11 other electricity generation technologies, 7 decisions related to electricity storage, and 
21 decisions related to DSM.  
 
Note that in all but the equivalency scenario conventional coal-fired generation 
technologies are not permitted to compete for investment in the model. This 
acknowledges the 2012 Canadian coal-fired electricity regulations, which prohibit 
investment in electricity generation technologies that emit greenhouse gas emissions in 
excess of 420 tonnes carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per Gigawatt-hour (GWh) of 
electricity (CEPA, 2012). This regulation came into effect July 1, 2015 (CEPA, 2012). In 
the equivalency scenario it is possible to retrofit existing coal-fired facilities at the end of 
their life to extend their longevity. I assume this retrofit option costs $400/kw, a figure 
that aligns with Environment Canada’s analysis of the coal-fired regulations (CEPA, 
2012).  
 
Constraints 
Without constraints, the simplest approach to minimizing the cost of operating the 
electricity system would be to sell all of the generation assets and produce zero or even 
negative electricity. To motivate a non-trivial solution it is necessary to constrain the 
feasible solution set.  
 
Meeting Electricity Demand 
The first constraint in the LP model requires that electricity generation is greater or equal 
to electricity demand. The forecast for electricity demand used in SIM is presented in 
detail in Chapter 6. To match the seven time-steps in the LP model the electricity forecast 
has been simplified to seven points (Figure 7A.1).  
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Figure 7A.1 – SIM Electricity Generation and Peak Capacity Constraints 
 
The second constraint in the LP model is the requirement that available firm capacity is 
large enough to meet peak electricity demand. The forecast for firm capacity is also 
outlined in Chapter 6. The simple relationship estimated from historical data is that peak 
electricity demand (MW) is equal to 15.6% of electricity demand (GWh). This 
simplifying assumptions means that as the electricity system grows, so to does peak 
demand. This assumption could be adjusted in future versions of the model to allow the 
relationship between electricity demand (GWh) and peak demand (MW) to vary based on 
the profile of electricity demand. This might mean that peak demand is a lower 
percentage of electricity generation if, as in this case, electricity demand growth occurs in 
industry, which has a flatter demand profile than residential electricity demand. In the 
scenarios like Greening the Grid this would mean less electricity storage would be 
required. For this analysis I maintain the assumption of a static relationship between 
electricity demand and peak demand.  
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Firm capacity includes the fossil fuel generation assets (coal- and natural gas-fired 
plants), hydroelectric stations, biomass plants, and small modular nuclear reactors. To 
allow higher integration of variable renewables, five-eighths of the available electricity 
storage capacity is counted towards firm capacity. Wind receives a partial ‘capacity 
credit’ in recognition that it is often available; 10% of wind capacity is counted towards 
firm capacity (Interview 11). Solar-photovoltaic and solar thermal capacities are not 
counted towards the firm capacity total. DSM peak savings are counted as contributing to 
firm capacity.  
 
In SIM the retirement schedule for existing electricity generation infrastructure 
(presented in Figure 1-3) has also been simplified to seven time steps (Figure 7A.2). 
After the optimizations are run I find that existing hydroelectric facilities are maintained 
in all scenarios through investments in repowering when retirement is scheduled to occur. 
In all but the Greening the Grid scenario, the Shand power plant is retrofitted in 2025 to 
extend its life until the 2045 time-step. In the SaskPower BAU scenario Boundary Dam 
IV and V are allowed to operate until 2025 when they are then converted to CCS. In all 
scenarios, the facilities are retired as scheduled in 2020.  
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Figure 7A.2 – Simplified Capacity Retirement Schedule  
(adapted from SaskPower, 2011) 
 
Renewable Energy Constraints 
There are constraints that define the possible contributions of renewable electricity 
generation technologies. Biomass capacity is constrained to 150 MW (see Chapter 4). 
Hydroelectric capacity is restricted to the potential capacity (MW) indicated for each 
investment project listed in Table 7A.1. The contribution that wind can make to total 
electricity generation is restricted by constraints in each time-step. In most of the 
scenarios wind is constrained to 6% of total electricity generation in 2020, 9% in 2025, 
12% in 2030, and continues to increase by 3% per time-step until it reaches 24% of 
electricity generation in 2050. The increases represent progress in understanding how to 
integrate variable wind generation into the electricity system. The domestic renewable 
energy and Greening the Grid scenarios loosen these constraints on wind (see discussion 
of these scenarios in Chapter 7).  
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Electricity Storage Constraint 
Electricity storage is constrained to have a value less than or equal to 50% of the total 
capacity of the variable renewable technologies: wind, solar-PV, and solar thermal. This 
constraint ensures that electricity storage is matched with variable electricity supply. It is 
modelled after the relationship found at the Cowessess Wind Battery Storage project, 
where an 800-kilowatt (kW) Enercon wind turbine is matched with 400 kW of lithium-
ion battery storage (Jansen, 2014).  
 
Demand Side Management Constraints 
Demand side management (DSM) efforts are constrained in each time-step to the 
potential outlined in Chapter 6 (see Tables 6-4, 6-5, and 6-6). DSM efforts are reset to 
zero in each time-step. This assumes that for energy conservation gains to be maintained, 
sustained effort must be put into DSM programming. This is a way of recognizing the 
potential for rebound effects following from energy conservation efforts.  
 
Policy Constraints 
The greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction scenarios are motivated using 
constraints. The equivalency scenario involves constraining GHG emissions in 2020 to be 
equal to those achieved in the SaskPower BAU scenario. The four scenarios for reducing 
GHG emissions by 80% below 2015 levels by 2050 each constrain GHGs from electricity 
to that level. The domestic renewable energy scenario also requires that total electricity 
generated by the combination of biomass plants, hydroelectric stations, wind turbines, 
solar-PV installations, solar thermal installations, and DSM efforts, equals or exceeds 
90% of total electricity generation in 2050.  
 
The third scenario, an escalating carbon tax, does not require an additional constraint. 
Instead the carbon tax affects the objective function directly and penalizes fossil fuel 
generation options for the GHGs released to the atmosphere. GHG emissions stored 
underground through carbon capture and storage (CCS) are not charged a carbon tax. 
Emissions that emerge from underground when captured carbon is used to extract oil are 
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also not charged to the electricity system; it is assumed that these GHGs would become a 
liability of the fossil fuel extraction sector.  
 
Limitations 
Because the linear program is set up to minimize the total discounted operating cost of 
meeting Saskatchewan’s electricity demand the relative costs of the various technologies 
are important. The linear programming model will select the least cost option that meets 
the necessary constraints. This is true even if costs differ only slightly. Linear 
programming (LP) models are often critiqued for “penny-switching” (Jaccard et al., 
2003). This means that the LP model will switch from one preferred electricity generation 
technology to another even if the costs of the technologies differ by a fraction of a cent 
(Jaccard et al., 2003). Because of the importance of relative costs, I conduct a sensitivity 
analysis of key cost assumptions in Chapter 7. I also encourage readers not to interpret 
the scenarios resulting from SIM as ‘optimal’; the optimization program merely provides 
a decision-rule for assembling scenarios at the least financial cost to SaskPower. Chapter 
8 explores the impacts of these scenarios that are not easily translated into financial cost. 
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Appendix 7B – Technical Documentation for the  
WIRE (‘Will It Run Electricity’) Model 
 
Introduction 
The Will It Run Electricity Model, or WIRE model for short, is an operational model of 
the Saskatchewan electricity system.  Its purpose is to test scenarios developed in the 
Saskatchewan Investment Model (SIM) to understand whether they will sufficiently meet 
hourly electricity demand. In interviews and workshops, participants expressed concern 
that the “intermittency” of variable renewable energy technologies is a barrier to their 
adoption in Saskatchewan. The WIRE model tests scenarios to determine whether they 
are able to adequately supply consistent power to Saskatchewan homes, businesses, 
government, and industry. Each scenario is tested for four representative months: March, 
June, September, and December. If a scenario does not adequately supply reliable power 
in the WIRE simulation then I revisit the SIM model and its assumptions – for example in 
the Greening the Grid scenario mentioned in Chapter 7 I adjusted the hydroelectric 
capacity factor and solar capacity factors to correspond to annual minimum capacity 
factors, rather than average annual capacity factors. I then re-run SIM and test the model 
again using WIRE (See Figure 7B-1). The process continues until a scenario is found that 
achieves the long-run objectives of SIM, while satisfying the hourly objectives of WIRE. 
 
 
Figure 7B-1 Iterative Exchange Between the SIM and WIRE Models 
SIM	Optimization	 WIRE	Simulation	
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Related Literature 
The WIRE model builds on the work of Benitez, Benitez and van Kooten (2008) who use 
an hourly electricity model to understand the economic impact of increased wind power 
penetration in Alberta. Benitez et al. (2008) also consider the economic impact of using 
wind in combination with hydroelectric power storage in the province. The formulation 
for ramp rate constraints (identified below) is drawn from van Kooten (2012).  
 
Model Description 
The WIRE model is a non-linear programming optimization model. It is coded in the 
GAMS (General Algebraic Modelling Software) language and solved with a non-linear 
programming solver. The GAMS code for this model is included at the end of this 
appendix.  
 
The WIRE model is designed to model a one-month time span with hourly (h) time steps. 
Months with 30 days have 720 time steps (hours), while months with 31 days have 744 
time steps. In each time step electricity generation must be large enough to meet 
electricity demand. 
 
Electricity Demand 
Hourly electricity demand data and hourly wind power production data for 2013 were 
supplied by SaskPower and compiled by Dr. Mark Bigland-Pritchard (2015a). This 
hourly data is separated out by ‘power class’, ‘oilfield’, and ‘other’. I scale this hourly 
electricity demand for each category to represent the composition of demand in 2050. 
There are three scenarios for demand; a business as usual (BAU) scenario where few 
demand side management (DSM) actions are taken by 2050, a medium scenario with 
greater levels of DSM, and a high scenario that achieves the greatest level of DSM. In the 
BAU scenario, power class electricity demand is forecast to grow by a factor of 2.13 
from 2015 to 2050. To represent this scenario in WIRE I scale the hourly power class 
data from 2013 by multiplying by 2.13. The scaling factors I use for each of the scenarios 
and customer categories are as follows: 
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Table 7B.1 Scaling Factors for Electricity Demand 
 
Objective Function 
The objective function in WIRE is a cost function that adds up the variable operations 
and maintenance costs and fuel costs of operating a given electricity system. The 
objective function also includes the capital cost of building an additional natural gas 
peaking plant if supply is insufficient to meet demand. The cost function (z) is 
represented by the following equation: 
 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐵. 1  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑧 =  𝑉𝑂𝑀! + 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙! ∗ 𝐺𝑒𝑛!,!!!!!  . 
 
In GAMS code, this equation is represented as follows: 
 
cost    ..  z =e= (sum(h,(sum(i,(VOM(i)+Fuel(i))*(Gen(h,i)))))). 
 
Where, 
• h is an index of the number of hours in the month; 
• i is an index of electricity generation technologies; 
• VOM(i) is the variable operations and maintenance cost per MWh of electricity 
generated for technology i; 
• Fuel(i) is the fuel cost per MWh of electricity generated for technology i; 
• Gen(h,i) is the electricity generated (in MWh) in hour h by technology i; 
The summation brackets indicate that the objective function sums variable O&M costs 
and fuel costs over each technology (i) for each hour (h). The WIRE model works to 
minimize cost by adjusting available decision variables and adhering to constraints 
imposed on the model. The WIRE model prioritizes the lowest cost generation options 
for each hour. 
Customer Type BAU Med. DSM High DSM
Power class 2.13 1.99 1.94
Oilfield 1.00 0.94 0.92
All other 1.47 1.38 1.34
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Decision Variables 
Within the objective function the decision variable is Gen(h,i) which requires the WIRE 
model to make h x i decisions to decide how much electricity is generated by each 
generation technology (i) in each hour (h). 
 
The WIRE model also contains several other decision variables related to variable 
renewable electricity generated by wind and solar, and demand side management peak 
shifting opportunities. I explore these below.  
 
Wind Energy 
Wind electricity generation in each hour is taken as a given in WIRE. Wind electricity 
generation is calculated by multiplying the hourly capacity factors achieved by 
Saskatchewan wind turbines in 2013 with installed wind capacity in the given SIM 
scenario: 
 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐵. 2  𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝐺𝑒𝑛! =𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝐶𝑎𝑝 ∗𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝐶𝐹! . 
 
In GAMS code, this equation is represented as: 
 
WindGen(h)=WindCap*WindCF(h). 
 
Where, 
• WindGen(h) is the amount of electricity generated in hour (h) by wind turbines in 
Saskatchewan; 
• WindCap is the total MW of installed capacity of wind power in the province;  
• WindCF(h) is the capacity factor in hour (h) of Saskatchewan wind turbines. This 
data was obtained from SaskPower by Mark Bigland-Pritchard. It is loaded into 
the model as a set of hourly parameters.  
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The optimization model must determine how much wind electricity to use to meet 
demand, how much to store for later use, and how much to curtail if production exceeds 
demand or the other generation technologies cannot ramp up or down fast enough. These 
decisions are represented by the following variables: 
 
• UseWind(h) is a decision variable indicating the amount of wind electricity used 
to meet electricity demand in hour h; 
• WindStore(h) is a decision variable indicating the level of wind electricity to store 
in hour h; 
• Curtail(h) is a decision variable indicating the amount of wind electricity to curtail 
in hour h; 
 
The sum of these three variables must equal total wind electricity generation 
(WindGen(h)). This is represented in WIRE by the following equation: 
 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐵. 3   𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝐺𝑒𝑛! = 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑! +𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒! + 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙! . 
 
In GAMS code this is represented by the equation: 
 
Windy(h) .. WindGen(h) =e= Windstore(h) + Usewind(h) + Curtail(h). 
 
Solar Energy 
Like wind, solar energy is taken as a given in the WIRE model. Hourly solar photovoltaic 
capacity factors for Estevan in 2003 were calculated by Dr. Mark Bigland-Pritchard 
(2015b) using data from Environment Canada’s CWEC weather database. Of interest, 
these solar capacity factors display significant seasonal variation.  
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(Source: Bigland-Pritchard; author’s calculations) 
Table 7B.2 Monthly Solar Photovoltaic Capacity Factors 
 
Mirroring the approach to wind generation, hourly solar capacity factors for each 
representative month are applied to the installed photovoltaic capacity: 
 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐵. 4  𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛! = 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑎𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐶𝐹! . 
 
In GAMS code this is represented by the equation: 
 
SolarGen(h)=SolarCap*SolarCF(h). 
 
Solar energy decisions are represented by the following decision variables: 
 
• UseSolar(h) is a decision variable indicating the amount of solar electricity used 
to meet electricity demand in hour h; 
• SolarStore(h) is a decision variable indicating the level of solar electricity to store 
in hour h; 
• SolarCurtail(h) is a decision variable indicating the amount of solar electricity to 
curtail in hour h. 
 
Estevan Kindersley LaRonge
North 
Battleford
Prince 
Albert Regina Saskatoon
Monthly 
Averages
January 11.3% 10.5% 11.2% 10.0% 13.0% 12.0% 11.5% 11.4%
February 16.4% 13.7% 13.5% 12.4% 13.1% 12.7% 12.6% 13.5%
March 22.9% 23.3% 18.7% 22.1% 21.3% 22.0% 22.3% 21.8%
April 22.8% 21.2% 26.0% 20.0% 21.5% 20.0% 20.0% 21.7%
May 25.8% 25.2% 27.2% 25.5% 27.9% 27.3% 27.5% 26.6%
June 24.3% 24.4% 23.9% 23.3% 25.4% 26.3% 24.8% 24.6%
July 28.6% 29.8% 25.8% 26.0% 25.5% 30.3% 27.3% 27.6%
August 29.9% 28.9% 23.9% 27.1% 26.9% 28.9% 27.4% 27.6%
September 22.0% 23.2% 14.7% 18.3% 18.6% 21.2% 18.7% 19.5%
October 18.3% 19.1% 11.5% 16.8% 16.0% 17.2% 16.8% 16.5%
November 16.6% 13.5% 9.6% 13.1% 13.8% 14.7% 13.6% 13.6%
December 11.3% 10.1% 7.5% 10.1% 10.5% 9.9% 10.5% 10.0%
Annual 20.1% 19.7% 17.5% 18.1% 18.8% 19.4% 18.6%
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The sum of these three variables must equal total solar electricity generation 
(SolarGen(h)). This is represented in WIRE by the following equation: 
 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐵. 5   𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐺𝑒𝑛! = 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟! + 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒! + 𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙! . 
 
In GAMS code this is represented by the equation: 
 
Sunny(h) .. SolarGen(h)=e= SolarStore(h) + UseSolar(h) + SolarCurtail(h). 
 
The WIRE model will choose to store solar electricity in any one hour if it can be used at 
a later hour to meet electricity demand and lower total costs for the month. The WIRE 
model will choose to curtail solar electricity in any given hour if excess electricity is 
being generated at that hour and electricity storage is at full capacity.   
 
Electricity Storage 
The possibility of storing electricity has been built into the model in order to address 
issues of renewable energy variability. The storage technology resembles the 
characteristics of a lithium-ion battery, pumped-hydro storage, or compressed air storage. 
Because the model is run within each representative month independently, seasonal 
storage is not represented in the model. Future versions of WIRE may improve upon this. 
 
There are three main factors that determine the characteristics of electricity storage in 
WIRE: 
 
• Storecap: the capacity of electricity storage in the SIM scenario, expressed in 
MW. Efforts are made to iteratively reduce the storage capacity when possible; 
• Storage.up: the maximum amount of electricity – expressed in MWh – that can be 
held in storage. I assume that a 400 MW electricity storage facility can store 744 
MWh of electricity. This relationship is consistent with the Cowessess wind 
storage project located east of Regina where a 400-kilowatt lithium-ion battery is 
able to store 744 kWh of electricity (personal communication Ryan Jansen, June 
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2014). This relationship is expressed with the following constraint in GAMS: 
Storage.up(h) = Storecap * (744/400)           
• UseStore(h): is a decision variable determined by the optimization solver. The 
WIRE model determines the amount of stored electricity to use in each hour (h). 
Importantly, there are conversion losses in the process of storing electricity. To 
model these conversion losses, only 70% of the electricity pulled from storage can 
be used to meet supply. This represents a 30% conversion loss from storage.  
 
Demand Side Management Peak Shifting 
The WIRE model is built to allow peak shifting demand side management (DSM). I 
allow electricity demand from one hour (h) to be shifted ahead three hours (h+3). This is 
introduced with a simple equality: 
 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐵. 6  𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑒! = 𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑!!! . 
 
In GAMS code, this is represented by: 
 
DSM(h) .. DSMsave(h) =e= DSMspend(h+3); 
 
The WIRE model must then determine how much electricity demand to save in a given 
hour (h) in order to shift it ahead three hours. This peak shifting is limited by an upper 
bound that corresponds to the peak savings that result in a given SIM scenario. The upper 
bound is indicated in GAMS as follows: 
 
• DSMsave.up(h) = 67; 
• DSMspend.up(h) = 67. 
 
In this illustrative scenario 67 MW of peak shaving capacity are available.  
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Meeting Supply 
The key constraint in the WIRE model is ensuring that electricity demand, net of DSM, is 
lesser or equal to electricity generation in each hour. This constraint is characterized as 
follows: 
 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐵. 7  𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑! −  𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑒! + 𝐷𝑆𝑀𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑!≤  𝐺𝑒𝑛!,!!!  + 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑! + 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑟! + (.7 ∗ 𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒!) 
 
And in GAMS code is represented as: 
 
Meetsupply(h) .. Demand(h)  - DSMsave(h) + DSMspend(h) =l= sum(i, (Gen(h,i) )) +     
  Usewind(h) + UseSolar(h) + .7*Usestore(h) . 
 
Where, 
• 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑! is electricity demand in each hour; 
• 𝐺𝑒𝑛!,! is the amount of electricity generated by technology i in hour (h); 
• The other factors are as explained above.  
 
Capacity Constraints 
I constrain the total contribution that thermal, nuclear, biomass, and hydroelectric 
electricity technologies can provide over the course of a month. For the thermal, nuclear, 
and biomass technologies, these constraints largely align with the default settings in SIM. 
Occasionally, and usually when running WIRE for December when demand is highest, I 
allow the capacity constraint for a technology like natural gas combined cycle plants to 
achieve a value of 85%. This is a value that can be achieved when a natural gas plant is 
running as a source of “baseload” power.  
 
Hydroelectric capacity is limited by seasonal capacity factors. Due to winter snowmelt, 
streamflow in Saskatchewan is highest in the late spring. Water storage is available at 
Lake Diefenbaker where the Coteau Creek generating station is located. Coteau Creek is 
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upstream of Nipawin and E.B. Campbell and so when water flows from Lake 
Diefenbaker it increases flows to the two stations downstream. Lake Diefenbaker is also 
managed to ensure recreation opportunities in the summer, protect piping plover habitat 
in the spring, and to provide irrigation in the case of severe drought (Interview 42). This 
means that the reservoir is filled slowly in the spring to avoid flooding piping plover 
habitat, maintained at a high level in the summer to allow recreational activities, and then 
drawn down in the winter to provide hydroelectric power during periods of high demand. 
A typical operating year is shown in Figure 7B.1.  
 
(Source: Saskatchewan Watershed Authority, 2012) 
Figure 7B.1 Lake Diefenbaker Lake Levels 
 
Lacking hourly hydroelectric production data I constrain hydroelectric production to 
reflect historic monthly averages from 2009-2013 (SaskPower, 2014). Historic monthly 
averages are shown in Table 7B.3. These averages aggregate all existing hydroelectric 
facilities in the province. I apply these aggregated average hydroelectric capacity factors 
9 
 
Four target elevations for filling Lake Diefenbaker during late spring/early summer have been 
established to help meet the multiple purposes. 
 May 1 target elevation of 551.0 m.  This elevation is the minimum acceptable level for many of 
t e purposes served; and 
 May 15 target elevation of 552.0 m. This level is required to launch boats at Elbow Harbour. 
 July 1 target elevation within the range of 555.0 to 555.3 m.  This level provides for summer 
recreational use. 
 July 1 target elevation of 555.3 m. This elevation is the maximum level that the reservoir can fill 
before flooding of significant portions of the Piping Plover nesting habitat occurs. It serves the 
use of water supply generally while maintaining a level of flood control capacity. 
 
 
Figure 5: Annual water level fluctuations on Lake Diefenbaker (1980-2009). Lower quartile, upper 
quartile and median daily water elevations throughout the year. Points plotted represent elevations 
considered during the operation of Lake Diefenbaker (a) Irrigation minimum (551.0 m); (b) Navigation 
(552.0 m); (c) Optimal recreation use (555.0 to 555.3); and (d) Maximum for Piping Plover (555.3). 
*(d) July 1 Piping Plover Target 555.00 to 555.30 metres above sea level is a general guideline for long-term 
management. The Draft South Saskatchewan River Piping Plover Conservation Plan also recommends that a water 
level increase greater than 3.0m from May 12 to July 1 should be avoided, except under emergency flooding 
situations. 
1Full supply level is the maximum normal operating level of a reservoir behind a dam.  For Lake Diefenbaker the full 
supply level is 556.87 m. 
1 
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to both domestic hydroelectric production and hydroelectricity imported from Manitoba. 
More work could be done in the future to model streamflow and reservoir levels directly 
to determine available hydroelectric production.  
 
 
(Source: SaskPower, 2014) 
Table 7B.3 Hydroelectric Capacity Factors in Saskatchewan 2009-2013 
 
Ramp Rate Constraints 
A final constraint that shapes the WIRE model relates to the ability of electricity 
generation technologies to ramp up and ramp down their electricity production. 
Technologies like coal and nuclear plants are slow at ramping, while technologies like 
hydroelectric plants and natural gas combined cycle plants can ramp quite quickly. Fast-
ramping technologies are complementary to variable renewable electricity technologies 
like wind.  
 
Ramp rate controls enter the WIRE model with the following equations: 
 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐵. 8  𝐺𝑒𝑛!!!,! −  𝐺𝑒𝑛!,!  ≤ 𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝! ;  
 𝐸𝑞. 7𝐵. 9  𝐺𝑒𝑛!!!,! −  𝐺𝑒𝑛!,!  ≥ −𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝! . 
 
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 Average
January 55% 51% 43% 51% 53% 51%
February 57% 49% 49% 47% 54% 51%
March 44% 42% 57% 36% 37% 43%
April 51% 48% 73% 40% 42% 51%
May 75% 62% 88% 32% 38% 59%
June 83% 71% 89% 75% 35% 71%
July 82% 89% 94% 81% 35% 76%
August 60% 72% 56% 52% 31% 54%
September 49% 48% 53% 49% 30% 46%
October 53% 48% 44% 57% 33% 47%
November 45% 44% 43% 44% 38% 43%
December 52% 48% 47% 48% 44% 48%
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In GAMS coding those relationships are expressed with these equations: 
 
Rampup(h,i) .. Gen(h+1,i) - Gen(h,i) =l= Ramp(i); 
Rampdown(h,i) .. Gen(h+1,i) - Gen(h,i) =g= -Ramp(i). 
 
Where, 
• 𝑅𝑎𝑚𝑝! is the ramp rate in MW/hour for electricity generation technology i. 
 
van Kooten (2012) expressed ramp rates in terms of the percentage of capacity that can 
be ramped each hour. SaskPower provided me with ramp rates for thermal and 
hydroelectric facilities in Saskatchewan in terms of MW/hour (personal correspondence, 
June 2015). For each scenario I customize the ramp rates to relate to the total installed 
capacity for each technology using the constraints outlined in Table 7B.4. 
 
 
Table 7B.4 Ramp Rates Per Hour 
 
 
  
Capital Stock (MW)
% capacity/ 
hour
Biomass 10%
Coal 10%
Coal CCS 10%
Natural gas combined cycle 30%
Natural gas simple cycle (peaking) 50%
Natural gas CCS 30%
Hydro 100%
New Hydro 100%
Small Modular Nuclear Reactor 4%
 375 
References for Appendix 7B 
 
Benitez, Liliana E., Pablo C. Benitez, G. Cornelis van Kooten (2008) “The economics of 
wind power with energy storage.” Energy Economics. 30, pp. 1973-1989.  
 
Bigland-Pritchard, Mark (2015a) Hourly Electricity Demand by Customer Category. 
Saskatoon, SK: Low-Energy Design. 
 
Bigland-Pritchard, Mark (2015b) Hourly Solar Capacity Factors for 2003 calculated 
from Environment Canada’s CWEC weather database. Saskatoon, SK: Low-Energy 
Design. 
 
Jansen, Ryan (2014) Personal Correspondence. Meeting at the Cowessess Wind Storage 
Demonstration Project, Regina, SK, June 2014.  
 
Saskatchewan Watershed Authority (2012) Developing a New Reservoir Operating Plan 
for Lake Diefenbaker. Document Prepared for Consultation Meeting May 30, 2012. 
Regina, SK: SWA. 
 
SaskPower (2014) 2014, 2015, 2016 Rate Application: Response to SIECA Second Round 
Information Requests. Available on-line at: 
http://www.saskratereview.ca/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Ite
mid=16. Last accessed October 16, 2015.  
 
van Kooten, G. Cornelis (2012) “Natural Gas, Wind and Nuclear Options for Generating 
Electricity in a Carbon Constrained World.” Resource Economics & Policy Analysis 
Research Group Working Paper 2012-01. Victoria, BC: University of Victoria 
Department of Economics.  
  
 376 
GAMS Code for the WIRE Model 
 
$Title Will It Run Electricity Model – aka the WIRE model 
$Ontext 
Scenario: BAU + DSM in March 2050 
Version: October 13, 2015 
This is a model of the operational characteristics of electricity scenarios generated by the 
SIM model. It is built to run over the course of one month and to minimize the cost of 
generating electricity over that month.  
$Offtext 
 
set 
h hours /1*744/      ; 
set 
i gentype /coal, coal-CCS, NGSC, NGCC, NG-CCS, Hydro, MBHydro, Biomass, 
Nuclear, Import /; 
 
Parameters 
*The $include command allows data to be imported from a .csv file 
D(h) Electricity demand    / 
$ondelim 
$include March2050Demand.csv 
$offdelim 
/ 
 
WindCF(h) Wind capacity factor at each hour in 2013 on SaskPower system / 
$ondelim 
$include March2050WindCF.csv 
$offdelim 
/ 
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SolarCF(h) Solar capacity factor at each hour in 2003 on SaskPower system at Estevan/ 
$ondelim 
$include March2050SolarCF.csv 
$offdelim 
/ 
; 
 
Scalars 
WindCap /1720/ 
StoreCap /0/ 
SolarCap /10/; 
 
Parameter  
WindGen(h) ; 
WindGen(h)=WindCap*WindCF(h)  ; 
 
Parameter 
SolarGen(h) ; 
SolarGen(h)=SolarCap*SolarCF(h); 
 
 
Parameters 
VOM(i) Variable Operating Costs ($perMWh) 
/Coal             5.6 
 Coal-CCS    5.4 
 NGSC        11.9 
 NGCC          2.4 
 NG-CCS      8 
 Hydro          2.9 
 MBHydro   85 
 Biomass       0 
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 Nuclear        0 
Import     120 
/ 
 
GCAP(i) Generation Capacity  (Megawatts) 
/Coal              0 
 Coal-CCS     0 
 NGSC           0 
 NGCC     4955 
 NG-CCS       0 
 Hydro     1664 
 MBHydro     0 
 Biomass       0 
 Nuclear        0 
Import    1000 
/ 
 
Fuel(i) Fuel costs in 2050 for generation technologies $-per-MWh 
/Coal            26.31 
 Coal-CCS   35.08 
 NGSC         84.83 
 NGCC        56.55 
 NG-CCS     67.86 
 Hydro           0 
 MBHydro     0 
 Biomass    14.50 
 Nuclear       7.31 
Import         0 
/ 
*Note: Nuclear and biomass costs do not change from 2015 
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Ramp(i) Ramp rate constraint for each technology 
/Coal        180 
 Coal-CCS     180 
 NGSC          480 
 NGCC        1500 
 NG-CCS     1500 
 Hydro        1800 
 MBHydro  1000 
 Biomass      180 
 Nuclear        60 
Import      1000 
 / 
*Ramp rates are dependent on the scale of the system. They are changed to fit each 
scenario.  
 
CapFact(i) Capacity factor for each generating technology 
/Coal           .78 
 Coal-CCS   .78 
 NGSC         .40 
 NGCC        .54 
 NG-CCS     .49 
 Hydro         .43 
 MBHydro  .43 
 Biomass      .83 
 Nuclear        .83 
Import      1 
 
 
HydroCap Annual capacity factor for hydro in January (%) 
/.43/ 
 ; 
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Variable 
Gen(h,i) Generation per hour by electricity source 
; 
 
Positive variable 
Gen 
Storage 
WindStore 
UseStore 
UseWind 
Curtail 
SolarStore 
UseSolar 
SolarCurtail 
DSMsave 
DSMspend; 
 
*Setting Upper (.up) and Lower (.lo) Bounds and Initial values (.l)  
Gen.up(h,i) = GCAP(i)                        ; 
Gen.lo(h,'hydro') = 20; 
*The lower bound for hydro corresponds to the minimum streamflow, and resulting 
electricity generation, that must be maintained at E.B. Campbell 
Storage.l('1') = 0 ; 
Storage.up(h) = Storecap * (744/400)          ; 
DSMsave.up(h) = 67; 
DSMspend.up(h) = 67; 
 
Variable  
z total operating cost; 
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Equations 
cost define objective function 
MeetSupply(h) electricity generated will meet demand 
Rampup(h,i) how quickly generation technologies can ramp up 
Rampdown(h,i) how quickly generation technologies can ramp down 
CapacityLimit(i) constrains generation technologies to operate within capacity factor 
Store(h) specify how storage works 
Windy(h) specify how wind power works 
Sunny(h) specify how solar power works 
DSM(h) allow peak shifting by 3 hours 
; 
 
*The equations are defined below. 
*Ramping constraints limit the speed at which generation capacity can change 
 
Rampup(h,i) .. Gen(h+1,i) - Gen(h,i) =l= Ramp(i); 
Rampdown(h,i) .. Gen(h+1,i) - Gen(h,i) =g= -Ramp(i); 
 
Meetsupply(h) .. d(h)  - DSMsave(h) + DSMspend(h) =l= sum(i, (Gen(h,i) )) +     
  Usewind(h) + UseSolar(h) + .7*Usestore(h)  ; 
 
cost    ..  z =e= (sum(h,(sum(i,(VOM(i)+Fuel(i))*(Gen(h,i)))))) + (GasAdd*CapCost) ; 
 
CapacityLimit .. (sum(h,Gen(h,i))) =l= CapFact(i)*744*GCAP(i) ; 
 
Store(h) .. Storage(h+1) =e= Storage(h) + Windstore(h+1) + Solarstore(h+1) –  
  Usestore(h+1); 
 
Windy(h) .. WindGen(h) =e= Windstore(h) + Usewind(h) + Curtail(h) ; 
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Sunny(h) .. SolarGen(h)=e= SolarStore(h) + UseSolar(h) + SolarCurtail(h); 
 
DSM(h) .. DSMsave(h) =e= DSMspend(h+3); 
 
Model WIRE /all/ ; 
 
Option Reslim  = 1000000 ; 
Option Iterlim = 1000000 ; 
 
Solve WIRE using nlp minimizing z   ; 
 
*Unload results to GDX file in order to then export them to Excel 
execute_unload "results1013March2050BAU.gdx" Gen.L  Windstore.l Usewind.l 
Curtail.l Usestore.l UseSolar.l DSMsave; 
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Appendix 8A – Cost of Service Model 
  
SaskPower has a cost of service model that they use to translate the cost of generating 
and distributing electricity into the electricity rates paid by customers. This cost of 
service model adheres to a few general principles: 
  
1. Cross-subsidization is minimized. Cross-subsidization refers to charging more 
for electricity to some electricity users in order to charge less, or subsidize, others. 
SaskPower tries to avoid cross-subsidization in their current cost of service 
model; 
2. Large power customers pay for the transmission, but not for the distribution of 
electricity. Transmission lines are the large, high-voltage lines that carry 
electricity from power plants to major load centres. These lines will often serve 
major power users like potash mines or oil refineries directly. Transmission lines 
in Saskatchewan are typically 230 kilovolts (kV), 138 kV, 115 kV, or 110 kV. 
Lower voltage lines (25 kV and 14.4 kV), linked to transmission lines at 
substations, are used to provide electricity to commercial and residential 
customers (SaskPower, 2011). These low-voltage distribution lines are the power 
lines we see throughout towns and cities in the province. Figure 7A.1 shows a 
transmission line with a smaller distribution line running beneath. Because large 
power users do not use the distribution network, they do not pay the costs of 
building and maintaining the network of low voltage lines; 
3. Customer groups that use more power at peak times pay a premium for their 
electricity. The electricity system must be sized large enough to meet peak 
demand. As shown in Figure 6-5, electricity demand from large industrial power 
customers is relatively stable. Electricity demand from residential and commercial 
customers displays peaks in periods of high demand. These peaks require 
additional generation capacity to be made available and, as a consequence, 
residential and commercial customers pay more for their electricity. 
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Figure 8A.B SaskPower Transmission and Distribution Lines Near Balgonie, SK 
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The specific formulas SaskPower uses in their cost of service model are not publicly 
available. I have worked to approximate their cost of service model in the following 
steps: 
  
Step 1: Allocate line losses to customer categories 
I begin with line loss factors from SaskPower’s (2008) submission to the Saskatchewan 
Rate Review Panel’s review of SaskPower’s cost of service model. Table 8A.1 shows the 
expected line loss as a percentage of demand in each category. 
 
 
Table 8A.1 Responsibility for Line Losses (% of customer category demand) 
  
 
Table 8A.1 shows that electricity demand from the potash, northern mining and pipeline 
load power customers is anticipated to lead to line losses of 6.1%. This means if 
customers in that category desired 100 GWh of electricity, 6.1 GWh would be lost in the 
process of transmission. Losses in the commercial and residential categories are higher 
because electricity must travel through the distribution networks and more is lost before 
reaching the customer. I use these line loss factors as a basis for allocating total line 
losses to each customer category. Table 8A.2 shows the line loss estimates that result for 
each time step. 
 
 
Responsibility for line losses (% of Demand)
Potash, Northern Mining & Pipeline Load 6.1%
All Other Power Class Load 6.5%
Oilfields 14.0%
Commercial 15.6%
Residential 15.9%
Farms 14.9%
Resellers 5.4%
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Table 8A.2 Line Losses Assigned to Each Demand Category (GWh) 
  
Step 2: Allocate Line Loss to Demand Customer Categories 
I then allocate line loss to demand for each category to calculate required generation: 
 𝐸𝑞. 8𝐴. 1  𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!,! =  𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑!,! + 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠!,! 
 
Where, 
• c indicates customer category; 
• t indicates time-step; 
• 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!,! refers to the amount of electricity (GWh) SaskPower 
must generate in order to satisfy demand for customer group c in time-step t; 
• 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑!,! refers to electricity demand by end-user c in time-step t (GWh); 
• 𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠!,! refers to line loss incurred  to meet demand for end-user c in time-
step t (GWh). 
  
The results are presented in Table 8A.3. 
 
 
Table 8A.3 – Electricity Demand With Line Loss Assigned (GWh) 
 
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Potash, Northern Mining & Pipeline 214    294    336    378    425    471    524    586    
All Other Power Class Load 175    189    200    214    228    242    258    275    
Oilfields 328    365    399    395    382    368    355    342    
Commercial 406    429    446    464    484    503    524    545    
Residential 353    396    437    484    536    592    655    724    
Farms 133    137    137    139    140    141    143    144    
Resellers 48      50      51      53      54      56      57      58      
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Potash, Northern Mining & Pipeline Load5,314   7,136   8,086   9,018   10,054 11,047 12,192 13,514 
All Other Power Class Load 4,075   4,305   4,545   4,800   5,068   5,352   5,651   5,967   
Oilfields 3,728   4,062   4,419   4,338   4,151   3,970   3,798   3,634   
Commercial 4,186   4,329   4,470   4,616   4,768   4,923   5,084   5,251   
Residential 3,573   3,927   4,308   4,728   5,189   5,695   6,249   6,858   
Farms 1,433   1,437   1,437   1,439   1,440   1,441   1,443   1,444   
Resellers 1,348   1,372   1,394   1,418   1,441   1,465   1,490   1,515   
Corporate 88        99        107      113      119      126      134      142      
Line Losses
Total 23,745 26,666 28,767 30,469 32,231 34,020 36,040 38,324 
ASSIGNED TO CUSTOMER CLASSES
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Step 3: Allocate Transmission and Distribution Costs to Customer Categories 
In SIM, transmission and distribution costs are charged per kilowatt-hour of electricity 
demand. This is meant to approximate the fixed costs of building and maintaining the 
Saskatchewan electricity grid. Costs are taken from EIA (2014) and are summarized for 
each time-step in Table 8A.4.  
 
 
Table 8A.4 – Transmission and Distribution Costs 
 
For each time step, the average transmission cost (in cents/kWh from Table 8A.3) is 
multiplied by total electricity generation to obtain total transmission cost. The total 
transmission cost is then allocated to all categories of electricity demand based on their 
proportional share of 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!,!. Corporate use is exempted from this 
calculation; I assume corporate use occurs on-site at power plants (see Table 8A.5). 
 
 
 
Table 8A.5 Transmission Cost Allocation (%) 
 
A similar approach is used for distribution costs. The average distribution cost (in 
cents/kWh from Table 8A.4) is multiplied by commercial, residential, and farm demand, 
as well as half of oilfield demand to obtain total distribution cost at each time step. Total 
distribution cost is then allocated to each customer category based on their contribution to 
the total (percentages are shown in Table 8A.6). Resellers do not pay distribution cost. 
Instead, Saskatoon Light and Power and Swift Current Light and Power maintain their 
Transmission and Distribution (cents /kwh)
Transmission 1.08       1.21       1.32       1.46       1.63       1.85       1.85        1.85       
Distribution 3.05       3.11       3.20       3.46       3.85       4.26       4.26        4.26       
(Source: EIA, 2014)
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Potash, Northern Mining & Pipeline Load22.5% 26.9% 28.2% 29.7% 31.3% 32.6% 34.0% 35.4%
All Other Power Class Load 17.2% 16.2% 15.9% 15.8% 15.8% 15.8% 15.7% 15.6%
Oilfields 15.8% 15.3% 15.4% 14.3% 12.9% 11.7% 10.6% 9.5%
Commercial 17.7% 16.3% 15.6% 15.2% 14.8% 14.5% 14.2% 13.8%
Residential 15.1% 14.8% 15.0% 15.6% 16.2% 16.8% 17.4% 18.0%
Farms 6.1% 5.4% 5.0% 4.7% 4.5% 4.3% 4.0% 3.8%
Resellers 5.7% 5.2% 4.9% 4.7% 4.5% 4.3% 4.1% 4.0%
Corporate
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
NOT CHARGING CORPORATE FOR TRANSMISSN AND DISTRBN
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own distribution networks. 
 
 
Table 8A.6 Distribution Cost Allocation (%) 
 
Step 4: Allocate Electricity Generation Costs 
Electricity generation costs include the annual amortized cost of capital, fixed O&M, 
variable O&M, fuel costs, and carbon charges (in scenarios where a carbon price is 
applied). These costs are allocated based on electricity demand for each category. For 
example, if residential customers are responsible for 15% of electricity demand, that 
category is assigned 15% of the electricity generation costs. Table 8A.7 presents the 
proportions of electricity demand responsibility. These percentages are multiplied against 
annual electricity generation costs. 
 
 
Table 8A.7 Electricity Demand Proportions (%) 
  
Step 5: Add All of the Costs Together 
The total cost responsibility for each customer category is captured by adding together 
electricity generation costs, and the transmission and distribution costs assigned to each 
respective category (where applicable). This sum equals the total cost responsibility for 
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Potash, Northern Mining & Pipeline Load
All Other Power Class Load 
Oilfields 17% 17% 18% 17% 15% 14% 13% 12%
Commercial 38% 37% 36% 36% 35% 35% 35% 34%
Residential 32% 33% 35% 37% 39% 41% 43% 45%
Farms 13% 12% 12% 11% 11% 10% 10% 9%
Resellers
Corporate
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
RESELLER CUSTOMERS DO NOT PAY FOR DISTRIBUTION COST
NOT CHARGING CORPORATE FOR TRANSMISSN AND DISTRBN
POWER CUSTOMERS DO NOT PAY FOR DISTRIBUTION COST
POWER CUSTOMERS DO NOT PAY FOR DISTRIBUTION COST
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Potash, Northern Mining & Pipeline Load22.4% 26.8% 28.1% 29.6% 31.2% 32.5% 33.8% 35.3%
All Other Power Class Load 17.2% 16.1% 15.8% 15.8% 15.7% 15.7% 15.7% 15.6%
Oilfields 15.7% 15.2% 15.4% 14.2% 12.9% 11.7% 10.5% 9.5%
Commercial 17.6% 16.2% 15.5% 15.2% 14.8% 14.5% 14.1% 13.7%
Residential 15.0% 14.7% 15.0% 15.5% 16.1% 16.7% 17.3% 17.9%
Farms 6.0% 5.4% 5.0% 4.7% 4.5% 4.2% 4.0% 3.8%
Resellers 5.7% 5.1% 4.8% 4.7% 4.5% 4.3% 4.1% 4.0%
Corporate 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Line Losses
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
ASSIGNED TO CUSTOMER CLASSES
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each category.  
 
Step 6: Calculate Net Demand for Electricity 
To establish the net demand for electricity we need to subtract electricity saved through 
demand side management (DSM) from total demand. DSM savings are allocated to each 
customer category based on the assumptions made in Chapter 6 regarding DSM potential. 
To recap,  
 
Industrial DSM savings are allocated based on their contribution to the total of the 
following: 
• Potash, northern mining, and pipeline load + 
• Oilfields + 
• 75% of Other power users. 
 
Commercial DSM savings are allocated based on their contribution to the total of the 
following: 
• Commercial + 
• 50% of Reseller + 
• 25% of Other power users. 
 
Residential DSM savings are allocated based on their contribution to the total of the 
following: 
• Residential + 
• Farms + 
• 50% of Reseller. 
 
Tables 8A.8 to 8A.10 show the proportions of DSM savings assigned to each customer 
category. The proportions vary by year depending on relative electricity demand from 
each customer category.  
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Table 8A.8 Industrial DSM Proportions (%) 
 
 
Table 8A.9 Commercial DSM Proportions (%) 
 
 
 Table 8A.10 Residential DSM Proportions (%) 
 
Table 8A.11 shows how those savings are allocated across the customer categories for the 
Greening the Grid scenario.  
 
 
Table 8A.11 Illustrative DSM Savings in the Greening the Grid Scenario (GWh) 
 
As a note, the one downfall of this approach is that line loss is not adjusted to account for 
DSM. I treat line loss as part of electricity demand and DSM as part of electricity supply. 
If the two were to be made interactive the model would become non-linear and would be 
more difficult to solve, especially in Excel. Allowing DSM to effect line loss would, 
however, meant that the benefits of DSM would be amplified. This could be an avenue 
for future model improvement.  
Industrial DSM Allocation (%) 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Potash, Northern Mining & Pipeline Load 45% 50% 52% 54% 57% 59% 61% 63%
All Other Power Class Load - industrial 26% 23% 22% 21% 21% 21% 21% 21%
Oilfields 30% 27% 27% 25% 22% 20% 18% 16%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Commercial DSM Allocation (%) 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Commercial 70% 70% 70% 69% 69% 69% 69% 69%
All Other Power Class Load - Commercial 18% 18% 19% 19% 20% 20% 20% 21%
Reseller - commercial 12% 12% 12% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Residential DSM Allocation (%) 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Residential 62% 64% 66% 68% 70% 72% 74% 75%
Farms 25% 24% 22% 21% 20% 18% 17% 16%
Resellers - residential 13% 12% 11% 11% 10% 10% 9% 9%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Potash, Northern Mining & Pipeline 0 1009 436 1427 1546 1698 1874 2077
All Other Power Class Load - Ind 0 455 183 568 583 615 650 686
All Other Power Class Load - Comml 20 29 35 40 42 45 47 50
Oilfields 0 545 226 651 605 578 553 529
Commercial 78 110 131 144 150 155 160 165
Residential 13 41 78 121 140 153 168 184
Farms 5 15 26 37 39 39 39 39
Resellers - residential 3 8 14 20 21 21 21 22
Reseller - commercial 13 19 22 24 24 25 25 25
Total 132 2230 1151 3032 3149 3329 3537 3777
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Step 7 – Calculate Required Rate 
The next step is to divide the total cost responsibility for each customer category by the 
net demand for each category, 
 𝐸𝑞. 8𝐴. 2  𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒!,! =  !"#$% !"#! !"#$%&#'(')'*+!,!!"# !"#$%&!,! . 
 
This required rate is the rate that SaskPower would have to charge in order to recoup their 
costs. It is differentiated based on different responsibilities for line loss, and transmission 
and distribution costs.  
 
Step 8 – Add Return on Equity Target 
The required rate only just meets costs, but SaskPower does aim for a return on equity of 
8.5% in the long-term. I multiply required rates for each customer category and time-step 
by 1.085 to reflect this return on equity target.  
 
Step 9 – Applying a Peaking Penalty 
Table 8A.12 displays representative electricity rates for SaskPower customer categories.  
 
 
 
Table 8A.12 Representative Electricity Rates 
 
Commercial, residential and farm customers pay energy costs (cents/kWh) roughly twice 
that of the large power customers. Part of the higher energy cost payment is due to the 
contribution commercial, residential and farm customers make to peak demand. In order 
Customer Category
Monthly 
Fixed 
Charge
Energy Cost 
(cents /kwh)
Normalized 
(Potash = 
1.0)
Rate 
Category Size (kV)
Potash, northern mining and pipeline* $7,081 5.4 1.0 E25 230 kv
Other Power customers* $215 6.4 1.2 E07 25 kV and <
Oilfield* $55 6.7 1.2 E43 72 kV
Commercial* $28 12.1 2.2 E75
Residential (urban) $20 12.6 2.3 E01
Farm* $31 11.2 2.1 E34
Reseller (Saskatoon)* $13,000 4.1 0.7 E33 138 kV
*Monthly	fixed	charge	increases	per	kVa	demand
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to arrive at a rate schedule roughly equivalent to the SaskPower schedule I charge 
peaking penalties to commercial, residential, farm, and other power customers. The 
peaking penalties are as follows: 
 
• Commercial – 42.5% 
• Residential – 50% 
• Farm – 34% 
• Other power customers – 19.5% 
 
The peaking penalties are held constant from 2015-2050 when analyzing likely rate 
impacts.  These peaking penalties make the required rate in the 2015 time-step roughly 
equal to the representative rates outlined in Table 8A.12. Illustrative required rates for the 
SaskPower BAU scenario from Chapter are presented in Table 8A.13.  
 
 
Table 8A.13 Expected Electricity Rates in SaskPower BAU Scenario ($/MWh) 
 
  
Year 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Potash, Northern Mining & Pipeline Load 63 83 106 112 122 131 137 138
All Other Power Class Load 76 99 127 135 147 158 165 166
Oilfields 78 98 121 129 140 152 158 158
Commercial 135 163 197 215 234 254 263 263
Residential 140 171 206 225 245 266 275 276
Farms 125 152 184 201 219 237 246 247
Resellers 64 83 106 116 126 135 141 142
Corporate 51 69 91 96 104 111 117 117
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Appendix 9A – Post-Workshop Survey 
 
 
Opportunities and Barriers for  
Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation in Saskatchewan  
 
Post-Workshop Survey 
 
Thank-you for participating in the energy-modelling workshop focused on ‘Opportunities 
and Barriers for Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation in Saskatchewan.’  
 
Please answer the 6 questions below to the best of your ability. This workbook should 
take approximately 10 minutes to complete.  
 
For comparative purposes with our earlier survey responses please indicate your name: 
 
 
Name: ____________________________ 
 
Note that your response will not be attributed to you personally.  
 
Thank-you, 
Brett Dolter 
PhD researcher 
York University 
 
 
  
 394 
Question 1 - Renewable electricity generation technologies include: biomass, 
hydroelectric, solar photovoltaic, solar thermal, and wind generation. In 2014, renewables 
supplied 23% of Saskatchewan's electricity demand with hydroelectricity providing 
20%, wind providing 3%, and small contributions from solar photovoltaics and biomass.  
 
What is the maximum proportion of Saskatchewan electricity that renewables can supply 
in the medium-term (i.e. by 2030-2035)? 
 
 
Insert Response Here (%): _________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
Question 2 - What is the maximum proportion of Saskatchewan 
electricity that renewables can supply in the long-term (i.e. by 2045-2050)? 
 
 
 
Insert Response Here (%): _________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 3 – Has your response changed from the earlier survey?   
 
YES   /   NO   /  UNSURE 
 
 
If yes, why?  
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Question 4 – Have you learned anything new from this workshop?  (Please circle one) 
 
YES  /  NO  /  UNSURE 
 
 
Please explain: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question 5 – Did you enjoy the experience of interacting with others in this workshop 
setting?  
 
 
YES  /  NO  /  NEUTRAL 
 
 
Comments: 
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Question 6 – Please indicate with a checkmark which of the following are VERY 
IMPORTANT barriers for increasing renewable energy and energy conservation in 
Saskatchewan: 
 
___      Cost: The price of renewable electricity is too high. 
 
___      Feed-in-Tariff: Saskatchewan does not pay preferred rates for renewable power.  
 
___      Grid design: The Saskatchewan grid is not optimized for renewables. 
 
___      Job loss: A focus on renewables will lead to lost jobs in the coal-power industry. 
 
___      Intermittency: Renewables cannot provide reliable electricity. 
 
___      Physical limits: Saskatchewan lacks adequate hydro, solar, wind resources. 
 
___      Political will: Political leaders in Saskatchewan have not prioritized renewables.  
 
___  Preference for coal: SaskPower has a preference for coal-fired generation.  
 
___  Public ownership: A private market would increase renewables more quickly.  
 
___      Social acceptance: People do not want to live near renewable energy generation. 
 
___      Other:       
 
___      Other:       
 
 
 
General Comments: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank-you for your time and participation! I look forward to sharing the results of this 
project with you! 
 
Best wishes, 
Brett 
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Appendix 9B – Workshop Script 
 
 
 
Workshop Outline 
 
 
Session I – Introduction & Context: 1:00 p.m. – 2:30 p.m. 
 
1:00-1:30 – WELCOME, INTRODUCTIONS, GROUND RULES 
 
Points to Convey 
• Thank-you | Grateful for time 
• Introduce myself | As many of you know, I’m Brett Dolter, I’m the PhD student 
who invited you to this meeting.  
• Introduce Scott | I’m joined today by Scott Fulton our facilitator for the day.  
• Round Table | Before we get started I’d just like to do a round table so let’s go 
around the room and please state your names and your affiliation if you’d like 
to state it 
o ROUND TABLE 
• Great – we have a lot of expertise around the table. We’re going to have a great 
session.  
• Big Picture | We are at a seminal moment in climate change policy.  
o BRETT – spell out climate policy context 
§ To achieve 2DS we need to stop the growth of GHGs and reduce 
to near-zero by 2050; 
§ It will take a heroic effort to achieve it. Some have likened the 
task to a second ‘moon-shot’.  
§ This time the goal is to transition away from fuels that release 
GHGs to the atmosphere.  
§ Renewable energy such as: hydroelectricity, wind, solar, and 
biomass offer the potential to decarbonize the electricity grid. 
§ In my research project I am seeking to understand the costs, 
barriers, opportunities, and trade-offs involved in pursuing a 
renewable energy pathway to a low-GHG future.   
• There Are Three Objectives for Today |  
1. I’ve invited you here today to ground-truth the models I’ve created.  
o You have been invited to this workshop because you have expertise 
on the Saskatchewan electricity system. Your participation will help 
to ensure that the results of this research are valid and useful for the 
Saskatchewan public, and, I hope, SaskPower. 
o “Models are a way of disciplining our thinking.” I want to test the 
assumptions and the structure of the models I’ve created.     
2. Use the Models to Create A Sunny skies, Winds of Change scenario for 
renewable energy in Saskatchewan. Goal is to leave here with clear 
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scenarios in our minds that provide a picture of a renewable energy 
future and a roadmap of how we would get to that future.  
3. In the process Develop a shared understanding of the opportunities, 
costs, technical barriers, and environmental impacts of increasing the 
amount of renewable energy generated in the province 
o I’ve invited participants with diverse perspectives to the meeting so 
that we can learn from each other.  
o We can take that learning back to our respective professional worlds.  
• SCOTT | FACILITATION INTRODUCTION I’m Scott Fulton. I’m a teacher 
and educator. My role today is to host the conversation, and ensure that 
everyone has the chance to participate, and that we move through the agenda 
and stay on time so that we can all leave on time.  
o Do I have everyone’s permission to intervene to ensure everyone has the 
opportunity to speak and to keep the conversation moving?  
o Also – there will likely be different perspectives on the table today. They are 
all welcomed. We can disagree without being disagreeable. 
• BRETT | GROUND RULES FOR HOW INFORMATION IS USED 
o Here are some ground rules: 
§ To encourage people to speak freely I’d like us all to recognize that 
what is said today is not to be interpreted as the official position of 
any of the organizations present. 
§ Basically, what is said in the room stays in the room, or at least is not 
attributed to any individual or organization. 
• Do I have agreement on that? 
o We’ll be recording the session using audio and visual equipment. This is a 
way to take notes so the discussion can inform my dissertation.  
o I’ve asked everyone to sign a consent form to participate in the workshop. If 
you haven’t signed one please do so now. There is a clause at the back that 
states I will not release footage or audio of any participant without 
following up to again ask for written consent.  
o With that I’d like to encourage everyone to bring curiousity, a willingness to 
listen, and creativity to the tasks ahead. 
• ICEBREAKER 
 
 
1:30-2:00 – HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
• BRETT | I want to walk you through some of the history of the Saskatchewan 
electricity system so we understand where we are today, how we got here, and 
some of the challenges for the future.  
• PRESENTATION  
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A Walk Through History 
 
• Saskatchewan’s electricity system began in municipalities. Towns and cities built 
power plants to provide street lighting to residents. These were run on a 
‘moonlight basis’, which means they were only turned on at night when the 
moon was not expected to shine.  
• When the potential for electricity to transform Saskatchewan society became 
evident there were calls for rational development of the system.  
• The Saskatchewan Power Commission was created in 1929 to work to 
coordinate and consolidate the Saskatchewan electricity system.  
• With a centralized electricity system the Saskatchewan Power Commission could 
exploit ‘Cheap, lignite coal’ in South-eastern Saskatchewan and hydroelectric 
potential along the Saskatchewan River system.  
• The Depression crushed demand for electricity. Demand only began to grow 
again leading into World War II. But Wartime rationing kept the system from 
expanding.  
• Rapid and exponential growth of the electricity system began in the late 1940s 
and 1950s.  
• In 1949 the Saskatchewan Power Commission became the Crown 
Corporation we now call SaskPower. 
• SaskPower’s immediate task was to bring electricity to rural Saskatchewan. In 
the 1952 election Tommy Douglas had promised to electrify 40,000 new farms. 
This was a huge challenge for SaskPower.  
• [READ QUOTE] 
• Rural electrification was a success and Tommy Douglas called it his greatest 
achievement as Premier (greater than introducing Medicare to Canada) 
• I think it is a useful historic lesson for two reasons: 
o 1. It shows great change is possible 
o 2. It shows how political promises and government policy can influence 
SaskPower’s business 
• SaskPower continued to promote load growth in the 1950s, hiring people like 
Lillian McConnell to speak as “Penny Power” educating Saskatchewan citizens 
about the virtues of electricity.  
• She appears to have been successful [Point to load growth graph] 
• In 1965 SaskPower’s first hydroelectric facility was commissioned: E.B. 
Campbell.  
• This was good news for most of the province, but did have impacts on the people 
of Cumberland House downstream from the dam. [QUOTE]  
• 1965 was also the year that Regina City Council agreed to let SaskPower sell and 
distribute electricity in the city.  
• Regina was the last brick on the wall of creating a centralized electricity system in 
Saskatchewan.  
• Centralization lowered costs and allowed power created by ‘cheap, lignite coal’ 
and hydroelectricity to be transmitted around the province.  
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• The 1960s were the golden age of power production in the province, and across 
North America: demand was increasing, revenues and profits were rising, all was 
well.  
• The 1970s were a more difficult period. The energy price shocks of the early 
1970s led to inflation, making large capital projects like power plants more 
expensive.  
• It was at this time that Penny Powers became a Penny Pincher and SaskPower 
shifted its focus from load promotion to energy conservation. Energy 
conservation could allow large capital projects to be deferred.  
• To combat inflation, interest rates were increased. They reached a peak in the 
early 1980s. This meant that financing charges skyrocketed creating difficulties 
throughout the 1980s. By 1989 SaskPower’s debt had reached $2 billion dollars.  
• The Progressive Conservatives planned to sell SaskEnergy to help pay off the 
debt. Privatization was now a clear threat for SaskPower.  
• The late 1980s were also a time of increasing environmental awareness. 
SaskPower was caught in the thick of this with the proposed Rafferty-Alameda 
dam.  
• The dam was given a federal government green light without an environmental 
assessment. The Canadian Wildlife Federation took the federal government to 
court and asked them to enforce their own guidelines for environmental 
assessment. The Wildlife Federation won their case, even though construction had 
started on the dam. Rafferty-Alameda now stands as a historic precedent in 
environmental law.  
• It was in the 1990s that climate change concerns began to gain prominence. 
SaskPower recognized they would need to reduce their emissions in the future. By 
the late 1990s SaskPower began to diversify their operations, partnering to build a 
cogeneration plant at Lloydminster. The Corey Potash mine soon followed.  
• The first wind projects: SunBridge and Cypress were completed in the early 
2000s, and the 150 MW Centennial wind farm was put in place in time for the 
Centennial.  
• Demand growth in recent years has been met with natural gas simple-cycle 
turbines, and combined cycle plants with some additions of wind to help reduce 
natural gas bills.  
• There are challenges ahead.  
o The federal government has introduced regulations on coal-fired 
electricity that require coal plants to be retired or retrofit to achieve a 
standard of 420 grams CO2e/kwh.  
o Much of the SaskPower fleet is aging and is scheduled to retired in the 
next 15 years.  
o Demand is still growing.  
• So now in this workshop we’ll explore opportunities for renewable energy and 
energy conservation to help meet those challenges.   
• INFORMATION IN: 
1. Comments? Reactions? Anything Surprising? Anything missing?  
2. If there is anything missing let me know and I’ll add it to the timeline 
using a sticky note. 
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2:00-2:30 – INTRODUCE THE MODEL & EXAMINING THE ASSUMPTIONS  
• BRETT | We’ve talked about the past, now we’re going to look towards the 
future. In order to do that we’re going to use modelling as a tool.  
• MODELLING 101 
o Some people in the room are better modellers than me. If you have 
reflections please contribute. Here is a little modelling 101.  
o What is a model? 
§ Partial representation of reality 
§ We choose what to include, what to exclude 
o What can a model do?  
§ “Models are tools for disciplining our thinking” 
o What can a model not do? 
§ “All models are wrong. Some models are useful.” 
• SASKATCHEWAN INVESTMENT MODEL 
o Today we’re focusing on a model to decide what generation technologies 
to invest in in order to meet electricity demand by 2050. 
o In technical terms the model is a linear programming optimization 
model. The goal is to minimize the cost of generating electricity in 
Saskatchewan subject to constraints: 
§ Constraint 1 – electricity supply must meet demand 
§ Constraint 2 – firm, dispatchable capacity must be available to 
meet peak demand 
§ Supply Constraints: 
• biomass potential limited to 300 MW 
• in most runs wind limited to 20% of electricity generation 
• hydro limits and increasing costs    
• WORKBOOK 
o A model is only as good as the assumptions that go into it. I want to 
draw upon the expertise in the room to test the assumptions that have 
gone into this model.  
o There are three important areas I’d like feedback on: 
§ Costs: capital costs now and in the future, fuel costs 
§ Demand forecast & conservation potential: how much will 
demand grow into the future? What is possible for energy 
conservation? 
§ Renewable energy potential: how much biomass, hydro, wind, 
solar is possible?  
o We’re going to break into three groups. One group for each focus area.  
o Please take 5 minutes to work through the workbook on your own and 
then you’ll have 10 minutes to discuss your thoughts as a group. 
o I’ll then ask for one person from each group to provide a 5-minute 
report on the discussion.  
o I’m also going to keep these recorders running in the groups so that I 
can go back and track the input I’ve received.  
o I’ll take this input and use it to improve the model.  
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BREAK 2:30 – 2:45 
 
• SCENARIOS – 2:45 – 3:45 
o Lisa White surveyed a group of experts in her research and they 
recommended a renewable energy pathway.  
o I’d like to flesh out what this renewable scenario looks like. We’re going 
to create three new groups – I’d like members of the first groups to 
spread themselves around, so that each new group has representatives 
from the former groups.  
o Each group is going to build a scenario for a renewable energy future.  
§ Select which technologies to build, their quantities 
o Survey response notes: there are different perspectives on what is 
possible so each group can create two scenarios: 
§ An ambitious ‘sunny skies’ or ‘winds of change’ scenario with a 
high penetration of renewable energy 
§ A moderate scenario with some penetration of renewables 
o As individuals you may disagree about which is most likely or best, but 
the question to ask is: 
§  What would have to be true in order for this scenario to be 
preferred? 
§ For example, perhaps the ambitious scenario is only possible if 
we achieve low-cost electricity storage.  
§ Please track these caveats. 
o I’ll move around to each group and input these scenarios into the model 
so we can test them for their performance in terms of cost, GHGs, and 
other environmental indicators. Points for low-cost, low-GHG scenarios.  
o At the beginning of the session please select a person in your group to 
report back to the group. At the end I’ll ask a representative from each 
group to present the scenarios the group has created.    
o MODEL on the screen: 
§ Here are the areas for entry into the model 
• Change demand growth rates 
• Change cost inputs 
• Plan investment path  
§ Here are the ways to see what the model has created 
o SCOTT – [moving around the room, sitting in and listening, making 
sure that everyone has a chance to be heard.] 
 
• REPORT BACK – 3:45 – 4:15 
o Let’s have a reporter from each group. Each reporter has 5 minutes to 
present the scenario. We’ll have ten minutes of discussion at the end.  
o I’ll take these scenarios away and test them in the ‘Will It Run 
Electricity Model’.  
 
• OPPORTUNITIES AND BARRIERS 4:15 – 4:45 
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o [Start: SCOTT ensure everyone has a sticky-note pad and a sharpie] 
o RECAP:  
§ We’ve talked about the assumptions going into the model 
§ We’ve talked about scenarios for the future 
§ Now let’s talk about how we could make them real.  
o In the survey I asked what the barriers were to more renewable energy 
in the province. The barriers people identified as most important were: 
x,y,z. I’ve listed all of those barriers on the wall here.  
o You’re going to use the sticky notes to add to the list of barriers and to 
also create a list of opportunities to overcome the barriers. For example, 
the Cowessess wind and storage project is showing how wind power 
might be made less variable.  
o We can also talk about opportunities outside the discussion of barriers. 
The FNPA has created an opportunity to expand renewable energy in 
the province in partnership with First Nations. Renewable energy here is 
an opportunity for inclusion of First Nations in the Saskatchewan 
economy.  
o Take 5 minutes and come up with as many barriers and opportunities as 
you can think of.  
§ Barriers are XX colour 
§ Opportunities to overcome barriers are XX colour 
§ [Facilitators – grab and post, encouraging them, reading them].  
o I see a few people here mentioned XX, did someone who put that up 
want to explain it?  
o Organize into themes. Conversation by theme.  
 
• THANK-YOU 4:45 – 5:00 
o Thank-you so much for your time. There is a quick survey I’d like you to 
fill out before you leave.  
o There are a tremendous number of great ideas put on the table today.  
o Here are some I’m going to take away: 
§ NOTE THINGS I’VE HEARD  
o I’m going to use this input to improve the model. I’ll share the results 
with you when I’ve incorporated your input.  
o I just want to thank-you for this fantastic session. I think everyone 
deserves a round of applause. [start clapping] 
o [SCOTT and I will start handing out the surveys] 
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Appendix 9C – Modelling Workbook 
 
Introduction 
This workbook is designed to provide: 
 
1. Information on how the model was 
created, and  
2. An opportunity for you to contribute to 
the model. 
 
The model you will interact with today is a 
linear programming optimization model 
built in Excel.  
 
The model is used to determine the least-
cost means of producing electricity in 
Saskatchewan.  
 
The model is shaped by constraints, 
including the constraint that the supply of 
electricity must equal demand.  
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The model solves by selecting investments 
in five-year planning periods to 2050. 
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1.0 Costs  
Costs are key inputs to the economic model. 
Generation technologies differ with respect 
to the following costs: 
 
• Capital cost: cost of building new 
generation facilities measured in $CDN 
per kilowatt ($/kw) 
 
• Fixed Operations & Maintenance 
(FOM) cost: annual fixed cost of 
operating generation facilities measured 
in $CDN per kilowatt per year ($/kw/yr) 
 
• Variable Operations & Maintenance 
(VOM) cost: cost of operating facilities 
and repairing wear-and-tear based on 
electricity output, measured in $CDN 
per Megawatt-hour ($/MWh)  
 
• Fuel use and efficiency: thermal 
generation uses coal or natural gas. 
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1.1 Capital Costs  
Cost data was taken largely from the U.S. 
Energy Information Agency (EIA). The EIA 
(2015) provides data on current and 
expected costs of electricity generation 
technologies in 2040.  
 
The EIA (2015) costs were compared to 
Saskatchewan and Canadian published 
reports of the costs of recent Saskatchewan 
and Canadian projects. A Saskatchewan 
multiplier was calculated to reflect 
differences between EIA costs and 
Saskatchewan achieved costs. 
 
In this model, costs change over time 
according to a pre-set rate. I call this the cost 
improvement rate.  
 
Explore the implications of changing cost 
parameters in the worksheet: ‘1.0 Cost 
Tables.’ Record revisions in Table 1b.  
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Capital cost parameters 
EIA 2015 
Capital 
Cost 
($/kw)* 
Sask 
Multiplier 
Cost 
Improv-
ment (%) 
Sask 
Cost 
($/kw) 
Biomass  3,641  1.87 1.16% 	8,409		
New coal scrubbed  2,903  1.82 0.94% 	6,524		
Adv Pulverized Coal with CCS  6,460  1.82 0.54% 	14,520		
Natural gas combined cycle  1,012  2.60 1.15% 	3,249		
Natural gas simple cycle (peaking)  963  1.81 0.92% 	2,153		
Natural gas CCS  2,062  2.60 1.50% 	6,620		
Hydro  2,638  2.38 0.37% 	7,754		
Wind  1,970  0.90 0.87% 	2,190		
Solar - Photovoltaic  3,263  1.48 1.25% 	5,964		
Solar - Thermal  4,032  1.48 1.26% 	7,370		
Small Modular Nuclear Reactor  6,380  1.90 2.02% 	14,970		
Electricity Storage  2,500  1.00 1.50% 	3,088		
*All costs in 2012 CDN dollars 
	 	 	 	Table 1a – Existing Capital Cost Parameters 
 
	
Initial 
	
Cost Improvement 
Capital cost parameters 
 Capital 
Cost 
($/kw) 
Sask 
Multiplier Low (%) High (%) 
Biomass       		
New coal scrubbed       		
Adv Pulverized Coal with CCS       		
Natural gas combined cycle       		
Natural gas simple cycle (peaking)       		
Natural gas CCS       		
Hydro       		
Wind       		
Solar - Photovoltaic       		
Solar - Thermal       		
Small Modular Nuclear Reactor       		
Electricity Storage       		
 Table 1b - Suggested Capital Cost  
Parameter Revisions 
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Figure 1 shows the impact of changing the cost 
improvement factor on the capital cost ($/kw) of 
solar photovoltaic (PV). 
 
 
Figure 1 – Solar-PV Capital Cost Improvement  
 
Costs decrease according to the following equation: 
 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙! =  𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙! ∗ (exp −𝐶𝐼 ∗ 𝑡 ) 
 
Where t indicates time and CI is the cost 
improvement.   
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The Saskatchewan multiplier is based on 
the following projects.  
Name	 Type	 Size	(MW)	
Cost	($M	
current)	 Dollars	
Boundary	Dam	III	 Coal	CCS	 110	 $1,467	 2014	
Queen	Elizabeth	Repowering	 Combined	cycle	 170	 $514	 2014	
North	Battleford	Generating	Station	 Combined	Cycle	 260	 $700	 2013	
Spy	Hill	 Simple-cycle	 86	 $150	 2012	
Yellowhead	 Simple-cycle	 138	 $250	 2011	
Ermine	 Simple-cycle	 94	 $150	 2008	
Chaplin	 Wind	 177	 $355	 2014	
Morse	 Wind	 23	 $81	 2014	
Red	Lily	 Wind	 26.4	 $69	 2011	
Tasi	Twe	 Hydro	 50	 $400	 2015	
Ontario	Power	Generation	RFP	 Nuclear	 2400	 $26,000	 2009	
Figure 2 - Saskatchewan Project Costs  
 
Explore the Saskatchewan multipliers in the 
worksheet: “1.0 Sask Multiplier.” Record 
your revisions in Table 1b above.   
 
Record revisions for Fixed O&M and 
Variable O&M costs, learning rates, and 
Saskatchewan multipliers in Tables 2b 
(Fixed) and 3b (Variable) below.  
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Fixed O&M Parameters 
 
Table	2a	-	Existing	Fixed	O&M	Cost	Parameters	
	 	 	 	
Fixed O&M cost parameters 
EIA 2015 
FOM 
Cost 
($/kw)* 
Sask 
Multiplier 
Cost 
Improv-
ment (%) 
Sask 
Cost 
($/kw/yr) 
Biomass  105  1.0 -0.06% 105	
New coal scrubbed  31  1.0 -0.10% 31	
Adv Pulverized Coal with CCS  72  1.0 -0.43% 72	
Natural gas combined cycle  15  1.0 0.00% 15	
Natural gas simple cycle (peaking)  7  1.0 -0.15% 7	
Natural gas CCS  32  1.0 -0.10% 32	
Hydro  15  1.0 -0.37% 15	
Wind  39  1.0 -0.06% 39	
Solar - Photovoltaic  25  1.0 -0.57% 25	
Solar - Thermal  67  1.0 -0.07% 67	
Small Modular Nuclear Reactor  34  1.0 -0.07% 34	
Electricity Storage  15  1.0 0.00% 15	
*All costs in 2012 CDN dollars 
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	Table	2b	-	Suggested	Fixed	O&M	Cost	
Parameters	
	 	  
Fixed O&M cost parameters 
Initial 
2015 
FOMl 
Cost 
($/kw/yr) 
Sask 
Multiplier 
Learning 
Rate Low 
(%) 
Learning 
Rate 
High (%) 
Biomass       		
New coal scrubbed       		
Adv Pulverized Coal with CCS       		
Natural gas combined cycle       		
Natural gas simple cycle (peaking)       		
Natural gas CCS       		
Hydro       		
Wind       		
Solar - Photovoltaic       		
Solar - Thermal       		
Small Modular Nuclear Reactor       		
Electricity Storage       		
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Variable O&M Parameters 
 
Variable O&M cost exogenous parameters 
EIA 2015 
VOM 
Cost 
($/kw)* 
Sask 
Multiplier 
Cost 
Improv-
ment 
(%) 
Sask Cost 
($/kw/yr) 
Biomass 5.23 1 0.001 5.23	
New coal scrubbed 4.45 1 -0.001 4.45	
Adv Pulverized Coal with CCS 8.40 1 0.005 8.40	
Natural gas combined cycle 3.25 1 -0.013 3.25	
Natural gas simple cycle (peaking) 15.36 1 -0.012 15.36	
Natural gas CCS 6.75 1 -0.013 6.75	
Hydro 5.73 1 -0.006 5.73	
Wind 0.00 1 0.000 0.00	
Solar - Photovoltaic 0.00 1 0.010 0.00	
Solar - Thermal 0.00 1 0.000 0.00	
Small Modular Nuclear Reactor 11.29 1 -0.003 11.29	
Electricity Storage 0 1 0.000 0.00	
*All costs in 2012 CDN dollars 
	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	Table	3b	-	Suggested	Variable	O&M	Cost	Parameters	
	
Cost Improvement 
Variable O&M cost parameters 
Initial 
2015 
VOM 
Cost 
($/MWh) 
Sask 
Multiplier Low (%) High (%) 
Biomass       		
New coal scrubbed       		
Adv Pulverized Coal with CCS       		
Natural gas combined cycle       		
Natural gas simple cycle (peaking)       		
Natural gas CCS       		
Hydro       		
Wind       		
Solar - Photovoltaic       		
Solar - Thermal       		
Small Modular Nuclear Reactor       		
Electricity Storage       		
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2.0 Fuel Prices 
There are two important fuel prices in this 
model: natural gas and coal.  
 
Natural gas prices to 2035 are taken from 
the National Energy Board reference 
forecast for SK industrial buyers (NEB, 
2013). The NEB forecast is extended to 
2050 using the 2030-2035 growth rates.  
 
 
Figure 3 – Natural Gas Price Forecasts (NEB, 
2013; author’s calculations) 
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Coal Prices are calculated using 
Westmoreland annual reporting. Two 2015 
coal prices are listed in the worksheet ‘Fuel 
Prices’: $18.20/tonne and $22.51/tonne.  
 
I assume these prices grow at a constant rate 
of 2% per year from 2015-2050.  
 
 
Figure 4 – Coal Prices 
(Westmoreland 2014 Annual Report, author’s 
calculations) 
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Please answer the following three questions: 
 
Q1. Which natural gas price forecast 
would you recommend using?  
o Reference 
o Low 
o High 
 
 
Q2. What 2015 coal price would you 
recommend using?  
o $18.20 
o $22.51 
o Other ________________ 
 
Q3. What growth rate would you 
recommend using for coal price 
escalation?  
o 2%/yr 
o 1%/yr 
o Other ________________  
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3.0 Renewable Constraints 
To reflect Saskatchewan’s renewable energy 
potential and existing technical constraints 
and policy the following constraints have 
been introduced in the model: 
 
1.Conventional hydroelectricity is limited 
to 1000 MW. 
2.Biomass capacity is limited to 300 MW. 
3.Wind generation is originally limited to 
20% of total electricity generated in 
2020. The wind generation constraint is 
allowed to grow 3% each 5-year 
investment period, reaching 38% by 
2050.  
4.Wind and solar generation does not 
contribute to firm capacity to meet peak 
demand.  
5.Electricity storage must be paired with 
wind and solar to meet peak demand.  
6.Electricity storage capacity cannot 
exceed 50% of wind & solar capacity. 
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7.Only 40% of electricity storage 
capacity contributes to meeting peak 
demand. This is based on some of the 
findings of the Cowessess wind project.  
 
Please discuss these constraints and record 
suggested revisions below. When discussing 
each constraint it may be useful to ask: 
 
“What conditions would have to hold true in 
order for this constraint to be valid?” 
 
 
Discussion/Recommendations 
 
 
 
Biomass: 
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Hydroelectricity: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wind percentage:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Electricity storage treatment:  
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4.0 Demand Growth  
 
I have created an electricity demand forecast 
to 2050 by extending the SaskPower 2014 
Load Forecast to 2025 using annual growth 
rates. 
 
You can create your own forecast by 
adjusting the growth rates in the worksheet: 
‘4.0 Electricity Demand.’ 
 
The existing forecast is summarized in 
Figure 5 on the following page.  
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Figure 5 - Saskatchewan Electricity Load Forecast 
 
Q4. Which description best characterizes the 
probability that this electricity load forecast will be 
realized? Please check the response that best fits.  
o Very likely (80-100%) 
o Somewhat likely (55-79%) 
o Equally likely and unlikely (46-54%) 
o Somewhat unlikely (21-45%) 
o Very unlikely (0-20%) 
o Within the probable range of future demand, but 
cannot attach a probability 
o Uncertain - do not want to hazard a guess  
 -    
 5,000  
 10,000  
 15,000  
 20,000  
 25,000  
 30,000  
 35,000  
 40,000  
 45,000  
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
R
eq
ui
re
d 
El
ec
tr
ic
ity
 (G
W
h 
pe
r y
ea
r)
 
Year 
Potash, Northern Mining & Pipeline Load All Other Power Class Load  
Oilfields Commercial 
Residential Farms 
Resellers Corporate 
Line Losses 
 421 
Q5. How would you improve upon this forecast? Please 
answer in the space provided below. You can also save 
preferred growth rates in the excel file.  
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5.0  Energy Conservation  
ICF Marbek completed a ‘Conservation 
Potential Review’ for SaskPower in 2011. 
Summaries of their findings for the 
residential, commercial, and industrial 
sectors are included in worksheet: ‘5.0 ICF-
Marbek CPR’ and in Figure 6. 
 
  
Figure 6 – Sask Conservation Potential 
SaskPower CPR 2010  Summary Report 
ICF Marbek 11 
 
Exhibit 4 Upper and Lower Achievable Electric Energy Savings by Sector 
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To understand the costs of undertaking 
energy conservation in Saskatchewan I 
looked to the Ontario Conservation Potential 
Review (CPR) also written by ICF-Marbek. 
The Ontario documents provide cost 
information including the expected program 
costs that would be spent to achieve certain 
levels of energy conservation.  
 
I used the Ontario cost data and scaled it to 
match the Saskatchewan conservation 
potential. I then estimated a linear 
relationship between electricity savings and 
program costs. Figures 7-9 summarize the 
relationships.  
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Figure 7 – Residential DSM Program Costs 
 
About Figure 7: 
• The slope of the purple line is .23 meaning a 
program cost of $230,000/GWh saved; 
• I assume DSM savings last for 5 years before 
expiring. 
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Figure 8 – Commercial DSM Program Costs 
 
About Figure 8: 
• The slope of the green line is .13 meaning a 
program cost of $130,000/GWh saved; 
• I assume DSM savings last for 5 years before 
expiring; 
• DSM potential in each period is limited by the 
upper potential outlined in ICF-Marbek (2011) 
for SaskPower; 
• Upper potential grows over time allowing more 
energy conservation in future periods.  
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Figure 9 – Industrial DSM Program Costs  
 
About Figure 9: 
• The slope of the purple line is .17 meaning a 
program cost of $170,000/GWh saved; 
• I assume DSM savings last for 5 years before 
expiring; 
• DSM potential is limited by the potential 
outlined in ICF-Marbek (2011) for SaskPower. 
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In the ICF-Marbek reports, program costs 
per Gigawatt-hour saved begin to increase 
with higher energy conservation 
achievement. This reflects the need to pay 
more for incentives to encourage conserving 
actions.  
 
To keep the model linear I used the upper 
technical potential numbers as hard 
constraints on the potential DSM in each 
investment period and kept the program 
costs constant over time.  
 
Please consider the following questions: 
 
Q6. Is it valid to draw upon Ontario’s program costs 
when analyzing Saskatchewan’s conservation costs? 
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Q7. Is it valid to use constant program costs up to a 
hard limit in each period?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Q8. Are the program costs ($/GWh saved) accurate? 
Note that they do not change over time. This assumes 
that ‘low-hanging fruit’ appears as quickly as we can 
‘pick it’.  
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Peak Demand Savings 
Energy saved (measured in Gigawatt-hours) 
is converted into peak demand savings using 
different formulas for residential, 
commercial, and industrial savings. 
Conversion factors are highlighted in yellow 
in the worksheet: ‘5.0 ICF-Marbek CPR’. 
 
The conversion factors were selected to 
calibrate to the ICF-Marbek relationship 
between GWh saved and peak demand 
shaved.  
 
I assume that industrial peak demand 
reduction is half that of the ICF-Marbek 
report.  
 
Q9. Is this a valid method of estimating peak demand 
reduction?  
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Thank-you for agreeing to participate in an energy-modelling workshop focused on ‘Opportunities
and Barriers for Renewable Energy and Energy Conservation in Saskatchewan.’ This survey is
being used to get a sense of the range of perspectives that will be present at the workshop. 
Please answer the 8 questions below. This survey should take 10-12 minutes to complete.  
Note that your responses will not be attributed to you personally and your identity will be kept in
confidence. Your responses will be made anonymous and presented at the workshop along with
the responses provided by the other participants. 
Thank-you for your time,
Brett Dolter
PhD researcher
York University
brett.dolter@gmail.com
Pre-Workshop Survey
Renewable Electricity in Saskatchewan
1
Background
Renewable Electricity in Saskatchewan
Global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) must be reduced to mitigate climate change. In 2012,
Saskatchewan's electricity sector released 15.8 Megatonnes (Mt) of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e),
which comprised 21.1% of Saskatchewan’s GHG total (Environment Canada (2014) National Inventory
Report Part III). 
Saskatchewan’s electricity sector has one of the highest GHG intensities of industries of its kind in Canada
(see Figure 1 below). This intensity has been falling in recent years. SaskPower reports that the GHG
intensity of Saskatchewan electricity was reduced to 660 grams (g) CO2e/kwh in 2014 (SaskPower 2014
Annual Report, p. 49). 
Canadian federal regulations will cause Saskatchewan's electricity GHG intensity to fall further. In 2014,
44% of electricity generated in Saskatchewan was from coal-fired plants. Federal electricity regulations
require that coal-fired electricity plants achieve a GHG intensity of 420 gCO2e/kwh if they are to
continue operating at the end of their service life. A typical coal-fired plant has a GHG intensity of 800-1100
gCO2e/kwh. Conventional coal plants must be either retired or retrofit with carbon capture and storage
(CCS) to comply with the federal regulation. Coal-fired plants equipped with CCS are expected to have a
GHG intensity of 100-150 gCO2e/kwh. 
In comparison, a combined cycle natural gas power plant typically has a GHG intensity of 436 gCO2e/kwh.
Renewables like hydroelectricity, solar, and wind generation do not emit GHGs during their operation. They
do however contain embodied GHGs that are released during their manufacture and construction
processes. Biomass plants release GHGs, but these are recaptured when the feedstock grows back (e.g.
CO2 is recaptured by growing trees). Nuclear reactors do not emit CO2 during operation, but do embody
GHGs released during the mining of uranium and construction and decommissioning of the plants.
2
Figure 1 - Provincial Electricity Sector GHG Intensities 
(Source: Environment Canada National Inventory Report (2014) Part III)
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Question 1 - Long-Term Target for the GHG Intensity of Saskatchewan Electricity
Renewable Electricity in Saskatchewan
Comment
1. Thinking ahead to the future, what GHG intensity should Saskatchewan strive to achieve in the electricity
sector by 2050?
*
900-999 gCO2e/kwh
800-899 gCO2e/kwh
700-799 gCO2e/kwh
600-699 gCO2e/kwh
500-599 gCO2e/kwh
400-499 gCO2e/kwh
300-399 gCO2e/kwh
200-299 gCO2e/kwh
100-199 gCO2e/kwh
0-99       gCO2e/kwh
Uncertain - don't want to hazard a guess
Don't Know
4
Question 2 - Technologies for Reducing Saskatchewan Electricity GHG Intensity
Renewable Electricity in Saskatchewan
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2. Several technologies might contribute to lowering the GHG intensity of Saskatchewan's electricity
system.  Seventeen of these technologies are listed below in alphabetical order. Please rank the
technologies in terms of their importance for reducing the GHG intensity of Saskatchewan's electricity
system, with 1 indicating most important and 17 indicating least important. Note: You can drag and drop
each listed technology to the position you like.
Battery storage (e.g. lithium-ion, hydrogen)  N/A
Biomass  N/A
Coal with Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS)  N/A
Demand Side Management (e.g. peak load shifting, energy conservation, smart grids)  N/A
Hydroelectricity (Saskatchewan)  N/A
Hydroelectric imports from Manitoba  N/A
Natural Gas Cogeneration (partner with industry e.g. potash mining)  N/A
Natural Gas Combined Cycle  N/A
Natural Gas Simple Cycle  N/A
Natural Gas with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)  N/A
Pumped Hydro Electricity Storage  N/A
Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (360 MW or smaller)  N/A
Solar Photovoltaics (small-scale distributed generation <10 MW)  N/A
Solar Photovoltaics (utility-scale 10 MW or greater)  N/A
Solar Thermal (utility-scale 10 MW or greater)  N/A
Wind (small-scale distributed generation, turbines <1 MW)  N/A
Wind (utility-scale, turbines 1 MW or larger)  N/A
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Question 3 - Preferred Electricity Generation Scenario
Renewable Electricity in Saskatchewan
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Biomass
Coal-fired Generation with Carbon
Capture and Storage (CCS)
Conventional Coal-fired Generation
Demand Side Management (e.g. peak
load shifting, energy conservation,
smart grid)
Hydroelectricity (Saskatchewan)
Hydroelectric Imports from Manitoba
Natural Gas Cogeneration (partner with
industry e.g. potash mining company)
Natural Gas Combined Cycle
Natural Gas Simple Cycle
Natural Gas with Carbon Capture and
Storage (CCS)
Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (360
MW or smaller)
Solar Photovoltaics (small-scale
distributed generation <10 MW)
Solar Photovoltaics (utility-scale 10 MW
or larger)
Solar Thermal (utility-scale 10 MW or
larger)
Wind (small-scale distributed
generation, turbines <1 MW)
Wind (utility-scale, turbines 1 MW or
larger)
3. Imagine a preferred electricity generation mix in the year 2050 that achieves the electricity GHG intensity
you listed in Question 1. What proportion of total electricity generation is provided by each of the following
technologies in your preferred scenario? 
Please respond by typing the desired proportions in the appropriate boxes. 
Please respond in terms of proportion of electricity generated (% Gigawatt-hours) rather than proportion of
capacity installed (% Megawatts).
The choices need to add up to 100.
*
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Question 4 - Medium-Term Renewable Energy Potential in Saskatchewan
Renewable Electricity in Saskatchewan
Other (please specify)
4. Renewable electricity generation technologies include: biomass, hydroelectric, solar photovoltaic, solar
thermal, and wind generation. In 2014, renewables supplied 23% of Saskatchewan's electricity demand
with hydroelectricity providing 20%, wind providing 3%, and small contributions from solar photovoltaics
and biomass. 
What is the maximum proportion of Saskatchewan electricity that renewables can supply in the medium-
term (i.e. by 2030-2035)?
*
100%
90-99%
80-89%
70-79%
60-69%
50-59%
40-49%
30-39%
20-29%
10-19%
0-9%
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Question 5 - Long-Term Renewable Electricity Potential in Saskatchewan
Renewable Electricity in Saskatchewan
Other (please specify)
5. What is the maximum proportion of Saskatchewan electricity that renewables can supply in the
long-term (i.e. by 2045-2050)?
*
100%
90-99%
80-89%
70-79%
60-69%
50-59%
40-49%
30-39%
20-29%
10-19%
0-9%
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Question 6 - Desirable Renewable Electricity Generation Mix
Renewable Electricity in Saskatchewan
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Biomass
Coal-fired Generation with Carbon
Capture and Storage (CCS)
Conventional Coal-fired Generation
Demand Side Management (e.g. peak
load shifting, energy conservation,
smart grids)
Hydroelectricity (Saskatchewan)
Hydroelectric Imports from Manitoba
Natural Gas Cogeneration (partner with
industry e.g. potash mining company)
Natural Gas Combined Cycle
Natural Gas Simple Cycle
Natural Gas with Carbon Capture and
Storage (CCS)
Small Modular Nuclear Reactors (360
MW of smaller)
Solar Photovoltaics (small-scale
distributed generation < 10 MW)
Solar Photovoltaics (utility-scale 10 MW
or larger)
Solar Thermal (utility-scale 10 MW or
larger)
Wind (small-scale distributed
generation, turbines <1 MW)
Wind Power (utility-scale, turbines
larger than 1 MW)
6. What electricity generation mix would achieve the maximum renewable potential you identified in
Question 5? 
Please indicate the proportion of electricity generated by each of the following technologies in the long-run
maximum renewable potential scenario.  
Please respond in terms of proportion of electricity generated (% Gigawatt-hours) rather than proportion
of capacity installed (% Megawatts).
The choices need to add up to 100. If necessary, please include non-renewable elements that would be
complementary to the renewable contributions to take the total to 100.
*
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Question 7 - Barriers to Renewable Electricity
Renewable Electricity in Saskatchewan
 Not important
Somewhat
important Very important
Cost: The price of renewable electricity is too high.
Feed-in-Tariff: Saskatchewan does not pay preferred rates for renewable
power.
Grid design: The Saskatchewan grid is built for centralized, not distributed,
generation.
Job loss: A focus on renewables will lead to lost jobs in the coal-power
industry.
Intermittency: Renewables cannot provide reliable electricity.
Physical limits: Saskatchewan lacks adequate hydro, solar, wind resources.
Political will: Political leaders in Saskatchewan have not prioritized
renewables.
Preference for coal: SaskPower has a preference for coal-fired generation.
Public ownership: A private market would increase renewables more quickly.
Social acceptance: People do not want to live near renewable energy
generation.
Other (please specify)
7. In speaking to diverse stakeholders about the future of electricity in Saskatchewan I heard about barriers
to increasing renewable electricity in Saskatchewan. Participants in the interviews listed the following
barriers. How important is each barrier?
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Respondent Information
Renewable Electricity in Saskatchewan
Name  
Company/Affiliation  
Email Address  
Phone Number  
8. Please provide your name, affiliation, and a means of contacting you. *
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Thank-you!
Renewable Electricity in Saskatchewan
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